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

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HISTORY

OF THE

CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE

OF

FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

FORMING A SEQUEL TO

"THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

BY

M. A. THIERS,

LATE PRIME MINISTER OF FRANCE,

MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY, AND OF THE INSTITUTE,

&c. &c. &c.

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TRANSLATED BY

D. FORBES CAMPBELL, Esq.

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Consul, nearly seduced by his language to M. Lombard, and ready at length to terminate its long vacillations, by throwing itself into the arms of France.

Such was the state of things a little previous to the deplorable conspiracy of which we have related the tragical phases. M. Lombard had returned to Berlin quite charmed with what he had heard at Brussels, and, in communicating his own impressions to the youthful Frederick William, had determined him definitively to coalesce with us. Another circumstance had greatly contributed towards producing this happy result. Russia had shown herself unfavourable to the policy of Prussia, which consisted in a sort of continental neutrality, founded upon the ancient Prussian neutrality, and had endeavoured to substitute for that policy a project of a European triple league, which, under the pretext of restraining the belligerent powers, would speedily have terminated in a new coalition, directed against France and subsidised by England. Frederick William, stung by the reception that had been given to his proposals, and by the evident consequences that might result from the Russian project, feeling that strength was on the side of the First Consul, offered him, no longer a barren friendship, as he had done since 1800, through the enigmatical M. d'Haugwi[illegible]lliance. At first he had [illegible]nsion of the Prussian [illegible]e states of Germany, [illegible]nover, which would [illegible]pening the continent [illegible] the route to Vienna. [illegible] with M. Lombard, [illegible]n of M. Lombard to [illegible] the king of Prussia [illegible] this new scheme, [illegible]re to guarantee to [illegible]ing for Prussia, all [illegible]d in Pola[illegible]nd since [illegible] the ann[illegible]xation of [illegible]Repu[illegible]one, the acqui- [illegible]nance of the king- [illegible]upation of Taranto. [illegible]er of these interests, [illegible]not be immediately [illegible]. Should its good [illegible]raged to unite their [illegible]n. As the price of [illegible]e evacuation of the [illegible]tion of the French [illegible]essary for the collec- [illegible]to say, to 6000; and, [illegible]sses of France should [illegible]er dictating her own

terms, the cabinet of Berlin required that the fate of Hanover should be determined in accordance with the views of Prussia. This was indirectly stipulating that Hanover should be given to her.

What determined Frederick William to enter thus far into the policy of the First Consul, was the maintenance of the peace of the Continent, which depended, in his opinion, upon a solid alliance between Prussia and France. He perceived, with a sagacity creditable to himself, and especially creditable to M. d'Haugwitz, by whose counsels he was here guided, that, if Prussia and France were strongly united, no continental power would dare to disturb the general peace. He, at the same time, said that in enchaining the Continent he would also enchain the First Consul; for the guarantee of the existing situation of the two powers was a means of fixing that situation, and of interdicting the First Consul from any new enterprises. If Prussia had only adhered to such views, and if she had been encouraged to do so, the destinies of the world would have been changed.

The same reasons which had determined Prussia to make the proposal that we have recited, should have determined the First Consul to accept it. What he definitively desired, at least at that period, was the Rhine and the Alps as the boundaries of France, besides an absolute domination in Italy, and a preponderating influence in Spain: in a word, the supremacy of the West. He would have secured all this in obtaining the guarantee of Prussia, and he would have secured it with a degree of certainty all but infallible. Doubtless, the Continent would have been reopened to the English by the evacuation of the banks of the Elbe and the Weser; but those facilities restored to their commerce would not have afforded them benefit at all proportionate to the injury they would have experienced from the immobility of the Continent, thenceforward secured by the union of Prussia with France. And, the Continent at peace, the First Consul was certain, by applying his genius to the subject for some years, sooner or later to strike some grand blow against England.

True it is, that in the proposition of Prussia the title of *alliance* was wanting; the substance was unquestionably there, but the word was designedly left out by the policy of the young king.

That prince, in fact, had determined not to insert the word; he had even endeavoured to diminish the apparent importance of the treaty by terming it a convention. But of what consequence was the form when the substance was secured; when the engagement to join his forces to ours was formally stipulated; when that engagement, taken by a king, honest and faithful to his word, was one to be depended upon? This is the place in which to note one of the errors of judgment of not only the court of Prussia, but of all the courts of Europe of that day. They admired the new government of France, since it had been directed by a great man; they loved his principles as much as they respected his glory; and

yet they wilfully held themselves aloof from him. Even when some object of importance compelled them to make advances to him, they were unwilling to meet him except upon terms of official formality; not that they either felt, or would have ventured to show, towards him, the aristocratic contempt of old dynasties towards new ones; the First Consul had not as yet exposed himself to comparisons of that sort by constituting himself the chief of a dynasty, and the military glory, which was his chief title, was one of those merits before which disdain must ever prostrate itself. But each power feared, in proclaiming itself his ally, to pass in the eyes of Europe as a deserter of the cause of kingcraft. Frederick William would have felt himself embarrassed in presence of his young friend Alexander, and even in presence of his enemy the emperor Francis. The young and lovely queen, surrounded by a coterie brim-full of the passions and prejudices of the *ancien régime*, a coterie in which M. Lombard was satirised, because he had returned from Brussels an enthusiastic admirer of the First Consul, and in which M. d'Haugwitz was detested because he was the champion of the French alliance; the young and lovely queen and her circle would have cried aloud and overwhelmed the king with their censure. That, to be sure, was a mere domestic annoyance, such as Frederick William was by no means unaccustomed to. But he would not have been able to reconcile a formal treaty of alliance with the equivocal language, destitute of frankness, which he habitually used with the other courts. He wished to be able to hold up the engagements entered into with the First Consul, as a sacrifice that he had made, in spite of his own wishes, to the most urgent wants of his subjects. The evacuation of Hanover was, indeed, an object of the highest importance to his subjects, inasmuch as the Elbe and the Weser would thereby be reopened to their trade. To obtain from France the evacuation of Hanover, it was indispensable, he would have said, to yield her something, and he had found himself compelled to guarantee to her that which, moreover, all the powers, and especially Austria, had guaranteed to her either by treaties or by secret conventions. At this price, without any new concession, he had delivered Germany from foreign troops and re-established her commerce. Add the word alliance to the proposed convention, and this representation would become impossible. It is true that the stipulation relative to Hanover was as compromising as the word alliance would have been, but it was consigned to an article which it was promised, on word of honour, should be kept secret. That court, as has been shown, was as weak as it was ambitious; but its promise, once written, could be relied upon. It was advisable, then, to deal with her such as she was, to make allowance for her weaknesses, and to hasten to profit by this rare opportunity of binding her to France.

In our time, since the breaking up of the old Germanic Empire, there remain but few subjects of rivalry between Prussia and

Austria, and a very important one exists between Prussia and France, in the Rhenish provinces. But in 1804, Prussia, thrown at a considerable distance from the Rhine, had only congenial interests with France, and antagonistic interests with Austria. The mutual hatred between Frederick the Great and Austria was still in full force. The reform of the Germanic Constitution, the secularisation of the ecclesiastical territories, the suppression of the immediate nobility, the partition of votes between the Catholic and the Protestant princes, were so many questions resolved or to be resolved, which animated the two courts with retrospective and anticipative resentment. Prussia, enriched with church property, representing the revolutionary principles of Germany, and thus possessing in the eyes of the old monarchies almost the bad odour of the Revolution, as well as its interests, was our natural ally; and, unless we were desirous of having no friend in Europe, it was evidently with her that we should make common cause.

In fact, as an ally, Spain was not worthy of the name, and to regenerate her was to run the risk of being plunged at a future day into immense difficulties. Italy, torn into fragments, of which we possessed nearly the whole, could add nothing substantial to our strength; she could give us, at the most, some soldiers, capable, indeed, of being rendered good, but requiring, for that purpose, to have served for a long time with our own. Austria, abler and more astute than all the other courts combined, cherished the resolution, concealed from every one else and almost from herself, to spring upon us at the first opportunity, in order to recover what she had lost. Nor was there any thing astonishing or reprehensible even in that resolution; all who have been vanquished seek to regain their place, and have a right to do so. Inasmuch as Prussia was, so to speak, the France of Germany, insomuch was Austria all that we can imagine of the opposite, for she was the perfect picture of the *ancien régime*. Moreover, there was a special reason for her being irreconcileable with France; Italy—the object of her liveliest desire, and of a no less lively desire on the part of the First Consul. From the moment that he aspired to the dominion of Italy, he could only hope for truces, of longer or shorter duration, with Austria. Between the two constantly opposed courts of Germany, then, it was impossible to choose that of Vienna. As for Russia, to pretend to the dominion of the Continent was necessarily to have her for an enemy. The last ten years had abundantly proved that, even without having any interest in the war which we sustained against Germany, with an interest identical to our own in the war which we had sustained against England, she had, under Catherine, taken a hostile attitude; under Paul I. had sent forth her Suwarrow; and, under Alexander, had ended, under the pretext of protecting the lesser powers, by aiming at a continental protectorate incompatible with the continental influence that we sought to exercise. Continental jealousy made her our enemy, as maritime

jealousy made us an enemy of England. Thus, then, Spain, in its abasement, having no strength to offer to us; Austria being implacable on account of Italy; Russia being our rival on the Continent, as England was our rival upon the Ocean; Prussia, on the contrary, having interests congenial to our own, and playing the part of an intruder and upstart among the old governments, Prussia was our natural and inevitable ally. To neglect her was to consent to be wholly isolated. To remain isolated permanently, and under whatever circumstances, was to invoke destruction as the consequence of our first reverse of fortune.

When alliances were in question, the First Consul was ill-advised by M. de Talleyrand. That minister, influenced by taste rather than by calculation, had a decided predilection for Austria. Filled with reminiscences of the old cabinet of Versailles, in which the Great Frederick was detested on account of his sarcasms, and in which the court of Vienna was beloved on account of its cajoleries, he fancied himself, at the Versailles of bygone days, when all went smoothly with Austria. For such insufficient cause he was cool, satirical, contemptuous towards Prussia, and dissuaded the First Consul from putting trust in her. His advice, however, had but little weight in the matter. The First Consul, from the time of his attaining power, had judged with his usual sagacity as to the quarters in which alliance was desirable, or not, and he had leaned towards Prussia. At the same time, confident in his strength, he was in no hurry to choose his friends. He saw all the utility of having friends, and he appreciated all at their true respective value, but he believed that he would always have time to choose them, and he determined to do so at his leisure.

When M. de Lucchesini, in consequence of the interviews at Brussels, presented a letter from the king himself, and the project of alliance, wanting only the title, the First Consul was deeply stung. He, rightly enough, considered the connexion with France to be honourable enough, and, more especially, profitable enough to be publicly avowed by Prussia. "I accept," said he, "the proposed basis, but I wish the word alliance to be inserted in the treaty. It is only Prussia's public profession of friendship with us which can intimidate Europe, and enable me to direct all our resources against England. Such a treaty once signed, I will reduce our land force and increase our marine, and devote myself wholly to maritime warfare. Without such a formal and public alliance, I could not, without danger, effect this modification of our forces, and I should sacrifice the blockade of the rivers without any adequate advantage."

There was much correctness in this reasoning. The complete avowal of our alliance would have given us a moral power, which a half avowal could not have secured to us. But still the bare fact of a union of our strength was of immense consequence, and the substance should in this case have been preferred to the mere

form. Prussia, allied with us merely to the extent of being bound to take up arms with us under certain circumstances, would speedily have been compromised in the eyes of Europe, exposed to the sneers and reproaches of the other cabinets, and thereby irritated till at length she would have thrown herself, even despite herself, into our arms. A first step towards us would have rendered the second step inevitable. It was an error, therefore, not to meet her cordially. The First Consul, independent of the word alliance, upon which he laid the utmost stress, disputed some of the conditions demanded by Prussia. As respected Hanover he was inclined to be very accommodating, and made no difficulty as to ceding it, should the opportunity offer, to Prussia, knowing that he would thus sow the seeds of perpetual discord between her and England. Nevertheless, he was still impracticable as to the opening of the rivers. He revolted at the idea of opening part of the Continent to the English, to those English who blockaded every sea. He went so far as to say to the Prussian minister:

"What! for a mere pecuniary consideration, would you have me sacrifice one of the most effective means of annoying Great Britain? You have aided the cloth-merchants of Silesia with three or four millions of crowns; you ought to aid them with as much more. Make your calculation: how much will it cost you? Six or eight millions of crowns? I am ready to supply you with that amount privately, provided that you give up the opening of the rivers."

This proposition was not to the taste of Prussia, who wished to be able to say to the European courts, that she had only gone thus far with the First Consul in order to secure the withdrawal of the French troops from the Elbe and the Weser.

When the proposal, thus modified, was returned to Berlin, the king was alarmed at the idea of an avowed and definite alliance. The emperor Alexander, and the German courts, were incessantly present to his mind, making him a thousand reproaches for his perfidy. He was also apprehensive of the enterprising nature of the First Consul, and feared that in binding himself too completely to him, he should be drawn into war, which was precisely that which he was most anxious to avoid. The court itself was divided and excited upon this question. Although the cabinet was secret to the utmost, some inklings got abroad of the matter which so gravely occupied it; and the court was loud in its wrath against M. d'Haugwitz, whom it accused of being the parent of such a policy. This eminent statesman, whom a certain seeming duplicity, springing rather from his position than from his nature, caused to be ill spoken of in the courts of Europe, but who at that period understood better than any Prussian—nay, we would freely add, better than any Frenchman—the mutual interests of the two powers, made every effort to revive the courage of his alarmed sovereign, and, at the same time, to prevail on the First

Consul not to be too excessive in his demands. But his efforts were unavailing, and in his disgust he formed the resolution of retiring from office, a resolution which he shortly afterwards put into execution. The Russian minister at Berlin, M. d'Alopeus, a Russian, as fiery and arrogant as M. de Markoff, disturbed all Potsdam with his outcry. The Austrian diplomatists filled it with their intrigues. Every passion was aroused against the idea of an alliance with France. Nevertheless, this interior agitation extended no further than the immediate circle of the court, and had not become the public rumour of Berlin.

Such was the state of affairs when the news arrived of the seizure of the duc d'Enghien upon the Germanic territory. It produced an immense effect. The excitement of the anti-French party overstepped all bounds. The embarrassment of the opposite party was extreme. The prediction of the consul Lebrun, that that act would cause immense excitement in Europe, was now fully justified. However, to extenuate in some degree the effect of this intelligence, it was affirmed that this was purely a measure of precaution; that the First Consul had desired to secure a hostage, but that it had never entered his mind to destroy a young prince of a race so illustrious, and who, besides, was unacquainted with what had been plotted at Paris. Scarcely were these apologies made when the intelligence arrived of the sad event at Vincennes. Thenceforth the French party was compelled to be silent—it could not even proffer apologies. The French minister, Laforest, though he enjoyed a high personal reputation, suddenly found himself deserted by the society of Potsdam, and he even mentioned in his despatches that no one would speak to him. In one of his daily reports he repeats these actual words of a lady who, nevertheless, was extremely well disposed towards the French legation. "If we may judge of the exasperation of minds from the violence of language, I have no doubt that every thing that is connected with the French government would be insulted—to say no worse—did not Prussia still possess protecting laws, and a king whose principles are well known."

M. de Laforest, at the same date, added that these *yelpers*, after having, externally at least, displayed a lively sensibility, *could not conceal a sort of insulting joy, and congratulated each other, as though they had achieved an important victory.*

In point of fact, this terrible event was an important advantage to the enemies of France, for it everywhere threw the French party into the background, and cemented alliances which could only be broken up at the cannon's mouth.

The blunders of a foe are but a sorry compensation for our own. England, however, had provided that compensation for us. She had committed an act not easily to be characterised, in furnishing pecuniary aid to a conspiracy, and in ordering, or permitting three of her diplomatic servants, at Cassel, at Stuttgard, and at Munich, to engage in the most criminal in-

trigues. The First Consul despatched a thoroughly trustworthy officer, who, disguised, and giving himself out to be an agent of the conspiracy, wormed himself into the confidence of Messrs. Drake, and Spencer Smith. He received from them, for transmission to the conspirators, and by way of a slight instalment—seeing the difficulty of raising on the instant a sufficient amount in specie—upwards of a hundred thousand francs in gold, which he immediately handed over to the French police. The report of that officer, and the autograph letters of Messrs. Drake and Spencer Smith, were placed together, and exhibited to the diplomatic corps, that their authenticity might be established. The fact was beyond denial. The report and the documents in question, inserted in the *Moniteur*, and forwarded to the courts of Europe, caused a severe censure of England to succeed to that passionate blame of which France had for some time been the exclusive object. It was quite evident to all impartial men, that the First Consul had been provoked by detestable conduct, and it occasioned them regret, for the sake of his glory, that he had not contented himself with the legal punishment of Georges and his accomplices, and the disgrace which must have attached to the misconduct of the English diplomatic agents. Messrs. Drake and Smith, indignantly dismissed from Munich and from Stuttgard, passed hastily across Germany, not daring to show themselves anywhere. Mr. Drake, especially, on reaching Berlin, received orders from the Prussian police not to stop there even for a single day. He merely passed through that capital, and hastened to embark for England, bearing with him the stigma which attaches to the profanation of the most sacred of functions.

The conduct of Mr. Drake and his colleague furnished something of counterpoise to the death of the duc d'Enghien. Nevertheless, the Prussian cabinet, though perfectly civil in its tone, suddenly became cool, silent, and reserved towards M. de Laforest; no more mention was now made by it of alliance or of business affairs: not a word did it utter about the sad event which was everywhere so deeply deplored. It was known that Messrs. d'Haugwitz and Lombard were in despair about the occurrence which was so ruinous to their policy; M. d'Haugwitz was known to have taken the resolution of quitting the helm of state, and retiring to his estates in Silesia, much impoverished by the war. But these personages preserved unbroken silence. M. de Laforest having endeavoured to bring about an explanation, M. d'Haugwitz listened attentively to him, and replied in these grave terms: "Be assured, sir, that throughout this affair the king has been especially anxious about all that concerns the glory of the First Consul. As to the alliance, that is no longer to be thought of. Too much was required of the king; moreover, a total change has suddenly taken place in his ideas, in consequence of an unforeseen event, the effects of which neither you nor I can prevent."

In fact, the dispositions of the king of Prussia were completely

altered. He was now disposed to connect himself with Russia, and hoped to find in that power the support which he had formerly anticipated from France. He had desired to obtain from the First Consul some reduction in the army of Hanover, and the evacuation of the banks of the Elbe and the Weser, by undertaking to share whatever dangers might menace France. Now, determined to have nothing in common with France, he made up his mind to endure the occupation of Hanover, and the consequent closing of the rivers; and sought, in a closer connexion with Russia, the means of preventing, or, at the least, limiting the inconveniences which might arise from the presence of the French in Germany. He therefore without delay made overtures to the Russian ambassador. It was an easy matter to conduct such a negotiation to a successful termination, for it was wholly congenial to the wishes of the Russian court.

While the effect of the tragical event which occupied the attention of all Europe grew weaker at Berlin, it developed itself at St. Petersburg. It was still greater there than elsewhere. At the court of a young, mercurial, and rash sovereign, freed by its remote locality from the necessity of being prudent, no restraint was put upon the manifestation of feelings. It was on a Saturday that the courier arrived at St. Petersburg. The following day, Sunday, was the diplomatic levee day. The emperor, annoyed by the hauteur of the First Consul, and little inclined to restrain himself in order to please him, listened, on this occasion, only to his resentment, and the outcries of an impassioned mother. He caused all his household to go into mourning, without even consulting his cabinet. When the hour for the levee arrived, the emperor and his court made their appearance in mourning, to the great astonishment even of the ministers, who had not been made aware of that intention. The representatives of all the courts of Europe joyfully beheld this testimony of grief, which was a virtual insult to France. Our ambassador, general Hédouville, present, in common with the other foreign ministers at this levée, was for some instants placed in a most painful situation. But he displayed a coolness and dignity which had a striking effect upon all the witnesses of this strange scene. The emperor passed by without addressing a single word to him. The general proved himself to be neither embarrassed nor disturbed, but with a look of the utmost tranquillity, inspired by his dignified bearing, respect for the French nation, compromised, though it was, by a great misfortune.

After this imprudent display, the emperor deliberated with his minister as to the course to be pursued. This young monarch, sensible indeed, but no less vain than sensible, was impatient to play a conspicuous part. He had already played a part in German affairs; but he had speedily perceived that he had rather been permitted to play that part by the policy of the First Consul, than conquered it for himself. He had interceded for Naples and

Hanover, without being attended to; and he had been mortified by the lofty tone in which the First Consul had reproved the conduct of M. de Markoff, although he himself disapproved of that conduct. In such a temper, the slightest opportunity would have sufficed to provoke him to an outbreak; and in yielding to wounded vanity, he imagined that he only obeyed the most honourable feelings of humanity. If to this we add a temper to the utmost degree susceptible, and an utter want of experience, we shall fully explain his sudden resolutions.

To the affront of which we have spoken he wished to add a political step, which was somewhat more serious than a court demonstration. After having vainly opposed his wishes, his ministers imagined a very hazardous means of gratifying him—that of protesting, in quality of guarantee of the Germanic empire, against the invasion of the territory of Baden. This, as we shall presently see, was an extremely rash step.

The quality of guarantee of the Germanic empire, which was here assumed by the court of Russia, was very disputable, for the recent mediation, exercised in conjunction with France, had not been followed by a formal act of guarantee. And so necessary was this act to the existence of the guarantee, that the ministers of France and Russia had frequently consulted with the German ministers upon the necessity for drawing up such a document, and upon the form which it would be expedient to give to it. The act, however, had not been drawn up. In its absence, there remained whatever claim could be founded upon the treaty of Teschen, by which, in 1779, France and Russia had guaranteed the arrangement entered into by Prussia and Austria, relative to the succession of Bavaria. Did that engagement, limited to a special object, confer the right of interfering in a question of the domestic police of the empire. The point was doubtful. At all events, if the empire had occasion to complain of a violation of its territory, it was for the injured sovereign, that is to say, for the grand-duke of Baden, or at most for a German power, but assuredly not for a foreign power to complain. In raising this question, therefore, Russia acted wholly without title. She was about to embarrass Germany, even to do her a disservice, for, notwithstanding that she was affronted, she had no inclination to commence a quarrel, of which the issue was easy to foresee. Finally, it was the greatest of levities to make this disturbance. Scarcely four years had elapsed since the commission of a crime, which calumniators called a parricide, which had stained St. Petersburg with blood, and raised the young monarch to the throne. The assassins of the father still surrounded the son, and not one of them had been punished. Was not this, then, to provoke a crushing reply from the most hardy of adversaries? M. de Woronzow was ill, and replaced by the young prince Czartoryski; and it must be mentioned to the praise of the latter, that, young as he was, he made strong objections. But the aged ministers showed no more pru-

dence in this conjuncture than the youthful monarch himself; for, as regards prudence, the passions level all ages. The cabinet of St. Petersburg, then, determined that a note should be addressed to the Germanic Diet, to arouse its anxiety, and to provoke its consideration of the violation of territory recently committed in the Grand Duchy of Baden. A corresponding note was to be addressed to the French government.

The manifestations inspired by this affair did not end here. It was resolved to evince to the court of Rome an emphatic disapprobation of the condescension it had recently manifested to France in delivering up to her the emigrant Vernègues. The Russian minister at Rome was recalled on the instant. The Pope's nuncio was dismissed from St. Petersburg. There could not be a more misplaced or more affronting censure of the proceedings of a foreign court, however blameable they might be. Saxony, alarmed at the displeasure felt by the First Consul at the presence of M. d'Entraigues at Dresden, had solicited the cabinet of St. Petersburg to recall him. The cabinet of St. Petersburg replied that M. d'Entraigues should remain at Dresden, as Russia needed not to consult the convenience of other courts in the selection of her agents.

After taking these very imprudent steps, they busied themselves in providing against the consequences by forming alliances. A willing and favourable ear was naturally lent to the language of Prussia, who, after having abandoned Russia for France, had now abandoned France for Russia, and sought to unite herself to the north. It would have gratified Russia to induce Frederick William to join in a sort of Continental coalition, independent of England, but inclining towards her. However, it was necessary to be contented with what was offered by the king of Prussia. That prince, obliged to leave Hanover in the hands of the French, since he had broken off negotiations with them, sought to provide against the ill consequences of their presence by means of an understanding with Russia. He wished no more than this, and it was impossible to lead him further.

Consequently, each party having endeavoured to bring about the result which it preferred, they agreed upon a sort of engagement, consisting of a reciprocal declaration of Prussia and Russia, drawn up in varied terms and impressed with the spirit of the two courts. The purport of this engagement was as follows:—As long as the French should confine themselves to the occupation of Hanover, and their forces should not exceed the number of thirty thousand men in that part of Germany, the two courts were to remain passive and maintain the *status quo*. But should the French troops be augmented in number, or should other states of Germany be invaded, the two powers were to combine and resist such fresh invasion; and should their resistance to that progress of the French towards the north, lead to a war, they were to unite their forces, and sustain the struggle in

common. The emperor, in such a contingency, placed all the resources of his empire unreservedly at the disposal of Prussia. This deplorable engagement, signed by Prussia on the 24th of May, 1804, was accompanied, however, by a multitude of restrictions on the part of that power. The king, in his declaration, said that he did not intend to be lightly led into a war, that consequently it would not be merely the addition of some hundreds of men to the French army in Hanover, sent for the annual and regular recruiting of that army, nor would it be a chance collision with one of the small German powers, which would lead him to risk a rupture with France, but her design, formally manifested by a real and considerable augmentation of her forces in Hanover, to aggrandise herself in Germany. The young emperor, on his part, laid no such restriction upon his engagement. He bound himself unconditionally to join his troops to those of Prussia, in the event of war.*

* This treaty, in the form of a mutual declaration, must not be confounded with the secret treaty of Potsdam concluded on the 3rd of November, 1805, while Napoleon was on his march from Ulm to Austerlitz, and which was wrung from Prussia in consequence of the violation of the territory of Anspach and of Bareuth. The treaty of which we here speak has never appeared in any published collection of diplomatic documents; it has even remained unknown in France. Having procured a copy of it, I here publish it, to throw a light upon an important fact, the abandonment of the French alliance by Prussia.

Declaration of the Court of Prussia.

WE, Frederick William III., &c. &c.

The war which is rekindled between England and France having exposed the north of Germany to foreign invasion, the consequences which have already resulted from it to our monarchy and to our neighbours, have excited our utmost anxiety; but above all, the further consequences which may result from it have required us to devise and to mature a timely remedy for them.

However much the occupation of Hanover, and its indirect consequence, the closing of the rivers, are to be deplored, we have resolved, after making every effort short of war with a view to the cessation of this state of things, to make to peace the sacrifice of not challenging that which has been already consummated, and of abstaining from active measures so long as no fresh usurpations shall oblige us to adopt them.

But if, notwithstanding the solemn promises given by the French government, it should extend beyond the *status quo* of the present time, its enterprises against the safety of any Northern State, we are resolved to oppose it with the forces which Providence has placed in our hands.

We have made a solemn declaration to this effect to France, and France has accepted it; but it was especially towards his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, that confidence and friendship rendered it our duty to explain ourselves, and we have had the satisfaction of ascertaining that our resolutions were in precise conformity with the principles of our august ally, and that he himself was resolved to join us in maintaining them. We have accordingly agreed with his Imperial Majesty upon the following points:

1stly. We shall make common cause against any new encroachment by the French government upon the Northern States unconcerned in her war with England.

2ndly. To this end, we shall bestow a rigorous and sustained attention upon the preparations of the Republic. A vigilant eye will be kept upon her

This treaty, so unusual in form, was to remain secret, and, in fact, did remain unknown to us. Scarcely was it concluded when the king of Prussia, continually oscillating from side to side, to ward off all danger of war, feared, after making himself safe on the side

troops stationed in Germany; and if their number should be augmented, we shall, without loss of time, put ourselves into an attitude to uphold and give effect to the protection intended to be bestowed upon the weaker states.

3rdly. Should a new usurpation actually take place, we feel that half measures against so dangerous an adversary would be worse than useless. It would, consequently, be with forces proportioned to the vast power of the Republic, that we should march against it. Accordingly, while we accept with gratitude the offer of our august ally instantly to support our troops with an army of forty or fifty thousand men, we do not the less reckon upon the previous stipulations of the treaty of alliance between Russia and Prussia; stipulations which so closely connect the destinies of the two empires, that when the existence of one of them is in peril, the duties and sacrifices of the other should have no bounds.

4thly. To determine when a *casus fœderis* will exist, events and circumstances must be looked at in their true spirit and full scope. The small states of the Empire, situated beyond the Weser, may temporarily present scenes revolting to principle, whether from their being perpetually traversed by French troops, or from their sovereigns being sold to France, like the comte de Bentheim, or dependent upon her, from other causes, like the comte d'Aremberg. There the insignificant deviations that a representation suffices, as in the case of Meppen, to redress, and that do not endanger the safety of any state, are foreign to a compact formed solely with a view to safety. It is upon the banks of the Weser that our interests begin to be essentially affected, because from that line Denmark, Mecklenburg, the Hanseatic towns, &c., are exposed, and, consequently, the *casus fœderis* will arise at the first attempt of the French upon a state of the Empire situated on the right of the Weser, and especially upon the Danish provinces or Mecklenburg, anticipating, as we justly may, that the king of Denmark will then make common cause with us against the enemy.

5thly. The immense marches which the Russian troops would have to make in order to join ours, and the difficulty of their arriving in time to bear their part in decisive operations, make us deem it expedient that a different mode of transport be adopted for the different arms of the service. Thus, while the Russian cavalry and artillery horses will march through our provinces, it would seem preferable that the infantry and the guns should be transported by sea, and disembarked in some part of Pomerania, of Mecklenburg, or of Holstein, according to the operations of the enemy.

6thly. Immediately after the commencement of hostilities, or earlier still if the two contracting courts see fit, Denmark and Saxony will be invited to give their adhesion to the compact, to lend their co-operation, and furnish means proportionate to their power, as also will the other princes and states of the north of Germany who, from the proximity of their territories, must participate in the benefits of this arrangement.

7thly. Thenceforth, we bind ourselves not to lay down our arms, or enter into any accommodation with the enemy, unless with the consent and agreement previously obtained of his Imperial Majesty, relying with confidence upon our august ally, who has taken the like engagements towards us.

8thly. After the proposed end shall be attained, we reserve to ourselves to concert with his Imperial Majesty as to the ulterior measures to be taken for entirely freeing the north of Germany from the presence of foreign troops, and for solidly and permanently securing this happy result, by devising such an order of things as shall prevent Germany from being again exposed to the inconveniences she has suffered since the commencement of the present war.

This declaration is to be exchanged against one of similar purport, signed

of Russia, that he had laid himself too open on the side of France. The suddenness with which he had ceased to speak of alliance with us, the grave and stern silence preserved about the affair of the duc d'Enghien, seemed to him to put peace in peril. He, there-

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by his majesty the emperor of Russia, and we pledge our royal troth and word faithfully to fulfil the engagement we have herein taken.

In witness whereof, we have signed these presents with our hand, and have caused our royal seal to be affixed thereto.

Done at Berlin this 24th of May, in the year of Our Lord 1804, and the eighth year of our reign.

(Signed) FREDERICK WILLIAM.
(Countersigned) HARDENBERG.

Counter-declaration on the part of Russia.

The critical situation of the north of Germany, and the impediments to which its commerce, as well as that of the whole of the north of Europe, is subjected by the presence of the French troops in the electorate of Hanover; further, the imminent danger which may be anticipated to the peace of the states in that part of the Continent, which have not as yet been subjected to the yoke of France, having excited our utmost anxiety, we have applied ourselves to the discovery of means calculated to calm our apprehensions upon this subject.

As the invasion of the electorate of Hanover could not be foreseen, and as circumstances unfortunately prevented its deliverance at the time from the presence of the French troops, we have deemed it expedient for the moment, not to take any active measures, so long as the French government shall confine itself to the occupation of his Britannic majesty's German possessions; but at the same time, not to suffer the French to overstep in Germany the line behind which they at present remain.

His majesty the king of Prussia, whom in full confidence we have made acquainted with our alarms, and with the measures which seemed to us to be indispensable to the warding off of the dangers that we anticipated, having expressed his concurrence in our views, as well as his desire to aid in precautions so salutary, and to oppose all further encroachments of the French government upon the other states of the Empire unconcerned in its quarrel with England, we have agreed with his said majesty upon the following points:—

1stly. As the well-known audacity and activity of the French government enables it to undertake and to execute its plans on the instant, it is absolutely necessary to keep watch over the preparations it may make for furthering its designs upon the north of Germany. A vigilant eye, therefore, will be kept upon the French troops stationed in those parts, and in the event of their number being increased, we shall lose no time in assuming a position calculated to give full effect to the protection proposed to be extended to those states which, from their weakness, are unable to protect themselves from the dangers which threaten them.

2ndly. To obviate all uncertainty as to the period at which shall commence the active employment of the means before specified and destined on either side for preserving the north of Germany from all foreign invasion, it is agreed, at the outset, between us and his Prussian majesty, to define the *casus fœderis* of the present engagement. Accordingly, we have agreed to consider it to exist at the first encroachment which the French troops, stationed in the electoral territories of his Britannic majesty, shall make upon the adjacent states.

3rdly. Should the *casus fœderis* occur, his majesty the king of Prussia being nearer to the scene of action, will not wait for the junction of the respective forces hereinafter specified, but will cause operations to be commenced imme-

fore, ordered M. d'Haugwitz to make to the French minister a solemn declaration of neutrality, an absolute neutrality on the part of Prussia, so long as the French troops occupying Hanover should not be augmented. Accordingly, M. d'Haugwitz, suddenly quitting his reserved silence towards M. de Laforest, declared to him that his sovereign had pledged his word of honour that he would remain neuter under all circumstances if the number of French troops in Hanover should not exceed 30,000. He added, that this was almost equal to the alliance that had been broken off, as the inactivity of Prussia, assured upon the condition she thus set upon it, secured the inactivity of the Continent. The earnestness of this declaration, which seemed so uncalled for at that juncture, surprised M. de Laforest, but revealed nothing to him; nevertheless, it appeared very singular to him. Frederick William supposed that he had now safely regulated his position with every one. Nothing is more pitiable to look upon than weak incapacity, plunging into political perplexities, and com-

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diately on receiving tidings that the French troops have overstepped the line they at present occupy in the north of Germany.

4thly. All the means which we ourselves propose to employ to the same end being by that time ready for active employment, we engage, in the most formal manner, to march to the assistance of his Prussian majesty at the first warning, and with the greatest possible despatch.

5thly. The forces which we shall employ in the defence of the rest of the north of Germany, will amount to forty thousand regular troops, and will be augmented, if need be, to fifty thousand. His majesty, the king of Prussia, on his part, engages to employ for the same object an equal number of regular troops. Military operations once commenced, we undertake not to lay down our arms, nor come to any terms with the common enemy, except with the consent of his Prussian majesty, and after preliminary agreement with him; it being distinctly understood that his majesty the king of Prussia equally obliges himself not to lay down his arms, nor come to any terms with the common enemy, except with our consent, and after preliminary agreement with us.

6thly. Immediately after the commencement of hostilities, or earlier if it shall seem expedient to the two contracting courts, the king of Denmark and the elector of Saxony will be invited to give their adhesion to this compact, and to co-operate with it by means proportioned to their power, as will also be invited all the other princes and states of the north of Germany, who, from the proximity of their territories, will participate in the benefits of the present arrangement.

7thly. After the proposed end shall be attained, we reserve to ourselves to concert with his Prussian majesty as to the ulterior measures to be taken for entirely freeing the soil of the Germanic empire from the presence of foreign troops, and for solidly and permanently securing this happy result, by devising such an order of things as shall prevent Germany from being again exposed to the inconveniences which she has suffered since the commencement of the present war.

This declaration is to be exchanged against one of similar purport, signed by his majesty the king of Prussia, and we pledge our imperial troth and word faithfully to fulfil the engagements we have herein taken. In witness whereof we have signed these presents with our own hand, and have caused the seal of our Empire to be affixed thereto. Given at St. Petersburg, on this [illegible] 1804, and fourth year of our reign.

promising itself by aiming at too much, as the weak bird fastens itself in the fowler's net by the very struggles that it makes to regain its liberty.

Thus, by the double policy of the king of Prussia, and under the deep impression made by the event of Vincennes, the foundation was laid of the third coalition. Russia, delighted at having secured Prussia, now began to direct her efforts towards Austria, and laid herself out rather more than she had previously done to ingratiate herself with that power. She had a ready means of doing this in opposing France, and siding with the court of Vienna on the still undecided questions of the Germanic empire.

We must now show what effect had been produced at Vienna by the event which had so deeply disturbed the courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg. If there was any one court more than another to which the seizure of the duc d'Enghien upon the Germanic soil might naturally occasion concern, that one, most assuredly, was the court of Vienna. Nevertheless, the only ministers who evinced moderation on that occasion, were the ministers of the emperor. They uttered not a word that could wound the French government, took not a step of which it could complain. And yet the head of the Empire, the natural guardian of the safety and dignity of the German territory, was bound, or no one was, to complain of the act committed in the grand-duchy of Baden. In truth, it must even be remarked, that every thing would have been right and consistent, if the affected indifference of the court of Austria had been displayed at St. Petersburg, and the Russian promptitude in complaining had been manifested at Vienna. No one could have been surprised if the emperor had temperately, but firmly demanded explanations from the First Consul in respect of a violation of territory, which must necessarily cause great anxiety in Germany. But nothing of the sort occurred; precisely the contrary was the case. At St. Petersburg they were young, inexperienced, and, above all, they were far from France; at Vienna they were prudent, dissimulating, and, above all, very close to the conqueror of Marengo. They were silent. M. de Cobentzel, urged by M. de Champagny, rather than urging him, to explanation, said that he understood the hard necessities of policy, that he certainly regretted an event that was calculated to give rise to new perplexities in Europe, but that, as far as he was concerned, the cabinet of Vienna would only guard, even more anxiously than ever, against the disturbance of the Continental peace.

Fully to appreciate the conduct of the cabinet of Vienna on this occasion, it must be known, that while awaiting a favourable opportunity to regain what she had lost, an opportunity which she did not wish imprudently to create, that cabinet watched with eager curiosity what was passing at Boulogne, cherishing very naturally the hope that the French armies might be overwhelmed by the ocean, but by no means wishing to attract their

irresistible superiority towards the banks of the Danube. In the interval, the cabinet of Vienna availed itself of the occupation afforded to France by the maritime war, to settle in its own way, the questions which had been left unsettled by the recess of 1803. These questions, left unsettled for want of time, it will be remembered, were the following:—The proportion to be established between the Catholic and the Protestant votes in the College of Princes; the maintenance or the suppression of the immediate nobility; the new division of the territory into circles for the police, and preservation of order in Germany; the reorganisation of the Germanic Church; the sequestration of real and personal property belonging to the secularised ecclesiastical principalities, and other matters of minor consequence. The gravest of these questions in its results, was the delay made in the new organisation of the circles, as it produced an absence of police, which left every thing in the power of the stronger party. France being at this time wholly bent upon maritime war, and moreover, separated from Russia, there was no longer any foreign influence capable of aiding the oppressed states, and the whole Empire was a prey to anarchy.

At the close of the negotiation of 1803, Austria had sequestrated those dependencies of the secularised principalities which were within her grasp. It will be remembered, that some of these ancient ecclesiastical principalities possessed funds deposited in the bank of Vienna; others territories surrounded by various German states. These funds and territorial possessions naturally belonged to the indemnified princes. Austria, alleging some obscure maxim of the feudal law, had sequestrated upwards of thirty millions of capital, which was lodged in the bank of Vienna, or invested in the public funds. The heaviest loss had fallen on Bavaria and the house of Orange. Austria did not stop here in her aggressions. She treated with a number of the petty princes to wring from them certain possessions which they held in Suabia, for the purpose of securing to herself a position on the lake of Constance. She had purchased the town of Lindau from the prince of Bretzenheim, having ceded to him, in exchange, certain territories in Bohemia, with the promise of a vote in the diet as formerly. She had treated with the house of Kœnigseck, with the view of obtaining on similar terms, other lands situated in that country. Finally, Austria had advocated in the diet the creation of new Catholic votes, so as to equalise the strength of the Catholic and Protestant parties. The majority of the diet not appearing disposed to gratify her, she threatened to put an end to all deliberation until this question of the proportion of votes should be decided in conformity to her wishes.

The Germanic princes, injured by the violences of Austria, avenged themselves by committing similar violences upon states weaker than their own. Hesse and Wurtemburg had caused the states of the nobility to be invaded, making no secret of their

designs of incorporation. The immediate nobility of Franconia having addressed the imperial chamber of Wetzlar, to obtain an inhibition against the usurpations with which they were threatened, the Hessian government everywhere caused the placard of the decision of the imperial chamber to be torn down, thus showing an example of signal contempt for the tribunals of the Empire. Their violences did not end here; they refused to pay the pensions of the clergy, who had been despoiled of their property by the secularisations. The duke of Wurtemburg would not pay any of them. Amidst this reciprocity of violence, each was silent as to the proceedings of others, in the hope of thus securing impunity for his own conduct. They did not complain of the sequestrations of Austria, in order that she might wink at the wrongs done to the immediate nobility, and to the unfortunate pensioners who were deprived of their bread. Bavaria, the worst treated by Austria, avenged herself upon the Prince arch-chancellor, whose electorate had been transferred from Mayence to Ratisbon. Annoyed at seeing him upon the territory of Ratisbon, which she had long coveted, she pursued him with her threats, took from him a quantity of lands that were surrounded by her own, and caused him to feel a thousand anxieties for his existence. Prussia followed a like course of action in Westphalia, and was not behindhand with either Bavaria or Austria, in the way of usurpation.

Only two states conducted themselves honestly: firstly, the Prince arch-chancellor, who, owing his existence to the arrangements of 1803, endeavoured to make them respected by the members of the confederation; secondly, the Elector of Saxony, who, disinterested amidst these various pretensions, remained unmoved in his ancient principality, had neither lost nor gained any thing, and voted uselessly in favour of the rights of each, in sheer prudence and honesty.

All the culpable concessions that had been made to Austria, in permitting her to oppress some in order that she might tolerate the oppression of others, failed to disarm her, especially as regarded Bavaria. Believing herself strong enough to be able to act openly as she pleased, she took up the cause of the immediate nobility, of which she was the natural and interested protectress, for the sake of the recruiting of her armies.

We have already seen that the immediate nobility, holding from the emperor, and not from the territorial princes by whom their possessions were wedged in, did not owe military contingent to these latter. Those inhabitants who were of a military turn enrolled themselves in the Austrian corps, and Franconia alone thus supplied more than two thousand recruits annually, who were still more valuable for their quality than for their number. They were, in fact, true Germans, far superior to other Austrian soldiers as to intelligence, courage, and all warlike qualities. They furnished all the sub-officers of the imperial armies, and formed

in some sort the German *cadre* into which Austria drafted the subjects of all sorts that she possessed in her vast dominions. In consequence, she was resolved to brave every thing except a war with France rather than yield. Without troubling herself about the reproaches that might be made her for excess of power, she brought before the aulic council, as an act of violence cognizable exclusively by the police of the emperor, the encroachments committed upon the immediate nobility; and with a promptitude very uncommon in Germanic proceedings, had an interlocutory decision pronounced, called *conservatorium* in the constitutional language of the Empire, and intrusted its execution to four confederated states —Saxony, Baden, Bohemia, and Ratisbon. By Bohemia on the one side, by the Tyrol on the other, she put eighteen battalions in motion, and threatened Bavaria with an immediate invasion should she not withdraw her troops from the various lordships which she had invaded. It will easily be understood that Austria, thus situated, was extremely anxious to conciliate the First Consul, for though much occupied towards the ocean, he was not the man to recoil in any point. Moreover, the irritation to which he had been roused, rendered him more susceptible and more redoubtable than ever. This it is that explains the reserve of the Austrian diplomatists upon the death of the duc d'Enghien, and the real or affected unconcern which they displayed at the occurrence of so grave an event.

We have already described the effect produced upon the First Consul by the attacks directed against his person. The benefits which he had taken a pleasure in heaping upon the emigrants had not disarmed their hatred. The consideration which he had shown to Europe had not calmed its jealousy. Irritated to the highest degree at being so ill requited, he felt a sudden revolution take place in his soul, and he was more inclined to ill-treat all whom previously he had the most caressed. The reply to the manifestations of which we have spoken had not to be waited for; and after having deplored his having been misled by his passions, we shall again have occasion to admire the grandeur of his character.

The court of Prussia had become reserved, and no longer spoke of alliance. The First Consul was silent, too, towards her; but sharply reprimanded M. de Laforest, for having in his despatches too faithfully reported the public impression at Berlin. As regarded the court of Russia, the reply was instantaneous and merciless. General Hédouville had orders to quit St. Petersburg within eight-and-forty hours, without alleging any other reason for his departure than the state of his health; the customary reason by which diplomatists leave room for guessing at what they do not care to say. He was to leave it unknown, too, whether he left only for a short time or for good and all. M. de Rayneval alone was to remain in quality of *chargé-d'affaires*. Since the dismissal of M. de Markoff, only an agent of that rank, M. d'Oubril, had remained

at Paris. The First Consul then returned to the despatch of the Russian cabinet, a reply which must have been bitter indeed to the emperor. He was reminded in that note, that France, after behaving in the handsomest manner towards Russia, and after conceding to her a half voice in all the great affairs of the Continent had met with no good return; that she had found the Russian diplomatic agents, without an exception, hostile and malevolent; that, in contravention of the late treaty which bound the two courts not to embarrass each other, the cabinet of St. Petersburg had accredited French emigrants to foreign courts and covered conspirators with the pretext of Russian nationality to shelter them from the police of France; that this was violating alike the letter and spirit of treaties; that if they wished for war, they had only frankly to express that wish; that though the First Consul did not wish for war, he assuredly did not fear it; for there was nothing alarming in his reminiscences of the last campaign (allusion was here made to Suwarrow's disaster); that, as regarded what had taken place at Baden, Russia showed great officiousness in constituting herself the guarantee of the Germanic soil, as her titles to interfere were extremely disputable; that, at all events, France had exercised a legitimate right of defence against plots carried on upon her frontiers, under the eyes and with the knowledge of certain German governments, upon whom she had heaped benefits which had been repaid only with the blackest ingratitude; that she, moreover, had explained to them, and would explain to them only, and that Russia, similarly circumstanced, would have acted as France had acted, for had she been informed that the assassins of Paul I. were assembled at a march from her frontier, would she not have seized them there?

This was pitiless irony to address to a prince, who was reproached with not having punished any one of the murderers of his father, and who was therefore accused, though unjustly enough, of complicity in that horrible crime. It must have convinced the emperor Alexander of his extreme imprudence in interfering in the affair of the duc d'Enghien, when the tragical death of Paul I. rendered the retort so easy and so terrible.

Relatively to Germany, Russia having recently approved the [illegible]t of Austria, and the pretension publicly avowed by that [illegible] to refer constitutional questions to the aulic council, the [illegible]onsul plainly declared, that France thenceforth separated [illegible] from Russian policy, as regarded the future regulation [illegible]manic affairs; that she did not admit that questions left in [illegible]e were to be settled by the aulic council, a simple tri- [illegible] of the emperor, rather than by the empire; that these [illegible]ns, like all others, ought to be decided in the Diet, the [illegible]ne body, the sole depositary of the German sovereignty. [illegible]reach, then, was complete in all points, the resolutions as [illegible]e as the language was plain.

As to Austria, the First Consul could not but congratulate himself upon the indifference which she had manifested for the victim of Ettenheim. But he plainly perceived that advantage was taken at Vienna, of the difficulties which the maritime war seemed to cause him. He wished Austria to be thoroughly undeceived upon that point. There were two ways in which he could combat England, the one by actually grappling with her in the strait of Calais, the other by crushing her allies upon the continent. All things considered, the second plan was both more easy and more certain than the first, and though less direct, would not fail to be effective. Should Austria provoke him, he was determined, without the loss of an instant, to raise his camp at Boulogne, and to enter Germany, as he was unwilling to cross the sea until he should have disarmed all the allies, open or concealed, of Great Britain. He caused it to be intimated to the two Cobentzels, as well to the one who was ambassador at Paris, as to him who was minister at Vienna, that Bavaria had for ages been the ally of France, and that he would not sacrifice her to the ill-will of Austria; that if she had done wrong in too roughly dealing with the property of the immediate nobility, Austria, by her unjust sequestrations had forced all the German princes to indemnify themselves by violence, for the violences to which they had been subjected; that Bavaria might have acted wrongly, but that he would not allow her to be crushed with impunity, and that unless Austria recalled the battalions which she had despatched into Bohemia and the Tyrol, he was resolved to march an army of forty thousand men upon Munich, where they should keep garrison until the retreat of the imperial troops.

This precise and positive declaration threw the De Cobentzels and the cabinet of Vienna into unspeakable embarrassment. They endeavoured to escape from it by new complaints of the incessant enmity of France to Austria, and of the deep despair to which the latter would be reduced. However, M. de Talleyrand and M. de Champagny were firm, and it was agreed on both sides that Bavaria should evacuate the territories of the immediate nobility, but that the Austrian troops, halting at first in their then positions, should afterwards retrograde, so as not to compromise the dignity of the emperor by too precipitate a re[treat]. The cabinet of Vienna again made known, that if its [wishes] were gratified with regard to the proportion of Protestant [and] Catholic votes in the Diet, the support of Austria might be reckoned upon under all circumstances, and especially in the question which was about to present itself on account of the note addressed by Russia to the Germanic Diet.

That note had arrived at Ratisbon by the same courier who took to Paris the despatches of St. Petersburg. It painfully embarrassed the German princes, for it was a foreign court that invited them to mark their sensitiveness to a violation of the Germanic territory, and should they display that sensitiveness

would to the highest degree incur the resentment of France. There had not been time to send instructions to the ministers at the Diet, but they, anticipating the dispositions of their respective courts, had appeared inclined rather to neglect the note than to attach any great importance to it. The Prussian minister, M. de Goërtz, already conspicuous in Germanic negotiations, was in favour of hushing the business up altogether. But, owing to the proximity of Vienna, the Austrian ministers had already received their instructions, and playing, as was their custom, a double part, disapproving of the note when they were in presence of the French agents, and promising to secure its reception when they were in presence of the Russian agents, hit upon a middle course. The note was taken into consideration, but each minister was to refer it to his court, ultimately to decide upon its contents. "You see," said M. de Hugel to the Russian minister, "that we have got your note admitted." "You see," said he to the French minister, "that by adjourning the discussion for two months, we have rendered it harmless, for in two months the proceeding of the emperor Alexander will no longer be remembered."

Such, in fact, was to be the fate of that rash and inconsiderate proceeding. But to secure that result, more than one embarrassment still remained to be surmounted. The German governments were unwilling to offend either France, whom they feared, or Russia, of whom they might eventually have need. Their ministers, therefore, exerted themselves at Paris to find the solution of the difficulty. "Settle the matter as you find most convenient to you," said the First Consul to them; "if the discussion take place in two months, so as to be officially brought to the consideration of France, my reply will be so lofty and so harsh, that the Germanic dignity will be cruelly humiliated. You will have no choice but to endure that reply, or to take up arms, for I am resolved, if need be, to commence on the Continent my war with Great Britain."

M. de Talleyrand, faithful to his habitual love of peace, endeavoured to find expedients for preventing the rupture. The foreign ministers, fearing the First Consul, and finding in M. de Talleyrand, on the contrary, extreme courtesy, an affability not, however, destitute of dignity, diligently courted him. Among the most assiduous and intelligent of them was M. le duc de Dalberg, nephew of the Prince arch-chancellor, and at that time minister of Baden at Paris. M. de Talleyrand made use of him to influence the court of Baden. After reminding that court of all that it owed to France, who had so greatly aggrandised its territories in the arrangements of 1803, it was also reminded how much it had to fear, should the war break out again. It was urged to declare at Ratisbon that it had received satisfactory explanations from the French government, and that it, consequently, wished that no proceedings should be taken upon the Russian note. While M. de Talleyrand required it to give

a written note to this effect, the cabinet of St. Petersburg, relying upon the relationship between the house of Baden and the imperial family of Russia, endeavoured to modify this declaration, so far as to render it ineffective. But France was both nearer and more powerful, and could not but prevail. Moreover, two months were to elapse before the opening of the discussion; from Paris to Carlsruhe, and from Carlsruhe to Paris, drafts of the proposed note were exchanged and incessantly modified, and it was impossible to fail in hitting at last upon a solution of the difficulty.

The First Consul gave himself but little concern about these goings and comings, and left the matter to his minister for foreign affairs. He had affronted Russia, and had compelled Austria to remain quiet. He had alarmed Prussia by his coldness, and as for the Diet of Ratisbon, he treated it as the representative of an institution falling into decrepitude, in spite of all the efforts he had made to give it a new youth; and he was prepared to remain utterly silent towards it, or to return it some humiliating reply. All these questions, to which the catastrophe of Vincennes had given birth abroad, scarcely sufficed to turn his attention from affairs at home, which had now reached an actual crisis.

Although, in a few days, the impression produced by the death of the duc d'Enghien underwent that diminution which the weakening power of time effects upon all impressions, however vivid, there still remained a permanent cause of excitement in the proceedings against Georges, Moreau, and Pichegru. In truth, it was a sad though inevitable necessity, that of putting upon their trial so many persons of so different a caste; some, as Messrs. de Rivière and de Polignac, dear to the ancient French aristocracy; others, as Moreau, dear to all who loved the glory of France; nothing could be more untoward and embarrassing while public curiosity was highly excited, and while the malevolent, ever ready to put the most subtle or the most absurd constructions upon the smallest circumstance, were in an unusual state of exasperation. But it was absolutely necessary that justice should be done, and this trial was still for a month or two more to disturb the usual calm of the First Consul's government.

An accident, wholly unforeseen, occurred to add to the dark and sinister aspect of that situation. Pichegru, prisoner of the First Consul, at first suspecting his generosity, and putting but little faith in the offers of clemency conveyed to him by M. Réal, had soon become reassured, and had given himself up with confidence to the idea of preserving his life, and of recovering his honour by founding a grand colony at Cayenne. The offers of the First Consul were sincere, for in resolving to strike none but royalists, he wished to pardon Moreau and Pichegru. M. Réal, incapable of a bad feeling, experienced in the progress of this important prosecution, a second misfortune. He had arrived too late at Vincennes, he went too rarely to the cell of Pichegru, where the interests of the prosecution but little required his presence, seeing that

nothing was likely to be drawn from a man so firm and self-possessed as that ex-general of the Republic. Absorbed by a thousand cares, M. Réal neglected Pichegru, who, hearing no further mention of the First Consul's proposals, and being informed of the sanguinary execution of Vincennes, supposed that he could not rely upon the clemency which had been offered and promised to him. Death would have been of comparatively little consequence to this warrior, it was the almost inevitable *dénouement* of the culpable intrigues in which he had been engaged since his first lapse from the straight path in 1797 ; but he would have to appear between Moreau and Georges, the one of whom he had compromised, and to the other of whom he had delivered up his honour by joining in a royalist conspiracy. All the denunciations to which he had been exposed at the epoch of the 18th Fructidor, and which he had repulsed with a feigned indignation, were now about to be justified. With his life he would lose the poor remnants of his already compromised honour. The unfortunate man preferred instant death, but death free from the disgrace which must result from his public trial. This sentiment proves that he was somewhat better than his recent conduct indicated. He had borrowed from M. Réal the works of Seneca. One night, after reading for several hours, and leaving the book open at a passage treating of suicide, he strangled himself by means of his silk cravat and a wooden peg, of which he made a sort of tourniquet. Towards morning, the keepers, hearing some noise in his chamber, entered, and found him suffocated, his face being red, as though he had been seized with apoplexy. The medical men and magistrates who were called in left no doubt as to the cause of his death, and made it abundantly evident for all candid men.

But no proof is sufficiently clear for partisans who are resolved to believe a calumny, or to propagate without believing it. On the instant it was believed among the royalists, who were naturally well pleased to attribute all sorts of crimes to the government, and among idlers who, without malice, are yet delighted to discover in all events more complications than really exist, it was believed that Pichegru had been strangled by the hirelings of the First Consul. This catastrophe, termed that of the Temple, was the completion of the catastrophe termed that of Vincennes; the one was the sequel of the other. The character of the new Nero was thus rapidly developed. After the example of the Roman prince, he passed from good to evil, from virtue to crime, almost without interval. And as those who took the trouble to argue their falsehoods, required some ostensible motive for such a crime, they said that despairing of convicting Pichegru, they assassinated him that his presence might not aid his fellow-prisoners on their trial.

This was at once the most absurd and most odious of inventions. If there was any one of the accused whose presence at the trial was peculiarly necessary to the interests of the First Con-

sul, that one was Pichegru. Pichegru, personally, could not be considered a rival of any moment, since his proven affiliation to the royalist party had destroyed him in the public opinion; moreover, the depositions of the accused of all parties alike overwhelmed him. The man to be feared, if there was one, on account of his still intact glory, and of the difficulty of convicting him, was Moreau; and if any one of the accused could be serviceable against him, it was Pichegru, who had been the connecting link between the royalists and the republicans. Pichegru, in fact, brought to trial, unable to deny either his connexion with Georges or his connexion with Moreau, and being as unable to explain away as to deny those connexions, would inevitably have served to connect Moreau with the royalists—in other words, to cover him with merited confusion. Pichegru, then, was an immense loss to the accusation. In a word, if a crime was to be committed in order to get rid of a dangerous rivalry, it was Moreau and not Pichegru who should thus have been kept from public trial. The supposition, then, was as stupid as it was atrocious. But it was none the less assumed by the gossips of the royalist coteries that the First Consul, to disembarrass himself of Pichegru, had caused him to be strangled. This unworthy accusation could not but speedily fall to the ground; but in the meantime it caused much excitement, and the hawkers of false news, by repeating it, aided the perfidy of the inventors. This new misfortune renewed for some days the sad impressions already produced by the conspiracy of the emigrant princes. Those impressions, however, could not be durable. If enlightened men, friends of the First Consul, and jealous of his glory, could not but feel in the depths of their hearts inconsolable regret, the multitude were well convinced that they could fearlessly repose under the protection of a firm and a just hand. No one seriously feared the renewal of executions, exiles, and spoliations. It must even be confessed that the men personally concerned in the Revolution, whether they had acquired public property, public functions, or an embarrassing celebrity, were secretly well pleased to see general Bonaparte separated from the Bourbons by a *fossé* stained with royal blood.

However, the sensations produced by political events were then confined to a small number of persons which every day became more and more limited. The extraordinary participation of the people in public affairs during the Revolution had given place to a sort of inattention, partaking at once of lassitude and of confidence. In the earlier days of the Consulate, the government was still watched with some degree of anxiety; but soon, perceiving it to be at once so able and so fortunate, men gave themselves up to security and repose, and directed their attention to private affairs, long neglected during a stormy revolution, which had thrown property, commerce, and industry, alike into confusion. Of those aroused masses there now only remained attentive to passing events those classes which possess sufficient leisure and en-

lightenment to concern themselves with state affairs; and interested men of all parties, emigrants, priests, acquirers of national property, soldiers, and placemen.

Now in the circles thus composed, opinions were divided. If some termed the death of the duc d'Enghien an abominable crime, others considered that the plots incessantly renewed against the person of the First Consul were no less abominable. These latter argued that in order to repossess themselves of power, the royalists risked the destruction of all government in France; that supposing the First Consul killed, there would remain no one who could hold the reins of power with a sufficiently strong hand; that anarchy and bloodshed would resume their ascendancy; that, after all, it had been wisely done to act sternly, in order that villains and dupes should be discouraged; that the royalists were incorrigible; that though the First Consul had heaped kindness upon them, they were incapable of being grateful or even resigned; and that to deal efficiently with them, it had been necessary to make them tremble, at least once. These were the arguments which were repeated in the circles formed around the government, and consisting of the chiefs of the army, of the magistracy, of the administration, the members of the Senate, the Tribunate, and the Legislative Body. And as the impression made by the death of the duc d'Enghien abated, nearly the same things were repeated even among those peaceful and disinterested men who demanded that they should at length be left in repose, under the protection of the powerful arm that now governed France.

From that conflict of spirits there suddenly sprang up an idea, which was soon propagated with the rapidity of lightning. The royalists, considering the First Consul to be the sole obstacle to their projects, had desired to strike at him, in the hope that the whole government would perish with him. Well! it was now exclaimed, their criminal hopes must be baffled. This man whom they would fain destroy must be made king or emperor, that hereditary right being added to his power he may be provided with natural and immediate successors, and that crime against his person thus becoming useless, there might be the less temptation to commit it. As we have seen, the reaction towards monarchical principles had been rapid during some years. For five directors named for five years, there had been substituted the scheme of three consuls named for ten years; then the scheme of three consuls had been followed by that of one consul, holding power for life. Having entered upon such a course there was no stopping short of taking the last step; in other words, returning to hereditary power. The slightest impulse given to the public mind sufficed for that. This impulse the royalists had taken it upon themselves to give, in wishing to assassinate the First Consul; and in acting thus they only presented a very ordinary spectacle, for it most frequently occurs that it is the enemies of a government, who, by their imprudent attacks, enable it to make its most rapid progress.

All at once, alike in the Senate, in the Legislative Body, in the Tribunate; not only in Paris, but in the principal towns of the departments where the electoral colleges were assembled, in the camps distributed along the coasts, everywhere and almost simultaneously, monarchy and hereditary succession were extolled. This movement of opinion was natural; it was also in some degree excited by the manifestations of assemblies desirous of paying their court, by prefects who wished to display their zeal, by the generals who wished to attract the notice of an all-powerful master; all well knowing that in advocating monarchy they were in accord with that master's as yet unspoken thought, and that they assuredly would not offend him should they perchance anticipate the moment fixed by his ambition.

Though undictated, the language was everywhere uniform. It was high time, it was said, to put an end to hesitations and to false scruples, and adopt the only stable institution, that is to say, hereditary monarchy. As long as the royalists could hope to destroy the government and the Revolution at a single blow, they would renew their crimes, and perhaps would at length be successful. They would not recommence, or at least they would be the less tempted to do so, should they see beside the First Consul his children, or his brothers, ready to succeed him, and the new government, like the old one, thus possessed of the property of surviving itself. To place a crown upon that precious and sacred head on which reposed the destinies of France, was to furnish it with a buckler which would protect it against the blows of assassins. To protect it was to protect all the interests of the Revolution, to save from a sanguinary reaction the men who were compromised by their errors; it was also to preserve to the acquirers of the national domains their property, to the military their rank, to all the members of the government their position, to France, that government of equality, justice, and grandeur, which she had secured. Moreover, every one, it was added, had returned to sound ideas. Every one now wondered how senseless theorists had persuaded the nation into making of that vast and antique France a republic like that of Sparta and of Athens. Every one now perceived that in replacing the monarchy by a republic, the destroyers had exceeded the original and legitimate objects of the Revolution, which contemplated only the reform of abuses, the abolition of the feudal system, the modification of the royal authority but not its destruction; that if, in 1802, at the institution of the Consulate for life, a false shame restrained the legislators of France, now, that this false shame had passed away, now that the crimes of the royalists had completely opened all eyes, it was necessary to come to a determination, and settle the form of government by a complete and definitive act; that, after all, this would be

merely adding the *de jure* to the *de facto*, as in reality general Bonaparte was king, and an absolute king; while in decreeing him royalty, under its real form, they could treat with him, could limit that royalty, and thus, at one stroke, give durability to the government and guarantees to liberty.

Such was the general language a few days after the painful scenes of which we have spoken above.

What a spectacle was here presented by that nation which, after essaying a sanguinary republic under the Convention, a moderate but inert republic under the Directory, suddenly disgusted with this collective and civil government, loudly demanded to be governed by the hand of a soldier, and was so eager to have one, as to be on the point of selecting the unfortunate Joubert in the absence of general Bonaparte; hailed the latter on his return from Egypt, and entreated him to accept of a power which he was only too impatient to seize, made him Consul for ten years, then for life, and finally hereditary monarch, and all this that it might be guaranteed by the strong arm of a warrior against that anarchy whose frightful spectre incessantly pursued it! What a lesson for the theorists who, in the delirium of their conceit, thought to make France a republic because circumstances had made her a democracy! What had been required to dissipate these ideas? Merely four years, and an abortive conspiracy against an extraordinary man, the object of the love of some, of the hatred of others, and of the intense attention of all! And admire, too, the profundity of this lesson! That man had been the object of a criminal attempt, but he, in his turn, had committed a sanguinary act; and at that very moment men feared not to raise him on the buckler to the throne, so necessary did they feel him to be! They accepted him not less glorious, but less pure. They accepted him with his genius, they would have selected him without it; they would have taken him whatever he was, provided he was powerful; so precious was mere strength so soon after such great disorders! Have we not in our own day seen alarmed nations throw themselves into the arms of indifferent soldiers, because they presented at least the appearances of strength?

In Rome, that old republic, it required the want, long felt, of a single chief, the inconvenience often repeated of the elective transmission of power, it required many generations, Cæsar first, then Augustus after Cæsar, and even Tiberius after Augustus, to habituate the Romans to the idea of monarchical and hereditary power. It did not require so many precautions in France for a people fashioned to monarchy during twelve centuries, and only during ten years to a republic. It required only a simple accident to return from the dream of some generous but mistaken spirits, to the living and indestructible souvenirs of a whole nation.

In every country torn by factions or threatened by an external enemy, the necessity of being governed and defended will sooner or later lead to the triumph of a powerful personage, powerful as Cæsar at Rome, rich as the Medicis at Florence. If such a country has for a long time been a republic, it will require many generations to fashion it to monarchy; but if that country has always been a monarchy, and the follies of factions have for an instant wrenched it from its natural condition to convert it into an ephemeral republic, it will require some years of troubles to inspire it with a horror of anarchy, fewer years still to find the soldier capable of putting an end to that anarchy, and the wish of that soldier, or a dagger-thrust of his enemies, to make him king or emperor, and thus restore the country to its habits, and dissipate the dream of those who supposed it possible to alter human nature by vain decrees and by still vainer oaths. Rome and Florence, after having long been republics, tended the one towards the Cæsars and the other towards the Medicis, and were more than half a century in giving themselves to them. England and France, republics of ten years, tended in three or four years to their Cromwell and Napoleon.

Thus the Revolution in those days of rapid reaction, was obliged in the face of Heaven to confess its errors one after the other, and exhibit the most startling contradictions. Let us discriminate, however: when it sought the abolition of the feudal system, equality in the eyes of the law, uniformity of justice, administration and taxation, and the regular intervention of the nation in the state-government, it did not deceive itself; on these points it had exhibited no inconsistency, no contradiction, and it had no errors to confess. When, on the contrary, it aimed at a barbarous and chimerical equality, the absence of all social hierarchy, the continual and tumultuous presence of the multitude in the government, the Republic in a monarchy of twelve centuries, and the abolition of all worship, it was at once senseless and guilty, and could not but have one day to confess its errors before the whole world! But of what consequence are some fleeting errors compared to the immortal truths which, at the expense of its blood, it bequeathed to the human race! Even those errors themselves contained useful and grave lessons given with an incomparable grandeur. If France, in her return to monarchy, obeyed the immutable laws of human society, perhaps her course was too rapid, as is the custom of revolutions. A dictatorship, under the title of protector, sufficed Cromwell. The dictatorship, under the form of a perpetual Consulate, with a power extensive as his genius, and durable as his life, should have sufficed general Bonaparte for the accomplishment of all the good that he meditated, to reconstruct that annihilated ancient society, to transmit it, after having reorganised it, either to his heirs, if he were to have such, or to those who, more fortunate, were some day to enjoy

the fruit of his toils. In sooth, it was decreed in the councils of Providence, that the Revolution, in retrograding, should go beyond the re-establishment of the monarchical form to the re-establishment of the ancient dynasty itself. To accomplish the noble task of general Bonaparte, the dictature, under the form of the Consulate for life, should, in our opinion, have sufficed, and in making him an hereditary monarch, that was attempted which was hurtful alike to his moral greatness and to the grandeur of France. Not that they were without full right who wished to convert a soldier into a king or an emperor: the nation incontestably, could transmit to whom it chose, and to a sublime soldier still more than to any one else, the sceptre of Charlemagne and of Louis XIV. But that soldier, in his natural and proper position of the first magistrate of the French Republic, had no earthly equal, even upon the loftiest thrones. In becoming an hereditary monarch, he was to be put in comparison with kings, little or great, and ranked as their inferior in one point—that of blood. Even though it were only to the eyes of prejudice, he was to be below them in something. Received among them and flattered, because feared by them; he would in secret be disdained by the puniest among them. But, what is graver still, when he should have become king or emperor, what would he not attempt in order to become king of kings, chief of a dynasty of monarchs, holding from his new throne! What stimulants for an ambition already too much excited, and which could perish only by its own excesses.

In our humble opinion, at least, the institution of the Consulate for life was a wise and politic measure, and the indispensable completion of the dictatorship, which had become necessary: the re-establishment of the monarchy in the person of Napoleon Bonaparte was not a usurpation (a word borrowed from the language of the emigrants), but an act of vanity on the part of him who too readily lent himself to it, and of imprudent avidity on the part of new convertites, eager to devour that reign of an instant. If it be only considered as a lesson to mankind, we must confess that of all the lessons that Providence bestows upon nations, the most instructive and the most profound was given by this heroic soldier, and by these republicans recently converted to monarchy, all alike eager to invest themselves in the purple upon the ruins of that Republic of ten years, to which they had taken a thousand oaths. Unhappily France, who had paid with her blood for their republican delirium, was to pay with her grandeur for their new-born monarchical zeal; for it is for the sake of having French kings in Westphalia, in Naples, and in Spain, that France has lost the Rhine and the Alps. Thus, in all things France was destined to instruct the universe: what glory and yet what calamity for a nation!

At every change there are needed men to realise the ideas which are in all minds; in other words, instruments. For the

revolution that approached there was a man very singularly fitted for the purpose. Hitherto M. Fouché, with a remnant of sincerity, had blamed the rapidity of the reaction which reconducted France towards the past; he had even obtained the good opinion of Madame Bonaparte by appearing to partake her perplexed fears; but he had, on the same account, incurred the censure of her husband. By playing this unthankful part of a secret disapprover, M. Fouché had lost his post, and he was not the man to play so losing a part much longer. Accordingly, he chose the very opposite course. Spontaneously directing the police in the inquiry into the recent conspiracy he had restored himself to office. Seeing that the First Consul was much embittered against the royalists, he had humoured his anger, and had urged him on to the immolation of the duc d'Enghien. If the idea, which has often been attributed to the First Consul, of making a sanguinary compact with the revolutionists, and of thus obtaining the crown at the price of a frightful gage, if this idea ever entered the mind of any man of that day, assuredly it entered the mind of M. Fouché. Approving the death of the duc d'Enghien, he also was among the most ardent of the new partisans of hereditary succession. In his zeal for monarchy he surpassed Messrs. de Talleyrand, Rœderer, and Fontanes.

Doubtless, the First Consul needed no encouragement to aspire to the throne. He wished for the supreme rank, but without it having been, as the mere herd of narrators have supposed, his constant aim, from the time of his campaigns in Italy, or even from the 18th Brumaire; no, he had not conceived such desires at once. His ambition, like his fortune, had grown up by degrees. Arrived at the command of armies, he from that lofty position perceived loftier positions still in the government of the Republic, and aspired to them. Having gained those, he saw still above him that of the perpetual Consulate, and similarly aspired to that. From that eminence he saw the throne, and aspired to mount it. Such is the march of human ambition, nor was that to be called a crime. But to clear-seeing minds this incessantly excited and never satisfied ambition was a danger; for still to gratify was still to excite it.

But at the moment of seizing upon a power which does not naturally belong to him, even the most daring genius hesitates, if he does not tremble. In such situations, an involuntary shame seizes upon the most ardent ambition, and prevents it from avowing its whole desire. The First Consul, who consulted but little with his brothers upon state affairs, found in them, when his personal grandeur was in question, confidants to whom he loved to open his whole thought, and confidants more ardent than he himself was, for they burned to become princes. It will be remembered, that they looked upon the Consulate for life with no pleased eye, considering it an abortive attempt. At the period to which we now refer,

Lucien was absent, and Joseph was about to quit Paris. Lucien, in one of his headstrong fits of indiscretion, had married a widow, handsome indeed, but very inferior in position to the Bonaparte family. Having quarrelled with his brother on account of this marriage, Lucien had retired to Rome, playing the part of an exile, and seeking in the enjoyments of the arts, consolation for fraternal ingratitude. Madame Lætitia Bonaparte, who, beneath the humility of a woman born poor, and affecting to remember that fact, concealed some of the passions of an empress-mother, constantly and unjustly complained of Napoleon, and showed a marked preference to her son Lucien, whom she had followed to Rome. The First Consul, full of affection for his relatives, even when he had reason to be displeased with them, had accompanied his mother and brother with his all-powerful protection, and had recommended them to the kindness of Pius VII.; stating that his brother went to Rome to indulge his taste for the arts, and his mother for the benefit of a mild climate. Pius VII. paid his illustrious guests the most delicate and anxious attentions.

Joseph, also, was discontented, but wherefore one would never guess, did not history take the trouble to relate it. He was offended because the First Consul had wished to name him president of the Senate, and he had refused that high office in the tone of an insulted man, when it was offered to him by M. Cambacérès, on the part of the First Consul. The latter, who detested idleness, then caused him to be told to go and seek greatness where he himself had found it, in the army. Joseph, named colonel of the fourth regiment of the line, set out for Boulogne at the moment the great question of the re-establishment of monarchy was mooted. The First Consul, therefore, was deprived of two confidants to whom he would gladly have unbosomed himself on what concerned his personal grandeur. M. de Cambacérès, to whom he usually spoke out upon all subjects whether general or personal—M. Cambacérès at the epoch of the institution of the Consulate for life, had spared him the embarrassment of avowing his wishes, by taking the initiative, and becoming the instrument of a change which was universally approved. But, now, M. Cambacérès was silent for two reasons, one of them good, the other bad. The good reason was, that, with his rare sagacity, he feared the flights of an unlimited ambition. He had heard mention made of the Empire of the Gauls, of the Empire of Charlemagne, and he trembled to see the solid grandeur of the treaty of Lunéville sacrificed to gigantic enterprises in consequence of the elevation of General Bonaparte to the imperial throne. The less worthy reason was his clashing interest, for he was about to find himself separated by all the height of the throne from the First Consul, and from being a co-partner in the sovereignty, small as might be his share in it, to become the simple subject of the

future monarch. The third consul, Lebrun, perfectly devoted, but never interfering in any thing but the administration, could not be of any use.

M. Fouché, in the ardour of his zeal, made himself the spontaneous instrument of the approaching change. He approached the First Consul, whose secret desires he had discerned, represented to him the necessity for taking a prompt and decisive step, the urgency of putting an end to the anxieties of France, by placing the crown upon his head, and thus definitively consolidating the work of the Revolution. He described all classes of the nation as being animated by the same sentiments, and impatient to proclaim Napoleon Emperor of the Gauls, or Emperor of the French, as might best suit his policy or his taste. He returned often to the charge, endeavouring to enforce the advantages of the opportunity now presented, when all France, alarmed for the life of the First Consul, was disposed to grant whatever he might ask. He passed from exhortations almost to reproaches, and sharply twitted the hesitations of general Bonaparte. The latter had not quitted his retreat at Malmaison since the affair of Vincennes. M. Fouché repaired incessantly to Malmaison, and when he could not join the First Consul while walking out, he seized upon his private secretary, M. de Menneval, and demonstrated to him, at full length, all the advantages of hereditary monarchy, and not only of monarchy but of aristocracy, as the support and ornament of the throne; adding, that if the Consul would re-establish it, he was ready to defend the wisdom of that new creation, and, if necessary, even to become a noble himself.

Such was the zeal of this ex-republican, so completely convinced of his past errors. His restless activity, more excited on this occasion than was usual, led him to move even further than there was need. He bustled about, like those people who would fain have the merit of urging forward that which goes by itself.

In fact, there was no one who was not disposed to second the wishes of the First Consul. France, having long witnessed the rise of a master, who, moreover, had heaped benefits and glory upon her, would not refuse him whatever title might be most agreeable to his ambition. The bodies of the state, the chiefs of the army, who knew how impossible all resistance had become, and who, in the ruin of Moreau, had seen the danger of an ill-timed opposition, threw themselves eagerly before the new Cæsar, that they might at least be distinguished for their zeal, and profit by an elevation which there was no longer time to prevent. It is the common disposition of mankind to profit by the ambition which they cannot combat with success, and to console their envy by their avidity. There was but one embarrassment felt by all, namely, to resume the use of words which had been proscribed, and to repudiate others which had been adopted with enthusiasm. A slight precaution in the choice of a title for the

future monarch could facilitate the object. Thus, in calling him emperor, and not king, the difficulty was much diminished. Moreover, no one was better fitted to relieve the existing generation from such an embarrassment, than an ex-Jacobin like M. Fouché, taking upon himself the task of giving an example to all, master and subjects, and hastening to be the first to speak words which others, as yet, dared not have on their lips.

M. Fouché arranged every thing with some leaders of the Senate; the First Consul seeing and approving all that he did, but feigning to have no hand in any thing. They feared to take the initiative in the French journals; for their absolute dependence upon the police would have given their opinion the character of a forced one. We had secret agents in England, and they contrived to have it stated in certain English journals, that since the last conspiracy Bonaparte was anxious, gloomy, and threatening; that every one in Paris was in a state of anxiety; that it was the natural consequence of a government in which every thing depended upon one head; and that, consequently, all peaceable men wished that hereditary succession, established in the Bonaparte family, should give the existing order of things that stability of which it was destitute. Thus the English press, usually employed in calumniating the First Consul, was now employed in serving his ambition. These articles, copied and commented upon, caused a very lively sensation, and gave the signal that was waited for. At this period there were several electoral colleges assembled in L'Yonne, the Var, the Upper Pyrenees, the Nord, and the Röer. It was easy to obtain addresses from them. Addresses were also suggested to the municipal councils of the great towns, such as Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Paris. Finally, the camps scattered along the coast were in their turn thrown into fermentation. Military men, in general, were of all classes the most devoted to the First Consul. With the exception of a certain number of officers and generals, some of whom were sincere republicans, and others animated by the old rivalry which divided the armies of the Rhine and of Italy, most of the chiefs of the army saw their own personal elevation, in the elevation of a warrior to the throne of France. They were consequently quite ready to take the initiative, and, as had often been done in the Roman empire, to make an emperor themselves. General Soult wrote to the First Consul, that he had heard generals and colonels demanding the establishment of a new form of government, and expressing their readiness to give the First Consul the title of Emperor of the Gauls. The general asked for orders on this point. Petitions were circulated in the divisions of dragoons that were encamped at Compiègne; these petitions were covered with signatures, and were about to arrive in Paris.

On Sunday, 4 Germinal (25th of March), some days after the death of the duc d'Enghien, numerous addresses from the

electoral colleges were presented to the First Consul. Admiral Ganteaume, one of his most devoted friends, himself presented the address of the college of the Var, of which he was president. It said, in formal terms, that it was not sufficient to *seize* and to *punish* conspirators, but that it was necessary by a large system of institutions which should consolidate and perpetuate power in the hands of the First Consul and his family, to secure the repose of France, and terminate its long anxieties. Other addresses were read at the same reception, and immediately after these manifestations came one of a more elevated order. M. Fontanes had received the presidency of the Legislative Body, and thus, by the favour of the Bonaparte family, had obtained a place that he had merited by his talents alone. It devolved on him to congratulate the First Consul upon the completion of an immortal work, the Civil Code. That code, the fruit of so many studious vigils, a monument of the strong will and comprehensive intellect of the chief of the Republic, had been terminated in the present session, and the grateful Legislative Body had determined to consecrate that souvenir by placing in its hall a marble bust of the First Consul. It was this determination that M. de Fontanes announced at this reception, and certainly, of all the services of the man whom it was intended to honour, there was not one that more merited remembrance, at the moment when he was about to be made hereditary sovereign of a country organised by his genius. M. de Fontanes expressed himself as follows:—

"CITIZEN FIRST CONSUL:

"For four years an immense empire has reposed under the shelter of your powerful administration. The wise uniformity of your laws is about still more to unite all its inhabitants. The Legislative Body wishes to consecrate this memorable epoch: it has decreed that your bust, placed in the centre of its hall of deliberations, shall eternally remind it of your services, and of the duties and the hopes of the French people. The double right of conqueror and legislator has always imposed silence on all others; you have seen it confirmed in your person by the national suffrage. Who could again nourish the criminal hope of dividing France against France? Will she divide herself for some reminiscences of the past, when she is united by all the interests of the present? She has but one chief, yourself; she has but one enemy, England.

"Political tempests may perhaps have thrown even some wise men into unforeseen routes. But as soon as your hand raised the standard of the country, all good Frenchmen recognised and followed it; all passed over to the side of your glory. Those who conspire in the bosom of a hostile country, irrevocably renounce their natural soil; and what can they oppose to your ascendancy? You have invincible armies, they have only libels and assassins; and while the voice of religion is raised in your favour at the foot of those altars which you have

restored, they cause you to be insulted by some obscure organs of rebellion and superstition. The impotence of their plottings is proven. They daily render destiny more severe by struggling against its decrees. Let them yield at length to that irresistible movement which sways the universe, and meditate in silence on the causes of the ruin and elevation of empires."

That abjuration of the Bourbons, made in presence of the designated new monarch, and with that solemnity of language, was, though indirect, the most significant of all the manifestations. However, it was determined to publish nothing until the most elevated body in the State, the Senate, charged by the Constitution with taking the initiative, had made a first movement.

In order to provoke this movement it was necessary to come to an understanding with M. Cambacérès, who presided over the Senate. For this purpose it was necessary to confer with him, and secure his co-operation; not that any resistance on his part was to be feared, but his mere disapproval, even if a silent one, would have been a real inconvenience in a case in which it was necessary that the impulse should seem to be universal.

The First Consul sent for Messrs. Lebrun and Cambacérès at Malmaison. M. Lebrun, as being the easier to persuade, was the first sent for. No effort was necessary in his case, for he was a decided partisan of monarchy, and more especially under the sovereignty of general Bonaparte than of any one else. M. Cambacérès, discontented with what was in progress, arrived when the conference with his colleague Lebrun was already far advanced. The First Consul, after having spoken of the movement which had arisen in the public mind, asked the opinion of the Second Consul upon the question, then so much canvassed, of the re-establishment of monarchy.

"I shrewdly suspected," replied M. Cambacérès, "that that was what was to be spoken of. I see that every thing tends to that end, and I am very sorry for it." Then ill concealing the personal vexation which mingled with his prudent views, M. Cambacérès stated to the First Consul the grounds of his opinion. He depicted the republicans as being discontented that they were to be deprived of even the name of the phantom which they had pursued; the royalists revolted at seeing the throne re-erected without a Bourbon being seated upon it; he pointed out the danger of pushing the return to the old system so far, that very soon it would only require the substitution of one person for another to re-establish the old monarchy. He repeated the remarks of the royalists themselves, who boasted that in general Bonaparte they had a precursor charged with paving the way for the return of the Bourbons. He pointed out the inconveniences of a new change, productive of no advantage beyond a vain title, for the power of the First Consul was already unlimited; and he observed that frequently it was

more perilous to change the name of things than to change the things themselves. He alleged the difficulty of obtaining from Europe the recognition of the monarchy that it was proposed to found, and the still greater difficulty of obtaining from France the effort of a third war, in order to wring the recognition from the old monarchies; in short, he put forth a variety of reasons, some good, some middling, and tinged with an ill-temper by no means usual to so staid a personage. But he dared not mention the best, though he well knew them; namely, that if this new gratification of an immense ambition were granted, there was no point at which they could stop short; for in decreeing to general Bonaparte the title of Emperor of the French, they would prepare him to desire that of Emperor of the West, to which he secretly aspired, and which was by no means the least of the causes which urged him to go beyond all the limits of the possible, and to perish in so doing! Like every annoyed and constrained man, M. Cambacérès did not put forth his best arguments, and was beaten by his interlocutor. The First Consul, so dissimulating at the time of the institution of the Consulate for life, now made that step which was not made towards him. He frankly confessed to his colleague that he wished to take the crown, and he declared why. He maintained that France desired a king; that this was evident to any one capable of observation; that she daily receded from the follies which had been put into her head, and that of all those follies the Republic was the most signal; that the eyes of France were so completely opened to her defects, that she would take a Bourbon, if they would not give her a Bonaparte; that the return of the Bourbons would be a calamity, for that would be a pure counter-revolution, and that, for himself, without wishing for more power than he already possessed, he yielded on this occasion to the public will and to the interests of the Revolution itself; that, for the rest, it was necessary to come to a resolution, for the excitement was such in the army, that they would probably proclaim him Emperor in the camps, and that then his elevation to the throne would resemble the act of Prætorians, which was above all things to be avoided.

These reasonings had but little weight with M. Cambacérès, who had no inclination to allow himself to be convinced, and each remained of his own opinion, vexed at having advanced too far. This unforeseen opposition of M. Cambacérès embarrassed the First Consul, who, feigning to feel less impatience than he really did feel, told his two colleagues that he would not interfere at all, but leave the public excitement to take its own course. They parted in mutual discontent, and M. Cambacérès returning to Paris with M. Lebrun, towards the middle of the night, addressed these words to him: "All is finished, the monarchy is re-established, but I have a presentiment that what is being plastered up will not be durable. We have made war

upon Europe to give her republics, daughters of the French republic; henceforth we shall make war to give her monarchies, sons or brothers of our own, and exhausted France will end by sinking beneath those silly enterprises."

But this disapprobation of M. Cambacérès was the most silent and inactive of all resistances. He allowed M. Fouché and his assistants to act as they pleased. An excellent opportunity presented itself to them. According to the custom of addressing to the Senate communications upon important events, there had been presented to it a report of the Grand-juge, relative to the intrigues of the English diplomatic agents, Drake, Spencer Smith, and Taylor. It was necessary to reply to this communication of the government. The Senate had named a committee to prepare the draft of a reply. The leaders, seeing a favourable occasion, exerted themselves to persuade the senators that the time had arrived for taking the initiative on the subject of re-establishing monarchy; that the First Consul hesitated, but that it was necessary to overcome his hesitations by denouncing to him the gaps in the existing institutions, and by indicating to him how they could be filled up. They hinted cautiously at the unpleasantness to which, two years previously, the Senate was exposed through halting behind the wishes of general Bonaparte. They plainly advanced a very specious reason for the Senate not allowing itself to be outstripped. The army, argued they, excited to the highest pitch in favour of their chief, was ready to proclaim him Emperor, and then the Empire, as at Rome, would be the gift of the Prætorians. It was necessary to make haste, that France might be spared such a scandal. They would only imitate in this the example of the Roman Senate, which, more than once, hastened to proclaim certain emperors, in order to avoid receiving them from the hands of the legions. Then came a reason which needed not to be spoken aloud or whispered; it was, that there still remained for distribution a great part of the senatorships instituted at the same time as the Consulate for life, which procured an endowment of land, in addition to the pecuniary salary allowed to each senator. There would also be a profusion of new places to distribute. It was necessary, therefore, as they could not resist the elevation of a new master, not to run the risk of displeasing him. It must be added, that to these baser reasonings some better ones were joined. Except a by no means numerous opposition, of which M. Sieyès was the original founder, but with which, as with every thing else, he had become disgusted, and which he had abandoned to subaltern leaders; with the exception of this opposition, the mass saw in monarchy the port in which the revolution must seek its safety.

These reasons, so various in character, gained over the majority of the senate, and it was determined to make a

significant reply to the message of the First Consul. The following is the substance of that reply.

The institutions of France are incomplete in two respects. Firstly, there is no tribunal for great crimes against the state, which must be referred to an insufficient and weak jurisdiction. (What passed at the tribunal of the Seine, during the proceedings against Georges and Moreau, inspired every one with this opinion.). Secondly, the government of France rests upon a single head, which is a continual temptation to conspirators, who imagine that by striking at that head, they can destroy every thing. Here is a double gap which it is necessary to point out to the wisdom of the First Consul, to awaken his solicitude, and induce him, if need be, to take the initiative.

On the 6th Germinal (27th March), the second day after the audiences reported above, the Senate was summoned to deliberate upon this draft of reply. M. Fouché and his friends had prepared every thing, without giving notice to M. Cambacérès, who usually presided in the Senate. It appeared that they had not even apprised the First Consul, in order that they might give him an agreeable surprise. That surprise was by no means so agreeable to M. Cambacérès, who was stupified on hearing the draft of the committee read. However, he preserved an unruffled countenance, and allowed nothing to be perceived by the numerous eyes that were fixed upon him, for it was desired to know how far all this was agreeable to the First Consul, whose confidant and accessory Cambacérès was supposed to be. During the reading of the draft of the committee, a very slight but still perceptible murmuring was heard in a part of the Senate; nevertheless, the draft was adopted by an immense majority, and it was determined that it should be communicated to the First Consul on the very next day.

Scarcely had M. Cambacérès left this sitting of the Senate when, offended at not having been advertised, he wrote to the First Consul at Malmaison instead of going thither in person, and, in a very cool letter, communicated to him all that had taken place. The First Consul returned on the following day to receive the Senate, and wished to have a previous explanation with his two colleagues. He appeared astonished at the precipitation of the procedure, and in some sort taken by surprise. "I have not sufficiently reflected," said he to M. Cambacérès; "I need to consult farther with you, and many others before I determine. I will reply to the Senate that I will deliberate. But I will neither receive it publicly, nor publish its message. I will not let any thing be noised abroad until my resolution shall be definitively taken." This was what was agreed upon, and executed that same day.

The First Consul received the Senate as he had announced, and replied verbally to its members, that he thanked them for their testimonies of devotion, but that he must maturely delibe-

ate upon the subject submitted to his attention, previous to making a public and definitive reply.

Although he witnessed, and was a silent accessory to all that had taken place, the First Consul was almost outstripped in his wishes. The impatience of his partisans had surpassed his own, and he evidently was not ready. The address of the Senate, therefore, was not published, for although absolute secrecy was impossible, yet as long as no official and avowed proceedings were taken, it was always possible to recede, should any unforeseen obstacle be encountered.

Previous to advancing too far to retrograde, the First Consul wished to be secure of the army and of Europe. In the main, he did not doubt either, for he was dear to the first, and dreaded by the second. But it was a severe sacrifice to impose upon his companions in arms, who had poured out their blood for France, and not for one man; it was a severe sacrifice to impose upon them, to wish them to accept him for their sovereign. And, considering the effect produced on Europe by the death of the duc d'Enghien, it was a singular act of condescension to ask of all the legitimate princes, to ask them to recognise as their equal a soldier who, but a few days before, had imbued his hands in the blood of the Bourbons. However much ground there might be to expect that the power of the soldier would extort assent, it was wise to be assured of it beforehand.

The First Consul wrote to general Soult, and to those of the generals in whom he had the most confidence, to ask their opinion as to the proposed change. He said that he had not come to any fixed determination, sought nothing but that which was best for France, and wished, previous to coming to any decision, to have the opinion of the chiefs of the army. Assuredly the reply was not doubtful; but to ask it was, at the least, to fish for protestations of devotion, which would serve for example, and urge forward lukewarm or refractory spirits.

As regarded Europe, the complaisance, though probable in the main, yet presented some doubt. We were at war with Great Britain; in that quarter, therefore, nothing needed to be done, the consent of that power being wholly out of the question. The recent relations with Russia rendered it a point of dignity not to address her. There remained Spain, Austria, Prussia, and the smaller powers. Spain was too weak to refuse anything, but the outpoured blood of a Bourbon made it imperative to allow some weeks to pass before having recourse to her. Austria had appeared the least sensible of all the powers to the violation of the Germanic territory, and in her profound indifference to every thing but her own interest, there was nothing that might not be expected from her. But in matters of etiquette she was rigid, punctilious, sensitive, as that court might well be whose antiquity and whose titles were unequalled. An emperor (for that title was decided upon as at once newer.

greater, and more military than that of king) an emperor to add to the list of sovereigns was not a very easy thing to make acceptable to the head of the Holy Roman Empire.

Prussia, notwithstanding her recent coolness, was still the power most easy to render favourable. A courier, therefore, was immediately despatched to Berlin, with an order to M. de Laforest to see M. d'Haugwitz, to learn from him whether the First Consul might hope to be recognised by the king of Prussia in quality of hereditary Emperor of the French. This was to be asked in such wise as to place the young king between a lively gratitude or a bitter resentment on the part of France. M. de Laforest was ordered to leave no trace of this step in the archives of the legation. As for Austria, without writing to M. de Champagny, and without risking a direct overture, means of acting were at hand, namely, to sound M. de Cobentzel, who professed to M. de Talleyrand an immoderate desire to gratify the First Consul. M. de Talleyrand was the very minister for such a negotiation. He obtained very gratifying assurances from M. Cobentzel, the most satisfactory language, but nothing positive. It was necessary to refer to Vienna for positive instructions.

The First Consul was, therefore, obliged to wait for a fortnight before he could reply to the Senate, and allow the architects of his new grandeur to pursue their work. However, addresses were still allowed to arrive from the great towns, and the principal authorities. They were not, however, inserted in the *Moniteur*.

The king of Prussia was found in the best possible dispositions. That prince, after having reverted towards Russia, and secretly allied himself to her, feared that he had gone too far in that direction, and that he had too plainly manifested his censure of what had taken place at Ettenheim. He wished, therefore, for nothing better than an opportunity of doing something personally agreeable to the First Consul. M. de Laforest had scarcely begun to broach the subject to M. de Haugwitz, when the latter, preventing him from concluding, hastened to declare that the king of Prussia would not hesitate to acknowledge the new Emperor of the French. Frederick William fully expected to encounter new censure from the restless coterie that surrounded the queen, but he knew how to brave that censure for the interests of his kingdom, and he considered a good understanding with the First Consul to be the first among those interests. It must be added, that he experienced a feeling which all the other courts were equally to experience, that of satisfaction at seeing the Republic abolished in France. Monarchy alone could render them secure, and the Bourbons appearing for the time being impossible, general Bonaparte was the new monarch whom all the princes expected to behold on the throne of France. This is a new proof among a thousand

others, of the brief duration that certain impressions have among men, especially when they have an interest in effacing them from their hearts. All the courts were about to recognise as emperor that personage whom, in their wrath, they had but a fortnight before called an assassin and a regicide.

The king of Prussia himself wrote to M. de Lucchesini a letter, which was communicated to the First Consul, and which contained the most friendly expressions.

"I unhesitatingly authorize you," said the king, "to seize the earliest possible opportunity to make known to M. de Talleyrand, that after having seen the supreme power conferred for life upon the First Consul, I should see with still greater interest the public order, established by his wisdom and his great actions, consolidated by the hereditary establishment of his family, and that I should not hesitate to acknowledge it. You will add, that I indulge the hope that this unequivocal testimony of my sentiments will be equivalent, in his opinion, to all the securities and guarantees that could be offered to him by a formal treaty, of which the bases substantially exist; and that I hope that I, in my turn, may reckon upon his freely reciprocating that friendship and confidence which I should wish to see constantly maintained between the two governments." (23d of April, 1804.)

This language, though sincere in the main, was not, however, altogether consistent with the spirit of the treaty signed with Russia; but the immoderate desire of peace led this prince into equivocations most unworthy of his character.

Matters proceeded differently at Vienna. There no engagement had been entered into with Russia; they did not wish to redeem concession made to one party by concession made to another; they were guided solely by the closest calculations of their own interest. The death of the duc d'Enghien, and the violation of the Germanic territory, were considered to be of minor importance. The only subject of consideration was the return to be exacted for the sacrifice that was to be made in recognising the new emperor. In the first place, notwithstanding the inconvenience of disobliging Russia by conceding a point so eminently agreeable to the French government, it was necessary to to make up their minds to recognise Napoleon, for to refuse would be to cause war, or nearly so, with France; and that, at least for the moment, was above all things to be avoided. But it was requisite to derive advantage from the recognition in question, to defer it for a short time, to sell it for certain advantages, and to represent to Russia as the effect of ill-will towards France, the delay employed in negotiating the advantages desired. Such was the Austrian policy, and it must be confessed that it was natural enough among powers which were in a state of perpetual suspicion of each other.

The Austrian party in the Empire being so much weakened, it might happen that at the next election the house of Austria

would lose the imperial crown. There was a means of warding off this inconvenience, by securing to the house of Austria itself, for its hereditary states, not a royal but an imperial crown, in such wise, that the head of that house would remain emperor of Austria in the event of any future election causing him to cease to be emperor of Germany. This is what M. de Champagny, at Vienna, and M. de Cobentzel, at Paris, were charged with demanding from the First Consul as the price of what he demanded for himself. For the rest they were to assure him that, saving the discussion of conditions, the principle of the recognition was at once admitted by the emperor Francis.

Although the First Consul had entertained but little doubts as to the dispositions of these powers, their replies filled him with satisfaction. He lavished testimonies of gratitude and friendship upon the court of Prussia. He no less warmly thanked the court of Vienna, and added, that he consented without hesitation to recognise the title of emperor, when assumed by the head of the house of Austria. Only, he would not wish to publish that declaration immediately, lest he should appear to purchase the recognition of his own title at any price whatever. He preferred to engage himself, by a secret treaty, to recognise at a future time, the successor of Francis II., as emperor of Austria, should he lose the quality of emperor of Germany. Further, if the court of Vienna insisted, he was ready to give way upon this difficulty, which was not one in fact, as all these titles had ceased to have any real importance. From Charlemagne down to the eighteenth century, there was but one single sovereign who bore the title of emperor, at least in the west. Since the eighteenth century, there were two, the Czar of Russia having taken that qualification. In consequence of what was passing in France, there were going to be three. Some day there would be four, if at a future Germanic election any other prince than the head of the house of Austria should be chosen as emperor. It was even supposed that the king of England, having called the united Parliament of England, Scotland, and Ireland the IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT, might be tempted to style himself emperor. In that case there would be five. All this did not merit to be paused upon. They were mere appellations which no longer had the value which attached to them when Francis I. and Charles V. disputed for the suffrages of the Germanic electors.

Independently of these tranquillising assurances of the principal courts, the First Consul had received the strongest testimonials of adhesion from the army. General Soult especially had written him a letter full of the most satisfactory declarations, and during the fifteen or twenty days which had been devoted to corresponding with Vienna and Berlin, the important cities of Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Paris, had sent energetic

addresses in favour of the re-establishment of monarchy. The impulse was general, the éclat as public as it could be; it was necessary, therefore, to proceed to official steps, and explain to the Senate the posture of affairs.

The First Consul, as has been seen, had not publicly received the Senate, and had made only a verbal reply to the message of the 6th Germinal. He had deferred his official answer for nearly a month. He made it on the 5th Floréal (25th April, 1804), and it brought about the expected dénouement.

"Your address of the 6th Germinal," said the First Consul, "has not ceased to occupy my attention.... You have judged the right of inheritance of the supreme magistracy necessary to shelter the French people from the plots of our enemies, and from the agitations which might spring from rival ambitions; many of our institutions have also seemed to you to need perfecting, in order to secure, undecayingly, the triumph of equality and of public liberty, and to afford to the nation and to the government the double guarantee of which they stand in need. In proportion as I have fixed my attention upon these grave objects, I have felt more and more deeply how important to me are the counsels of your wisdom and experience under circumstances at once so novel and so important. I therefore invite you fully to explain your views and wishes."

This message was not yet published any more than that to which it served as a reply. The Senate immediately assembled to deliberate. The deliberation was smooth, and the conclusion known beforehand: it was the proposal to convert the Consular Republic into an hereditary Empire.

However, it was not advisable that every thing should pass in silence; it was requisite that there should be a debate somewhere, in a body whose discussion was public, of the grand resolution that was contemplated. The Senate did not discuss. The Legislative Body heard official orators, and voted in silence. The Tribunate, though narrowed and converted into a section of the Council of State, still preserved the right of speech. It was resolved to make use of it, that there might be heard, in the only Tribune which had preserved the privilege of expressing its opposition aloud, some speeches having the appearance of being independent.

The Tribunate was then presided over by M. Fabre de l'Aude, a personage devoted to the Bonaparte family. It was agreed with him to choose a tribune, whose anterior opinions had been frankly Republican, and to charge him to open the proceedings. The tribune Curée, the compatriot and personal enemy of M. Cambacérès, was selected to play this part.

It was publicly believed that this personage, the supposed creature of the Second Consul, had been named and put forward by him. Such was not the case. It was without his knowledge, and rather in opposition to him, that M. Curée had

been named. The latter, formerly an ardent republican, and now, like many others, completely reconciled to monarchical ideas, submitted a motion in which he proposed the re-establishment of hereditary succession in favour of the Bonaparte family. M. Fabre de l'Aude carried the motion to St. Cloud, to submit it to the approbation of the First Consul. He seemed not to be very fully satisfied with it, and thought the language of the converted republican neither sufficiently dexterous nor sufficiently elevated. However, it would have been inconvenient to choose another member of the Tribunate. He had the copy that was submitted to him retouched, and returned it immediately to M. Fabre de l'Aude. The text had undergone a singular alteration at St. Cloud. Instead of the words *hereditary succession in the Bonaparte family*, were inserted the words *hereditary succession in the descendants of Napoleon Bonaparte.* M. Fabre de l'Aude was a particular friend of Joseph, and one of the members of his private circle. Evidently the First Consul, displeased with his brothers, would not take any constitutional engagement towards them. The sycophants of Joseph busied themselves around M. Fabre de l'Aude, and the draft of the motion was taken back to St. Cloud, to have the words *Bonaparte family* replaced instead of the words *descendants of Napoleon Bonaparte*. The draft was returned with the word *descendants* retained without any explanation.

M. Fabre resolved not to make any stir about this circumstance, and to give M. Curée the text of the motion as it had come from the hands of the First Consul, but after inserting the version preferred by Joseph. He imagined that if the motion were once presented and copied into the *Moniteur*, no one would venture to alter it again, and he prepared himself, if need should be, to have a painful explanation with the First Consul. It was a proof that the party surrounding the Consul's brothers were strongly enough combined to brave, in their interest, even the displeasure of the head of the family. All these proceedings were communicated day by day to Joseph, who had already proceeded to the camp of Boulogne.

On Saturday, the 8th Floréal (28th of April, 1804), the motion of M. Curée was deposited at the Tribunate, and the discussion of it adjourned to Monday, the 10th Floréal. A crowd of orators pressed forward to the Tribune to support it, and vied with each other for the opportunity of distinguishing themselves by a dissertation upon the advantages of monarchy. The substance, which, moreover, was correct, was as follows:

The Revolution of 1789 sought the abolition of feudality, the reform of our social state, the reform of abuses introduced under an arbitrary rule, and the diminution of the absolute power of royalty, by the intervention of the nation in the government. Those were its real objects. All which exceeded that limit had gone beyond the mark, and produced nothing

but misfortunes. France had been taught this by bitter experience. It was necessary to profit by that experience, and to undo what had been overdone. Monarchy, then, was to be re-established upon the new bases of constitutional liberty and civil equality. Re-establishing the monarchy there was but one monarch possible, Napoleon Bonaparte, with remainder to the members of his family.

The most zealous orators of the Tribunate seasoned their harangues with invectives against the Bourbons, and the solemn declaration that the restoration of those princes to France was for ever impossible; that it was the duty of every Frenchman, at the cost of his blood, to oppose their return. It would appear that the inconsistency which these orators now exhibited in advocating monarchy after having taken so many oaths to the Republic, indivisible and imperishable, should have been a lesson to teach them to speak less positively as to the future. But there is no lesson which can prevent ordinary men from plunging into the torrent which rushes before them: all go readily with it, especially when they hope to find honours and fortune in its course.

In the number of these zealots the most zealous were the men who had formerly been distinguished for their republican spirit, or those who at a later period were to distinguish themselves by their zeal for the Bourbons. One personage alone, in the midst of this outburst of abject adulation, displayed real dignity. He was the tribune Carnot. Undoubtedly, he deceived himself in his general theories, for, after what had occurred during ten years, it was difficult to conceive that, for a country like France, the Republic was preferable to monarchy, but the champion of error was more noble in his attitude than the champions of truth, because he had the advantage over them of a courageous and disinterested conviction. What renders his courage the more honourable to him is, that he expressed himself not as a demagogue, but, on the contrary, as a wise and moderate citizen and a lover of order. He declared that he would on the next day submit docilely to the sovereign whom the law should have instituted, but that while it was under discussion, and until it had passed, he would express his opinion upon it.

He commenced by speaking in noble terms of the First Consul, and of the services that he had rendered to the Republic. If, to secure order and a reasonable liberty in France, an hereditary ruler were necessary, it would be madness, said he, to choose any other than Napoleon Bonaparte. No one had dealt more terrible blows to the enemies of the country; no one had done so much for its civil organisation. Had he conferred nothing else on the nation but the Civil Code, his name would deservedly descend to posterity. It could not, then,

be doubted that if it was necessary to raise up the throne again, it was he who ought to be set upon it, and not that blind and vindictive race, who would re-enter France only to shed the blood of the best citizens, and to re-establish the reign of the narrowest prejudices. But since, in fact, Napoleon Bonaparte had rendered such great services, was there no other recompense that could be offered to him than the sacrifice of the liberty of France?

The tribune Carnot, without plunging into endless dissertations upon the advantages and disadvantages attached to different forms of government, endeavoured to show that at Rome the times of the Empire had been as much disturbed as those of the Republic, and that the former had less of masculine virtues and heroism; that the ten centuries of the French monarchy had not been less stormy than those of all the known republics; that under the monarchy the people attached themselves to families, identified themselves with their passions, their rivalries, and their hatreds, and agitated themselves as much for those causes as for any others; that if the French Republic had had its days of bloodshed, such troubles were inseparable from its origin; that this, at the utmost, only proved the necessity for a temporary dictatorship, as at Rome; that that dictatorship had been conferred on Napoleon Bonaparte; that no one disputed it with him; that it depended upon himself to make the noblest and most glorious use of it, in preserving it only during the time necessary to prepare France for liberty; but that if he would convert it into a perpetual and hereditary power, he would renounce a matchless and immortal glory; that the new states founded twenty years since on the other side of the Atlantic, were a proof that repose and happiness were to be found under Republican institutions; and that, as regarded himself, he should for ever regret that the First Consul would not employ his power in securing such a felicity for his country. Examining the often used argument that there would be more chance of a durable peace by assimilating the form of government to that generally received in Europe, he demanded whether the recognition of the new emperor would be so easy as was imagined; whether they would resort to arms in case of a refusal; whether France, converted into an Empire, would not be as likely as France maintained as a Republic, to offend Europe, excite its jealousies; in a word, provoke war?

Glancing backward, and bidding a noble adieu to the past, the tribune Carnot exclaimed:

"Was liberty, then, shown to man that he might never enjoy her? Was she incessantly presented to his wishes as a fruit to which he could not stretch out his hand, but to be stricken with death? No; I cannot consent to look upon this benefit so universally preferable to all others, and without which all others become valueless—I cannot consent to look

upon it as a mere illusion. My heart tells me that liberty is possible, that its régime is easy, and more stable than any arbitrary or oligarchical government."

He concluded with these words, worthy of a good citizen:

"Ever ready to sacrifice my dearest affections to the interests of our common country, I shall content myself with having this one more time raised the accents of a free soul, and my respect for the law will be all the more secured, because it is the fruit of long convulsions and of that reason which imperatively commands us now to unite firmly against the common enemy, that enemy who is ever ready to foment discords, and to whom all measures are legitimate that will aid him towards his end of universal oppression and the dominion of the seas."

The tribune Carnot evidently confounded liberty with the Republic, and that is the common error of those who reason as he did. The Republic is not necessarily liberty, any more than monarchy is necessarily order. Oppression is to be met with under a republic, as disorder is to be met with under a monarchy. But for good laws, both the one and the other would be met with under all governments. But the question to be decided was whether, with wise laws, a monarchy would not give, in a higher degree than any other form of government, the utmost possible liberty, and, besides, the force of action necessary to great military states; and especially whether the habitudes of twelve centuries had not rendered it inevitable, and thence desirable, in a country like ours. If that were the case, would it not have been better to admit it and to organise it wisely, than to flounder about in a false position which harmonised neither with the ancient manners of France nor with the want which was then experienced of a stable and permanent government? The illustrious tribune was right, in our opinion, only upon one point: perhaps a temporary dictatorship was all that was necessary to enable Napoleon to pave the way at a future time, to the Republic, according to M. Carnot; to a representative monarchy, according to us. Napoleon was marvellously chosen by Providence to prepare France for a new régime, and to deliver her up, aggrandised and regenerated, to those, be they whom they might, who were to govern her after him.

The tribune Carin de Nisas undertook to reply to M. Carnot, and acquitted himself of that task to the great satisfaction of the new monarchists, but with a mediocrity of language equal to the mediocrity of his ideas. However, it was a mere pretence of discussion. Fatigue and the conviction of its profound inutility speedily put an end to it. A committee of thirteen members was appointed to examine the motion of the tribune Curée, and convert it into a definitive resolution.

In the sitting of the 13th Floréal (3rd of May), that is to say, on the Tuesday, M. Jard-Pauvillier, the reporter of that committee, proposed to the Tribunate to pass a vote, which, by the consti-

tutional rules then in force, would have to be addressed to the Senate, and carried to that body by a deputation.

The vote was as follows:—

First, That Napoleon Bonaparte, now Consul for life, become Emperor, and in that capacity invested with the government of the French Republic.

Secondly, That the title of emperor and the imperial power be made hereditary in his family, in the male line, according to the order of primogeniture.

Thirdly, That in introducing into the organisation of the constituted authorities the modifications rendered necessary by the establishment of hereditary power, equality, liberty, and the rights of the people shall be preserved in all their integrity.

This vote, adopted by an immense majority, was carried to the Senate on the following day, 14th Floreal (4th of May, 1804). It was M. François de Neufchateau who, as vice-president, occupied the chair at that sitting. After hearing the deputation, and having officially registered the vote it had brought up, he said to the tribunes: "I cannot remove the veil which conceals for a time the proceedings of the Senate. I may inform you, however, that since the 6th Germinal we have directed the attention of the chief magistrate to the same subject as you have. But observe your advantages; that which we, for two months have meditated in silence, your constitution has enabled you to discuss in presence of the people. The happy developments that you have given to a grand idea, have procured for the Senate, which opened the Tribune to you, the gratification of congratulating itself on its choice, and applauding your labour.

"In your public discourses we have recognised the substance of all our opinions. Like you, citizen tribunes, we do not wish the return of the Bourbons, because we do not wish counter-revolution, the only present that could be made to us by those unfortunate exiles, who have carried away with them despotism, nobility, feudal tyranny, slavery, and ignorance.

"Like you, citizen tribunes, we wish to raise up a new dynasty, because we wish to secure to the French people all the rights which they have reconquered. Like you, we wish that liberty, equality, and enlightenment, may be prevented from retrograding. I speak not of the great man called by his glory to give his name to the age in which he lives. It is not to himself, but to us, that he devotes his energies and genius. What you propose in the ardour of enthusiasm, the Senate will consider with cool deliberation."

It is evident from these words of the vice-president, that the Senate wished to take the lead, and not to expose itself this time to be anticipated or surpassed in the matter of devotion to the new master. The secret directors of the change that was in progress had well foreseen the influence which the discussion of the Tribunate would exercise upon that body. They had made use of it to hasten the resolution of the Senate,



It was now nece
stitutional articles.
several senators, of the
which committee was char
Senatus Consultum. As no
publicity, they on the following
the proceedings of the Senate, the com
to the First Consul, those which it had re
all the addresses which, for some time past,
re-establishment of monarchy.

The committee named proceeded to the work on th
It assembled at St. Cloud, in the presence of the First Co
and his two colleagues. It examined and resolved in suc
sion, all the questions to which the establishment of he
ditary power had given birth. The first which presented itse
was the title of the new monarch. Should he be called king
or emperor? The same reason which in ancient Rome in-
duced the Cæsars not to revive the title of king, and to take
the wholly military title of *Imperator*—this same reason decided
the framers of the new constitution to prefer the title of
emperor. It presented at once more novelty and more gran-
deur; it avoided, to a certain extent, the *souvenirs* of a past
which they wished to restore, in part, but not entirely.
Moreover, in this qualification, there was something of the
unlimited which suited the ambition of Napoleon. His nume-
rous enemies in Europe, daily attributing to him designs which
he had not at all, or not as yet, by repeating in a host of jour-
nals that he contemplated the reconstitution of the Empire of
the West, or at least that of the Gauls—his enemies had prepared
all minds, and even his own, for the title of emperor. This

title was in the mouths of all, whether friends or foes, had been adopted. It was chosen without opposi cordingly, it was decided that the First Consul s claimed Emperor of the French.

The hereditary succession, the object of the was naturally established upon the princi that is to say, from male to male, in the or Napoleon having no children, and not have any, it was proposed to give hi ion, such as it existed in the Roman ions and its solemn forms. In mission of the crown w bers of th misconduct in a ne throne, an absolute rial family was attributed the marriage of a French consent of the head of the e prince and his children of all ning short of the dissolution of the d, could enable him to recover the rights

ers and sisters of the Emperor received the rank and princesses, as well as the honours attached to title. It was resolved that the civil list should be established on the same principles as that of 1791: that is to say, that it should be voted for the whole reign; that it should consist of the still existent royal palaces; of the produce of the domains of the crown, and of an annual revenue of twenty-five millions. The allowances of the French princes were fixed at a million francs per annum for each. The Emperor had the right of fixing by imperial decrees (corresponding to what we call ordonnances) the interior government of the household, and the court etiquette suitable to his imperial dignity.

On entering so completely into monarchical ideas, it was necessary to surround this new throne with grand dignities, which should serve it both for ornament and support. It was further necessary to remember those secondary ambitions which had voluntarily ranked themselves below a superior ambition, had aided it to obtain its grandeurs, and were entitled, in their turn, to receive from it the price of their private and public services. All had their eyes upon the two consuls, Cambacérès and Lebrun, who, though far inferior to their colleague in every re-

spect, had nevertheless shared the supreme power, and rendered incontestable services by the wisdom of their counsels. Both of them were members of the senatorial committee, which drew up at St. Cloud the new monarchical constitution. The consul Cambacérès, probably for the first time in his life, unable to conceal a displeasure, showed himself cold and little communicative. He was as reserved on this occasion as M. Fouché was the contrary, and was no longer able to disguise his vexation, and the contempt that he felt for the constructors of the new monarchy. This state of affairs produced several quarrels, which were speedily terminated by the authority of Napoleon. There was a general feeling of the necessity of satisfying the two consuls who were going out of office, and especially M. Cambacérès, who, in spite of certain failings, enjoyed an immense political consideration. It had at first been proposed, in order to render the imitation of the Roman Empire complete, to allow the two consuls to remain beside the Emperor. Every one is aware that, after the elevation of the Cæsars to the empire, they preserved the institution of the consuls, that one of the mad members of the family gave that title to his horse, that others gave it to their slaves, or their eunuchs, and that, in the Empire of the East, very near the time of its fall, there were still two annual consuls, charged with the regulation of the calendar. It was this any thing but flattering remembrance that inspired otherwise well-meaning friends with the idea of preserving the two consuls in the new French Empire. M. Fouché, repelling this proposal, urged that there was but little need to care about those who might lose somewhat by the new organisation; the mainly important point was to do away with every trace of a régime so decried as that of the Republic had now become.

"Those who are superseded by the new régime," replied M. Cambacérès, "can console themselves, for they will carry with them what men do not always carry out of office, the public esteem."

This allusion to M. Fouché, and to his first retirement from office, caused the First Consul to smile an approval of the retort, but he hastened to put an end to these disputes, which had become painful. The second and third Consuls were not summoned any more to the sitting of the committee.

M. de Talleyrand, the most ingenious of inventors, when the object was to gratify ambition, proposed to borrow from the Germanic Empire certain of its grand dignities. In that ancient empire, each of the seven electors was marshal, cup-bearer, treasurer, or chancellor of the kingdom of Arles, or of Italy, &c. &c. With the idea, but vague as yet, of the possible future re-establishment of the Empire of the West in favour of France, it was to prepare the way for that measure, to surround the Emperor with grand dignitaries, chosen for the nonce from the French princes or the great personages of the Republic, and destined at a future time to be kings themselves,

and to form a cortège of vassal monarchs around the throne of the modern Charlemagne.

M. de Talleyrand, in concert with the First Consul, devised six grand officers, corresponding not to so many offices of the imperial household, but to so many departments of the government. In that constitution, in which there still remained many elective functions, in which the members of the Senate, of the Legislative Body, and of the Tribunate were to be elected, and in which the Emperor himself was to be elected in the event of a failure of collateral issue, a grand elector, entrusted with certain honorific duties relating to elections, might be conceived. A grand elector, then, was proposed as the first grand dignitary. For the second, an arch-chancellor of the Empire was proposed, charged with duties of pure pomp, of general surveillance with reference to the judicial order. For the third, an arch-chancellor of State, charged with similar duties with reference to the diplomatic service; for the fourth, an arch-treasurer; for the fifth, a constable; for the sixth, a high-admiral. The title of each of the latter sufficiently indicates to what part of the government his dignity related.

The titularies of these grand officers were, as we have said, dignitaries and not functionaries, for they were intended to be irresponsible and irremovable. They were to have purely honorific privileges, and only the general surveillance of the department of government to which, respectively, their titles had reference. Thus, the grand elector convoked the Legislative Body, the Senate, and the electoral colleges, administered the oath to the members elected to the various assemblies, and took part in all the formalities attendant upon the convocation or the dissolution of the electoral colleges. The arch-chancellor of the Empire received the oath of magistrates, or presented them when sworn before the Emperor, attended to the promulgation of laws and *Senatus Consulta*, presided over the Council of State and the High Imperial Court (of which we shall speak by and by), suggested desirable reforms of the laws, and finally, exercised the functions of civil officer of state for the births, marriages, and deaths of the members of the imperial family. The arch-chancellor of State received the ambassadors, introduced them to the Emperor, and signed and promulgated treaties. The arch-treasurer was custodier of the great book of the national debt, gave the guarantee of his signature to all the papers delivered to the creditors of the State, audited the accounts of the accountant-general's office, previous to submitting them to the Emperor, and gave his advice as to the management of the finances. The constable, with reference to the war administration, and the high-admiral with reference to that of the marine, had precisely similar duties. But Napoleon laid it down as a fixed principle, that a grand dignitary should never be a minister, in order that the depart-

ment of display might be kept distinct from the real function. There were in each department of government, dignities modelled upon royalty itself, inactive, irresponsible, and honorific as it, but, like it, charged with a general and superior superintendence.

The titularies of these dignities could supply the place of the Emperor in his absence, whether in the Senate, in the councils, or at the army. They formed with the Emperor the grand council of the Empire. Finally, in case of the extinction of the natural and legitimate heirs, they elected the Emperor, and in case of minority they watched over the future sovereign, and formed the council of regency.

The idea of these grand dignitaries was accepted by all the framers of the new constitution. Each titulary, provided that he was not at once a grand dignitary and an imperial prince, was to receive a salary equal to one-third of that of the princes, that is to say, the third of a million (13,333*l.* sterling). Here were the means of providing for the two brothers of the Emperor, his superseded colleagues, and the eminent personages who had rendered important services, military or civil. After the two brothers, Joseph and Louis, every one thought of the consuls Cambacérès and Lebrun, Eugène Beauharnois, the adopted son of the First Consul, Murat, his brother-in-law, Berthier, his faithful and invaluable companion in arms, and M. de Talleyrand, his medium of communication with the European powers. To his own will alone was left the distribution of these high favours.

It was natural, at the same time, to create in the army elevated posts, to re-establish that dignity of marshal which existed in the old monarchy, and which is adopted by all Europe as the most brilliant sign of military command. It was settled that there should be sixteen marshals, besides four honorary marshals, selected from veteran generals, become senators, and, therefore, precluded from active functions. The posts of inspectors-general of artillery, of engineers, and of cavalry, were also re-established. To the grand military officers were added grand civil officers, such as chamberlains, masters of the ceremonies, &c., and of both was composed a second class of dignitaries, under the title of grand officers of the Empire, holding their appointments for life, like the grand dignitaries themselves. To give them all a sort of root in the soil, they were charged with the presidencies of the electoral colleges. The presidency of each electoral college was permanently assigned to one of the grand dignitaries and to one of the class of civil or military grand officers. Thus the grand elector was to preside over the electoral college of Bruxelles; the arch-chancellor over that of Bordeaux; the arch-chancellor of State over that of Nantes; the arch-treasurer over that of Lyons; the constable over that of Turin; the high-admiral over that of Marseilles. The grand officers, civil or military, were to preside over the electoral col-

leges of minor importance. Human artifice could invent nothing more skilful to imitate an aristocracy with a democracy; for this hierarchy of six grand dignitaries, and of forty or fifty grand officers placed upon the steps of the throne, was at once an aristocracy and a democracy: an aristocracy by the position and the honors which, thanks to our conquests, it was to have; a democracy by origin, as it consisted of lawyers, soldiers of fortune, and sometimes of peasants, become marshals, and was to remain constantly open to any man who could rise by his genius or by his courage. These creations have disappeared with their creator, with the vast Empire which served as their base; but it is possible that they would finally have succeeded had time sanctified them with that dust of antiquity which engenders respect.

While raising the throne and ornamenting its steps with this social pomp, it was indispensably necessary to secure some guarantees to the citizens, and to compensate them by some little real liberty for that apparent liberty of which they were deprived by the abolition of the Republic. For some time past it had been emphatically argued that under a well-regulated monarchy the government would be stronger, and the citizens at the same time more free. It was necessary to keep a part of these promises, if one of the kind could be kept, at a time when every one putting forward his wishes for an energetic power would, for want of using it, allow liberty to perish, how strongly soever written in the laws. It was proposed, then, to give to the Senate and to the Legislative Body some prerogatives of which they were destitute, and which were calculated to become useful guarantees to the citizens.

The Senate, composed in the first place of eighty members elected by itself, then of citizens whom the Emperor judged worthy of that elevated position, and finally of the six grand dignitaries and the princes, having attained the age of eighteen, was still the first body in the State. It formed the others by the faculty of election which it had preserved; it could annul any unconstitutional law or decree, and could reform the constitution by means of an organic *Senatus Consultum*. Amidst the successive transformations to which it had been subjected within four years, it had remained quite as powerful as M. Sieyès had desired it to be. The restorers of monarchy, deliberating at St. Cloud, proposed to add two new prerogatives of the highest importance. They confided to it the guardianship of personal liberty and of the liberty of the press. By Article XLVI. of the first Consular constitution, the government could not detain an individual in prison without bringing him, within ten days, before his natural judges. By the second Consular constitution, that which established the Consulate for life, the Senate, in the case of conspiracy against the safety of the State, had the power to decide whether the government should exceed the delay of ten days, and

if so, by how long a period. It was now determined to regulate in a popular manner, the arbitrary power thus given to the government over the liberty of the citizens. A senatorial commission was formed, consisting of seven members chosen by ballot, and to be continually renewed by the retirement of one of the members every four months. It was to receive the petitions and complaints of prisoners or their families, and to declare whether the detention was just and required by the interest of the state. When such was not the case, if, after having addressed a first, second, and third request to the minister who had ordered the arrest, that minister did not cause the claimed individual to be released, the minister could himself be cited before the imperial high court for violation of personal liberty.

A similar commission, organised in the same manner, was charged to watch over the liberty of the press. It was the first time of this liberty being named in the Consular constitutions, so little was it thought of so shortly after the saturnalia of the press during the Directory. As for the periodical press, it was left under the authority of the police. It was not for it that any interest was expressed. It was only for books that any concern was evinced, they alone being deemed worthy of the liberty that was refused to the journals. They were not to be subjected, as they were before 1789, to the arbitrary power of the police. Every printer or bookseller, having any publication restrained by public authority, had the power to apply to the senatorial commission, charged with this duty; and if, after examining the interdicted or mutilated book, the senatorial committee disapproved of the rigour of the public authority, it made a first, second, and third application to the minister, and after the third, in case of refusal to yield to its repeated opinion, it could cite the minister before the high imperial court.

Thus, besides the powers which we have already enumerated, the Senate had the duty of watching over personal liberty, and the liberty of the press. These two last guarantees were not without their value. Nothing, it is true, had any instant efficiency, under a despotism which was accepted by all. But under the successors of the depository of this despotism, should there be any such, such guarantees could not fail to acquire a real power.

Something in the same direction was done for the organisation of the Legislative Body. The Tribunate, as we have observed several times, alone discussed the laws, and, after having formed its opinion, deputed three orators to sustain it against three councillors of State, before the mute Legislative Body. This dumbness, corrected, in the opinion of M. Sieyès, by the loquacity of the Tribunate, had speedily become absurd in the eyes of a satirical nation, which, though fearing oratory and its excesses, laughed nevertheless at the compulsory silence of its legislators. The dumbness of the Legislative Body had become

more ridiculous than ever, since the Tribunate, deprived of all vigour, had also become silent. It was determined, that the Legislative Body, after having heard the councillors of State and the members of the Tribunate, should retire and discuss, in secret committee, the bills which had been submitted to it; that there each member could speak, and that then the Legislative Body would resume its public sitting, and vote in the ordinary way, by ballot.

The right of speech, then, was restored to the Legislative Body, in secret committee.

The Tribunate had become, since the institution of the Consulate for life, a sort of council of State; reduced from that epoch to fifty members, and having acquired the habit of only examining bills in private conference with the councillors of State, who approved those bills, it received in the new constitution an organisation conformable to the habits it had adopted. It was divided into three sections, the first of legislation, the second of home affairs, the third of finance. It was only to discuss laws in the sections, and never in general assembly. Three orators were to go, in the name of the section, to support its opinion before the Legislative Body. This was definitively to perpetuate, by a constitutional regulation, the new form which the body had only imposed upon itself in deference.

The term of service of its members was extended from five to ten years, a favour to the individual members, but a restriction of the power of the body itself, by less frequently renewing its spirit.

Finally, to all this was added an institution, necessary alike for the safety of the government and that of the citizens; it was that of a high court, which in England, and now in France, exists in the House of Peers. The want of such a court had been felt in the prosecution of those implicated in the Georges conspiracy, and in the lamentable execution of Vincennes. It would be still more felt under a dictatorial government, whose agents offered only a nominal responsibility, since they could not be summoned before any body of the State. There was not then, as now, the means of summoning them before one of the two chambers. It was very requisite, therefore, to furnish the government with a guarantee against conspiracies, and the citizens against the agents of public authority.

It was desired to give to the institution of this high court the outward advantage which was sought for all the new monarchical institutions, that of adding as much to the liberty of the citizens as to the power of the government. Accordingly, its seat was placed in the Senate, without, however, its being entirely and solely composed of senators. It was to consist of sixty senators, out of a hundred and twenty; of six presidents of the council of State; of fourteen councillors of State; of twenty members of the Court of Cassation; of grand officers of the Empire; of six grand dignitaries, and of princes having

acquired deliberative votes. Its president was to be the high chancellor. It was charged with taking cognizance of plots formed against the security of the State and the person of the Emperor; of arbitrary acts imputed to the ministers and their agents; of magisterial derelictions or extortions; of errors imputed to land and sea generals in their commands; of offences committed by members of the imperial family, by grand dignitaries, grand officers, senators, councillors of State, &c., &c. It thus was not only a court of justice charged with the repression of great crimes, but also a political jurisdiction as to the ministers and the agents of the public authority; a tribunal of marshals as to generals and admirals; and a court of peers as to the great personages of State. A procureur-general, permanently attached to this extraordinary jurisdiction, had the duty of prosecuting, *ex officio*, in the event of complainants not themselves commencing proceedings.

The only modification made in the ordinary form of justice was the title of *Court* being substituted for that of Tribunal, for the tribunals of high rank. The Tribunal of Cassation was to take the title of *Court* of Cassation, and the Tribunals of Appeal were to be called Imperial Courts.

It was determined that an act of deference should once more be made towards the national sovereignty, and that registers in the usual manner should be opened to receive the suffrages of the citizens as to the establishment of the imperial hereditary succession in the male line of Napoleon Bonaparte, and his two brothers Joseph and Louis.

The Emperor was, within the space of two years, to take a solemn oath to the constitutions of the Empire, in presence of the grand dignitaries, the grand officers, the ministers, the Council of State, the Senate, the Legislative Body, the Tribunate, the Court of Cassation, the archbishops, the bishops, the presidents of the courts of justice, the presidents of electoral colleges, and the mayors of thirty-six principal towns of the Republic. This oath was to be taken, said the text of the new constitutional act, to the French people, upon the testament. It was conceived in the following terms: "I swear to maintain the integrity of the territory of the Empire, to respect and to cause to be respected the laws of the Concordat, and of the liberty of worship; to respect and to cause to be respected the equality of rights, political and civil liberty, and the irrevocability of the national property; to raise no impost and to establish no tax except by virtue of the law; to maintain the institution of the Legion of Honour, and to govern solely with the view to the interest, the happiness, and the glory of the French people."

Such were the conditions adopted for the new monarchy in a draft of a *Senatus Consultum*, written, like all the laws of that period, in a clear, simple, and precise manner.

This was the third and last transformation undergone by the celebrated constitution of M. Siéyès. We have elsewhere explained what was the idea of that legislator of the French Revolution. The aristocratic system is the haven in which those Republics have found shelter which have not ended in despotism. M. Sieyès, perhaps without suspecting it, had sought to pilot into the same port the French Republic, as much disgusted with agitations after ten years, as the Republics of antiquity and of the middle age were after many centuries; and he had composed his aristocracy of the leading and experienced men of the Revolution. To this end he had invented a Senate, inactive, but armed with immense influence, electing its own members and those of all the State bodies out of the rarely-renewed lists of notables, naming the heads of the government, revoking them, ostracising them at will, taking no part in the making of laws, but having the power to annul them on account of unconstitutionality; in a word, not exercising power, and yet conferring it, and having always the faculty of arresting it. To this he added an equally inactive Legislative Body, which silently admitted or rejected the laws which the Council of State was entrusted to make and the Tribunate to discuss; and, lastly, a supreme representative of the executive power, called grand elector, elective, and for life, like a doge, and inactive as a king of England, named by the Senate, and, in his turn, naming the ministers who alone were active and responsible. In this manner M. Sieyès had every where separated influence and action; influence, which delegates power, then controls, and arrests it; action, which receives and exercises it. He had given the former to an aristocracy indolent and exalted, the latter to elective and responsible agents. He had thus approached a sort of aristocratic monarchy, but still without hereditary succession, resembling Venice rather than Great Britain, and adapted rather to an exhausted country than to a free one.

Unfortunately for the labour of M. Sieyès, beside this aristocracy without root, composed of disabused and unpopularised revolutionists, was a man of genius whom France and Europe called a saviour. There was but small chance of this aristocracy defending itself like that of Venice against usurpation, and still less that in a time of rapid revolutions the struggle could be very long. At the outset, previous to accepting this constitution of M. Sieyès, general Bonaparte arranged his own place in it by making himself First Consul instead of grand elector. Scarcely had he begun to govern, when the ill-timed resistances of the Tribunate restraining him from the good that he wished to accomplish, he had crushed them, amid the loud applause of the public, wearied with revolutions, and had himself made Consul for life by the Senate. On the same opportunity he had added the constituent power to the previous powers of the Senate, not fearing to render all-powerful a body

that he dominated; he had annihilated the Tribunate by reducing it to fifty members, and by dividing it into sections, which discussed the laws proposed, *tête-à-tête* with the sections of the council of State. Such was the second transformation of the constitution of M. Sieyès, that which took place in 1802, at the epoch of the Consulate for life. A vigorous hand had thus in two years caused that aristocratic Republic to terminate in a sort of aristocratic monarchy, to which nothing more was needed than hereditary succession. Consequently, many had asked themselves, in 1802, why all was not finished at once, and why hereditary succession was not given to this so evident monarch? A conspiracy directed against his life awakening in greater force than ever the desire of more stable institutions, had at length brought about the last transformation, and the definitive conversion of the Constitution of the year VIII. into a monarchy, representative in form, absolute in fact. There were almost as many remains of republicanism beside a despotic power, as in the empire founded by the Cæsars. It was not representative monarchy such as we now understand it. That Senate, with the faculty of electing all the bodies of the State out of the electoral lists, with its constituent power, with its faculty of annulling the law—that Senate with so much power and yet subject to a master, did not resemble an Upper Chamber. That silent Legislative Body, although speech was restored to it in secret committee, did not resemble a Chamber of Deputies. And yet that Senate, that Legislative Body, that Emperor, all might one day have become a representative monarchy. We must not, then, judge of the constitution of M. Sieyès, altered by Napoleon, by the mute obedience which reigned under the Empire. Our Constitution of 1830, with the press and the chambers, would probably not have produced results sensibly different, for the spirit of the times does more than written laws. It would have been necessary to judge of the Imperial Constitution under the following reign. Then opposition, the inevitable sequel of a long submission, would have sprung up even in the Senate, for a long time so docile, but armed with an immense power. It would probably have come to an understanding with the electoral colleges to make choices conformable to the new spirit; it would have broken the fetters of the press; it would have opened the doors and windows of the palace of the Legislative Body, that the voices of its members might be heard afar off. It would have been representative monarchy as we now have it, with this difference, that the resistance would have come from above instead of from below. That is no proof that it would have been less enlightened, less constant, or less courageous. This, however, is a problem which time has borne away without solving, as it has borne away so many others. But those institutions were far from deserving the contempt which has so often been

expressed for them. They composed an aristocratic Republic, diverted from its end by a powerful chief, temporarily converted into an absolute monarchy, and destined, at a later day, to become a constitutional monarchy, strongly aristocratical, it is true, but founded upon the basis of equality; for under it every fortunate soldier might become constable, every able jurisconsult might become arch-chancellor, after the example of its founder, who became, from a simple officer of artillery, hereditary Emperor and Ruler of the world.

Such was the work of the constituent committee assembled at St. Cloud. During the last days of its sitting Messieurs Cambacérès and Lebrun had not attended. The altercations that had been provoked by the monarchical zeal of M. Fouché on the one hand, and by the ill-humour of M. Cambacérès on the other, were the cause of the Second and Third Consuls ceasing to be summoned. The wisest and the most prudent of the senators who were included in the committee regretted their absence, and pointed out to Napoleon how important it was to gratify his colleagues by treating them handsomely. He did not require to be advertised of that, for he well knew the value of the Second Consul, Cambacérès, appreciated his unostentatious devotedness, and was anxious to attach him to the new monarchy. He therefore sent for him to St. Cloud, entered into a new explanation with him upon the last change, listened to his opinions, stated his own, and terminated the debate by the expression of his will, thenceforth irrevocable. He had determined upon the crown, and he did not conceal it. Moreover, he had a splendid compensation to offer to Messrs. Cambacérès and Lebrun. To the first he destined the dignity of arch-chancellor of the Empire, to the second that of arch-treasurer. He treated them precisely as his own brothers, who were to be comprised in the number of the six grand dignitaries. He announced this resolution to M. Cambacérès; to that announcement he added that seductive language, which no one at that time resisted, and succeeded in entirely regaining him.

"I am," said he to M. Cambacérès, "and I shall be, more than ever surrounded by intrigues, and by false or interested counsels; you alone will have the judgment and the sincerity to tell me the truth. I wish, then, to bring you closer than ever to my person and to my ear. You will remain with me to possess all my confidence, and to justify it." These compliments were well merited. M. Cambacérès, having nothing more to desire or to fear in that elevated position, would be, and in fact was, the truest and the most influential of the counsellors of the new Emperor.

Joseph Bonaparte was named grand elector, Louis Bonaparte, constable. The nomination to the two dignities of arch-chancellor of State and high-admiral were deferred. Napoleon still hesitated among the various members of his family. He had thought of

Lucien, who was absent and in disgrace, but whose recent marriage there was some hope of dissolving; of Eugene Beauharnois, who solicited nothing, but with a perfect submission awaited all from the tenderness of his adoptive father; of Murat, who solicited, not personally, but through his wife, who, young, lovely, ambitious, and very dear to Napoleon, availed herself most skilfully of the tenderness he felt for her.

M. de Talleyrand, the principal inventor of the new dignities, experienced on this occasion a first disappointment, which had a very mischievous influence on his disposition, and threw him at a later period into an opposition which was ruinous to himself, and troublesome to Napoleon. The post of arch chancellor of the Empire, which had reference to judicial functions, having fallen to the Second Consul Cambaceres, M. de Talleyrand had hoped that the post of arch chancellor of State, which had reference to the diplomatic functions, would naturally have devolved upon him. But the new Emperor expressed himself quite resolutely upon that point. He did not admit the possibility of grand dignitaries being ministers: he would have for the latter only removable and responsible agents, whom he could revoke and punish at will. General Berthier was an instrument fully as valuable to him as M. de Talleyrand. He chose, nevertheless, to leave him minister, like M. de Talleyrand, compensating them both with grand endowments. The pride of M. de Talleyrand was singularly wounded, and, though a courtier, still he displayed somewhat of that attitude of a discontented courtier, which he then kept much in control, but which he subsequently kept far less so, thereby incurring some bitter disgraces.

There still remained both in the army and at court, posts fitted to satisfy all ambitions. There were four posts of honorary marshals to give to generals who were enjoying repose in the Senate, and sixteen for those who, still full of youth, were still figured at the head of our soldiers. Napoleon reserved the four first named for Kellerman, in remembrance of Valmy; Lefebvre, for his tried bravery and a devotion which dated from the 18th Brumaire; and Perignin and Serrurier for the respect in which they were deservedly held by the army. Of the sixteen posts of marshals destined for generals in active service, he determined to confer fourteen immediately, and to reserve two as the reward of future merits. These fourteen batons were given to general Jourdan for the splendid achievement at Fleurus; to general Berthier for his eminent and sustained services on the staff; to general Massena for Rivoli, Zurich, and Genoa; to generals Lannes and Ney for a long series of heroic deeds; to general Augereau for Castiglione; to general Brune for the Helder; to Murat for his chivalric valour at the head of the French cavalry; to general Bessières for the command of the guard which he had had since Marengo,

and of which he was worthy; to generals Moncey and Mortier for their warlike merits; to general Soult for his services in Switzerland, at Genoa, and in the Camp of Boulogne; to general Davoust for his conduct in Egypt, and for a firmness of character of which he shortly afterwards gave brilliant proofs; and, finally, to general Bernadotte for a certain renown acquired in the armies of the Sambre and Meuse, and of the Rhine, and especially for his relationship, and in spite of an envious hatred that Napoleon had discerned in the heart of that officer, and which already inspired him with a presentiment, often plainly expressed, of a future treason.

A general who had not as yet commanded in chief, but who, like generals Lannes, Ney, and Soult, had directed considerable corps, and who merited the marshal's baton as much as the officers just mentioned, was not included in the list of the new marshals. The general in question was Gouvion St. Cyr. If he did not equal the warrior's nature and the battle-field glance of Masséna, he surpassed him in science and military combinations. Since Moreau had been lost to France by his misconduct, and since Kléber and Desaix were dead, he, or Masséna, was the man most capable of commanding an army; Napoleon, be it understood, being above parallel with any one. But the jealous and unsociable character of St. Cyr had begun to procure him the frowns of the supreme dispenser of favour. With sovereign power came its foibles; and Napoleon who had pardoned Bernadotte his petty treacheries, the presage of a greater one, knew not how to forgive general St. Cyr his disparaging spirit. Nevertheless, general St. Cyr was ranked among the colonels-general, and became colonel-general of the cuirassiers. Junot and Marmont, the faithful aides-de-camp of general Bonaparte, were named colonels-general of hussars and chasseurs, and Baraguay d'Hilliers of dragoons. General Marescot received the post of inspector-general of engineers, and general Sougis that of inspector-general of artillery. In the navy, vice-admiral Bruix, the chief and the organiser of the flotilla, obtained the baton of admiral, and was made inspector-general of the coasts of the ocean; and vice-admiral Decrès was named inspector-general of the coasts of the Mediterranean.

The court also furnished grand posts for distribution. It was formed with all the pomp of the ancient French monarchy, and with more *éclat* than the imperial court of Germany. It was to have a grand almoner, a grand chamberlain, a grand huntsman, a grand equerry, a grand master of the ceremonies, and a grand marshal of the palace. The post of grand almoner was given to cardinal Fesch, uncle of Napoleon, the post of grand chamberlain to M. de Talleyrand, and that of grand huntsman to general Berthier. The court posts bestowed upon the two last-named were intended as a compensation for not having obtained two grand dignities of the Empire. The post of grand equerry,

was granted to M. de Caulaincourt, to avenge him for the calumnies of the royalists, who had been outrageous against him since the death of the duc d'Enghien. M. de Ségur, formerly ambassador from Louis XVI. to Catherine, a man eminently calculated to teach the new court the usages of the old one, was named grand master of the ceremonies. Duroc, who had governed the consular, now become the imperial, household, was still to govern it, under the title of grand marshal of the palace.

We shall not mention either the inferior posts, or the subaltern aspirants who disputed for them. History has nobler matters to deal with. She only descends to such details when they are important to a faithful painting of manners. We shall only say that the emigrants who, previous to the death of the duc d'Enghien, tended towards a reconciliation, and after his death had again withdrawn for an instant, but who, forgetful like the rest of the world, already began to think less of a catastrophe two months old, began to figure among the number of aspirants who were eager to find berths at the imperial court. Some of them were admitted. A lady of very old family, Madame de la Rochefoucauld, destitute of beauty but not of wit, distinguished for her education and her manners, formerly a zealous royalist, but who now laughed gracefully enough at her departed opinions, was destined to be principal lady of honour to Josephine.

All these appointments were known before they were announced in the *Moniteur*, published from mouth to mouth amidst the inexhaustible gossip of those who approved and those who disapproved, who had enough to do to express all that they felt at witnessing so singular a spectacle, each applauding or censuring according to his friendships or his enmities, or his pretensions gratified or disappointed, and scarcely any one according to his political opinions; for there were no political opinions then, except among hot-headed royalists, or implacable republicans.

To these nominations there was added another, and a far more serious one, that of M. Fouché, who was called to the ministry of police, re-established on his account, to recompense him for his services during the recent events.

It was necessary to give to these choices, and to the greatest of them all, that which made a general of the Republic an hereditary monarchy, the character of official acts. The *Senatus Consultum* was agreed upon and drawn up. It was arranged to present it on the 25th Floréal (16th of May, 1804), to the Senate, that it might be there decreed in the accustomed form. That presentation having taken place, a commission was immediately appointed to make its report. The drawing up of the report was intrusted to M. de Lacepéde, the savant and the senator most devoted to Napoleon. He had completed it in forty-eight hours, and presented it to the Senate on the 28th

Floréal (18th of May). That day was appointed for the solemn proclamation of Napoleon as Emperor. It had been decided that the consul Cambacérès should preside over the sitting of the Senate, that his adhesion to the new monarchical establishment might be the more striking. M. de Lacepède had scarcely finished his report, when the senators without a single apparent dissent, and by a sort of unanimous acclamation, adopted the *Senatus Consultum* in its entirety. They even evinced a visible impatience during the formalities indispensable to such an act, so eager were they to depart for St. Cloud. It was agreed that the Senate should go in a body to that residence to present its decree to the First Consul, and to salute him as Emperor. Scarcely was the adoption of the *Senatus Consultum* terminated, ere the senators tumultuously put an end to their sitting and hurried to their carriages, each striving who should be earliest at St. Cloud.

Arrangements had been made at the palace of the Senate, upon the roads, and also at St. Cloud, for this unheard of scene. A long line of carriages, escorted by the cavalry of the guard, conveyed the senators to the residence of the First Consul, on a lovely spring day. Napoleon and Josephine, pre-informed, expected this solemn visit. Napoleon, standing in military costume, calm as he well knew how to be when men's gaze was fixed upon him, and his wife at once gratified and agitated, received the Senate, with Cambacérès at its head. He, respectful as a colleague, still more respectful as a subject, bowed low and addressed the following speech to the soldier whom he was about to proclaim Emperor.

"SIRE.—Four years ago the affection and the gratitude of the French people intrusted the reins of government to your majesty, and the constitutions of the State had already left to you the choice of a successor. The more imposing title which is now decreed to you, therefore, is but a tribute that the nation pays to its own dignity, and to the necessity it experiences of daily offering you new proofs of its daily increasing respect and attachment.

"How, indeed, can the French people reflect without enthusiasm upon the happiness it has experienced since Providence prompted it to throw itself into your arms?

"Our armies were vanquished, the finances in disorder; public credit was annihilated; the remnants of our ancient splendour were disputed by factions; the ideas of religion, and even of morality were obscured; the habit of giving and resuming power left the magistrates without consideration.

"Your majesty appeared. You recalled victory to our standards, you restored order and economy in the public expenditure; the nation, encouraged by the use that you made of them, took confidence in its own resources; your wisdom calmed down the fury of parties; religion saw her altars raised.

again; finally, and that is doubtless the greatest of the miracles worked by your genius, that people whom civil ferments had rendered indocile to all restraint and inimical to all authority, have been by you taught to cherish and respect a power exercised only for its repose and glory.

"The French people does not pretend to set itself up as a judge of the constitutions of other states; it has no criticism to make, no examples to follow; experience henceforth becomes its lesson.

"For centuries it tasted of the advantages attached to the hereditary succession of power; it has had a short but painful experience of the contrary system; as the effect of a free and mature deliberation, it returns to a régime conformable to its spirit. It freely uses its rights to delegate to your imperial majesty a power that its interest forbids it to exercise for itself. It stipulates for generations yet unborn, and, by a solemn compact, it entrusts the happiness of its posterity to the scions of your race.

"Happy the nation which, after so many troubles, finds in its own bosom a man capable of stilling the storms of passion, of conciliating all interests, and of winning the suffrages of all ranks.

"If it be in the principles of our constitution to submit to the sanction of the people the part of the decree which concerns the establishment of an hereditary government, the Senate has deemed that it ought to beseech your imperial majesty to permit that the organic dispositions should forthwith be put in force, and for the glory as well as for the happiness of the Republic, at this very instant the Senate proclaims NAPOLEON EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH."

Scarcely had the arch-chancellor pronounced these words, ere the cry of *Vive l'Empereur* resounded beneath the roofs of the palace of St. Cloud. Heard in the court and gardens, that cry was repeated joyfully and with loud cheers. Confidence and hope beamed in every countenance, and all present, carried away by the exciting scene, felt that they had for a long time secured their happiness and that of France. The arch-chancellor, Cambacérès, himself carried away, seemed always to have wished for that which at this moment was accomplished.

Silence being restored, the Emperor addressed the Senate in the following terms:—

"Every thing which can contribute to the weal of the country is essentially connected with my happiness.

"I accept the title, which you believe to be useful to the glory of the nation.

"I submit to the people the sanction of the law of hereditary succession. I hope that France will never repent of the honours with which she shall invest my family.

"At all events, my spirit will no longer be with my posterity,

on that day when it shall cease to merit the love and confidence of the Grand Nation."

Reiterated acclamations drowned these noble words; then the Senate, through its organ, M. Cambacérès, addressed a few words of congratulation to the Empress, who, according to her custom, listened to them with perfect gracefulness, but replied to them only by her deep emotion.

The Senate then retired, after having conferred on that man, born at so vast a distance from the throne, the title of emperor, which he never lost, even after his fall, and in exile. We shall designate him henceforth under that title, which was his from the day of which we speak. The will of the nation, so certain that there was something puerile in the care that was taken formally to establish it—the will of the nation was to decide if he should be hereditary Emperor. But, in the meantime, he was Emperor of the French, by the power of the Senate, acting within the limits of its prerogatives.

As the senators retired, Napoleon detained the high chancellor Cambacérès, and pressed him to remain to dine with the imperial family. The Emperor and the Empress overwhelmed him with attentions, and endeavoured to make him forget the distance which henceforth separated him from his former colleague. Sooth to say, the arch chancellor might readily console himself; in reality, he had not at all fallen; only, his master had ascended, and had made every one ascend with him.

The Emperor and the arch-chancellor, Cambacérès, had to converse on some important subjects connected with the events of the day. These were, the ceremony of the coronation, and the government to be given to Italy, which could not remain a republic beside France, that had now become a monarchy. Napoleon, who loved the marvellous, had conceived a bold idea, the accomplishment of which would strike men's minds, and render still more extraordinary his accession to the throne; this was, to have himself crowned by the Pope himself, brought from Rome for that purpose. The thing was without precedent in all the eighteen centuries of the Church. All the emperors of Germany, without an exception, had gone to Rome to be crowned. Charlemagne, proclaimed emperor of the West in the Basilick of St. Peter, in some sort by surprise, on Christmas-day, 800, had not seen the Pope leave his abode on his account. Pepin, it is true, was crowned in France by pope Stephen, but the latter had repaired to France to ask aid against the Lombards. It was for the first time that a pope was about to quit Rome, to consecrate the rights of a new monarch, in that monarch's own capital. What resembled the past was, the Church recompensing with the title of Emperor the successful warrior who had succoured her; a marvellous resemblance to Charlemagne, and one which abundantly supplied the place of that legitimacy which was so vainly boasted by the Bourbons, and

which their defeat, their misconduct, and their co-operation in shameful plots had sunk into disrepute.

Scarcely had Napoleon conceived this idea, ere he converted it into an irrevocable resolution, and he promised himself that he would bring Pius VII. to Paris by any means, persuasion, or fear. It was one of the most difficult of negotiations, and one in which no one but himself could succeed. He determined to make use of Cardinal Caprara, who had incessantly written to Rome, that but for Napoleon religion would have been lost in France, and perhaps even in Europe. He imparted his project to the arch-chancellor, Cambacérès, and planned with him the method of setting about making the first attack upon the prejudices, the scruples, and the indolence of the Roman court.

As regarded the Italian Republic, it would, for two years past, have been a scene of confusion but for the presidency of general Bonaparte. In the first place, M. de Melzi, an honourable and tolerably sensible man, but morose, a martyr to gout, constantly on the eve of giving in his resignation as vice-president, and destitute of the firmness to support the heavy cares of government, was a very inefficient representative of the public authority. Murat, commanding the French army in Italy, threw difficulties in the way of the Italian government, which greatly added to the chagrin of M. de Melzi. Napoleon was incessantly obliged to interfere to make the two authorities agree. To these personal difficulties were added those which arose out of the state of affairs itself. The Italians, but little moulded as yet to the constitutional régime, which allowed them to participate in their own government, were either of an entire indifference, or of an extreme vehemence. To govern, there were only the moderates, few in number, and embarrassed with their part, placed as they were among the nobles devoted to Austria, the liberals, inclined to Jacobinism, and the masses, sensible only to the weight of the imposts. These masses complained of the expences of the French occupation. *We are governed by foreigners—our money goes across the mountains;* this grief, so common in Italy, was still heard under the new Republic, as it had been under the house of Austria. There was only a small number of enlightened men who felt that, thanks to general Bonaparte, the greater part of Lombardy, united in a single state, governed in reality by natives, and placed only under an external and distant surveillance, was thus called into a real existence, the commencement of Italian unity; that if it were necessary to pay twenty millions per annum for the French army, that was a very moderate indemnity for the support of an army of thirty or forty thousand men, indispensable if Italy would not return to the yoke of the Austrians. However, notwithstanding the gloomy colours with which the distempered spirit of M. de Melzi charged the picture of Italian affairs, those affairs after

all went on peaceably enough, directed as they were by the hand of Napoleon.

To convert that Republic into a monarchy vassal to the Empire, and to give it to Joseph, for instance, was to commence that Empire of the West which Napoleon, in his henceforth boundless ambition, already dreamed of; it was to ensure to Italy a more fixed régime; it was probably to gratify her, for she would be delighted to have a prince of her own; and were it only a mere change, it was possible that upon that sole ground it would satisfy unquiet and restless imaginations. It was agreed that the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, who was closely connected with M. de Melzi, should write to him and make the fitting overtures upon this subject.

Napoleon, after having agreed with his former colleague upon all that was to be done, sent for the cardinal legate to St Cloud, and spoke to him in an affectionate tone, but so positively, that it did not enter the mind of the cardinal to venture upon a single objection. Napoleon told him that he charged him expressly to request the pope to repair to Paris to officiate in the ceremony of the coronation; that he would make a formal demand to the same effect at a future time, when he should be assured that he would not be refused; that, moreover, he did not doubt of the success of his desires; that the Church owed him that success, and owed it also to herself, for nothing would be more serviceable to religion than the presence of the sovereign pontiff in Paris, and the union of religious pomps and civil pomps upon so solemn an occasion. Cardinal Caprara despatched a courier for Rome, and M. de Talleyrand on his side, wrote to cardinal Fesch, to inform him of this new project, and to engage him to support the negotiation.

It was spring! Napoleon would have wished the journey of the Pope to take place in autumn. He proposed, for that epoch, to add another marvel to that of a pope crowning at Paris the representative of the French Revolution; this was the expedition to England, which he had postponed on account of the royalist conspiracy and of the institution of the Empire, but the preparations for which he had so perfected, that he no longer entertained a doubt of success. He required but a month at the most, for it was a lightning stroke that he wished to strike. He destined July or August for that grand operation. He hoped, therefore, to have returned victorious, secure of definitive peace, and possessed of European omnipotence, towards October, and to be able to be crowned at the commencement of winter, on the anniversary of the 18th Brumaire (9th of November, 1804). In his ardent imagination he revolved all these projects at once, and it will soon be perceived, by the latest combinations he arrived at, that all was not mere phantom here.

The arch-chancellor Cambacérès, on his part, wrote to the

vice-president Melzi about the affairs of the new kingdom of Italy. M. Marescalchi, minister from the Italian Republic at Paris, was also to support the overtures of M. Cambacérès to M. de Melzi.

The following days were employed in taking the oath to the new sovereign of France. All the members of the Senate, of the Legislative Body, and of the Tribunate, were introduced in succession. The arch-chancellor Cambacérès, standing beside the Emperor who was seated, read the form of the oath; the person admitted then swore, and the Emperor, half rising from his imperial chair, slightly saluted him whose homage he had received. This sudden difference introduced into the relations between subjects and a sovereign, who on the previous day was their equal, produced some sensation among the members of the State bodies. After having been in some sort hurried away to bestow the crown, they were surprised at seeing the first consequences of what they had done. The tribune Carnot, faithful to his promise to submit to the law when once enacted, took the oath with the other members of the Senate. He gave to that act the dignity of obedience to the laws, and even seemed less sensible than others to the changes that had taken place in the outward forms of power. But the senators, especially, perceived them, and more than one satirical dialogue was held upon the subject. One circumstance, especially, contributed to cause these remarks. Of the thirty and odd senatorial appanages instituted at the epoch of the Consulate for life, fifteen still remained to be given; those of Agen, Ajaccio, Angers, Besançon, Bourges, Colmar, Dijon, Limoges, Lyons, Montpellier, Nancy, Nismes, Paris, Pau, and Riom. They were given on the 2nd Prairial (May 22nd). Messrs. Lacepéde, Kellermann, François de Neufchâteau, and Berthollet, were among the favoured. But among a hundred senators, more than eighty of whom were still to be provided for, fifteen gratified did not form a sufficient majority. However, those who had failed in their pursuit of senatorial appanages had other positions in view, and as yet there was no cause to despair. But in the meantime some ill-humour discovered itself in the language held. The *Moniteur* was daily filled with nominations of chamberlains, equerries, ladies of honour, and ladies in waiting. If the personal greatness of the Emperor caused every thing that he did to be forgiven, it was not the same with those who rose in his suite. The eager activity of those republicans, impatient to become courtiers, of those royalists in haste to serve him whom they had called a usurper, presented a strange spectacle; and if we add to the natural effect of that spectacle, the hopes disappointed or deferred, which were avenged in evil speaking, we shall easily comprehend that they must have criticised, satirised, sneered—in a word, gossiped immensely. But the masses, delighted with a government as

glorious as it was benificent, struck with so unheard of a scene, of which they perceived the whole, but not the details, the result but not the process, neither knowing nor envying those fortunates of a day, who had succeeded in making their children pages, their wives ladies of honour, and themselves prefects of the palace, or chamberlains, the masses were attentive, and seized with a surprise, which ended by changing itself into admiration. Napoleon, from a sub-lieutenant of artillery, become Emperor, accepted and welcomed by all Europe, and borne upon the buckler to the throne amidst a profound calm, covered with the splendour of his fortune the littlenesses that were mingled with this prodigious event. There was not experienced, it is true, that sentiment of eagerness which, in 1799, had led the alarmed nation to rush towards a saviour; there was no longer experienced that sentiment of gratitude which, in 1802, led the delighted nation to decree to its benefactor a perpetuity of power; in a word, men were less eager to pay with gratitude a man who paid himself so largely with his own hands. But men judged him worthy of the hereditary sovereignty; they admired him for having dared to take it, they approved of its being re-established, because it was a more complete return to order; in a word, they were dazzled by the marvel which they looked upon. Accordingly, although with sentiments somewhat different from those which filled their breasts in 1799 and in 1802, the citizens eagerly flocked to all the places at which registers were opened, to record their votes. The affirmative suffrages were counted by millions, and scarcely were the few negative suffrages, placed there in proof of the liberty enjoyed, perceptible amidst the immense multitude of favourable votes.

Napoleon had but one last annoyance to encounter previous to being in full possession of his new title. It was necessary to finish the proceedings against Georges and Moreau, which had in the first instance been engaged in with an extreme confidence. As to Georges and his accomplices, and even as to Pichegru himself, had he lived, the difficulty was not great. The trial was sure to cover them with confusion, and prove the participation of the emigrant princes in their plots. But Moreau was included in the cause. It had been expected, at the commencement, to find more proofs than did, in reality exist against him, and although his error was evident to men of good faith, yet the evil-minded were not without the means of disputing it. Moreover, there existed an involuntary sentiment of pity, at the aspect of this contrast between the two greatest generals of the Republic; one mounting the throne, the other in a dungeon, and destined, not to the scaffold, but to exile. All considerations, even of justice, are set aside on such occasions, and men more willingly pronounce the fortunate party in the wrong, even when he is in the right.

Those who were accused with Moreau, by the advice of

their defenders, had agreed together to exculpate him altogether. They were greatly irritated against him at the outset of the procedure; but, interest overcoming passion, they had promised to save him, if possible. In the first place, it was the greatest moral check to give to Napoleon to set his rival free from prison, victorious against the accusation made against him, clad in the colours of innocence, aggrandized by persecution, and henceforth an implacable enemy. Moreover, if Moreau had not conspired, it could be maintained that there had been no conspiracy, if no conspiracy no crime, if no crime no criminals.

The bar, always partial towards the accused, the commonalty of Paris, always independent in its judgment, and willingly opposing when great events did not connect it with power, were impassioned on behalf of Moreau, and expressed their wishes in his favour. Even those who, without any ill will towards Napoleon, saw in Moreau only an illustrious and unfortunate warrior, whose services might still be useful, wished that he might come forth innocent from this ordeal, and be restored to the army and to France.

The trial opened on the 28th of May (8th Prairial, year XII.), before a crowded auditory. The accused were numerous, and were ranged on four rows of seats. The bearing of all was not alike. Georges and his band displayed an affected assurance: they felt at their ease, for after all they could call themselves devoted victims of their cause. However, the arrogance of some of them gained them no public favour. Georges, although exalted in the eyes of the crowd by the energy of his character, provoked some cries of indignation. But the unfortunate Moreau, overwhelmed by his very glory, deploring at that moment the celebrity which drew upon him the eager gaze of the multitude, was deprived of calm assurance, which formed his principal merit in the battle field. He evidently asked himself what he had to do among those royalists, he who was one of the heroes of the Revolution; and, if he did himself justice, he could make but one reply, that he had merited his fate by having yielded to the deplorable vice of jealousy. Among those numerous accused, the public looked only for him. Some applauses, even, were heard from old soldiers hidden in the crowd, and despairing revolutionists, who imagined that they saw the Revolution itself seated upon that bench where the general-in-chief of the army of the Rhine was seated. That curiosity, those homages, embarrassed Moreau. While the others pronounced with emphasis their names, obscure, or sadly celebrated, he pronounced his glorious name in so low a tone that he was scarcely audible. Just punishment for having tarnished a splendid reputation!

The trial was tedious. The system of defence which it had been determined to adopt was exactly followed. Georges and Messrs.

de Polignac and de Rivière, had only come to Paris, because it had been represented to them that the new government had become wholly unpopular, and the public mind completely favourable to the Bourbons. They did not conceal their attachment to the cause of the legitimate princes, or their inclination to co-operate in a movement, if a movement had been possible; but, added they, Moreau, whom intriguers had represented as quite ready to receive the Bourbons, had no thought of doing so, and refused to listen to any of their proposals. From that time they had not even dreamed of conspiring. Georges, interrogated upon the grounds of the project, and confronted with his first declarations, in which he had avowed having come for the purpose of attacking the First Consul on the Malmaison road, with a French prince by his side, Georges, in confusion, replied, that would have been thought of afterwards, if an insurrectionary movement had appeared opportune, but that nothing being possible at the moment they had not even occupied themselves about a plan of attack. His attention was directed to the daggers, the uniforms intended for his Chouans, and those Chouans themselves seated beside him on the bench of the accused: he was not precisely disconcerted, but he then became silent, seeming to avow by his silence that the system invented for his co-accused and for Moreau was neither plausible nor dignified.

There was but one point upon which they all remained in conformity with their first declarations; the presence of a French prince in the midst of them. They felt, in fact, that, in order not to be classed among assassins it was necessary to be able to say that a prince was at their head. Little mattered it to them that they compromised the royal dignity; a Bourbon gave them the appearance of soldiers fighting for the legitimate dynasty. However, when these imprudent Bourbons saved their lives at London without troubling themselves about their unfortunate victims, those victims might well endeavour to save at Paris, if not their lives at least their honour.

As for Moreau, his system was more specious, for he had never varied. That system he had already exposed to the First Consul in a letter which was unfortunately written too late, a long time after the fruitless interrogatories of the grand juge, and when the government, engaged in the procedure, could not recede without seeming to be afraid of public debate. He admitted having seen Pichegru, but with a view to being reconciled with him, and procuring him the means of returning to France. After the civil troubles were appeased he had deemed that the conqueror of Holland was worth the pains of being restored to the Republic. He had not chosen to see him openly, nor directly to solicit his recall, owing to his own quarrel with the First Consul. The mystery of his proceedings had no other motive. It is true that advantage was taken of this

opportunity to speak to him about projects against the government, but he had repulsed them as absurdities. He had not denounced them because he believed them to be without danger, and moreover, because the occupation of an informer did not become a man like him.

This system, specious enough, if irrefragable evidence had not rendered it inadmissible, gave rise to very animated debates, in which Moreau displayed almost as true a presence of mind as was his wont when the fight was at the fiercest. He even made some noble replies, which were rapturously applauded by the auditory. "Pichegru," said the president to Moreau, "was a traitor, and was even denounced by you to the Directory! How, then, could you think of being reconciled with him, and of restoring him to France?" "At a time," replied Moreau, "at a time when the soldiers of Condé swarmed in the saloons of Paris, and of the First Consul, I might very well interest myself in restoring to France the conqueror of Holland." On this point he was asked why, under the directory, he was so tardy in denouncing Pichegru, and some suspicion seemed to be raised even as to his past life. "In cut short," replied he, "the interviews of Pichegru and the prince of Condé in putting, by the victories of my army, eighty leagues of ground between that prince and the Rhine. The danger being past, I left to the Council of War the care of examining the papers that had been found, and of sending them to the government if it deemed it expedient to do so."

Moreau being questioned as to the nature of the plot to which it had been proposed to him to associate himself, persisted in affirming that he had repulsed it. "Yes," it was replied, "you repulsed the proposal to replace the Bourbons upon the throne, but you consented to make use of Pichegru and of Georges to overthrow the Consular government, and you did so in the hope of receiving the dictatorship from their hands."

"That," replied Moreau, "is a ridiculous project to attribute to me, that of making use of the royalists in order to make myself dictator, and of supposing that if they were victorious, they would entrust the power to me. For ten years I made war, and I am not aware that in all those ten years I was guilty of absurdities."

That noble retort upon his past life was drowned with applause. But all the witnesses were not in the secret of the royalists; all were not prepared to give the lie to their first depositions, and there remained an individual named Roland, formerly in the army, who with grief, but with a persistance that nothing could shake, repeated what he had advanced from the first day. He said, that being the medium of communication between Pichegru and Moreau, the latter had directed him to declare that he would not have the Bourbons, but that if the

consuls were disposed of, he would use the power which would inevitably be conferred upon him to serve the conspirators, and to restore Pichegru to honours. Others still confirmed the evidence of Roland. Bouvet de Lozier, that officer of Georges who had escaped from suicide to hurl a terrible accusation against Moreau, could not retract it, but repeated it, though with some attempt at weakening it. In that accusation, made in writing, he had stated only the things that he had been told by Georges himself. The latter replied, that Bouvet had imperfectly heard, ill understood, and, consequenly, made an incorrect report. But there remained that night interview near the Madeleine, in which Moreau, Pichegru, and Georges were all together, a circumstance irreconcileable with a simple project of restoring Pichegru to France. Why should he give a night meeting to the chief of the conspirators, a man whom no one, except a royalist, could innocently meet? Here the depositions were so precise, so consistent, and so numerous, that, with the best possible will to do it, the royalists could not contradict what they had formerly said, and when they attempted to do so, they were straightway confounded.

Moreau this time was overwhelmed, and the sympathy of the auditory at length became evidently diminished. However, the clumsy reproaches of the president somewhat awakened that sympathy just as it was becoming extinct. "You are, at least, guilty of concealment," said the president to Moreau; "and although you pretend that such a man as yourself could not become an informer, your first duty was to obey the law, which enjoins every citizen, whatsoever or whomsoever he may be, to denounce the plots of which he may have cognisance. You still further owed that to a government which has heaped benefits upon you. Have you not large salaries, a mansion, an estate?"

The reproach was an unworthy one to address to one of the most disinterested generals of the time. "Monsieur le President," replied Moreau, "do not weigh my services against my fortune; there is no possible comparison between such things. My pay amounts to forty thousand francs, I have a house, and an estate worth (to the best of my belief) three or four hundred thousand francs. I should be possessed of fifty millions if I had used victory as so many others have." Radstadt, Biberach, Engen, Mæsskirch, Hohenlinden, those glorious souvenirs, weighed against some paltry money, aroused the auditory, and called forth those applauses which the improbability of the defence had begun to render unfrequent.

The trial had lasted for twelve days, and the public excitement was very great. In our own time we have often seen a trial entirely absorb the attention of the public. The same thing now occurred, but under circumstances calculated to produce an emotion quite independent of curiosity. Opposed to a triumph-

ant and crowned general, another general in misfortune and in bondage, offering, by his defence, the last possible resistance to a power that was every day becoming more absolute; amidst the silence of the national assemblies, the voice of the bar resounding as in the most free land; illustrious heads in peril, some of them belonging to the emigration, others to the Republic; here, assuredly, were circumstances to stir men's hearts. People yielded to a just pity, perhaps also to that secret sentiment which wishes for checks to fortunate power; and even those who were not inimical to the government put up their wishes for Moreau. Napoleon, who felt himself exempt from that base jealousy of which he was accused, and who well knew that Moreau, without favouring the Bourbons, had wished for his death, that he might seize his position, believed and openly said that the condemnation of a general guilty of a state crime was due to him, Napoleon. He desired that condemnation as his own justification; he desired it, not to bring to the block the head of the victor of Hohenlinden, but to have the honour of pardoning him. The judges knew this, and the people also.

But the law, which enters not into political considerations, and which is right in not entering into them, since if policy is sometimes humane and wise, it sometimes is also cruel and imprudent, the law amidst that conflict of passions, the last which was to disturb the profound repose of the Empire, remained unmoved, and decided with equity.

The 21st Prairial (10th of June), after a trial of fourteen days, while the court had retired to deliberate, certain of the accused royalists perceiving that they had been deceived, and that their efforts to exculpate Moreau had been of no service to them, asked for the juge-instructeur, that they might at length make more explicit, declarations to him. They now no more spoke of three interviews with Moreau, but of five, and M. Réal being made aware of this hastened to the Emperor, who instantly wrote to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès to find some means of communicating with the judges. But that was difficult, and would have been useless, and without having received any new communications, they, on the same day, the 10th of June, gave a decision which no influence had dictated. They pronounced sentence of death upon Georges and nineteen of his accomplices. As for Moreau, finding his physical complicity insufficiently made out, but his moral conduct reprehensible, they inflicted disgrace upon him by sentencing him to two years' imprisonment. M. Armand de Polignac and M. de Rivière were condemned to death. M. Jules de Polignac and five others of the accused to two years' imprisonment. Twenty-two were acquitted.

This decision, approved of by all impartial men, gave deadly offence to the new Emperor, who flew into a violent passion at the weakness of that justice which others were accusing of bar-

barity. He even broke through that restraint which power should habitually impose upon itself, and especially in so grave a matter. In the state of exasperation into which he was thrown by the unjust reports of his enemies, it was difficult to obtain any acts of clemency from him. But he was so prompt in calming himself, and so clear-sighted, that access was very soon reopened to his reason and to his heart. In the few days employed in appealing to the Court of Cassation, he took proper resolutions, remitted Moreau's two years' imprisonment, as he would have remitted him the capital punishment, had it been awarded, and consented to his departure for America.

That unfortunate general wishing to sell his property, Napoleon gave orders for it to be immediately purchased at the highest price. As for the condemned royalists, always severe towards them since the last conspiracy, he at first would grant no mercy to any of them. Georges alone, by the energy of his courage, inspired him with some interest, but he looked upon him as an implacable enemy, whom it was necessary to destroy in order to secure public tranquillity. However, it was not for Georges that the emigrant party was anxious. It was greatly so for Messrs. de Polignac and de Rivière; it blamed the imprudence which had placed these personages of exalted rank and superior education in a society so unworthy of them; but it could not resign itself to see their heads fall; and it is true that the enthusiasm of party, rightly appreciated, might render their fault excusable, and themselves worthy the indulgence even of the head of the Empire.

The beneficence of Josephine was proverbial: it was known that, though lapped in unheard of grandeur, she had preserved a truly affecting benignity and kindness of heart. It was also known that she lived in continual terror of the daggers that were constantly raised against her husband. An introduction to her was obtained by means of Madame de Rémusat, who was in personal attendance upon her, and Madame de Polignac was conducted to her at St. Cloud, to bathe the imperial robe with her tears. She was affected, as with so impressionable a heart she could not fail to be, at the sight of a wife in tears nobly soliciting the life of her husband. She hastened to make a first attempt with Napoleon. He, according to his custom, concealing his emotion beneath a harsh and stern countenance, roughly repulsed her. Madame de Rémusat was present.

"You still interest yourselves for my enemies," said he to them both; "they are all of them as imprudent as they are guilty. If I do not give them a lesson they will begin again, and will be the cause of there being new victims."

Josephine being thus repulsed, knew not to what other means to have recourse. Napoleon would in a few moments leave the Council Chamber and pass along one of the galleries of the château. She determined to place Madame de Polignac in his way,

that she might throw herself at his feet as he appeared. And, in fact, at the moment when he was passing, Madame de Polignac presented herself to him, and, with tears, begged the life of her husband. Napoleon, surprised, darted a stern glance on Josephine, whose complicity he readily guessed. But subdued in the instant, he replied to Madame de Polignac, that he was surprised at finding in a plot against his person, M. Armand de Polignac, the companion of his boyhood at the military school; that, however, he would grant his pardon to the tears of a wife; and that he only trusted this weakness on his part might not have evil effects in encouraging fresh acts of imprudence. "They are deeply culpable, madame," added he, "those princes who thus compromise the lives of their most faithful servants, without partaking their perils."

Madame de Polignac, transported with joy and gratitude, flew to recount amidst her alarmed emigrant friends this scene of clemency, which procured a moment of justice to Napoleon and Josephine. The life of M. de Rivière was still in peril. Murat and his wife sought access to Napoleon, moved him to compassion, and wrung from him a second act of mercy. The pardon of M. de Polignac involved that of M. de Rivière. It was immediately granted. For the magnanimous Murat, eleven years afterwards, there were no such generous intercessors.

Such was the termination of that sad, detestable, but blundering scheme, which had for its object the annihilation of Napoleon, but resulted in elevating him to the throne; which procured a tragical death to a French prince, who had not conspired, and impunity to those who had, although certainly with signal disgrace as the chastisement of their faults; and, finally, exile to Moreau, the only general of that period, in whom, by exaggerating his glory and lowering that of Napoleon, a rival could be found for the latter. A striking lesson by which parties should profit! To employ criminal means against government, party, or man, is ever to aggrandise and not to destroy.

Thenceforth all resistance was vanquished. In 1802, Napoleon had surmounted civil resistance, by annulling the Tribunate; in 1804, he surmounted military resistance by baffling the conspiracy of the emigrants with the republican generals. While he ascended the steps of the throne, Moreau retired into exile. They were destined once more to catch a glimpse of each other within cannon-shot, under the walls of Dresden, both of them guilty, the one in returning from a foreign land to make war upon his native country; the other, in abusing his power so far as to provoke a universal reaction against France: there the one was to be laid low by a French bullet; the other to gain a last victory while tottering on the verge of that abyss which has swallowed up his prodigious destiny.

However, those great events were still distant. Napoleon seemed then all-powerful and for ever. Doubtless, he had recently felt some sorrows; for, independently of great calamities, Providence ever alloys the joys of prosperity with some anticipative bitterness, as if to warn the human soul, and prepare it for startling misfortunes. That fortnight had been trying to him, but it was soon past. The clemency he had shown, threw a mild radiance upon his incipient reign. The death of Georges saddened no one, although his courage, worthy of a better fate, inspired some regret. Soon all were absorbed by that wondering curiosity attendant on an extraordinary spectacle.

Thus expired after twelve years duration, not the French Revolution, still vigorous and indestructible, but that Republic which had been styled imperishable. It expired beneath the hand of a victorious soldier, as all republics do, save those which slumber in the arms of oligarchy.

BOOK XX.

THE CORONATION.

Delay of the Descent on England—Causes and Advantages of that Delay—Redoubled Care in the Preparations—Financial Measures—Budgets for the Years XI., XII., and XIII.—Creation of indirect Taxes—Old Theory of a Tax solely on Land—Napoleon refutes that Theory, and causes the Adoption of a Tax upon Articles of Consumption—Original Organisation of the Administration of consolidated Taxes—Spain pays its Subsidy in Bills at long Dates—An Association of Capitalists offers to discount them—First Operations of the Company called *The Associated Merchants*—All the disposable Resources devoted to the Squadrons of Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon—Napoleon plans the Arrival of a French Fleet in the Channel in order to render the Passage of the Flotilla secure—First Combination on which he determines—Admiral Latouche-Tréville intrusted with the Execution of that Combination—That Admiral was to run out of Toulon, deceive the English by changing his Course, and make his Way to the Channel, after being joined by the Rochefort Squadron on the Passage—The Descent projected for July or August, previous to the Coronation—The Ministers of the Courts at Peace with France present their Credentials to Napoleon—The Austrian Ambassador alone delays to do so—Departure of Napoleon for Boulogne—General Inspection of the Flotilla Vessel by Vessel—The Dutch Flotilla—Imposing Ceremony on the Sea-Coast, and Distribution of Decorations of the Legion of Honour—Course of Events in England—Extreme public Agitation—Overthrow of the Addington Administration, by the Coalition of Fox and Pitt—Return of Mr. Pitt to the Ministry, and his first Measures for renewing a Coalition upon the Continent—Suspicions of Napoleon—He compels Austria to explain herself, by insisting that the Credentials of M. de Cobentzel should be delivered to him at Aix-la-Chapelle—He breaks off Diplomatic Relations with Russia, by allowing M. d'Oubril to depart—Death of Admiral Latouche-Tréville, and Postponement of the Descent till the Winter—Admiral Latouche-Tréville replaced by Admiral Villeneuve—Character of the latter—Progress of Napoleon on the Banks of the Rhine—Great Concourse at Aix-la-Chapelle—M. de Cobentzel there presents his Credentials to Napoleon—The Imperial Court repairs to Mayence—Return to Paris—Preparations for the Coronation—Difficult Negotiation to induce Pius VII. to proceed to Paris and crown Napoleon—The Cardinal Fesch despatched as Ambassador—Character and Conduct of that Personage—The Terror of Pius VII. at the Idea of going to France—He consults a Consistory of Cardinals—Five are against his going, and fifteen for it, but conditionally—Long Debate upon the Conditions—Final Consent—The Question of the Ceremonial left undecided—The Bishop Bernier and the Arch-chancellor Cambacérès, select from the Roman Ritual and from the French Ritual, the Ceremonies compatible with the Spirit of the Age—Napoleon refuses to allow the Crown to be placed on his Head—Pretensions of the Family—Departure of the Pope for France—His Arrival at Fontainebleau—His Joy and Confidence on witnessing the Reception which befals him—Ecclesiastical Marriage of Josephine and Napoleon—Ceremony of the Coronation.

BOOK XX.

THE CORONATION.

THE conspiracy of Georges, the proceedings that resulted from it, and the change that it brought about in the form of government, occupied the whole winter of 1803-4, and postponed the grand enterprize of Napoleon against England. But it had not ceased to occupy his mind, and he now with redoubled care and activity, prepared for its execution, about the middle of the summer of 1804. In truth, this delay was by no means to be regretted, for in his impatience to achieve this vast design, Napoleon had greatly exaggerated the possibility of being ready at the close of 1803. The continual experiments daily discovered new precautions to be adopted, and new improvements to be introduced, and it was but of little consequence to strike six months later, if the postponement gave the means of striking a surer blow. It was not the army, be it distinctly understood, that caused this loss of time, for at that epoch the army was always ready for action; it was the flotilla and the naval squadrons. The construction of flat-bottomed boats, and their assemblage in the four channel ports, was all that had been effected. But the Batavian (Dutch) flotilla had not arrived: the Brest and Toulon squadrons, the aid of which was deemed indispensable, were not ready, eight months not having sufficed for their completion. The winter of 1803 had been devoted to completing them. Thus the time apparently lost, had been most profitably employed. Above all, the delay had permitted the adoption of financial arrangements, which are always closely connected with military measures, and were more so now than ever. If, in exposing oneself to great inconveniences, one can succeed in carrying on war on land with but little money, by quartering upon the enemy, maritime warfare is not to be carried on without money, for on the immense solitude of ocean nothing is to be had but what we take with us on leaving our own ports. The financial measures, then, were not the least important part of the immense preparations of Napoleon, and they deserve our attention for a moment.

We have related with what resources the struggle had been commenced after the rupture of the peace of Amiens. The

budget of the year XI. (1803) voted with a still uncertain foresight of events, had been fixed at 589 million francs (23,560,000*l.* sterling) (exclusive of the charges of collection), that is to say, at 89 million francs above the budget of the preceding year, which had been squared with 500 million francs. But the expenditure had naturally exceeded the amount sanctioned by the Legislative Body; it had exceeded it by 30 million francs, and had reached 619 million francs. Certainly the excess was not great, when we reflect upon the preparations of an expedition like that of Boulogne. This moderation in the increase of the budget is explained by the epoch which separated the financial years. The financial year XI. finished at the 21st of September, 1803, and the same day commenced the financial year XII. Accordingly, the principal expenses of the flotilla could not be included in the budget of the year XI. It was thus that they had been able to limit the amount to 619 million francs, which, with the charges of collection, amounted to about 710 million or 720 million francs. The budget of the year XII. would necessarily be much higher, for it would have to cover all the items which that of the year XI. had left unpaid. This last had been provided for with the ordinary contributions, the produce of which, notwithstanding the war, continued greatly to increase, so great was the security under the wise and vigorous government which then ruled France. The stamp and register duties had increased by 10 million francs, the customs by 6 million or 7 million francs; and notwithstanding an alleviation of 10 million francs in the land tax, the ordinary imposts had risen to 573 million francs. The balance had been found in the 22 million francs of the Italian subsidy, and 24 million francs borrowed from the extraordinary resources, which, as we have said, consisted of the Spanish subsidy, fixed at 4 million francs per month, and of the price of Louisiana, ceded to the United States. These resources, scarcely touched, remained almost entire for the year XII., which was a fortunate circumstance, for all the expenses of the war were about to press at once upon that financial year (September, 1803, to September, 1804). The expenditure of the year XII. could not be estimated at less than 700 million instead of 619 million francs; making, with the costs of collection, and some supplemental per centages not included in the estimates, a total of 800 million francs. Moreover, in that amount, the new civil list was not included. It will be seen that the budgets were rapidly progressing towards the figure which they have since reached.

It was necessary to be prepared for a slight falling off in the revenue of the domains, in consequence of the alienations of the national property, and of the landed endowments conferred on the Senate, the Legion of Honour, and the Sinking Fund. The ordinary contributions would but little exceed 560 million

francs, unless through increased production, which was probable enough, but, from a scrupulous regard to accuracy, this was not relied on. There was required, then, no less a sum than 140 million francs of extraordinary means to provide for the 700 million francs, the supposed amount of expenditure, exclusive of the charges of collection and some supplemental per centages. Italy contributed 22 million francs for the three states in which our army did protective duty. The 48 million francs of the Spanish subsidy, the 60 million francs of the American subsidy, reduced to 52 million francs by bankers' charges, made the extraordinary receipts amount in all to 122 million francs. There consequently remained 20 million francs still to be found. The funds deposited as securities by public officers, were, as on former occasions, to supply this amount. Securities in money had already been required from the receivers-general, paymasters, receivers of the registry dues, customs, &c. These sums had been paid into the Sinking Fund, which placed the same to the credit of the depositors. The Sinking Fund, in its turn, had handed over the sums to government, which had undertaken to refund them at the rate of 5 million francs per annum. It was a sort of borrowing from the officers of the revenue, perfectly legitimate, since the state was entitled to some security from these persons for their fidelity and good management. This system of securities was susceptible of extension, because there were still revenue officials who had not as yet been subjected to the common rule. In fact, there existed a second category of receivers of the public revenue, whose position required regulating: these were the receivers of the direct taxes. Hitherto, in the country and in the towns, instead of collectors appointed by the state for collecting the direct taxes, the collection was intrusted to the contractor bidding lowest. This system had been changed in the great towns, where receivers had been permanently appointed as public servants, and were allowed by the treasury a commission on the amount of their collections, by way of salary. This new system having answered well, it was proposed, for the year 1804, to establish in all the communes, whether urban or rural, receivers nominated by government, and to require from them securities estimated in the whole at 20 million francs. That sum, handed over to the treasury, was to be refunded by the government by instalments, as had been agreed upon for the previous deposits.

To this resource was added the sale of some national property, to be taken from what remained disposable, since endowments had been provided for the Senate, the Legion of Honour, Public Education, and the Sinking Fund. This afforded a fresh resource of 15 millions for the year XII., over and above the amount deemed to be necessary. This property was made over to the Sinking Fund, which, selling it little by little, procured

from day to day, better prices. It was agreed that the Sinking Fund should retain the proceeds, in order to repay itself the five million francs, which were annually due to it by the government, in reimbursement of the deposits lent for the public service.

Such were the financial means created for the year XII.: 560 million francs of ordinary contributions; 22 million francs of Italian subsidy, 48 million francs of Spanish subsidy, 52 million francs of the price of Louisiana; 20 million francs of moneys lodged as security, besides several millions from national property. The whole exceeded the 700 million francs deemed to be necessary for that financial year, September, 1803, to September, 1804.

But they were at the close of the financial year XII., as it was now the summer of 1804. It was necessary to make arrangements for the year XIII., (September, 1804 to September, 1805), which would not have the benefit of one very considerable item, the American subsidy, which was entirely appropriated to the year XIII. It was indispensably necessary to supply this deficiency without delay.

Napoleon had long been convinced that the Revolution, although it had created great resources, by equalising taxation, had nevertheless dealt too severely with landed property, in throwing upon it alone the burden of public charges, by the suppression of indirect taxes. What the Revolution had done is only too common in disturbed times. At the first outbreak, the populace, especially that of the towns, take advantage of it to refuse to pay the tax imposed upon articles of consumption, and particularly upon liquors, which constitute its chief enjoyment. This was the case in 1830, when the taxes of this sort were refused during more than six months; in 1815, when the deceptive promise of their suppression obtained for the Bourbons a momentary popularity; and in 1789, when the first popular attacks were directed against the barriers. But these imposts, the most detestable to the populace of the towns, are, nevertheless, those which characterise truly prosperous countries, which really bear more upon the rich than upon the poor, and are the least injurious to production; while taxation imposed upon the land deprives agriculture of capital, of cattle, and manure, impoverishes the soil, and thus dries up the most abundant source of wealth. In the eighteenth century a prejudice found favour, which, at the time, it must be confessed, rested on incontestable ground. Landed property, accumulated in the hands of the aristocracy and the clergy, and unequally taxed, according to the rank and quality of its possessor, was an object of aversion to those generous spirits who sought to relieve the poor. It was at that period that they devised the theory of an unique tax, bearing exclusively upon the land, and supplying the entire expenditure of the State. By this means they could suppress the excise and the gabelles, taxes which appeared to press upon the populace alone. But this theory,

generous in intention, false in practice, was to fall before experience. Subsequent to 1789, landed property divided among thousands of hands, and subjected to equal burdens, no longer deserved the animadversion which had formerly been bestowed upon it, and it was necessary, above all, to consider the paramount importance of agriculture. It was to be considered that in burdening it beyond measure, the country population was injured and deprived of the means of cultivation, to the profit of the sellers and consumers of spirituous liquors. It was to be considered that it was absolutely necessary that the revenues should equal the expenditure, as the only safeguard against a recurrence to paper money and bankruptcy, and that to equalise the revenues and the expenditure, it was indispensable to vary the sources of taxation in order not to exhaust them. It well became the man who had restored order in France, who had drawn the finance from chaos by re-establishing a regular collection of the direct taxes, to complete his work by reopening the closed source of the indirect taxes. But, for this it required great authority and great energy. Faithful to his character, Napoleon feared not, the very day on which he sought the throne, to re-establish, under the title of Consolidated Taxes, the most unpopular but the most useful of burdens.

He first proposed it to the Council of State, and he there supported the correct view of the question with a marvellous sagacity, as though finance had been the study of his life. To the theory of the unique tax, imposed exclusively upon the land; exacting from the farmer and the land-owner the total sum necessary for the wants of the State, or at the least, obliging them to advance it even upon the supposition most favourable to them, that of the increased price of agricultural productions compensating them for that advance; to this absurdly exaggerated theory, he opposed the true and simple theory of taxation skilfully diversified, resting at once upon all descriptions of property and industry, demanding from no one of them too considerable a portion of the public revenue, producing, consequently, no compulsory variation of prices, drawing wealth from every channel through which it abundantly flows, and drawing from each in such wise as to exhaust none. This system, the offspring of time and experience, is open only to one objection: that objection is, that the diversity of impost brings with it a diversity of collection, and consequently an augmentation of expenses; but it presents so many advantages, and the opposite system is so violent, that this slight augmentation of expense should not be a serious consideration. When he had caused his views to be adopted by the Council of State, Napoleon sent his project to the Legislative Body, where it was not the object of any serious difficulty, owing to the preliminary conferences between the corresponding sections of the Tribunate and of the

Council of State. The following were the arrangements. An establishment was created, under the title of the Board of Consolidated Taxes. That board was to levy the new taxes by means of revenue officers, as they alone were found to be efficient in seeking out taxable commodities in the places where they were grown or manufactured. These commodities consisted of wines, brandy, beer, cider, &c. A uniform and very moderate duty was laid upon their first sale, according to a tariff formed at the epochs of the harvest of manufacture. The amount of the duty was to be paid at the instant of the first removal. The principal commodity taxed, after beverages, was tobacco. There was already a customs' duty upon foreign manufactured tobacco, and a manufacture duty upon French tobaccos (for a government monopoly had not yet been devised); but the produce of this latter duty was lost to the treasury, in consequence of deficient inspection. The creation of a Board of Consolidated Taxes supplied the means of collecting the whole of this duty, trivial then, but destined to become considerable. Salt was not included in the taxed commodities, from fear of reviving the remembrance of the ancient *gabelles*. Nevertheless, in Piedmont a Board of Salt Tax was established, which was a measure at once of police and of finance. Piedmont, obtaining its salt at Genoa, or at the mouths of the Po, and being frequently exposed to cruelly high prices, by the interested speculations of merchants, had never been able to dispense with the intervention of government. By creating a Board of Salt Tax, charged with purchase and sale, at a moderate price, an end was put to the danger of scarcities and dearness, and at the same time there was secured a ready and certain means of collecting a tax which was tolerably productive in the aggregate, though very moderate with reference to the tariff.

These various combinations could not bring any thing into the exchequer during the year XII., the year of their creation (1803-1804), but they afforded ground for reckoning on 14 or 18 million francs in the year XIII., 30 or 40 million francs in the year XIV., and, for the following years, amounts difficult to estimate, but, nevertheless, presumeably sufficient for all the necessities of a war, even a prolonged one.

By means of these arrangements the expenditure of the year XII. (1803-1804) would be met by the 700 million francs of ordinary and extraordinary receipts, and certain resources were secured for future years. But still, at the commencement of the system some serious practical difficulties were experienced. The two chief existing resources consisted of the price of Louisiana, and the monthly subsidy furnished by Spain. The unavoidable delay occasioned by the vote of the American funds, had prevented the payment of that resource into the treasury. However, the firm of Hope and Co. had agreed to advance a portion of it

towards the end of 1804. As to Spain, upon the 44 million francs (1,760,000*l.*) due in Floréal for the eleven previous months, she had only discharged in sundry payments, about 22 million francs, that is to say, one-half the amount due. The finances of that unfortunate country were more than ever embarrassed, and although the seas were open to her galleons, thanks to the neutrality which France had allowed her, the specie that reached her from America was squandered in idle dissipations.

To supply the place of these deferred payments, recourse was had to paper. The English have exchequer bills, and we now possess *bons royaux* payable at three, six, or nine months, which, negotiated on 'Change, constitute a temporary loan, by the aid of which the State is enabled, during a longer or a shorter period, to anticipate the revenues in course of collection. Notwithstanding that Napoleon had laboured hard and successfully in the re-establishment of the finances, the treasury had not yet sufficiently gained the confidence of the commercial world successfully to issue any paper whatever in its own name. The bills of the receivers-general, bearing the acceptance of responsible parties, and repayable at the office of the Sinking Fund in case of protest, had alone obtained confidence. They were, as we have already said, subscribed at the commencement of the financial year, to the whole amount of the direct taxes, and successively payable from month to month. The latest were at fifteen or eighteen months' date. In order to realise the revenues of the State in advance, these were discounted in sums of 20 or 30 million francs, at the rate of a half per cent. per month (six per cent. per annum) during the short peace of Amiens, and, since the war, at three-quarters per cent. per month (nine per cent. per annum). Notwithstanding the confidence that was felt in the government, that confidence was so little shared by the treasury, that the most eminent banking houses declined this sort of operations. These discount transactions were gone into by adventurous speculators, former contractors to the Directory. M. de Marbois, wishing to emancipate himself from their co-operation, applied to the receivers-general themselves, who, having formed themselves into a committee at Paris, discounted their own paper, either with their own funds or with funds which at a lower interest, they procured from the hands of the capitalists. But these government officers were limited in their speculations, and possessed neither the requisite capital nor the requisite boldness to furnish the treasury with any great assistance. There were at that time in Paris, a banker who was much experienced in this kind of operation, M. Desprèz; M. Vanlerberghe, an active contractor, very skilful in the art of provisioning armies; and, lastly, one of the most inventive and ingenious of speculators in enterprizes of every kind, M. Ouvrard, celebrated at that time for his immense fortune. All three had entered individually into

connexion with the government, M. Desprez for the discounting of treasury bills, M. Vanlerberghe, for the supply of provisions; and M. Ouvrard for all grand operations, whether of provisioning or banking. M. Ouvrard formed a co-partnership with Messrs. Desprez and Vanlerberghe, placed himself at the head of that association, and gradually became, as he had been under the Directory, the principal financial agent of the government. He succeeded in gaining the confidence of M. de Marbois, minister of the treasury, who, feeling his own incompetence, was glad to have the aid of an inventive spirit, capable of finding the expedients which he knew not how to find for himself. M. Ouvrard, on behalf of himself and partners, offered to undertake the discounting of the treasury bills. He entered into a first contract in Germinal, year XII. (April, 1804), by which he undertook to discount not only a considerable amount of the bills of the receivers-general, but even of the subsidy of Spain who, being unable to pay her subsidy in cash, paid it in bills at long dates. M. Ouvrard made no difficulty about taking these bills for money, and paying over the amount. M. Vanlerberghe and he had claims on the State for heavy sums on account of former contracts. They were now authorised, in discounting the bills of the receivers-general and of Spain, to reckon part of the sums due to them as so much cash. Thus in the very act of discounting, they paid themselves with their own hands. Under the firm of *Associated Merchants*, then, this association began to possess itself of the business of the State. Its origin is worthy of attention, for it soon took part in immense operations, and played a very considerable part in the financial world. To render the operation it had undertaken with the treasury good, and even excellent, it was only requisite that Spain should fulfil her engagements, for the bills of the receivers-general, composing part of the security, were in the highest degree safe. These bills had only the inconvenience of being long dated, as the treasury employed in its payments those of two or three months' date, and discounted those which were at six, twelve, and fifteen months. But excepting the length of time that they had to run, they were unexceptionably good. As for the bills signed by Spain, their value depended upon the conduct of a sadly imbecile court, and on the arrival of the galleons from America. On this basis M. Ouvrard constructed vast schemes, succeeded in dazzling the credulous mind of M. de Marbois, and set out for Madrid, in order to realise his bold conceptions. Napoleon looked with suspicion upon this fecund but rash spirit and had warned M. de Marbois also to be on his guard. But M. Ouvrard discounted through M. Desprez the treasury bills, and he himself discounted those of Spain, and provisioned the army through M. Vanlerberghe. Thanks to him all necessities were provided for at once, and the evil, if any existed, did not seem

likely to extend far, since, after all, M. Ouvrard seemed always in advance to the treasury, and never the treasury to him.

Such were the means employed immediately to provide for all the expenses of the war, without having recourse to loans. The speculators were required to anticipate, by means of discounts, the receipt of the state revenues, and that of 122 million francs, furnished by the allied countries, Italy, America, and Spain. As regarded the future, the long announced creation of indirect taxes, at length decreed this year, would completely provide for it.

Napoleon had resolved very speedily to execute his grand enterprize. He wished to cross the Straits towards the month of July or August, 1804; and if the incredulous who have questioned the reality of his project, could read his private correspondence with the minister of marine, the infinite number of his orders, and the secret communication of his hopes to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, they would no longer entertain any doubt as to the reality of that extraordinary resolution. All the vessels composing the flotilla were assembled at Etaples, Boulogne, Vimereux, and Ambleteuse, always excepting those which had been built between Brest and Bayonne, for the sort of craft intended for the assemblage could never have doubled Ushant. But nearly the whole being built between Brest and the mouths of the Scheldt, no considerable number were absent. There were sufficient to convey the hundred and twenty thousand men intended to pass over in the gun-boats. The remainder, as will be remembered, were always intended to embark in the fleets of Brest and the Texel.

The Dutch flotilla, built and assembled in the Scheldt, was behindhand. Napoleon had given the command of it to admiral Verhuell, who possessed his high esteem, and deserved it. The Dutch, but little zealous, and, especially, having but little confidence in this singular project, far too bold for their cold and methodical spirit, threw but little ardour into their co-operation. Nevertheless, the zeal of the admiral, and the urgings of our minister at the Hague, M. de Sémonville, had accelerated the armament for which Holland had engaged. A fleet of seven ships of the line, attended by numerous merchantmen, was ready to transport the twenty-four thousand men of the camp of Utrecht, commanded by general Marmont. At the same time, a flotilla, consisting of some hundreds of gun-boats and large fishing-boats, had completed its formation in the Scheldt. It remained to leave those moorings and clear the month of the Scheldt, which was far more accessible to the enemy than the coasts of France. Admiral Verhuell, personally commanding his detachments, had fought some brilliant battles between the Scheldt and Ostend. Notwithstanding the loss of some boats, five or six at the most, he had baffled all the efforts of the En-

glish, and converted the incredulity of the Dutch sailors into confidence. The Dutch flotilla succeeded, in the spring of 1804, in assembling at Ostend, Dunkirk, and Calais, and held itself in readiness to emkark the corps of marshal Davoust, encamped at Bruges. Napoleon would have wished for more; he would have wished that the two flotillas, Dutch and French, united into one, in the ports lying to the westward of Cape Grisnez—that is to say, at Ambleteuse, Vimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples, should have all had the same wind for departure. An effort was made to gratify his wish, by concentrating the encampments of the troops and the stations of the flotillas.

The works of the armament along the coast of Boulogne were finished, the forts constructed, and the basins dug. The troops having completed their task, had now returned to their military exercises. They had acquired a truly admirable discipline and precision of movement; and they presented an army not only inured to war by numerous campaigns, and hardened by rude labours, but as perfect in manœuvres as though they had spent whole years upon the parade ground. That army, perhaps the finest that prince or general ever commanded, impatiently expected the arrival of its chieftain, newly raised to the throne. It burned to congratulate him, and to follow him to the theatre of a new and prodigious glory.

Napoleon was no less impatient to join it. But an important question had arisen among the professional men, as to whether the gun-boats composing the flotilla, *nutshells*, as they were called, could brave the English fleet. Admiral Bruix, and admiral Verhuell had the utmost confidence in those boats. Both of them had exchanged cannon shots with the English frigates, had gone out of port in all weathers, and had acquired the conviction that these light craft were sufficient for clearing the Strait. Admiral Decrès, inclined to contradict every one, and especially inclined to contradict admiral Bruix, thought the reverse. Those of our marine officers who were not employed on the flotilla, whether from prejudice, or from the ordinary inclination to criticise what we have no part in doing, inclined to the opinion of the minister Decrès. Admiral Ganteaume, transferred from Toulon to Brest, had witnessed an accident which we have mentioned above, and which had caused him much anxiety for the fate of the army and of the Emperor, to whom he was sincerely devoted. The sight of a gun-boat, capsized before his eyes in Brest roadstead, almost keel upwards, had filled him with anxiety, and he had instantly written upon the subject to the minister of marine. That accident, as we have said, was of no importance. The boat had been unskilfully ballasted, the artillery had been ill-arranged, the men were not sufficiently practised, and the ill-distributed weight, added to the confusion of the crew, had led to the shipwreck.

It was not want of stability that admiral Decrès apprehended. The flotilla of Boulogne, manœuvring for two years in the heaviest squalls, had done away with all uncertainty on that head. But he addressed the following objections to the Emperor and to admiral Bruix.*

"Undoubtedly," said he, "a twenty-four pound shot has the same force, whether discharged from a gun-boat or from a ship of the line. It causes the same damage, often even more, when discharged from a slight vessel, which it is difficult to hit, and whose horizontal fire takes effect between wind and water. Add to this the musketry, destructive at a short distance, and the facility for boarding, and the value of the gun-boats cannot be doubted. They carry above three thousand guns of large calibre, that is to say, as many as a fleet of from thirty to thirty-five sail of the line, a fleet which it is not often easy to assemble. But where have these boats been seen to measure themselves with the large vessels of the English? In but one situation, that is to say, close in shore, in shallows, amidst which those large craft dared not trust themselves, to follow an enemy which, numerrous though individually weak, was prepared to riddle them with balls. It is similar to an army enclosed in a defile, and assailed, from the summit of inaccessible positions, by a cloud of adroit and intrepid sharpshooters. But," continued admiral Decrès, "suppose those gun-boats in mid channel, out of reach of shoals and sand-banks, and in presence of ships no longer afraid to bear down upon them; suppose, still further, a stiff breeze, which would render manœuvring easy to the ships and difficult to your gun-boats, would not these latter be in danger of being sunk in great numbers by the giants with which they would be obliged to contend?"

"Perhaps," replied admiral Bruix, "we might lose a hundred boats out of two thousand; but nineteen hundred would pass over, and they would suffice for the ruin of England." "Yes," rejoined admiral Decrès, "supposing the disaster of the hundred boats not to strike a panic into the crews of the other

* The private correspondence of M. Decrès with the Emperor, so private that M. Decrès wrote the whole of it with his own hand, is extant, in the private archives of the Louvre; it is one of the finest productions of that time, after the correspondence of the Emperor. It does equal honour to the patriotism of the minister, to his sound sense, and to the piquant originality of his mind. It contains very precious views upon the organisation of the marine of France: it should be unceasingly studied by seamen, and all connected with the administration of the navy. It is in that correspondence that I have been able to study that profound conception of the Emperor, and to acquire a new proof of his extraordinary foresight, and the certainty of the sincerity of his projects. One of these letters contains admiral Decrès' opinion of the flotilla, an opinion which at that time was rather suspected than known, for Napoleon ordered every one to observe silence alike upon the strong and upon the weak side of his plans. Operations were not then, as they since have been, decried by the indiscretion of the very agents entrusted with their execution.

nineteen hundred; supposing the number of the nineteen hundred should not prove an inevitable cause of confusion, and supposing the officers to preserve their coolness, for hesitation or alarm would be inevitably followed by a general catastrophe."

Attention had also been bestowed upon the hypothesis of a summer's calm, or a winter's fog, two equally propitious opportunities, for in a calm the English ships could not bear down upon our boats, in a fog they would be unable to see them, and in both cases their redoubtable encounter would be avoided. But these circumstances, though occurring twice or thrice in every season, would not afford sufficient security. Two tides, that is to say, the space of four-and-twenty hours, would be required to get out the whole flotilla, ten or twelve hours to cross over, and, allowing for the always inevitable loss of time, about forty-eight hours in the whole. Was it not to be apprehended that in this interval of two days, a sudden change in the atmosphere might surprise the flotilla in full operation?

The objections of the minister Decrès, then, were very serious. Napoleon drew his answers from his character, his confidence in fortune, and the remembrance of the St. Bernard and of Italy. He said, that his most brilliant operations were accomplished in spite of obstacles as great; and that while it was necessary to leave to chance as little as possible, something must be left to it. However, while refuting the objections, he knew how to appreciate them, and this man who by dint of tempting fortune, at length forfeited her protection, this man knew how to spare himself a peril in order to add a chance of success to his plans. Rash in conception, he always evinced consummate prudence in execution. It was in order to meet these objections that he incessantly reflected upon the plan of bringing, by an unexpected manœuvre, a grand fleet into the Channel. If this fleet, only for three days superior to the English force in the Downs, should cover the passage of the flotilla, all obstacles would be at an end. Admiral Decrès confessed that, supposing that case, he had not another objection to raise, and that the vanquished ocean would deliver Great Britain up to our attacks. And if, as was almost certain, our fleet should have the superiority for more than two days (for intelligence could not be rapidly enough conveyed to the English fleet which blockaded Brest, to enable it immediately to join that which observed Boulogne), there would be time enough for the flotilla to make the passage several times, to take over fresh troops, left in the camps, where too, ten or fifteen thousand horses and considerable additional baggage, ammunition, and artillery were waiting for the means of transport. The mass of force would then be so great that all resistance on the part of England would be impossible.

Prodigious results, therefore, depended upon the sudden arrival of a fleet in the Channel. For this, an unexpected combina-

tion was requisite, such as the English could not baffle. Fortunately, the old British admiralty, especially powerful by its traditions and its *esprit de corps*, could not compete in invention with a prodigious genius, constantly reflecting on the same subject, and free from the necessity of consulting with a collective administration.

Napoleon had at Brest a fleet of eighteen vessels, which was very soon to be increased to twenty-one; one of five at Rochefort, one of five at Ferrol, a ship lying for safety at Cadiz, and, finally, eight vessels at Toulon, which were about to be increased to ten. Nelson with his squadron was cruising off the isles of Hyères, to observe Toulon. Such was the state of the respective forces, such the field which presented itself to the combinations of Napoleon. His idea was to steal away one of his fleets, and send it unexpectedly into the Channel, in order to be superior there for some days to the English. When he proposed to act in the winter, that is to say, in the preceding February, he had thought of sending the Brest fleet to the coast of Ireland, to land there the 15 or 20,000 men on board it, and to cause it then suddenly to appear in the Channel. This bold plan had no chance of success except in winter, as at that season the continual blockade of Brest being impracticable, advantage could be taken of bad weather to put to sea. But in summer the presence of the English was so constant, that it was impossible to get out without a battle, and vessels encumbered with troops looking upon the sea for the first time, opposed to vessels exercised by a long cruise, and but lightly laden, would run great risks unless immensely superior in point of numbers. At that time of year the facilities for getting out were greater on the side of Toulon. In June and July strong north-westerly breezes, frequently blowing, would oblige the English to seek shelter in Corsica or Sardinia. A squadron, availing itself of such an occurrence, could set sail at the close of day, make twenty leagues in a night, deceive Nelson by making false route, and, by inspiring him with fears for the East, probably draw him towards the mouths of the Nile, for since Napoleon had escaped him in 1798, Nelson was constantly engrossed with the possibility of the French throwing an army into Egypt, and he was unwilling to be taken off his guard a second time. Napoleon determined to entrust the Toulon fleet to the most daring of his admirals, Latouche-Tréville, to compose it of ten ships of the line and several frigates, and to form a camp in the neighbourhood in order to awaken the idea of a new expedition to Egypt; to embark, in reality, only a few troops, and to send this fleet out during a north-westerly breeze, assigning to it the following route. It was first to sail towards Sicily, then, bearing to the westward to steer for the Straits of Gibraltar, pass them, pick up on the way the frigate *l'Aigle*, which had taken refuge at Cadiz, avoid Ferrol, whither Nelson would probably be tempted to hurry when he should

learn that the French had passed the Straits, enter the Gulf of Gascony to rally the French division of Rochefort, and, finally lying-to on the south of the Serlingueser to the north of Brest, profit by the first favourable breeze to pass into the Channel. This fleet, ten sail of the line strong at its departure, reinforced with six others during its cruise, and numbering sixteen on its arrival, ought to be sufficiently numerous to command the Strait of Calais for several days. To deceive Nelson was quite possible, for that great seaman, full of the genius of battle, had not always a perfectly correct judgment, and, moreover, his mind was continually disturbed with the remembrance of Egypt. To avoid Ferrol, in order to reach Rochefort to rally the squadron which lay there, was also very practicable. The most difficult was to penetrate into the Channel, and pass between the English squadron which guarded the coasts of Ireland, and the fleet of admiral Cornwallis, which blockaded Brest. But the squadron of Ganteaume, always kept ready for sailing, with all its people embarked, could not fail strongly to attract the attention of Cornwallis, and to compel him to keep close up to the mouth of Brest. If the latter, abandoning the blockade of Brest, should hasten after Latouche-Tréville, Ganteaume would instantly sail out, and one of the two French fleets, perhaps both of them, would be sure to arrive before Boulogne. It was almost impossible for the English Admiralty to divine such a combination, and guard against it. A point of departure so distant as that of Toulon ought less than any other to give alarm for the Channel. Moreover, in fitting out the flotilla in such a manner as that it could suffice for itself, all idea of external assistance was banished, and the vigilance of the enemy put to sleep. Thus, then, every thing was combined for the success of this scientific manœuvre, which could only occur to the mind of a man conceiving and acting alone, keeping his secret well, and perpetually thinking of the same thing.*

"If," said M. Decrès to the Emperor, "you would entrust a grand design to a man, it is necessary that you should first see him, speak to him, and animate him with your genius. This is especially necessary with our marine officers, demoralised by our maritime reverses, always ready to die like heroes, but thinking less of conquering than of falling nobly." Napoleon, in consequence, sent for Latouche-Tréville, who had just previously returned from St. Domingo. That officer had neither the range of mind nor the organising spirit of admiral Bruix, but in execution he displayed a boldness, and a ready perception, which would, probably, have made him, had he lived, the rival of Nelson. He was not discouraged like others, his companions in arms, but was ready to

* This was the first conception of Napoleon. We shall hereafter see that it was frequently modified according to the circumstances under which it was necessary to act.

attempt any enterprise. Unfortunately he had contracted at St. Domingo the seeds of a disease of which many brave men had already died, and even more died subsequently, Napoleon unfolded to him his plan, made its feasibility palpable to him, disclosed to him the grandeur, the immense consequences of it, and succeeded in infusing into the admiral's soul the ardour which transported his own. Latouche-Tréville, full of enthusiasm, quitted Paris before he had recovered his health, and went to superintend the equipment of his squadron. All was calculated for the execution of the project in July, or, at the latest, in August.

Admiral Ganteaume, who preceded Latouche in the command at Toulon, was transferred to Brest. The Emperor relied upon the devotion of Ganteaume, and was much attached to him. Nevertheless, he did not think him enterprising enough to be entrusted with his important manœuvre. But though inferior to admiral Bruix with respect to capacity, and to admiral Latouche as to audacity, he preferred him to all others for courage and experience. He had, therefore, confided to him the Brest squadron, which was probably destined to throw troops into Ireland; and had charged him to complete its equipment, that it might be in a state to co-operate with that of Toulon.

The fleet, however, was behindhand, owing to the unheard of efforts that had been made for the equipment of the flotilla. Since that had been ready, all the means of the marine had again been devoted to the equipment of the squadrons. They were working hard in the ports of Antwerp, Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, and Toulon. Napoleon had said that he would have a hundred ships of the line in two years, and twenty-five out of that hundred at Antwerp; that it was in that port that he placed his hopes of effecting the restoration of the French navy, and that he should, besides, find in that system of vast naval constructions, a means of employing the idle hands in the ports. But the consumption of materials, the encumbered state of the dock-yards, and also the inadequate number of the workmen, retarded the execution of the Emperor's grand designs. Scarcely any vessels were put upon the stocks at Antwerp, both the men and the materials having been employed at Flushing, Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, to supply the unceasing necessities of the flotilla. At Brest, only the eighteenth vessel was equipped; at Rochefort the fifth. At Ferrol, the poverty of the Spanish resources delayed the refitting of the division sheltered in that port. At Toulon there were only eight ships fit for instant service, and yet the winter had been most actively employed. Napoleon urged his minister of marine, Decrès, and left him no repose.*

* The following are two letters from the Emperor to the admirals, which

He had even given orders that they should work by torch-light, that the ten ships intended for Latouche should be equipped in good time. Sailors were no less wanted than materials and workmen. Admirals Ganteaume at Brest, Ville-

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show the energy of will with which he busied himself with the restoration of the French navy.

To the Minister of Marine.

Saint Cloud, 21st of April, 1804 (1st Floreal, Year XII).

It appears to me to be very desirable that an imposing ceremony should mark the laying of the first stone of the arsenal of Antwerp; but it seems to me no less desirable not to destroy the building on the pretext of regularity. It is sufficient to build nothing contrary to the general plan of regularity. Insensibly the rest will be established. When we have to destroy, we destroy what is irregular; but I must repeat to you what I lately said, that I cannot feel satisfied with the works at Antwerp, seeing that there is but one ship on the stocks, and five hundred workmen. I should desire that before the 1st Messidor there should be at least three seventy-fours on the stocks, that before the 1st Vendemiaire, year XIII., there should be six, and before the 1st Nivose nine; and all this cannot be done with the small number of workmen you have there. There are many unemployed workmen in Provence, and there will be many more at Bayonne and Bordeaux; therefore collect three thousand workmen at Antwerp. Stores from the north, wood, iron, every thing easily reaches there. If we were three years at war, we might still to build twenty-five vessels there. Everywhere else this is impossible. We want a navy, and we cannot be considered to have one till we have a hundred ships. We must have them in five years. If, as I think, ships can be built at Havre, two must be put on the stocks there. Two new ones must also be begun at Rochefort, and two more at Toulon, the four last-mentioned should, I think, be three-deckers.

I should also wish to keep an eye upon the port of Dunkirk. I beg that you will send me a note of the depth of the water there at low tide.

The flotilla will soon be complete everywhere. It is necessary, therefore, to find employment for that host of workmen at Nantes, Bordeaux, Honfleur, Dieppe, St. Malo, &c. We must consequently begin building frigates, brigs, and tenders. It is necessary as a matter of public spirit, that the workmen on the coast be not allowed to die of hunger, and that the seaward departments, which have been the least friendly to the Revolution, be made to perceive that the time approaches when the sea will also be our domain. St. Domingo cost us two millions per month; the English have taken it, we must apply the two millions per month solely to ship-building. My intention is to have the same activity in that as for the flotilla, only, as we are not hurried, business will be carried on with stricter order; I am in no hurry for the completion, but I require the commencement of a great deal.

I beg you to let me have, next week, a report from which I can ascertain the present condition of our marine, of what we are building, of what we require to build, and in what ports, and what will be the monthly cost, setting out from the principle that I should prefer your taking eighteen months to build each ship, so that I have by one-third the greater number.

As to the ships, I would construct them on the same plan, the frigates on the model of the *Hortense*, or the *Cornelie*, which seem good; for the ships take the best ships, and build ships of eighty, and of three decks, everywhere except at Antwerp, *where it appears to me to be prudent to commence in the first instance with seventy-fours.*

To the Minister of Marine.

Saint Cloud, 28th of April, 1804 (8th Floreal, Year XII).

I this day sign a decree relative to the constructions. I will admit of no sort of excuse. Let me have an account twice a week of the orders that you

neuve at Rochefort, Gourdon at Ferrol, and Latouche at Toulon, complained of being short-handed. Napoleon, after many experiments, was confirmed in his idea of supplying the deficiencies of the crews by young soldiers picked from the regiments, who, being exercised at the guns and at upon-deck manœuvres, would advantageously complete the manning of the ships. Admiral Ganteaume had already tried that measure at Brest, and had found it answer well. He bestowed great praise upon these sailors borrowed from the land service, and especially for their services at the guns. Only he requested not to have formed soldiers sent to him, who unwillingly submitted to a second training, but young conscripts, who, having nothing to unlearn, were more apt in learning what it was desired to teach them, and showed themselves more docile. However, they were taken on trial, and only those retained who showed an inclination for the sea. By this means the total number of seamen was augmented by a fourth or a fifth.

France had then about forty-five thousand seamen fit for service; fifteen thousand in the flotilla, twelve thousand at Brest, from four to five thousand between Lorient and Rochefort, four thousand between Ferrol and Cadiz, and about eight thousand at Toulon, without reckoning some thousands in India. To this total force, twelve, or perhaps fifteen thousand men could be added, which would carry the number of men embarked up to sixty thousand. The Brest fleet alone had received an addition of four thousand conscripts. They were much praised. If such squadrons could have sailed for some time under good officers, they would speedily have equalled the English squadrons. But, blockaded in the ports, they had no sea practice; and, moreover, the admirals were without that confidence which is only acquired by victory. However, every thing progressed under the influence of a powerful will, which exerted itself to restore confidence to those who had lost it. Admiral Latouche left nothing undone at Toulon, to be ready in July or August. Admiral Ganteaume sailed out of Brest, and returned, to train his crews a little, and to keep the English in continued doubt as to his actual intentions. By dint of threatening them with a

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give, and see to their execution; if any extraordinary measures are required, let me know. I will not admit any excuse to be valid, for with a good administration I would build thirty vessels of the line in France in a year, if that were necessary. In a country like France we ought to be able to do whatever we will. It will no doubt have escaped you that I intend to commence numerous constructions, except at Brest, where I do not intend to build any longer. My intention is to have afloat before Vendémiaire, year XIV., twenty-six ships of war: of course their being afloat at that time will depend upon whether we are previously at peace. But henceforth all seventy-fours should be built at Antwerp. Our principal building-yard should be at Antwerp. It is there only that in a few years the French navy can be restored. Before the year XV. we ought to have a hundred ships of war.

sortie, he would inspire them with an incredulity, of which he would some day take advantage.

Napoleon required a still further supplement to his naval force, and wished to appropriate to that purpose the marine of Genoa. He considered, that with a squadron of seven or eight ships of the line and some frigates in that port, he would divide the attention of the English between Toulon and Genoa, and oblige them to keep a double fleet of observation in that sea, or else to leave one of the two ports free, while blockading the other. He ordered M. Salicetti, our minister at Genoa, to conclude with that Republic a treaty, by which she should give up to us her dock-yards, for the building of ten frigates, and the same number of ships of the line. France, in return, engaged to receive into her navy a number of officers proportioned to that force, with pay equal to that of the French officers. Further, she undertook to enrol six thousand Genoese sailors, whom the Ligurian Republic, on her part, undertook to hold in constant readiness. On the conclusion of peace, France was to grant her flag to the Genoese, which would secure her French protection, very serviceable against the states of Barbary.

All the arrangements of Napoleon were now concluded, and it was necessary for him to set out. But he chose previously to receive the ambassadors charged to present him with their new credentials, in which he was styled Emperor. The Pope's nuncio, the ambassadors of Spain and Naples, and the ministers of Prussia, Holland, Denmark, Bavaria, Saxony, Baden, Wurtemburg, Hesse, and Switzerland, presented themselves to him on Sunday, the 8th of July (19th Messidor), with the forms adopted by all courts, delivered him their credentials, and treated him, for the first time, as a crowned sovereign. The ambassador from the court of Vienna, with which a negotiation was still in progress relative to the imperial title for the house of Austria; the ambassador of the court of Russia, with which France had quarrelled on account of the note addressed to Ratisbon, and finally, the ambassador of England, with which power we were at war, were alone absent from this assemblage. It may be said that, Great Britain excepted, Napoleon was recognised by all Europe, for Austria was about to execute a formal act of recognition; Russia regretted what she had done, and only required an explanation which should save her dignity, to recognise the imperial title of the Bonaparte family.

Some days later, the decorations of the Legion of Honour were distributed. Although this institution was decreed two years earlier, its organisation had required considerable time, and was now scarcely finished. Napoleon in person distributed those grand decorations to the first civil and military personages of the Empire, in the church of the Invalides, a monument for which he had an especial affection. He had not as

yet exchanged the order of the Legion of Honour against foreign orders; but in the absence of those exchanges which he proposed to make, in order to place in every respect his new monarchy on an equal footing with others, he, in the very middle of the ceremony, called the cardinal Caprara to his side, and detaching from his own breast the order of the Legion of Honour, he gave it to that old and respectable cardinal, who was profoundly affected by so marked a distinction. He also commenced with the Pope's representative the affiliation to an order which, all recent as it was, was speedily to be coveted by all Europe.

Endeavouring to render serious even the things apparently most vain, he sent the cross of grand-officer to admiral Latouche-Tréville. "I have named you," he wrote to him, "grand-officer of the Empire, and inspector of the coasts of the Mediterranean; but I am very anxious that the operation you are about to attempt may enable me to raise you to such a degree of consideration and honour as shall leave you nothing to wish for. Let us be masters of the Channel for six hours, and we are masters of the world."* (2nd of July, 1804.)

* The following is the entire letter:

By my courier, on his return, let me know on what day, wind and weather permitting, you will be able to sail; let me know what the enemy has done, and where Nelson is.

Meditate upon the grand enterprize with which you are intrusted, and before I sign your final orders, let me know the manner in which you think that they will be most advantageously fulfilled.

I have named you grand-officer, and inspector of the coasts of the Mediterranean; but I am very anxious that the operation you are about to attempt may enable me to raise you to a degree of consideration and honour which shall leave you nothing to desire.

The squadron of Rochefort consisting of five vessels, one a three-decker, and four frigates, is ready to weigh anchor; she has but five of the enemy's vessels against her.

The Brest squadron consists of twenty-one vessels. These vessels weigh anchor to harass admiral Cornwallis, and oblige the English to have a greater number of vessels on that station. The enemy keep also six vessels in front of the Texel, to blockade the Dutch squadron, consisting of fifty-one ships of the line, four frigates, and a convoy of eighty sail.

General Marmont's army is embarked.

Among Etaples, Boulogne, Vimereux, and Ambleteuse, two new ports that I had constructed, we have 270 gun-boats, 534 gun-brigs, 396 pinnaces, in all 1200 vessels, carrying 120,000 men, and 10,000 horses. Let us be masters of the Strait for six hours, and we are masters of the world.

The enemy have in the Downs, or before Boulogne, and before Ostend, two seventy-fours, three of sixty, or sixty-four, and two or three of fifty. Hitherto, Cornwallis has only fifteen ships; but all the reserves of Plymouth and Portsmouth have come to reinforce him. The enemy have also at Cork, in Ireland, four or five ships of war. I do not speak of frigates and smaller craft, of which they have a great number.

If you deceive Nelson, he will go to Sicily, or to Egypt, or to Ferrol. I do not think he will fail to present himself before Ferrol. Of five vessels which are in those parts, four are ready, as the fifth will be in Fructidor. But I think that Ferrol is too plainly pointed out; and it is so

Wholly occupied with his grand projects, the Emperor set out for Boulogne, after having delegated to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, in addition to the ordinary care of presiding over the Council of State and the Senate, the power to exercise the supreme authority should that be necessary. The arch-chancellor was the only personage in the Empire in whom he had sufficient confidence to delegate to him such an extent of prerogatives. He arrived on the 20th of July at Pont-de-Briques, and immediately proceeded to the port of Boulogne to inspect the flotilla, and the various works which he had ordered. The two armies, sea and land, welcomed him with transports of joy, and saluted his presence with unanimous acclamations. Nine hundred discharges of cannon from the forts and the line of broadsides, resounding from Calais to Dover, apprised the English of the presence of that man who, for eighteen months past, had so deeply disturbed the accustomed security of their isle. Napoleon, embarking on the instant, in spite of a stormy sea, would visit the stone forts of La Crèche and of L'Heurt, as well as the wooden fort placed between the two first, all destined, as we have said, to cover the line of boats. He had some shots fired under his own eyes, in order to ascertain if the instructions he had given for obtaining the longest possible ranges had been duly followed. He then put out to sea, and, within cannon shot distance of the English squadron, witnessed the manœuvring of several divisions of the flotilla, of which admiral Bruix had constantly boasted the improvement. He returned highly pleased,

natural for the enemy to suppose if your Mediterranean force enter the ocean, that it is intended to raise the blockade of Ferrol? It would appear better, then, to take a wide berth to make Rochefort, which will complete you a squadron of sixteen ships of the line, and of eleven frigates, and then, without losing a moment, without letting go an anchor, whether in doubling Ireland, keeping well out to sea, or in executing the first plan, to arrive before Boulogne. Our Brest squadron of twenty-three sail, will have an army on board, and will be daily ready to sail, so that Cornwallis will be obliged to hug the coast of Britanny, to endeavour to oppose its sortie.

For the rest, I await, ere I determine upon this operation, which has some hazards, but of which the success offers such immense results, the plan that you have promised me by the return of the courier.

You should embark as much provisions as possible, in order that under any circumstances you may not be straitened for any thing.

At the end of the month a new ship will be launched at Rochefort and at Lorient. That of Rochefort we need say nothing about, but should that of Lorient be in the road and unable to join before your appearance at the Isle of Aix, I wish to know if you think that you should make your course to pick her up; at all events, I think that going out with a good north-wester, it is above every thing preferable to execute the operation before winter; for, in bad weather, it would be possible for you to have more chances of arriving, but no less so, that there might be many days such as would render it impossible to profit by your arrival.

Supposing that you can set sail before the 10th Thermidor (10th of July), it is improbable that you should not arrive before Boulogne in the course of September, a time when the nights are already reasonably long, and the weather not bad for any length of time.

after having lavished testimonies of satisfaction upon the chiefs, both naval and military, who, under his supreme direction, had contributed to this prodigious creation.

The following, and the succeeding days, he visited all the camps, from Etaples to Calais; then returned to the interior to inspect the cavalry, which was encamped at some distance from the coasts; and, above all, the splendid division of grenadiers, organised by general Junot, in the environs of Arras. That division consisted of companies of grenadiers picked from the regiments which were not destined to make part of the expedition. There was not a finer corps, for the choice and beauty of the men. It far surpassed even the Consular guard, now become the Imperial guard. It comprised ten battalions of 800 men each. With these grenadiers the reform of the military head-dress had been commenced. They wore shakos instead of hats, and short hair, unpowdered, instead of the former long and powdered hair, which was at once inconvenient and uncleanly. Inured to warfare by numerous campaigns, and manœuvring with unequalled precision, they were animated by that pride which gives its greatest strength to a *corps d'élite*, and presented a division of about 8000 men, which no European corps of even twice or thrice their number, would have ventured to oppose. It was these grenadiers which Napoleon intended first to throw upon the shores of England, making them cross in the light pinnaces which we have elsewhere described. On beholding their bearing, their discipline, and their enthusiasm, Napoleon felt his confidence redoubled, and he doubted not that he should enter London and there conquer the sceptre of the earth, and the trident of the ocean.

Having returned to the coast, he resolved to inspect the flotilla, boat by boat, to see if his orders had been strictly attended to, and if it were possible, at the first signal, to embark, with the requisite rapidity, all that had been got together in the magazines of Boulogne. He found things exactly to his wishes. It required some days to embark the heavy *matériel*, but when that was once got on board, which should be done several weeks previous to the expedition, the horses, men, and field artillery, could be embarked on the flotilla in three or four hours. All was not yet ready, however. Some divisions were behind from Havre to Boulogne. The guard-boats, especially, under command of captain Daugier, had not yet arrived. The Dutch flotilla, too, caused Napoleon more than one difficulty. He was, to the highest degree, satisfied with admiral Verhuell, but the equipment of a part of that flotilla was not finished, whether from a lack of zeal on the part of the Dutch government, or, which is more probable, from the very nature of things. The two first divisions were assembled at Ostend, Dunkirk, and Calais; the third had not left the Scheldt. There remained another element of success, which Napoleon exerted himself to secure; it was to assemble the en-

tire Dutch fleet in the ports situated to the west of Cape Grisnez, by uniting more compactly in the four ports of Ambleteuse, Vimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples. The two flotillas would thus sail at the same time, and with the same wind, at three or four leagues distance from each other. But there are two things which are expended in grand operations with a rapidity, and to an extent, which always go far beyond the notions of matter-of-fact persons, time and money. Arrived at the commencement of August, Napoleon saw that he could not be entirely prepared before the month of September, and caused an intimation to be given to Admiral Latouche that the expedition was deferred for a month. He consoled himself for that delay, by considering that the month would be employed in getting better prepared than he at that moment was; and, that the season, moreover, being still sufficiently fine in the course of September, there would be the advantage of longer nights.*

In the meantime, he determined to give the army a grand fête, calculated to raise the spirits of the troops, if it were possible. He had distributed the grand decorations of the Legion of Honour to the principal personages of the Empire, in the church of the Invalides, on the anniversary of the 14th of July. He now proposed, personally, to distribute to the army the crosses which were to be given in exchange for the suppressed arms of honour, and to celebrate that ceremony on his birthday, on the very brink of the ocean, and in the presence of the English squadrons. The result answered his wishes, and it was a magnificent spectacle, long remembered by all who witnessed it.

He selected a spot situated to the right of Boulogne, on the high land, not far from the column which has since been erected in that part. This spot, having the form of a semicircular amphitheatre that had been designedly constructed on the brink of the ocean, seemed to have been prepared by nature for some grand national spectacle. There was space enough to allow the whole army to be drawn up there. In the centre of that amphitheatre a throne was erected for the Emperor, with its front to the land and its back to the sea. To the right and left

* The following is the text of the new order.

To the Minister of Marine.

14th Thermidor, Year XII (2nd August, 1804).

I wish you to despatch a courier extraordinary to Toulon, to make known to general Latouche, that different divisions of the flotilla having been unable to join, I have come to the conclusion that the delay of a month cannot but be advantageous, especially as we shall then have longer nights, but that it is my intention that he avail himself of this delay to add the ship *Berwick* to the squadron; that all possible means be used to bring about that result; that a ship more or less is no unimportant consideration, as it will bring the squadron up to eighteen ships.

I also wish the orders to be renewed for fitting out the *Algésiras* with all speed at Lorient. She must be in the road on the 10th Fructidor.

of it benches were put up to accommodate the grand dignitaries, the ministers, and the marshals. In prolongation of these two wings, detachments of the Imperial guard were to be drawn out. In front, on the slope of this natural amphitheatre, were to be ranged, as formerly the Roman people were in their vast arenas, the various corps of the army, formed in closed columns, and disposed in rays terminating at the throne as their common centre. At the head of each of these columns was to be the infantry, and at the rear the cavalry, overlooking the infantry from the whole height of their horses.

On the 16th of August, the morrow of Saint Napoleon, the troops repaired to the scene of the fête, through the streams of an immense population that hurried from all the neighbouring provinces to be present at this spectacle. A hundred thousand men, almost all of whom were veterans of the Republic, with their eyes fixed upon Napoleon, awaited the recompense of their exploits. Those soldiers and officers who were to receive the crosses, had left the ranks, and had advanced to the foot of the imperial throne. Napoleon, standing up, read to them the noble formula of the oath of the Legion of Honour, and then altogether, and accompanied by martial music and the reports of artillery, they responded, "WE SWEAR IT!" Then for several hours they in succession came forward to receive those crosses which were to replace nobility of birth. Gentlemen of the oldest lineage ascended the steps of the throne, side by side, with simple peasants, no less delighted than these were to obtain the distinctions awarded to courage, and all promising to shed their blood upon the shores of England, to secure to their country and to the man who governed it the undisputed Empire of the world.

This magnificent spectacle thrilled all hearts, and an unforeseen circumstance occurred to render it profoundly serious. A division of the flotilla, which had recently left Havre, entered Boulogne at this moment in heavy weather, and exchanging a smart cannonade with the English. From time to time Napoleon quitted the throne to direct his telescope upon the fight, and observe how his seamen and soldiers bore themselves in presence of the enemy.

Such scenes could not but be productive of great agitation in England. The British press, arrogant and insulting, as the press ever is in free countries, jested very much upon Napoleon and his preparations, but jested like a jester who trembles at that which he affects to laugh at. The immense preparations which had been made for the defence of England, agitated the country without completely reassuring men acquainted with the art of war. We have seen that, regretting that she had not a great army almost as much as France regretted that she had not a powerful navy, England had wished, by means of a *corps de réserve*, to augment her military force. A part of the men who

were drawn by the ballot to serve in the reserve, had passed into the line, which was thus increased to about 170,000 men. To this force were joined local militia corps, indefinite in number, who were only bound to serve in the provinces; and, finally, 150,000 volunteers, who presented themselves in the three kingdoms, and who displayed great zeal in submitting themselves to military training. As many as 300,000 volunteers were spoken of, but there was not, in reality, above half that number in actual preparation for service. The most eminent personages in England, in order to give an impulse to the public spirit, had assumed the uniform of the volunteers. Messrs. Pitt and Addington alike wore it. The levy, *en masse*, which had been decreed on paper, was not actually carried into effect.

Making the usual allowance for defalcations, England had to oppose to us 100,000 or 120,000 regular troops, of excellent quality, militias without organisation, and 150,000 volunteers, without experience, having inferior officers, and no general; the whole distributed in Ireland and England, and dispersed upon those points of the coast at which danger was apprehended. Of regular troops and volunteers, 70,000 men were reckoned to be in Ireland, leaving from 180,000 to 200,000 men of troops of the line and volunteers, for Scotland and England. Even with the art of moving masses of men, which only Napoleon at that time possessed, it was as much as could have been done to get 80,000 or 90,000 men of these forces together at the place of danger. And what could even double their number have done against the 150,000 perfect soldiers that Napoleon could throw across the Strait? The ocean was England's true defence! The English had 100,000 sailors, 89 ships of the line distributed over every sea, a score of fifty gun ships, and 132 frigates, besides a proportionate number of vessels on the stocks, or in the docks. Like Napoleon, perfecting their preparations with time, they had created sea *fencibles*, in imitation of the land *fencibles*. Under this title they had assembled all the fishermen and seamen not liable to the ordinary impressment, and these, to the number of about 20,000, were distributed along the coast in boats, forming a continual guard, independently of the advanced guard of frigates, brigs, and corvettes, which extended from the Scheldt to the Somme. Night signals, and carriages adapted for conveying troops by post, completed that system of precaution which we have described elsewhere, and which had been still further perfected in the course of the fifteen months which had elapsed since its commencement. Further, entrenchments had been thrown up, and in the Thames there was a line of frigates connected together by iron chains, capable of opposing a continuous and solid obstacle to all vessels. From Dover to the Isle of Wight, every approachable point of the shore was crowned with artillery.

The expense of these preparations, and the confusion which resulted from them, were immense. Men's minds excited as they

very naturally were in presence of a threatened invasion, deemed nothing good, nothing sufficiently reassuring; and, with a weak ministry whose capacity every one felt entitled to dispute, there was no moral authority which could repress the rage for censuring and suggesting. Every measure that was proposed was pronounced to be trivial, bad, or not sufficiently strong, and something else was suggested in its stead. Mr. Pitt, who had for some time been reserved, now ceased to be so, encouraged as he was by the general outcry. He bitterly blamed the measures of ministers, either because he considered the time to have arrived for overthrowing them, or because he really deemed their measures of precaution insufficient or badly calculated. It is at the least certain that his objections were better founded than those of other members of the opposition. He reproached the ministers for not having anticipated and prevented the concentration of the flat-bottomed boats at Boulogne, to the number, according to him, of above a thousand at the lowest. Although he sought rather to exaggerate than to conceal the actual danger, he was below the truth, for, including the Dutch flotilla, the number was 2300. He attributed this error to the ignorance of the Admiralty, which had not been able to foresee the use that might be made of gun-boats, and which had employed ships and frigates in shallows where those large craft could not follow the small vessels of the French. He maintained that with some hundreds of gun-boats, supported at a distance by frigates, the preparations of the French might be combatted with equal weapons, and their immense armament destroyed ere it could be assembled in the Channel. The reproach was specious, at least, if it were not well-founded.

The ministers replied, that during the last war an attempt had been made to employ gun-boats, and that they could not hold to the wind. This proved that the English seamen had applied themselves less than the French seamen to handling this sort of craft, for our boats had sailed in all weather. Sometimes they had grounded in shallows, but, with the exception of the accident which happened at Brest, not one had been lost owing to faulty construction.

Mr. Pitt, agreeing neither with the opinion of Mr. Wyndham, his former colleague, nor with that of Mr. Fox, his new ally, upon the insufficiency of the regular army, and perceiving the difficulty of instantly and at pleasure extending the proportions of an army, especially in a country which would not resort to the conscription, Mr. Pitt complained that greater use had not been made of the volunteers. He maintained that if these 150,000 English had been heartily made use of, and made to acquire that degree of training and discipline of which they were capable, they would have been rendered far less inferior than they actually were to the regular troops. This reproach, well or ill-founded, was as specious as the former one.

Mr. Pitt maintained these opinions with great warmth. In proportion as he became more strongly engaged with the opposition, he approached, if not in opinions and feelings, at least in conduct, to the old Whig opposition, that is to say, to Mr. Fox. The two adversaries, who had combatted each other for twenty-five years, now seemed to be reconciled, and there was a report in circulation that they were about to form a coalition ministry, the old majority being broken up. It has already been shown that a small part of that majority had followed Messrs. Wyndham and Grenville into opposition. A still larger part had joined them since Mr. Pitt had raised his standard. This Tory opposition consisted of all who thought that the existing ministry was incapable of making head against the circumstances, and that it was necessary to have recourse to the old leader of the war party. On the other hand, the old Whig opposition, headed by Mr. Fox, though it had sustained some losses, such as those of Messrs. Tierney and Sheridan, who were said to have joined Mr. Addington, had been singularly increased by a court occurrence. The intellect of the king appeared to be affected again, and the approaching regency of the Prince of Wales was announced. Now that prince, who had formerly quarrelled with Mr. Pitt, and recently with Mr. Addington, was greatly attached to Mr. Fox, and it was supposed would make him prime minister. Thence a certain number of members of the House of Commons, acting under his influence, had swelled the party of Mr. Fox. The two oppositions, united and augmented, the one by the demonstrations of Mr. Pitt, the other by the anticipated success of Mr. Fox, almost counterbalanced the majority of the Addington ministry.

Several successive votes speedily proved the seriousness of this state of things for the cabinet. In the month of March, Mr. Pitt had brought forward a motion for an account of the comparative state of the English navy in 1797, in 1801, and in 1803. Supported by the friends of Mr. Fox, he had succeeded in getting 130 votes for his motion, against 201. The ministry, then, had only a majority of 70 votes, and on comparing that vote with previous votes, one could not but be struck with the progress made by the opposition. Success encouraging the new allies, they pressed forward with new motions. In April, Mr. Fox moved that all measures adopted for the defence of the nation since the renewal of the war, should be referred to a committee. This was only another method of submitting to the judgment of parliament the conduct and capacity of the Addington administration. This time the majority was still further diminished. The opposition mustered 204 votes, and the ministers 256, which reduced to 52 the former majority of 70. This majority became daily weaker, and in the month of May a third motion was announced, which would place the ministry in an

actual minority, when lord Hawkesbury declared, in terms too clear to be misunderstood, that this motion was needless, as the cabinet was about to resign.

The old king, who liked Mr. Addington and lord Hawkesbury very much, and Mr. Pitt very little, nevertheless ended by summoning the last-named. That celebrated and all-powerful personage, so long our enemy, then resumed the reins of state, with the task of sustaining if possible, the threatened fortune of England. On returning to the ministry, he had left out his old friends, Messrs. Wyndham and Grenville, and his recent ally, Mr. Fox. He was reproached with his double breach of faith, of which very different explanations were given. The apparently true one was, that he was unwilling to have Messrs. Wyndham and Grenville, as being too violent Tories, and that the king was unwilling to have Mr. Fox, as being too decidedly a Whig. Mr. Pitt was accused of not having on this occasion made sufficient effort to overrule George III. It appeared to be the general wish, looking to the dangers with which the country was threatened, that the two ablest statesmen of England should unite their talents to give greater vigour and stability to the government.

Mr. Pitt, however, exercised so much influence on public opinion, he had so long enjoyed personal confidence, that he alone was sufficient to re-establish power. On entering the ministry he immediately demanded 2,400,000*l.* of secret service money. It was maintained that he wanted this money to renew the connexion of England with the Continent; for he was rightly looked upon as the fittest of all ministers to re-establish those coalitions, by the great respect in which he was held by the courts inimical to France.

Such were the events that occurred in England while Napoleon assumed the imperial crown, and repaired to Boulogne to make preparations for forcing the barrier of the ocean. It seemed as though Providence had brought these two men again upon the stage to strive once more against each other, and with more fierceness and violence than ever, Mr. Pitt in forming coalitions, which he well knew how to do, and Napoleon in destroying them at the edge of the sword, which he knew how to do still better. Napoleon was indifferent enough to what was passing on the other side of the Strait. He smiled at the military preparations of the English, still more sincerely than the English journalists jeered at his flat-bottomed boats. He asked but one boon of Heaven, that but for eight-and-forty hours he might have a fleet in the Channel, in which case he undertook to have his own way full speedily with all the armies that could be assembled between Dover and London. The ministerial changes in England would only have affected him had they placed Mr. Fox in office. Believing in that statesman's sincerity, and in his friendly feelings towards France, he would in that case have been led to turn from ideas of

an obstinate warfare to those of peace and even of alliance. But the appointment of Mr. Pitt, on the contrary, strengthened him in the opinion that it was necessary to end with some bold and desperate stroke, in which the two nations would stake their very existence. At the same time a demand of 60 millions of secret service money, which was only explicable on the supposition of some secret proceedings on the continent, could not fail to excite his attention. He saw that Austria was very tardy in sending new credentials, and very far from being frank at Ratisbon in the affair of the Russian note. Finally, he had received from M. d'Oubril the reply of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, to the despatch in which he had alluded to the death of Paul I. That reply of Russia appeared to him to indicate some ulterior project. With his usual sagacity, Napoleon already perceived the commencement of a coalition in Europe; he complained to M. de Talleyrand of his credulity, and of his complaisance to the two Messrs. de Cobentzel, and he added, that at the first doubt as to the dispositions of the Continent, he would throw himself, not upon England, but upon that power which should cause his anxiety; for he was not, he said, sufficiently infatuated to cross the Channel, if he were not entirely secure on the side of the Rhine." It was thus that he wrote from Boulogne to M. de Talleyrand, pointing out to him the necessity of urging Austria and Russia to explain themselves, when a sudden and ever to be regretted incident occurred, inevitably to put an end to his uncertainties, and to compel him to defer till some months later his projects of descent.

The brave and unfortunate Latouche-Tréville, a prey to an incompletely-cured malady, and to an ardour which he could not control, died in the port of Toulon, on the 20th of August, and when on the very eve of sailing. Napoleon received this melancholy intelligence at Boulogne, towards the end of August, 1804, at the moment when, prepared to embark, he was struck with some presentiment of a European coalition, and tempted, at times, to direct his blows elsewhere than upon London. The Toulon fleet having lost its commander, it was unavoidably necessary to postpone the English expedition; for, to select and appoint a new admiral, send him to his squadron, and give him time to become acquainted with it, all this would require more than a month. Now, it was the end of August; this, then, would lead to the month of October for the departure from Toulon, and to that of November for the arrival in the Channel. It would then be a winter campaign to make, and that would require new arrangements.

Napoleon immediately cast about for a man to be appointed in the room of admiral Latouche. "There is not a moment to be lost," wrote he to the minister Decrès, "in sending an admiral competent to command the Toulon squadron. It cannot be worse placed than it is now in the hands of Dumanoir, who is not

capable of maintaining discipline in so large a squadron, or of manœuvring it. It appears to me that for the Toulon squadron there are but three competent men, Bruix, Villeneuve, or Rossily. You can sound Bruix. I have great confidence in Rossily, but he has done nothing during fifteen years. However, the matter is so urgent that something must be done."—(28th of August, 1804.)

From this time, he perceived that the naval and military establishment that he had formed at Boulogne, would be less temporary than he had at first imagined, and he busied himself on the spot in simplifying its organisation, to render it less expensive, and at the same time, to add to its perfection in manœuvring. "The flotilla," he wrote to the minister Decrès, "has hitherto been looked upon as a mere expedition; henceforth it must be looked upon as a fixed establishment, and from this moment the greatest attention must be paid to that part of it which is to be permanent, in regulating it by other rules than the squadron."—(18th of September, 1804, 23rd Fructidor, year XII.)

He simplified, in fact, the administrative machinery, suppressed many double employments, arising out of the connexion of the land and sea forces, revised all the appointments, in a word, employed himself in rendering the Boulogne flotilla a separate establishment, which, being maintained at the lowest possible cost, could be kept up as long as war lasted, and could still exist even should the army for a time have to quit the coasts of the Channel.

He also resolved upon the formation of escadrilles, to give a greater degree of order to the movements of these 2300 boats. The following was the division that was finally resolved on: nine boats or gun-boats formed a section, and carried a battalion, two of these sections formed a division, and carried a regiment. The pinnaces, accommodating only half as many people, were to be double in number. The division of pinnaces was composed of four sections, or thirty-six pinnaces, instead of eighteen, in order to take on board a regiment of two battalions. Several divisions of boats, gun-boats, and pinnaces, formed an escadrille, and were to carry several regiments, that is to say, a *corps d'armée*. To each escadrille were added a certain number of those fishing-boats or coasters which had been got ready for the embarkation of the cavalry horses, and the heavy baggage. The whole flotilla was divided into eight escadrilles, two at Etaples for the corps of marshal Ney, four at Boulogne for the corps of marshal Soult, two at Vimereux for the advanced-guard and reserve. The port of Ambleteuse, in the new plan which there had been time to mature, was devoted to the Dutch flotilla, which was to carry the corps of marshal Davoust. Each escadrille was commanded by a superior officer, and independently manœuvred at sea, though combined in the unity of operations. In this wise, the arrangements of the flotilla were completely adapted to those of the army.

In the meanwhile, admiral Decrès sent for admirals Villeneuve and Missiessy, to offer them the vacant commands. Deeming Bruix indispensable at Boulogne, and Rossily as too long unaccustomed to the sea, he looked upon Villeneuve as the fittest to command the Toulon squadron, and Missiessy that of Rochefort, which Villeneuve would leave vacant. Admiral Villeneuve, whose name is surrounded by an unfortunate celebrity, was a man of ability, courage, and practical acquaintance with his profession, but he had no firmness of character. Susceptible to the highest degree, he was apt to exaggerate beyond bounds the difficulties that presented themselves, and to sink into that state of depression which leaves no command of either head or heart. Admiral Missiessy, less able, but cooler, was but little given to elation, but as little to depression. Admiral Decrès sent for them both, and endeavoured to reason them out of that discouragement which had seized not upon the sailors and officers, who were all animated with a noble ardour, but upon the commanders-in-chief of our fleets, who had to risk in every battle that renown which they prized above life. Decrès caused admiral Missiessy to accept the command of the Rochefort squadron, and admiral Villeneuve to accept that of the Toulon squadron. Towards the latter he bore a friendship, which dated from their early childhood. To him he entrusted the Emperor's secret, and the immense operation to which the Toulon squadron was destined. He excited his imagination by pointing out the grand object that was to be achieved, and the great honours that were thereby to be obtained. Deplorable endeavours of an old friendship! This momentary excitement was to give place with Villeneuve to a fatal depression, and to inflict the most sanguinary reverses upon our navy.

The minister hastened to transmit an account to the Emperor, of the result of his conferences with Villeneuve, and of the effect produced upon that officer by the perspectives of danger and glory which he had laid open to him.*

* We quote the letter of admiral Decrès, for it is important to understand the appointment of the man who lost the battle of Trafalgar.

Sire (wrote Decrès), vice-admiral Villeneuve, and rear-admiral Missiessy are here.

I have spoken to the first about the grand project. . . .

He listened coldly, and was silent for some instants. Then with a calm smile he said; I expected to hear something of the sort, *but to be approved, such projects must be achieved.*

I literally transcribe his reply in a private conversation, because it will depict to you more vividly than I can, the effect which the offer produced upon him. He added: *I will not lose four hours in rallying the first; with the five others and my own I shall be strong enough. It is necessary to be fortunate, and to ascertain how far I am so, I must be enterprising.*

We spoke of the course. He agrees with your majesty as to that. He only dwelt upon the unfavourable sufficiently to show me that he was not going blindly to work. Nothing of the kind affected his courage.

The appointments of grand-officer and vice-admiral have made a new man

Napoleon, who well understood men, did not expect much from the substitute of admiral Latouche. Constantly reflecting upon his project, he again modified and extended it in accordance with the circumstances which had occurred. The winter had restored freedom of movement to the Brest fleet, by interrupting the continuance of the blockade. Although Ganteaume had failed in decision, in 1801, he nevertheless had, on more than one occasion, displayed both courage and devotion, and Napoleon determined to intrust him with the most dashing and difficult part of his plan. He postponed the expedition until after the 18th Brumaire (9th of November), the epoch appointed for the coronation, and he resolved to send Ganteaume out at that rough season, with fifteen or eighteen thousand men destined for Ireland; then, when that admiral should have landed those men on some accessible point of the island, to have him speedily back into the Channel, there to protect the crossing of the flotilla. In this modified plan, admirals Missiessy and Villeneuve were intrusted with quite a different part from that which was assigned to the Toulon and Rochefort squadrons, when Latouche-Tréville had the command. Admiral Villeneuve, setting out from Toulon, was to sail for America, to reconquer the Dutch colonies of Surinam, Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo. A division, detached from Villeneuve's squadron, was to take the island of St. Helena, *en passant*. Admiral Missiessy had orders to throw a reinforcement of from three to four thousand men into our Antilles, then to ravage the English Antilles, taking them by surprise, and almost undefended. The two admirals then joining company, to return to Europe, had for their last instructions to raise the blockade of the squadron at Ferrol, and to return to Rochefort to the number of twenty sail. They were ordered to sail before Ganteaume, in order that the English, being informed of their departure, might be induced to pursue them. Napoleon desired that Villeneuve might sail from Toulon on the 12th of October, Missiessy, from Rochefort, on the 1st of November, and Ganteaume, from Brest, on the 22nd of December, 1804. He deemed it certain that the twenty sail of Villeneuve and Missiessy would draw fifty sail at least beyond the European seas! for the English, being suddenly attacked in

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of him. The ideas of danger are effaced from his mind by the hope of glory and he ended by saying, *I embark in it with heart and soul*, and this with a tone and gesture cool and decided.

He will set out for Toulon, as soon as your majesty shall have made me aware whether there are any further orders for him.

Rear-admiral Missiessy is more reserved with me, he asks to remain here for a week; he has an extreme coolness but less defined. I have heard that he was offended that your majesty had not given him the Mediterranean squadron. He is so because he is not vice-admiral. His great argument among his intimates is this, that not having been employed during the war, he has had no failures! I have given him orders to go and take the command of the squadron, and I reckon upon his being *en route* within a week. It will take him five or six days to reach his destination.

all quarters, could not fail to send succour everywhere. It was then probable that admiral Ganteaume would have sufficient freedom of movement to execute the operation entrusted to him, which consisted, after having touched at Ireland, of presenting himself before Boulogne, either by doubling Scotland or by sailing directly from Ireland into the Channel.

All his orders being given from Boulogne itself, where he was then located, Napoleon wished to avail himself of the time which still remained to him before winter, to clear up the affairs of the Continent. Directing the course of M. de Talleyrand by a daily correspondence, he prescribed to him the diplomatic measures which were calculated to lead to that end.

The reader will doubtless recollect the imprudent note of the cabinet of Russia, on the subject of the violation of the Germanic soil, and the bitter reply of the French cabinet. The young Alexander had deeply felt that reply, and had perceived, but too late, that the manner in which he had come to his throne had deprived him of all right to give such lofty lessons of morality to other governments. He was humiliated and alarmed at this. The soul of Alexander was rather quick than firm. He willingly threw himself forward, and then as willingly drew back, when he perceived danger. It was without consulting his ministers that he went into mourning for the duc d'Enghien, and it was in opposition to a portion of them that he had sent to Ratisbon the note of which we have made mention. Nevertheless, they had the greatest difficulty in keeping him in his first resolutions. The prudent men of St. Petersburg, when the first excitement was gone by, perceived that too little judgment had been shown in the affair of the duc d'Enghien, and they blamed first the young men who governed the empire, and, among those young men, the prince Czartoryski above all, because he was a Pole, and entrusted with the ministry of foreign affairs, since the retirement to the country of the chancellor Woronzoff. Nothing could be more unjust than this censure, as regarded the prince Czartoryski, for he had made all the resistance that he could to the vivacities of the court; but he was now desirous that the evil should be repaired without sacrifice of dignity. He consequently had directed M. d'Oubril, *chargé-d'affaires*, at Paris, to complain in a note, at once firm and moderate, of the manner in which the French cabinet had thought fit to refer to certain reminiscences; to show pacific inclinations, but to require a reply upon the three or four usual subjects of Russian remonstrance, such as the occupation of Naples, the still deferred indemnity of the king of Piedmont, and the invasion of Hanover. M. d'Oubril had orders, should he obtain even only a specious explanation on those points, to content himself with it, and to remain at Paris, but to take his passports, should he be met by an obstinate and disdainful silence.

Prussia, which, to use the expression of Napoleon, *continually*

struggled between two giants, being informed of the precise situation of the Russian cabinet, had communicated it to M. de Talleyrand, through her minister, Lucchesini, and had said to him: "Defer the reply as long as possible; then give a reply which will furnish the dignity of Russia with a seeming satisfaction, and this northern tempest, with which it is sought to alarm Europe, will be stilled."

These various communications having arrived at Paris while Napoleon was at Boulogne, M. de Talleyrand had had recourse to that procrastinating policy, in which it has been seen that he was an adept. Napoleon had willingly acquiesced in it, neither seeking nor fearing war with the Continent, and rather desiring to terminate all by a direct expedition against England. He, therefore, continued his preparations at Boulogne, leaving M. d'Oubril, in the meantime, in suspense at Paris. Nevertheless, M. de Talleyrand, not attaching sufficient importance to the Russian note, and taking too literally the intention of Prussia, had too readily trusted that all difficulty could be escaped from by delays. M. d'Oubril, after having waited through the whole month of August, had at length required a reply. Napoleon, wearied with M. d'Oubril's questions, and, moreover, inclined to come to a categorical explanation with the Continental powers, since the return of Mr. Pitt to power, desired that a reply should be made. He had himself sent the form of the note that was to be transmitted to M. d'Oubril, and M. de Talleyrand, according to his custom, had done his utmost to soften it, both as to form and substance. But, such as he transmitted it, the note was little calculated to spare the dignity of the Russian cabinet, which was unhappily involved.

This note opposed to the wrongs charged against France the wrongs which were chargeable against Russia. Russia, it argued, ought to have no troops at Corfu, yet she was daily augmenting the number of her forces there. She ought to have refused all favour to the enemies of France, and she had not confined herself to giving shelter to emigrants; she had still further bestowed upon them public functions at foreign courts. That was a positive violation of the last treaty. Moreover, the Russian agents everywhere showed themselves hostile. Such a state of things precluded all idea of intimacy, and rendered impossible that concert which had been agreed upon between the two cabinets, in conducting the affairs of Italy and Germany. As for the occupation of Hanover and Naples, that had been an inevitable consequence of the war. If Russia had engaged to cause Malta to be evacuated by the English, the cause of the war being then removed, the countries occupied by France would have been instantly evacuated. But to endeavour to press upon France, without endeavouring equally to press upon England, was neither just nor becoming. If Russia pretended to constitute herself the arbitress between the two belligerent powers, to judge, not only of the grounds of the

quarrel, but also of the means employed to decide it, the arbitration should be both impartial and firm. France was determined to accept no other. If war was wished for, she was quite ready for it, for, after all, the late campaigns of Russia in the west did not warrant her in assuming, towards France so lofty a tone as that which she now appeared to take. It was necessary that they should distinctly understand that the Emperor of the French was not the emperor of Turks, or of Persians. If, on the contrary, there was a desire to come to a better understanding with him, he was quite disposed to that; and, then, he assuredly would not refuse to do what had been promised, especially as regarded the king of Sardinia, but in the present state of relations, nothing could be obtained from him, for, as regarded him, threatening was the most inefficacious of all means.

This lofty note scarcely left M. d'Oubril any pretext for declaring himself satisfied. It was the consequence of the levities of his cabinet which, now wishing, with reference to Naples and to Hanover, to constitute itself judge of the means of war employed by the belligerent powers, and anon wishing to interfere as to some interior act, like that of the death of the duc d'Enghien, had laid itself open to having only unsatisfactory answers upon all the points upon which it touched. On consulting his instructions, M. d'Oubril deemed that it was his duty to demand his passports; but, that he might act in precise conformity to his instructions, he added that his departure was a simple interruption of diplomatic connexions between the two courts, but not a declaration of war; that when those connexions were no longer either useful or agreeable, there was no reason for continuing them; that, for the rest, Russia had no intention of resorting to arms; and that it was the French cabinet that would decide, by its posterior course of action, whether war was to follow this interruption of diplomatic relations.

M. d'Oubril, after this cold and yet pacific declaration, left Paris. Orders were sent to M. de Rayneval, who continued at St. Petersburg, as *chargé-d'affaires*, to return to France. M. d'Oubril set out at the end of August, and stopped some days at Mayence, to await the news of a free departure being permitted to M. de Rayneval.

It was evident that Russia, while endeavouring to evince its displeasure by the interruption of its relations with France, would, nevertheless, not resort to war unless a new European coalition should furnish her with an advantageous opportunity of doing so. All, consequently, in Napoleon's opinion, depended upon Austria. He put her, therefore, to close proof, that he might know what he had to expect, previous to giving himself up altogether to his maritime projects. The recognition of the imperial title, that he had assumed being still withheld, he peremptorily demanded it. His intention of visiting the banks of the Rhine would shortly take him to Aix-la-Chapelle, and he required that M. de Co-

bentzel should pay his respects and deliver his credentials in that very city in which the Germanic emperors were accustomed to take the crown of Charlemagne. He declared that if satisfaction were not given him in this respect, M. de Champagny, who had been named minister of the interior, in the room of M. Chaptal, who had been called to the Senate, should have no successor appointed to him at Vienna, and that a withdrawal of ambassadors, between powers so closely neighbouring as France and Austria would not pass over so pacifically as between France and Russia. Finally, he required that the Russian note, already avoided at Ratisbon by an adjournment, but the fate of which would shortly have to be decided on, should be finally rejected, or, he repeated, he would address to the Diet such a reply as must inevitably give rise to war.

All this being done, Napoleon quitted Boulogne, where he had passed six weeks, and proceeded towards the departments of the Rhine. Before setting out he had the opportunity of witnessing a battle between the flotilla and the English division. On the 26th of August (8th Fructidor, year XII.) at two o'clock in the afternoon, he was in the roadstead inspecting the line of the flotilla, consisting, as usual, of from 150 to 200 boats and pinnaces. The English squadron, moored at a distance from the shore, consisted of two ships of the line, two frigates, seven corvettes, six brigs, two luggers, and one cutter, in all twenty sail. A corvette, detaching herself from the main body of the enemy's division, placed herself at the end of our line of broadsides, to reconnoitre it, and to discharge some broadsides at it. The admiral, on this, gave orders to the first division of gun-boats under the command of captain Leray, to weigh anchor and bear down altogether upon the corvette; the order was executed, and the corvette was obliged to retire immediately. Seeing this the English formed a detachment, consisting of one frigate, several corvettes or brigs, and the cutter, to compel our gun-boats to retire in their turn, and to prevent them from regaining their usual position. The Emperor, who was in his barge with admiral Bruix, the ministers of war and marine, and several marshals, went into the midst of the boats that were fighting, and, to give them the example had his barge steered right for the frigate, which was advancing, full sail. He knew that the sailors and soldiers, who admired his daring when ashore, sometimes asked each other whether he would be as daring on the sea. He wished to enlighten them on that head, and to accustom them carelessly to attack the great vessels of the enemy. He had his barge put well a-head of the French line, and as near as possible to the frigate. She, seeing the imperial barge, dressed out in colours, and, perhaps, suspecting the precious freight it bore, had reserved her fire. The minister of marine, fearing the consequences to the Emperor of such an act of daring, was about to seize the rudder and alter the barge's course, but an imperative gesture of Napoleon stopped the movement of the minister, and the barge

held on its course towards the frigate. Napoleon with telescope in hand was examining her, when suddenly she discharged her reserved broadside, and covered with her projectiles the barge that carried *Cæsar and his fortunes*. No one was wounded, and they got off with the mere splashing from the projectiles. All the French craft, witnesses of this scene, had advanced as rapidly as possible, in order to sustain the fire, and to cover the Emperor's barge by passing before it. The English division assailed in its turn by a shower of balls and grape-shot, began to fall astern by degrees. It was followed, but put about and bore down again towards the shore. In the meantime, a second division of gun-boats, under the command of captain Pevrieu, had weighed anchor and made towards the enemy. Very shortly the frigate, much damaged and scarcely answering her helm, was obliged to stand out to sea. The corvettes followed the same course, some of them much damaged, and the cutter so riddled that she was seen to sink.

Napoleon quitted Boulogne delighted with the battle he had witnessed, and the more so, that secret reports which reached him from the English coast, gave him the most satisfactory details as to both the physical and moral effects which the battle had produced. We had had but one man killed and seven wounded, one of them mortally. The English, according to the reports addressed to Napoleon, had had from twelve to fifteen men killed, and sixty wounded. Their vessels had suffered very much. The English officers had been struck with the bearing of our small vessels, and with the rapidity and precision of their fire. It was evident, that if these boats had to fear the ships on account of their size, they could oppose to them a power very formidable from the multiplicity of their fire.*

Napoleon passed through Belgium, visited Mons and Valenciennes, and arrived at Aix-la-Chapelle on the 3rd of September. The Empress, who had gone to Plombières to take the waters, during Napoleon's stay on the coast, now joined him, to be present at the fêtes which were in preparation in the Rhenish provinces. M. de Talleyrand and several grand dignitaries and ministers were also there. M. de Cobentzel was punctual to the rendezvous given him. The emperor Francis, feeling the inconvenience of further delays, had taken, on the 10th of August, at an extraordinary conference of state, the imperial rank, and had assumed for himself and for his successors, the title of *elected* Emperor of

* Napoleon wrote to Marshal Soult:

"Aix-la-Chapelle, 6th of September, 1804.

The little battle at which I was present on the eve of my departure from Boulogne has produced an immense effect in England. It has created a real alarm there. On this subject you will see some very curious details translated for the newspapers. The howitzers which are on board the gun-boats tell admirably. The private information that I have received makes the loss of the enemy sixty wounded, and from twelve to fifteen killed. The frigate was much damaged.—*State Paper Office.*"

the Romans, always august, *hereditary* emperor of Austria, king of Germany, Bohemia, and of Hungary, arch-duke of Austria, duke of Styria, &c. He had then directed M. de Cobentzel to repair to Aix-la-Chapelle, there to present his credentials to the Emperor Napoleon. To this procedure, which the place at which it took place rendered still more significant, was joined a formal, and for the moment, sincere assurance of a desire to live in peace with France, and the promise, in compliance with Napoleon's desire, to take no heed of the Russian note to Ratisbon. That note, in fact, was done away with by an adjournment *sine die*.

The Emperor of the French gave M. de Cobentzel a gracious reception, and lavished upon him the most encouraging declarations in return for his own. With M. de Cobentzel there presented themselves, M. de Souza, the bearer of the recognition of Portugal, the bailiff of Ferrato, with that of the Order of Malta, and a crowd of foreign ministers, who, knowing how agreeable their presence at Aix-la-Chapelle would be, had determined upon the compliment of soliciting leave to go thither. They were received there with great pleasure, and with the grace which gratified sovereigns can always command. This assemblage was singularly brilliant by the concourse of both foreigners and French, by the splendour displayed, and by the military pomp. The reminiscences of Charlemagne were recalled there, with a scarcely disguised purpose. Napoleon descended into the vault in which the great man of the middle age had been interred, curiously examined his reliques, and gave the clergy striking proofs of his munificence. No sooner had he quitted these fêtes, than he returned to his serious occupations, and traversed all the country between the Meuse and the Rhine, Juliers, Venloo, Cologne, and Coblentz, inspecting at once the roads and the fortifications, everywhere amending the designs of his engineers, with that correctness of glance and profound experience, which belonged only to himself, and ordered new works, which would render that part of the frontiers of the Rhine invincible.

At Mayence, where he arrived towards the end of September (the commencement of the year XIII.), new pomps awaited him. All the German princes, whose states were in the neighbourhood, and who had an interest in paying court to their powerful neighbour, hastened to offer him their congratulations and homages, not through others, but in person. The prince arch-chancellor, owing to France the preservation of his title and of his opulence, came to render homage to Napoleon at Mayence, his former capital. With him there also presented themselves the princes of the house of Hesse, the duke and the duchess of Bavaria, and the venerable elector of Baden, the eldest of the princes of Europe, who was accompanied by his son and grandson. These personages and others who succeeded them at Mayence, were received with a magnificence far superior to that which they could have met with even at Vienna. They were all impressed with the prompti-

tude with which the crowned soldier had taken the bearing of a sovereign. That was caused by his having early commanded men, not by virtue of a vain title, but by virtue of his genius, his character, and his sword; and, as regarded command, that was an apprenticeship far superior to that which can be served in courts.

The rejoicings which had taken place at Aix-la-Chapelle, were renewed at Mayence, in presence of the French and Germans who had had hastened thither to be close spectators of the spectacle which at this moment excited the curiosity of all Europe. Napoleon invited to the fêtes of his coronation the greater number of the princes who visited him. In the midst of that tumult, withdrawing himself every morning from the vanities of the throne, he traversed the banks of the Rhine, and examined in all its details the fortress of Mayence, which he regarded as the most important on the Continent, not so much for its works as for its position on the bank of that great river, along which for ten centuries Europe has battled against France. He ordered the works which would give it the strength of which it was susceptible. The sight of this place inspired him with the idea of a most useful precaution, of which no one else would have thought had he not gone to the very spot. The recent treaties had ordained the destruction of the forts of Cassel and of Kehl. The first forms the outlet of Mayence, and the second the outlet of Strasburg, on the right bank of the Rhine. These two fortresses would lose their value without those two *têtes de pont*, which served them at once as means of defence, and as means of crossing to the other bank of the river. He gave orders for getting together great quantities of wood, and every kind of materials necessary for sudden works, together with fifteen thousand spades and pickaxes, so that within four-and-twenty hours from eight to ten thousand labourers could be set to work upon the opposite side of the river to reconstruct the destroyed works. The want of tools alone, wrote he to the engineers, would cause you a loss of a week. He even laid down all the plans for the immediate commencement of the works at a telegraphic order.

Napoleon, after having stayed at Mayence and the new departments long enough to arrange all his plans, set out for Paris, visited Luxembourg in passing, and reached St. Cloud on the 12th of October, 1804 (20th Vendemiaire, year XIII).

He had, for a time, flattered himself with the hope of presenting to France and to Europe an extraordinary spectacle, by crossing the strait of Calais with a hundred and fifty thousand men, and returning to Paris master of the world. Providence, which had reserved so much glory for him, had not permitted him to add so much splendour to his coronation. There remained to him another means of dazzling men's minds; that of causing the Pope to descend for an instant from the pontifical throne, to go to Paris itself to bless his sceptre and his throne. That was a great moral

triumph to gain over the enemies of France, and he did not doubt that he should succeed in gaining it. All was prepared for his coronation, to which he had invited the principal authorities of the Empire, numerous deputations of the army and navy, and a crowd of foreign princes. Thousands of workmen had been employed upon the preparations for the ceremony in the church of Notre Dame. A rumour of the coming of the Pope had got abroad, and the public mind was struck with wonder and admiration, the devout population enraptured, the emigrant party deeply annoyed, and Europe at once astonished and jealous. The question had been discussed where all business was discussed, in the Council of State. In that body, in which the most complete freedom had been left to opinions, the objections engendered by the Concordat were reproduced in still greater strength by the idea of, in some sort, submitting the coronation of the new monarch to the head of the Church. Those repugnances, so ancient in France, even among religious men, to ultramontane domination were all reawakened at once. It was said that this was to raise up again all the pretensions of the clergy, to proclaim a dominant religion, to make it appear that the recently elected Emperor held his crown not from the will of the nation and the exploits of the army, but from the sovereign Pontiff, a dangerous supposition, for he who gave the crown could also take it away again.

Napoleon, out of patience with so many objections to a ceremony which would be a real triumph over European malevolence, took up the argument in person, pointed out all the advantages of the presence of the Pope at such a solemnity, the effect that it would produce upon the religious public, and upon the whole world, the strength that it would bring to the new order of things, in the maintenance of which all the men of the Revolution were alike interested; he maintained that the pretensions of a Gregory VII. were incompatible with the spirit of the times, that the ceremony in question was simply an invocation of the protection of Heaven in favour of a new dynasty; an invocation made in the ordinary forms of the worship, which was oldest, most general, and most popular in France; that, moreover, without a religious pomp there would be no real pomp, especially in Catholic countries, and that if priests were to figure at the coronation, it was better to call the greatest and most highly qualified, and, if possible, the highest of them all, the Pope himself. Pushing his opponents as he pushed his enemies in war, that is to say, to extremities, he finished by this pointed question, which terminated the discussion at once: "Gentlemen," said he, "you are deliberating at Paris, at the Tuileries; suppose that you were deliberating at London, in the British cabinet—in a word, suppose that you were the ministers of the king of England, and that you were informed that the Pope at this moment crosses the Alps to crown the Emperor of the French; would you look upon that as a triumph

for England or for France?" To this interrogation, at once so pointed and so home thrust, no one made any reply, and the journey of the Pope to Paris encountered no further objection.

But to consent to that journey was not all; it still remained to get the consent of the court of Rome, and that was no ordinary difficulty. To succeed it was necessary to employ great skill, to combine much firmness with much gentleness, and the French ambassador, cardinal Fesch, with the irascibility of his temper and the inflexibility of his pride, was far less qualified for the task than his predecessor, M. de Cacault. This is the opportunity to describe that personage, who figured both in the Church and in the Empire. Cardinal Fesch was corpulent, of middle height, and of mediocre abilities, vain, ambitious, hasty, but firm; he was destined to prove a great obstacle to Napoleon. During the Reign of Terror, he, like so many other priests, had thrown aside the ensigns of the priesthood, and, with the ensigns, the obligations. Having become commissary of war in the army of Italy, no one, judging from his way of life, would have supposed him to be a former minister of religion. But when Napoleon, restoring all things to their proper places, had restored the priests to the altar, cardinal Fesch thought of returning to his first profession, and of obtaining in it the rank which his powerful relationship warranted him in hoping for. Napoleon would only restore him on condition of an exemplary conduct; and the abbé Fesch, with a rare moral resolution, altered his manners, concealed his habits, and gave, in a seminary, the spectacle of an edifying penitence. Having received the archbishopric of Lyons, which had been kept vacant for him, and a cardinal's hat, he immediately showed himself, not the supporter of Napoleon, but rather his antagonist in the Church; and it was already evident that he intended some day to compel a nephew, to whom he owed every thing, to be dependent upon an uncle supported by the secret ill-will of the clergy.

Napoleon had complained bitterly to the prudent Portalis of this new instance of family ingratitude, and Portalis had advised him to rid himself of that uncle by sending him as ambassador to Rome.

"There," said M. Portalis, "he will have enough to do with the pride and prejudices of the Roman court, and he will employ the faults of his disposition to your service instead of to your injury." It was to this end, and not for the purpose of some day making him pope, as was pretended by the retailers of false reports, that Napoleon had accredited cardinal Fesch to the court of Rome. No pope could have been more disagreeable, more hostile, more dangerous to him.

Such was the personage who was to negotiate the journey of Pius VII. to Paris.

As soon as Pius VII. had learned from the extraordinary

courier of cardinal Caprara the desires conceived by Napoleon, he was seized with perplexity, and for some time remained agitated by the most opposite feelings. He fully comprehended that this was an opportunity to render new services to religion, to obtain concessions for it which hitherto had been constantly refused; perhaps, even to obtain the restitution of the rich provinces which had been taken from the patrimony of St. Peter. But then, what risks were to be run! What painful remarks to endure from Europe! How many possible annoyances in the midst of that revolutionary capital, infected with the spirit of the philosophers, still swarming with their followers, and inhabited by the most satirical people upon the face of the earth! All these prospects presenting themselves at once to the mind of the Pope, sensitive and irritable as it was, agitated him to such a degree as obviously to affect his health. His minister and favourite councillor, the cardinal-secretary Gonsalvi, immediately became the confidant of his agitations.* He communicated to him his own anxieties, and received the communication of those of the cardinal, and both found themselves almost in agreement. They dreaded what the world would say of this consecration of an illegitimate prince, of an usurper, as Napoleon was called by a certain party; they feared the discontent of the courts of Europe, and especially that of the court of Vienna, which looked with a deadly dislike upon the rising of a new Emperor of the West; they feared from the party of the *ancien régime*, a far greater and better-grounded outcry than that which was raised at the epoch of the Concordat; better grounded, because in this case the interests of religion were less evident than the interests of a man. They feared that when the Pope was once in France, something unforeseen and inadmissible would be demanded from him with respect to religion, which he would have difficulty enough in refusing while at Rome, and which he could still less refuse at Paris, which would lead to troublesome, perhaps violent, disagreement. They did not go so far as to fear an actual violence, like the detention of Pius VI. at Valence; but they confusedly pictured to themselves strange and alarming scenes. It is true, that cardinal Gonsalvi, who had been to Paris about the Concordat, and cardinal Caprara, who had passed his life in that capital, had very different ideas of Napoleon, his courtesy, and the delicacy of his proceedings, from those which generally obtained in that court of old priests, who never thought of Paris but as an abyss governed by a fearful giant. Cardinal Caprara, especially, never ceased to repeat, that if the Emperor was the most passionate and imperious of men, he was also the most

* I do not suppose any invention here, I do not imagine any. What follows is faithfully extracted from the secret correspondence of cardinal Gonsalvi with cardinal Caprara, which correspondence remains in the possession of France.

generous and amiable when no offence was offered to him; that the Pope would be delighted to see him, and would obtain from him whatever he wished for religion and for the Church; that now was the time to set out, as the war tended towards some decisive crisis; that there would once more be vanquished and victors, and new distributions of territory, and that the Pope would perhaps obtain the Legations; that nothing had been promised, indeed, but that that, at bottom, was the intention of Napoleon, and that he only required an opportunity to realise it. These representations somewhat calmed the disturbed imagination of the luckless Pope; but Paris, the capital of that frightful Revolution which had destroyed kings, queens, and thousands of priests, was an object of undefinable terror to him.

Then he was assailed by the opposite fears. No doubt Europe would speak ill, should he go to Paris; it was possible that in that capital he might be exposed to unknown and fatal dangers; but should he not go, what would be the results to religion and the Holy See? All the states of Italy were within the grasp of Napoleon. Piedmont, Lombardy, Tuscany, and even Naples, despite the Russian protection, were swarming with French troops. Out of respect to the Holy See the Roman state had alone been spared. What would not Napoleon do, if irritated and affronted by a refusal which would infallibly be known to all Europe, and which would be taken for a denial of his rights, set forth by the Holy See? All these contradictory ideas formed a most painful ebb and flow in the minds of the Pope and his secretary of state, Gonsalvi. The cardinal Gonsalvi, who had already braved the danger, and who had found Paris any thing but unpleasant, was less agitated. He was only anxious about Europe, its opinions, and the displeasure of all the old cabinets.

However, the Pope and the cardinal, expecting to receive from Paris such urgings as would put it out of their power to refuse, wished to have the sanction of the sacred college. They did not dare to consult it as a whole, for it contained cardinals connected with foreign courts, who probably would betray the secret. They selected ten of the most influential members from the congregation of cardinals, and submitted to them, under the seal of confession, the communications that had been made by cardinal Caprara and cardinal Fesch. Unfortunately, these ten cardinals were divided in opinion, and it was to be feared that the same would be the case with the sacred college. The Pope and his minister then judged that it was necessary to refer to ten other cardinals, making twenty. That consultation, which remained secret, gave the following results. Five cardinals were absolutely opposed to the demand of Napoleon, fifteen were favourable to it, but with some objections and upon some conditions. Of the five who were against, only two grounded their refusal upon the illegitimacy of the sovereign whose coronation was in question. All the five urged that it was to consecrate and ratify all that the

new monarch had done or permitted to be done to the injury of religion; for, if he was the author of the Concordat, he was no less so of the Organic Articles, and, when he was general, had deprived the Holy See of the Legations; that again, more recently, in concurring in the secularisations, he had assisted in despoiling the Germanic Church of its property; that, if he wished to be treated as a Charlemagne, he must conduct himself like that Emperor, and display the same munificence towards the Holy See.

The fifteen cardinals who were inclined to consent, with some restrictive conditions, had objected the opinions and the discontent of the European courts, the inconsistency with the papal dignity of the Pope going to Paris to crown the new Emperor, while the emperors of the Holy Empire had all come to be crowned at Rome, at the foot of the altar of St. Peter; the unpleasantness of meeting the constitutional bishops whose retractation was incomplete, or who, subsequent to their reconciliation with the Church had raised new controversies; the false position of the Holy Father, in presence of some high functionaries, as, for example, M. de Talleyrand, who had broken the bands of the Church to enter those of matrimony; the danger of being exposed, in a hostile capital, to inadmissible demands, the refusal of which would probably lead to a violent rupture; and, finally, the danger of such a journey for a health so delicate as that of Pius VII. Referring to the censure which had been incurred in the last century by Pope Pius VI., when he made the journey to Vienna to visit Joseph II., and returned without having obtained any thing favourable to religion; the fifteen cardinals maintained that there could, in the eyes of the Christian world, be but one valid excuse for the act of condescension that was demanded of Pius VII., which was to demand and to obtain certain obvious advantages, such as the revocation of a portion of the Organic Articles, the abolition of the measures adopted by the Italian Republic respecting the clergy, the revocation of what the French commissioner had done at Parma and Plaisance, relatively to the church of that country, and finally, territorial indemnities for the losses which the Holy See had suffered, and, above all, the adoption of the ancient ceremonial observed at the coronation of Germanic emperors. Some of the fifteen cardinals now added, as an express condition, that the coronation should take place, not in Paris, but in Italy, when Napoleon should visit his transalpine states, and insisted upon this condition, as indispensable to the dignity of the Holy See.

Somewhat re-assured by these opinions, the Pope was inclined to consent to the wishes of Napoleon, insisting, however, in a peremptory manner, upon the conditions demanded by the fifteen consenting cardinals, and he had communicated that resolution to cardinal Fesch. But, in the interval, there had arrived at Rome

the text of the *Senatus Consultum* of the 28th Floréal, and the formula of the Emperor's oath, containing these words:—"I swear to respect, and to cause to be respected, THE LAWS OF THE CONCORDAT, AND THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION." The laws of the Concordat appeared to include the Organic Articles; the freedom of religion seemed to carry with it the consecration of heresies, and never had the court of Rome, on its part, admitted such a freedom. This oath suddenly became an argument for an absolute refusal. However, the twenty cardinals were again consulted, and this time there were only five who considered that the oath was not an insurmountable obstacle; while fifteen replied that it was impossible for the Pope to anoint the new monarch.

Although the secret had been well kept by the cardinal, the news from Paris, and some inevitable indiscretions of the agents of the Holy See, caused the negotiations to be divulged, and the public, consisting of prelates and diplomatists, who surround the Roman court, overflowed with censures and sarcasms. Pius VII. was styled *the chaplain of the Emperor of the French*, for that Emperor, standing in need of the ministry of the Pope, had not come to Rome as the Charlemagnes, the Othos, the Barbarossas, and the Charles V., of the olden day, had done; he had summoned the Pope to his palace.

This outcry, added to the difficulties of the oath, shook the determination of Pius VII., and the cardinal Gonsalvi, and they both agreed to the resolution of sending an answer, apparently favourable, but in reality negative, for it consisted in an acquiescence, loaded with conditions which the Emperor could not admit.

The cardinal Fesch had hastened to reply to the principal difficulty raised against the oath, and drawn from the engagement of the sovereign to respect liberty of religion, by saying that this engagement was not the canonical approbation of dissenting creeds, but the promise to permit the free exercise of all religions, and not to persecute any, which was conformable to the spirit of the Church, and to the principles adopted in the present age by all sovereigns. These very sensible explanations had, according to cardinal Gonsalvi, only a private character, not a public character, and could not excuse the court of Rome in the eyes of the faithful, or in the eyes of God, if it were wanting to the Catholic faith.

Although of any thing but an insinuating turn, cardinal Fesch had contrived to penetrate, by means of fear and presents, into the secrets of more than one personage of the Roman court, and was pretty correctly acquainted with both the objections and their authors. He communicated all that he knew to Paris, that the Emperor might perfectly understand how matters stood; and yet, being unaware to what extent the Pope desired to shelter himself from what was required of him, by proposing unacceptable conditions, he gave greater hope of success than he at the time

had reason to entertain, adding, however, that, in order to succeed, it was necessary to give the Holy See entirely satisfactory promises and explanations.

These communications, being transmitted to Paris, cruelly embarrassed cardinal Caprara, for they were taken for a consent, dependent only upon some explanations to be given, and the Pope's journey to Paris was held to be certain. Cardinal Caprara, who was acquainted with the real dispositions of his court, and did not dare to disclose them, was trembling and confused. The empress Josephine was even more anxious than Napoleon himself for the coronation, which seemed to her the pronouncing of Heaven's pardon for an act of usurpation. Accordingly, she received cardinal Caprara at St. Cloud, and lavished the kindest attentions upon him. Napoleon, on his part, testified his lively satisfaction, and both told the cardinal that they deemed the matter arranged; that the Pope would be received at Paris with all the honours due to the head of the universal Church, and that religion would reap infinite benefits from his journey. Napoleon, without knowing all, yet surmised a part of the secret wishes of the court of Rome, and shunned the approach of cardinal Caprara, from fear of being asked either for something utterly impossible, as the revocation of the Organic Articles, or very difficult, under the circumstances, as the restitution of the Legations. The cardinal, therefore, was doubly embarrassed, by the hopes, too easily conceived in Paris, and by the difficulty of getting access to Napoleon, to obtain from him such promises as would determine the court of Rome.

The abbé Bernier, who had become bishop of Orleans, the man whose at once prudent and profound intellect had been employed in overcoming all the difficulties of the Concordat, was again very serviceable on this occasion. He was intrusted with the replies to be made to the Roman court. He conferred for this purpose, with cardinal Caprara, and showed him that after the hopes that had been conceived by the imperial family, and the expectation to which the French public had been excited, it was impossible to draw back without insulting Napoleon, and risking the most serious consequences.

The bishop of Orleans drew up a despatch which would have done honour to the most learned and practised diplomatist. He referred to the services rendered by Napoleon to the Church, and the claims that he had upon its gratitude, the benefit that religion might still expect from him, the effect, above all, that the presence of Pius VII. would produce upon the French people, and the impulse which it would give to religious ideas. He explained the proper construction to be put upon the oath, and the expressions relative to freedom of religion; moreover, he proposed an expedient, it was to have two ceremonies; the one, civil, in which the Emperor would take the oath, and assume the crown; the other, religious, in which he would have that crown blessed by the

Pontiff. Finally, he positively declared that it was for the interests of religion and of the affairs cognate thereto, that the presence of the Pope at Paris was requested. There were sufficient hopes hidden beneath this language personally to win over the Pope, and to furnish him with a pretext on which he could justify to Christendom his condescension towards Napoleon.

To this official despatch of the French government, cardinal Caprara added some private letters, in which he described what was passing in France, the good which was to be accomplished there, and the evil that was to be repaired, and positively affirmed that a refusal could not be given but with the greatest perils, and that the Pope would reap from his journey nothing but subjects of satisfaction.

A second time transported to Rome, the negotiation was destined to be successful. The Pope and the cardinal Gonsalvi, enlightened by the letters of the legate and of the bishop of Orleans, comprehended the impossibility of a refusal, and, urged by cardinal Fesch, ended by agreeing. But they still felt the necessity of once more consulting the cardinals, and they were especially alarmed at that proposal of the bishop of Orleans, in which he started the idea of a double ceremony. The Pope admitted but one of them, for he wished not only to sprinkle holy water over the new Emperor, but also to crown him. The cardinals, therefore, were consulted anew, upon the explanations that had been sent from Paris. Cardinal Fesch obtained access to them, and struck fear into their hearts, which he was better calculated to do than he was to persuade. The reply was favourable, but they demanded an official note explanatory of the oath, promising but a single ceremony, and containing an express mention of the terms on which the Pope was to proceed to Paris.

Pius VII., therefore, caused it to be declared, that he had consented to go to Paris, on condition that the oath should be explained as not implying approbation of heretical dogmas, but the simple physical toleration of dissenting religions; that they should promise to listen to him when he should remonstrate against certain Organic Articles, or reclaim in behalf of the interests of the Churc hand the Holy See (the Legations were not named); that access to him should not be granted to the bishops who had disputed their submission to the Holy See, until after a new and complete submission on their part; that he should not be exposed to the meeting with persons in a situation repugnant to the laws of the Church (the wife of the minister for foreign affairs was specifically pointed out); that the ceremonial observed should be that of the court of Rome crowning the emperors, or of the archbishop of Rheims crowning the kings of France; that there should be but one ceremony, by the ministry of the Pope exclusively; that a deputation of two French bishops should be the bearers to Pius VII. of a letter of invitation, in which the Emperor should say that, detained by cogent considerations in the heart of his Empire,

and having much to consult upon with the Holy Father concerning the interests of religion, he begged him to visit him in France to bless his crown, and treat of the interests of the Church; that no sort of demand should be addressed to the Pope; and that his return to Italy should in nowise be obstructed. The pontifical cabinet finally expressed its desire that the coronation should be postponed to the 25th of December, the day on which Charlemagne had been proclaimed emperor, for the Pope, cruelly agitated, needed to pass some time at Castel-Gandolpho, to take some little repose, and moreover, could not leave Rome without arranging many affairs of the Roman government.

There was nothing but what was very admissible in these conditions, for in promising to listen to the remonstrances of the Pope against certain of the Organic Articles, no pledge was given to act upon those remonstrances, in the event of their being contrary to the principles of the French Church. Cardinal Fesch, indeed, had honestly declared that those of the Organic Articles which were most offensive to Rome would never be modified; those which required the consent of the civil authority to the introduction of papal bulls into France. Again, there could be no scruple as to promising a single ceremony; the observance of the Roman or the French ceremonial; a hope as to the territorial amelioration of the Holy See, for Napoleon had often contemplated this; the sending a deputation solemnly to invite the Pope to proceed to Paris; or the allegation of the interests of the Church as causing his journey; the repression of the four bishops who had relapsed from their reconciliation, and disturbed the Church in a mischievous manner. Finally, it was quite convenient to engage not to demand any thing of Pius VII., and to leave him his liberty, for never had a contrary design entered the minds of Napoleon and his government. In fact, it was only in the minds of those trembling and enfeebled old men that the supposition could have birth, of the liberty of the Pope being at all endangered in France.

As soon as the consent was obtained, cardinal Fesch declared that the Emperor would defray all the expenses of the journey, which, for an impoverished government, was one great difficulty removed. He further made known the details of the magnificent reception that was in reserve for the Holy Father. Unfortunately, he worried him by accessory exactions, which were altgether misplaced. He desired that twelve cardinals, besides the secretary of state, Gonsalvi, should accompany the Pope; he wished, contrary to the established custom, by which the cardinals take precedence in the order of seniority, to have the first place in the pontifical carriage, in quality of ambassador, grand-almoner, and uncle of the Emperor. All this was useless, and gave to timid and punctilious men as much pain as the most serious difficulties.

Pius VII. yielded upon some points, but was inflexible as to the number of cardinals, and as to being accompanied by the secretary

of state, Gonsalvi. In their vague terrors Pius VII. and Gonsalvi had determined upon a singular precaution for providing against all the dangers of the Church. The Holy Father, who imagined his health worse than it really was, and mistook the nervous agitation into which he was thrown for a dangerous illness, thought it very likely that he might die on his journey. He also thought it possible that advantage might be taken of his presence in France. For this second case he had drawn up and signed his abdication, and placed it in the hands of Gonsalvi, in order that he might be able to declare the papacy vacant. Further, in the event of his death or abdication, it would be requisite to convoke the sacred college, in order to fill the chair of St. Peter. It was necessary, therefore, to have as many cardinals as possible at Rome, and among them the man whose ability rendered him the most capable of directing the church in grave conjunctures, that is to say, cardinal Gonsalvi himself. There was still another reason, that decided the Pope upon acting thus. He had not been able to avoid an explanation with the court of Austria, to cause it to agree to his journey to Paris. Austria, appreciating his position, had admitted the necessity he was under of making the journey, but demanded a guarantee, whereby he promised not to treat at Paris about the arrangements of the Germanic Church, which were to be the result of the recess of 1803. It was especially on this account that Austria dreaded the Pope's stay in France. Pius VII. had solemnly promised not to treat with Napoleon upon any question foreign to the French Church. But in order that faith should be placed in his promise, it was necessary that he should not take with him to Paris the cardinal Gonsalvi, the man by whom all the important business of the Roman court was transacted. For these reasons, Pius VII. refused to take more than six cardinals with him, and persisted in his resolution to leave the secretary of state, Gonsalvi, at Rome. He consented to an arrangement as to the personal pretensions of cardinal Fesch. He was to occupy the first place from their arrival in France.

These points being settled, the Pope proceeded to Castel-Gandolpho, where the pure air, the calm which follows a resolution taken, and the news, every day more satisfactory, of the reception that was in preparation for him at Paris, re-established his much shaken health. Napoleon considered what he had obtained as a grand victory, which put the last seal on his rights, and which, in point of legitimacy, left him nothing more to desire. At the same time he would not lay aside his proper character amidst these external pomps; he would neither do nor promise any thing opposed to his own dignity, or to the principles of his government. Cardinal Fesch having informed him that it would be sufficient to depute to the Pope some general enjoying a high reputation, he sent general Caffarelli as the bearer of his invitation, and he couched that invitation in respectful, and even caressing terms, but

without giving any intimation that he invited the Pope to France on any other business than that of the coronation. The letter, in which a perfect dignity was preserved, ran thus:

"MOST HOLY FATHER:

"The happy effect produced upon the morality and the character of my people by the re-establishment of religion, induces me to beg your holiness to give me a new proof of your interest in my destiny and in that of this great nation, in one of the most important conjunctures presented by the annals of the world. I beg you to come and give, to the highest degree, a religious character to the anointing and coronation of the first Emperor of the French. That ceremony will acquire a new lustre from being performed by your holiness in person. It will bring down upon ourself and our people the blessing of God, whose decrees rule the destiny alike of empires and of families.

"Your holiness is aware of the affectionate sentiments I have long borne towards you, and can thence judge of the pleasure that this occurrence will afford me of testifying them anew.

"And hereupon, we pray God that He may preserve you, most Holy Father, for many years, to rule and govern our mother, the holy Church.

"Your dutiful son,

NAPOLEON."

This letter was accompanied by urgent entreaties that the Pope would arrive towards the end of November, instead of on the 25th of December. Napoleon did not disclose his real reason for wishing the ceremony to take place at the earlier epoch; that reason was no other than his project of a descent upon England, prepared for December. He alleged a reason, which was true, indeed, but less important; the inconvenience of too long detaining at Paris all the civil and military authorities, who were already convoked thither.

General Caffarelli, having set out, and travelled with all speed, reached Rome in the night of the 28th to the 29th of September. Cardinal Fesch presented him to the Holy Father, who gave him a truly paternal reception. Pius VII. received the Emperor's letter from the hands of general Caffarelli, and deferred reading it until after the audience. But when he had read it, and found no allegation of religious affairs as the cause of his journey to Paris, he was deeply grieved, and was thrown into a state of nervous agitation, which excited the most lively anxiety. At bottom, what really affected that respectable Pontiff, as it does all high-souled princes, was his honour, the dignity of his crown. He considered these compromised if the interests of religion were not set forth as the cause of his journey. The nickname of *chaplain to Napoleon*, which had been given to him by his enemies, deeply wounded him. He summoned cardinal Fesch, and said to him, "*It is poison* that you have brought me." He added that he would not reply to such a letter; and that he would not go to Paris, for faith had not been kept with him. Cardinal Fesch en-

deavoured to soothe the irritated Pope, and considered that a new consultation of cardinals would overcome this last difficulty. All began to feel the impossibility of drawing back, and by means of a last explanatory note, signed by the cardinal-ambassador, the difficulty was removed. It was settled that the Pope, on account of All Saints' day, should set out on the 2nd of November, and reach Fontainebleau on the 27th.

While this was going on at Rome, the Emperor Napoleon had prepared every thing at Paris to give a prodigious splendour to the ceremony. He had invited to it the princes of Baden, the prince arch-chancellor of the Germanic Empire, and numerous deputations, selected from the administration, the magistracy, and the army. He had committed to the bishop Bernier, and to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, the task of examining the ceremonial observed at the coronation of emperors and kings, and of suggesting the modifications that the manners and spirit of the times, and even the prejudices of France against the authority of Rome rendered it necessary to effect in it. He had prescribed the utmost secresy to them, in order that those questions should not become the subject of mischievous disputes, and reserved to himself the final decision on whatever was doubtful.

The two rituals, the Roman and the French, contained points of procedure, which would have been equally difficult to render palatable to public taste. According to each ceremonial, the monarch arrived without the ensigns of supreme power, such as the sceptre, the sword, and the crown, and received them only from the hand of the Pope. Further, the crown was placed upon his head. By the French ritual, the peers, by the Roman ritual, the bishops, held the crown above the head of the kneeling monarch, and the Pope, laying his hands upon it, lowered it upon his brow. Messrs. Bernier and Cambacérès, after suppressing certain forms that were too much in contradiction to the feelings of the time, had decided for preserving the last part of the ceremony, substituting for the peers of the French ritual, and for the bishops of the Roman ritual, the six grand dignitaries of the Empire, but still leaving it to the Pope, according to the ancient custom, to place the crown on the sovereign's head. Napoleon, grounding his argument upon the spirit of the nation and of the army, maintained that he could not thus receive the crown from the Pontiff; that the nation and the army, from whom he held it, would be offended at the sight of a ceremony at variance with fact, and with the independence of the throne. On this point he was inflexible, saying that he, better than any one, knew the real sentiments of France, tending, no doubt, towards religious ideas, but on that very account always ready to censure those which went beyond certain limits. He was resolved, then, to present himself at the church with his imperial ensigns; that is to say, as an emperor, and only to give them to the Pope to be blessed. He consented to be blessed, consecrated, but not

crowned. The arch-chancellor, admitting what was correct, in the opinion of Napoleon, pointed out the not inferior danger of offending the Pope, already much chagrined, and of depriving the ceremony of an important and valuable conformity with the antique forms in use from the days of Pepin and Charlemagne. Messrs. Cambacérès and Bernier, who were both intimately connected with the legate, were commissioned to procure his assent to the wishes of the Emperor. Cardinal Caprara, knowing how important forms were to his court, considered that he ought not to determine the question without obtaining the opinion of the Pope, but, at the same time, that it was best not to make any communication to the Holy See, lest new difficulties should be created. Satisfied that when the Pope should have once arrived, he would be at once reassured and delighted by the reception which was prepared for him, the cardinal believed that every thing would be more easily arranged at Paris, under the influence of an unexpected gratification, than at Rome, under the influence of the most vague alarms.

These difficulties being surmounted, there remained others, which originated in the bosom of the imperial family. The parts of the wife, the brothers, and the sisters of the Emperor, in this ceremony, had to be decided upon. First, it was to be settled whether Josephine should be crowned and anointed, like Napoleon himself. She ardently desired it, for it was a new tie to her husband—a new guarantee against a future divorce, which was the haunting anxiety of her life. Napoleon hesitated between his tenderness for her, and the secret presentiments of his policy, when a domestic scene almost produced the ruin of the unfortunate Josephine. All were eager and busy around the new monarch; brothers, sisters, and relations. All were anxious that in this ceremony, which seemed to consecrate them all, for a part consistent with their existing pretensions and future hopes. On witnessing this excitement, and the importunities of which Napoleon was the object, especially on the part of one of his sisters, Josephine, agitated, and devoured by jealousy, manifested frightfully injurious suspicions of that sister, and of Napoleon himself, suspicions in accordance with the atrocious calumnies of the emigrant party. Napoleon was suddenly transported with a violent anger, and, deriving from that anger the power of rising above his affection, he told Josephine that he would separate from her;* that, moreover, it would at a future time be necessary to do so, and that it would be better to do so at once, previous to having formed still closer ties. He called for his two adoptive children, and communicated his resolution, and plunged them into the deepest grief by the intelligence. Hor-

* I here give the faithful account of a lady of unquestionable veracity, who was an eye-witness, and attached to the Imperial family, and who has this reminiscence in her MS. memoirs.

tense and Eugène Beauharnois declared, with a resolution at once calm and sad, that they would follow their mother into the retreat to which she was to be condemned. Josephine, prudently counselled, displayed a submissive and resigned grief. The contrast between her grief, and the satisfaction displayed by the rest of the family, rent the heart of Napoleon; and he could not resolve to see exiled and unfortunate that wife, the companion of his youth, and exiled and unfortunate with her, those children who had become the objects of his paternal tenderness. He caught Josephine in his arms, and told her, in a burst of tenderness, that he should never have the strength to part from her, even should his policy require him to do so; and then he promised her that she should be crowned with him, and should receive by his side, and from the hand of the Pope, the divine consecration.

Josephine, with her characteristic mobility, passed from alarm to the most lively satisfaction; and gave herself up with a childish joy to the preparations for the coronation.

Napoleon, secretly cherishing the design of some day re-establishing the Empire of the West, wished his throne to be surrounded by vassal kings. For the present he had made his brothers, Joseph and Louis, grand dignitaries of the Empire; he intended soon to make them kings, and he had even now prepared a throne in Lombardy for Joseph. His design was that on becoming kings, they should still remain grand dignitaries of the Empire. They were to bear the same relation to the French Empire of the West as the princes of Saxony, Brandenburg, Bohemia, Bavaria, Hanovery &c. bore to the Germanic Empire. It was necessary that the ceremony of the coronation should correspond to that design, and be an emblem of the reality that was in preparation. He had not allowed that the bishops or the peers should hold the crown suspended above his head; or even that the chief of bishops, the bishop of Rome, should place it on his brow. For similar reasons, it was his will that his brothers, destined to be vassal kings of the Grand Empire, should take beside him a position which should plainly indicate that future vassalage. He therefore required that when he, clad in the imperial robes, should proceed to the interior of the church, from the throne to the altar, from the altar to the throne, his brothers should bear the train of his robes. He required this not only for himself but also for the Empress. It was the princesses, his sisters, who were to perform to Josephine the service that his brothers were to perform to him. An energetic expression of his will was required to obtain this. Although his kindness rendered domestic quarrels painful to him, he was very absolute when his resolutions concerned the views of his policy.

It was now November; every thing was in readiness at Notre Dame. The deputations had arrived; the tribunals had adjourned; sixty bishops or archbishops, attended by their clergy

had abandoned the duties of the altar. The generals, the admirals, the most distinguished officers of the land and sea service, marshals Davoust, Ney, and Soult, and admirals Bruix and Ganteaume, instead of being at Boulogne or at Brest, were at Paris. Napoleon was annoyed at this, for however much he liked pomps, they held a very secondary place in his liking to serious business. A multitude of the curious, flocking from all parts of Europe and France crowded the capital, and impatiently awaited the spectacle which had attracted them. Napoleon, who was far from being displeased with the crowding of which he was the object, Napoleon nevertheless was in haste to put an end to a state of things which interfered with that regular order which he loved to see existing in his Empire. He despatched officers after officers with letters to the Pope, filled with filial tenderness, but filled also with earnest importunities to him to hasten his progress. From delay to delay, the ceremony was now fixed for the 2nd of December.

The Pope had at length determined on quitting Rome. After having confided all powers to cardinal Gonsalvi, and having heaped caresses upon him, he, on the morning of the 2nd of November, proceeded to the altar of St. Peter, and knelt there for some time, surrounded by the cardinals, the grandees of Rome, and the populace. At this altar he offered up a fervent prayer, as though he had been about to brave some great peril, and then entered his carriage and took the road to Viterbo. The populace of Transtevers, so devoted to their pontiffs, accompanied his carriage for a long time, weeping. The time was gone by when that Roman court was the most enlightened in Europe! Now the members of the sacred college, scarcely understanding the age in which they lived, and even blaming, for lack of comprehending it, the prudent condescension of Pius VII., were prepared to believe the most absurd fables relating to it. There were some among them who considered as probable the report of a snare set in France to make the Holy Father prisoner, and wrest his states from him: as though Napoleon need resort to such means to become master of Rome! As if he at that moment desired any thing but the pontifical benediction, which would render the character of his power respectable in the eyes of men!

Pius VII., on setting out, had desired, notwithstanding his poverty, to carry with him some presents worthy of the host with whom he was about to reside. With his usual delicacy of tact, he had chosen, as presents for Napoleon, two antique cameos, as remarkable for their beauty as for their signification. The one represented Achilles, the other the continence of Scipio. For Josephine he destined some vases, also antique, and of admirable workmanship. By the advice of M. de Talleyrand he took for the ladies of the court a profusion of rosaries.

He set out, then, traversed the Roman state and Tuscany, amidst the population of Italy, kneeling on his path. At Florence

he was received by the queen of Etruria, now a widow, and regent for her son, of the new kingdom created by Napoleon. That princess, pious as a Spanish princess, received the Pope with demonstrations of devotion and respect which delighted him. He already began to recover somewhat from his anxieties. He desired to avoid the Legations, in order that his presence might not consecrate the grant that had been made of them to another state than the state of Rome. He was conducted by Plaisance, Parma, and Turin. He was not yet in France, but French authorities and French troops already surrounded him. He saw the veteran Menou, and the officers of the army of Italy respectfully bowing before him, and he was touched with the respectful expression of those masculine countenances. Cardinal Cambacérès and a chamberlain of the palace, M. de Salmatoris, who had been sent forward, presented themselves on the frontiers of Piedmont, which were also those of the Empire, and presented him with a letter from Napoleon, filled with expressions of his gratitude and of his wishes for the speedy and prosperous journey of the Pontiff. Becoming more reassured every hour, Pius VII. at length ceased to feel much fear of the consequences of his resolution. He passed the Alps. Extraordinary precautions had been taken to render the journey there safe and easy to him and to the aged cardinals who accompanied him. Officers of the imperial palace provided every thing with infinite zeal and magnificence. At length he arrived at Lyons. There his alarms were changed into positive delight. Crowds of people had assembled from Provençe, Dauphiny, Franche-Comté, and Burgundy, to see the representative of God on earth. The people have all at heart a confused but deep sentiment of the Divinity. Little matters the form under which it is presented to their adoration, provided that that form have been very anciently admitted, and that those above them set the example of respect. If to the natural force of this sentiment, we add the extraordinary power of reaction, and the vivacity with which the multitude reverts to ancient practices that it has temporarily abandoned, we may conceive the eagerness with which the people, both in the towns and rural districts of France, pressed forward to see the Holy Father. On beholding upon their knees, those people who had been described to him as continually in rebellion, alike against earthly and heavenly authority, Pius VII. was delighted and completely reassured; and he now perceived that his veteran councillor, Caprara, spoke quite truly when he told him that this journey would be a great benefit to religion, and would procure to himself infinite gratifications. Another letter from the Emperor was presented to him at Lyons, conveying new thanks to him, and new wishes for his speedy arrival. That debilitated Pontiff, suffering from an unhealthy sensibility, no longer feeling his fatigue, now that he saw himself welcomed in this manner, himself proposed to accelerate his journey by two days—an offer

which was accepted. He left Lyons amidst the same homages, and passed through Moulins and Nevers, everywhere encountering on the road a multitude filled with emotion, and sueing for the blessing of the head of the Church.

It was at Fontainebleau that Pius VII. was to stop. Napoleon had made this arrangement that he might have the opportunity of going to meet the Holy Father, and of providing him rest for two or three days in that lovely retreat. He had ordered for that day, the 25th of November, a hunting match, which was to approach the road by which the Holy Father was travelling. At the hour at which he knew that the pontifical cortége would arrive at the cross of St. Herem, he turned his horse in that direction to meet the Pope, who almost immediately arrived there. He instantly presented himself to the Holy Father and embraced him. Pius VII., affected by this earnest eagerness, looked with mingled curiosity and emotion upon that new Charlemagne, whom for years past he had regarded as God's instrument here on earth. It was the middle of the day. The two sovereigns entered the carriage to proceed to Fontainebleau, Napoleon giving the right side to the head of the Church. At the entrance to the palace the Empress, the grandees of the Empire, and the chiefs of the army, were arranged in a circle to receive Pius VII., and offer him their homage. He, although accustomed to the pomps of Rome, had never before seen any thing so magnificent. He was conducted, surrounded by this attendance, to the apartments intended for him. After some hours' repose, according to the rules of etiquette among sovereigns, he paid a visit to the Emperor and Empress, who immediately returned that visit. Each time more completely reassured, and carried away by the seductive language of his host, who had promised himself not to intimidate but to enchant him, he conceived an affection for Napoleon, which, at the close of his life, and after numerous and terrible vicissitudes, he still felt for the hero in exile. The grandees of the Empire were successively presented to him. He received them with perfect cordiality, and that gracefulness of advanced age which has a very great and a very powerful charm. The at once mild and dignified countenance of Pius VII. touched all hearts, and he in turn was touched by the effect that he produced. He had not been spoken to about any of the difficulties which still remained to be removed. His sensitiveness and his fatigue had been considered. He was wholly filled with the emotion, the joy, of a welcome which to him seemed an actual triumph to religion.

The moment at length arrived to set out for Paris, to enter, at length, that dreaded city, in which for a century the human mind had so violently worked, in which for some years past the destinies of the world had been regulated. On the 28th of November, after three days of repose, the Emperor and the Pope entered the same carriage to proceed to Paris, the Pope still having the right. The Pope was lodged in the Pavilion of Flora, which had been pre-

pared for his reception. The whole day of the 29th was left to him entirely to recover from his fatigue, and on the 30th the Senate, the Legislative Body, the Tribunate, and the Council of State, were presented to him. The presidents of these four bodies addressed him in speeches in which his virtues, his wisdom, and his noble condescension towards France were celebrated in language at once brilliant and dignified. But among these harangues, fugitive as the sensation which inspired them, it is necessary to distinguish that of M. de Fontanes, grave and durable as the truths with which it was filled:—

"MOST HOLY FATHER:

"When upon the field of battle the victor of Marengo conceived the design of re-establishing religious unity, and of restoring to the French people their ancient worship, he preserved the principles of civilisation from total ruin. This grand thought, occurring in the day of victory, gave birth to the Concordat; and the Legislative Body, on whose behalf I have the honour to address your holiness, converted the Concordat into a law of the land.

"Memorable day, equally dear to the wisdom of the statesman, and the faith of the Christian! It was then that France, abjuring but too serious errors, gave the most useful lessons to the human race. She seemed to confess in its presence, that all irreligious ideas are impolitic ideas, and that every offence against Christianity is an offence against society. The return to the ancient worship speedily led the way to the return to a government more natural to great states, and more in accordance with the habits of France. The whole social system, shaken by the inconstant opinions of man, rested once more upon a doctrine immutable as God himself. It was religion which in the bygone times polished savage societies, but it was now more difficult to repair their ruins than to lay their foundations.

"We owe this benefit to a double prodigy. France has witnessed the birth of one of those extraordinary men, who, at rare intervals, are sent to the succour of empires that are on the brink of ruin; while Rome, at the same time, has seen shining upon the throne of St. Peter all the apostolic virtues of the earliest ages. Their gentle authority is felt by all hearts. Universal homage must be paid to a pontiff as wise as he is pious, who knows alike what should be left to the course of human events, and what is demanded by the interests of religion.

"That august religion comes to consecrate with him the new destinies of the French Empire, and observes the same solemnity as in the age of the Clovises and the Pepins.

"All things have changed around it; it alone has remained unchangeable.

"It sees the families of kings become extinct, like those of subjects; but upon the ruins of fallen thrones, and upon the steps of thrones that are raised up, it ever admires the successive manifestations of the Eternal designs, and obeys them with confidence.

"Never had the universe a more imposing spectacle; never had the people grander lessons.

"The time no longer exists in which the Empire and the priesthood were rivals. Both unite to repel the fatal doctrines which have threatened Europe with utter subversion. May they for ever yield to the double influence of religion and policy united together. That wish will doubtless be realised; never in France had policy so great genius, and never did the pontifical throne present to the Christian world a more respectable and touching model."

The Pope displayed a lively emotion as he listened to that noble language, the noblest that had been spoken since the age of Louis XIV. The populace of Paris crowded beneath his windows, soliciting his appearance. The fame of his mildness, and of his noble countenance, had already spread throughout the capital. Pius VII. several times presented himself at the balcony of the Tuileries, always accompanied by Napoleon, was saluted with lively acclamations, and saw the people of Paris, that people who had been the actors of the 10th of August, and had worshipped the goddess Reason, kneeling before him, and awaiting the pontifical benediction. Singular inconstancy of men and of nations! which proves the necessity of holding to those grand truths on which human society reposes; for there is neither dignity nor repose in the caprices of a day, which are embraced and abandoned with a degrading precipitation.

The gloomy apprehensions which had so embittered the resolution of the Pope were now dissipated. Pius VII. found himself the guest of a prince full of respectfulness and attention, and adding courtesy to genius; and in the midst of a great nation, that had been led back to the old traditions of Christianity, by the example of a glorious chieftain. He was delighted that he had arrived, to add to this impulse by his presence. There were still some annoyances in store for him, both as touching the ceremony, and upon the subject of the constitutional bishops, who, after their reconciliation to the Church had allowed themselves to cavil about the terms of that reconciliation. They were four in number, Messrs. Lecoz, archbishop of Besançon; Lacombe, bishop of Angoulême; Saurine, bishop of Strasburg; and Remond, bishop of Dijon. M. Portalis had sent for them, and, by order of the Emperor, had enjoined them, if they desired to be presented to the Pope, to write a letter of reconciliation, drawn up in agreement with bishop Bernier and the cardinals of the pontifical cortège. At the last moment they wished to change an expression of this letter, which the Pope perceived and remarked upon, leaving to the Emperor the task of terminating these melancholy disputes. For the rest, he showed an equally mild and paternal countenance to all the members of the French clergy. There still remained the questions relating to the ceremonial. The Pope had admitted the principal modifications, founded upon the state

of society; but he was singularly affected by the question of the crowning. He was desirous to preserve the right transmitted by his predecessors, of placing the crown upon the brow of the Emperor. Napoleon gave orders for the point not to be insisted upon, and said that he would undertake to settle every thing at the spot itself.

The eve of that grand solemnity now approached; that is to say, the 1st of December. Josephine, who had found favour with the Holy Father by a kind of devoutness much akin to that of the women of Italy, Josephine sought an interview with him, to make an avowal, which she hoped to turn to good account. She declared to him that she had only been civilly married to Napoleon, as, at the time of her marriage, religious ceremonies were abolished.

The very throne presented a strange specimen of the manners of the time. Napoleon had put an end to this state of things for his sister, the princess Murat, by begging the cardinal Caprara to give her the nuptial benediction; but he had not chosen to do the same for himself. The Pope, scandalised by a situation which, in the eyes of the Church, was a mere concubinage, instantly demanded an interview of Napoleon, and in that interview declared that he could very well consecrate him, for the state of the consciences of emperors had never been inquired into by the Church, when they were to be crowned, but that he could not, by crowning Josephine, give the divine consecration to a state of concubinage. Napoleon, irritated against Josephine for this interested revelation, fearing to offend the Pope, whom he knew to be inflexible in matters of faith, and, moreover, unwilling to alter a programme which had already been published, consented to receive the nuptial benediction. Josephine, sharply reprimanded by her husband, but delighted with her success, received, in the very night preceding the coronation, the sacrament of marriage in the chapel of the Tuileries. It was cardinal Fesch, having M. de Talleyrand and marshal Berthier for witnesses, who, with the most profound secresy, married the Emperor and Empress. The secret was faithfully kept until the epoch of the divorce. On the following morning the reddened eyes of Josephine still bore testimony to the tears which these inward agitations had cost her.

On Sunday, the 2nd of December, a cold, but clear winter's day, that population of Paris which, forty years later, we have seen crowding, in similar weather, towards the mortal remains of Napoleon, hurried to see the passing of the imperial cortége. The Pope first set out at ten o'clock in the morning, and much earlier than the Emperor, in order that the two cortéges should not obstruct each other. He was accompanied by a numerous body of clergy, attired with the most costly ornaments, and escorted by detachments of the imperial guard. A richly decorated portico had been erected all round the Place Notre Dame, to receive, at their descent from their carriages, the sovereigns and princes who

were to proceed to the ancient basilick. The Archbishopric, adorned with a luxury worthy of the guests that it was to shelter, was arranged so that the Pope and the Emperor could rest there for an instant. After a brief stay, the Pope entered the church, where for several previous hours there had already been assembled the deputies of the towns, the representatives of the magistracy and of the army, the sixty bishops, with their clergy, the Senate, the Legislative Body, the Council of State, the princes of Nassau, Hesse, and Baden, the arch-chancellor of the Germanic Empire, and, lastly, the ministers of the different powers. The great door of Notre Dame had been closed, because the back of the imperial throne was placed against it. The church, therefore was entered by the side doors, situated at the two extremities of the transversal nave. When the Pope, preceded by the cross, and by the ensigns of the successor of St. Peter, appeared within that ancient basilick of St. Louis, all present rose from their seats, and 500 musicians pealed forth in solemn strain the consecrated chant, TU ES PETRUS. The effect of this was instant and sublime. The Pope, proceeded at a slow pace direct to the altar, before which he knelt, and then took his place on a throne that had been prepared for him to the right of the altar. The sixty prelates of the French Church presented themselves in succession to salute him. To each of them, constitutional or not, his countenance was equally benevolent. The arrival of the imperial family was now awaited.

The church of Notre Dame was decorated with an unequalled magnificence. Hangings of velvet sprinkled with golden bees, descended from the roof to the pavement. At the foot of the altar stood two plain arm-chairs, which the Emperor and Empress were to occupy before their crowning. At the west-end of the church, and opposite to the altar, raised upon twenty-four steps, and placed between columns, which supported a pediment, stood an immense throne, a sort of monument within a monument, intended for the Emperor, when crowned, and his wife. It was the custom in both the Roman and the French ritual. The monarch did not seat himself upon the throne until after he had been crowned by the Pontiff.

They now waited for the Emperor, and waited for a considerable time. This was the only disagreeable circumstance in this grand solemnity. The position of the Pope during this long delay was painful. The fear of the director of the ceremonies lest the two cortéges should meet, was the cause of the delay. The Emperor set out from the Tuileries in a carriage completely surrounded with glass, surmounted by gilt genii, bearing a crown, a popular carriage in France, and always recognised by the Parisians when it has since appeared in subsequent ceremonies. He was attired in a costume designed by the greatest painter of the day, and very similar to the costumes of the sixteenth century.

He wore a plumed hat, and a short mantle. He was not to assume the imperial costume until he reached the Archbishopric, and at the moment of entering the church. Escorted by his marshals on horseback, he proceeded slowly along the Rue St. Honoré, the Quay of the Seine, and the Place Notre Dame, amidst the acclamations of immense crowds, delighted to see their favourite general become Emperor, as though he had not himself achieved this with his excitable passions, and his warlike heroism, and as if some touch of a magic wand had done it for him. Napoleon, on arriving before the portico which we have already described, alighted from his carriage, proceeded to the Archbishopric, took the crown, the sceptre, and the imperial robe, and directed his course to the cathedral. Beside him was borne the grand crown, in the form of a tiara, and modelled after that of Charlemagne. At this first stage of the ceremony he wore only the crown of the Cæsars, namely, a simple golden laurel. All admired that noble head, noble beneath that golden laurel, as some antique medallion! Having entered the church to the sound of pealing music, he knelt, and then passed on to the arm-chair which he was to occupy previous to taking possession of the throne.

The ceremony then commenced. The sceptre, the sword, and the imperial robe had been placed on the altar. The Pope anointed the Emperor on the forehead, the arms, and the hands, then blessed the sword, with which he girded him, and the sceptre, which he placed in his hand, and approached to take up the crown. Napoleon, who had watched his movements, now, as he had promised, settled that difficulty on the spot, by firmly, though not violently, seizing the crown, and placing it upon his own head. This action, which was perfectly appreciated by all present, produced an indescribable effect. Napoleon, then, taking the crown of the Empress, and approaching Josephine, as she knelt before him, placed it, with a visible tenderness, upon the head of the partner of his fortunes, who at that moment burst into tears. This done, he proceeded towards the grand throne. He ascended it, followed by his brothers, bearing the train of his robes. Then the Pope, according to custom, advanced to the foot of the throne to bless the new sovereign, and to chant those words which greeted Charlemagne in the basilick of St. Peter, when the Roman clergy suddenly proclaimed him Emperor of the West:—VIVAT IN ÆTERNUM SEMPER AUGUSTUS. At this chant, shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur*" resounded through the arches of Notre Dame; the cannon added their thunder, and announced to all Paris the solemn moment of Napoleon's consecration, with all the forms received among mankind.

The arch-chancellor Cambacérès then presented him with the form of the oath, a bishop handed him the New Testament, and upon the book of Christians he took that oath which embodied the great principles of the Revolution. A pontifical high mass

was then chanted, and the day was far advanced when the two cortéges regained the Tuileries, through an immense concourse of people.

Such was the august ceremony which consummated the return of France to monarchical principles. It was not one of the smallest triumphs of our Revolution, to see that soldier, sprung from her own womb, anointed by the Pope, who, for that express purpose, had quitted the capital of the Christian world. It is on this account especially that such pomps are worthy of the attention of the historian.

If moderation of desires, ascending that throne as the companion of genius, had provided sufficient liberty for France, and put a timely limit to heroic enterprises, that ceremony would have consecrated the new dynasty for ever—that is to say, for several centuries. But we were destined to pass by other tracks to a more free political condition, and to a grandeur unhappily too confined.

It was fifteen years since the Revolution had commenced. A monarchy during three years, a Republic during twelve, it had now become a military monarchy, still based upon civil equality, upon the nation's participation in the framing of the laws, and upon the free admission of all the citizens to those re-established social distinctions. It was thus that French society had progressed in fifteen years, successively decomposed and recomposed with the characteristic promptitude of popular passions.

BOOK XXI.

THIRD COALITION.

Stay of the Pope at Paris—Endeavours of Napoleon to retain him there—The Fleets having been unable to act in December, Napoleon employs the Winter in organising Italy—Transformation of the Italian Republic into a Vassal Kingdom of the French Empire—Offer of that Kingdom to Joseph Bonaparte, and his refusal of it—Napoleon determines to place the Iron Crown on his own Head, declaring at the same time, that the Two Crowns of France and Italy will be separated on the return of Peace—Solemn Sitting of the Senate—Second Coronation at Milan fixed for the Month of May, 1805—Napoleon finds in his Transalpine Journey a Means of more completely concealing his new Maritime Projects—His Naval Resources are increased by England's sudden Declaration of War against Spain—Naval Strength of Holland, France, and Spain—Project of a grand Expedition to India—Momentary Hesitation between that Project and that of a direct Expedition against England—Final Preference of the Latter—Every thing is prepared to make the Descent in the Months of July and August—The Fleets of Toulon, Cadiz, Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest, are to assemble together at Martinique, to return into the Channel in July, to the Number of Sixty Sail—The Pope at length prepares to return to Rome—His Overtures to Napoleon, previous to departing—Replies as to the various Points treated of by the Pope—The Pope's mortification tempered, however, by the Success of his Journey into France—Departure of the Pope for Rome, and of Napoleon for Milan—Dispositions of the European Courts—Their Leaning towards a new Coalition—State of the Russian Cabinet—The young Friends of Alexander form a grand Plan of European Mediation—Ideas of which that Plan consisted; real Origin of the Treaties of 1815—M. de Nowosiltzoff charged to procure their Acceptance at London—Reception that he met with from Mr. Pitt—The Plan of Mediation is converted by the English Minister into a Plan of Coalition against France—Return of M. de Nowosiltzoff to St. Petersburg—The Russian Cabinet and Lord Gower sign the Treaty which constitutes the Third Coalition—The Ratification of that Treaty is subject to a Condition, the Evacuation of Malta by England—In Order to preserve to this Coalition the original Form of a Mediation, M. de Nowosiltzoff is to repair to Paris to treat with Napoleon—Ineffectual efforts of Russia to engage Prussia in the new Coalition—More Successful Efforts with Austria, who enters into conditional Engagements—Russia has recourse to Prussia as a Mediator, to obtain Passports for M. de Nowosiltzoff—Those Passports are granted—Napoleon in Italy—Enthusiastic personal Affection shown to him by the Italians—Coronation at Milan—Eugène de Beauharnais declared Viceroy—Military Fêtes and Visits to the various Cities—Napoleon irresistibly attracted towards certain Plans by the Sight of Italy—He projects the future Expulsion of the Bourbons from Naples, and determines forthwith to unite Genoa to France—Motives to this Union—Conversion of the Duchy of Lucca into an Imperial

Fief to the Profit of the Princess Eliza—After a Stay of Three Months in Italy, Napoleon prepares to proceed to Boulogne to execute the Descent—Ganteaume, at Brest, has not found a single Day favourable for Sailing—Villeneuve and Gravina having successfully got out of Toulon and Cadiz, are instructed to release Ganteaume from Blockade, that they may all proceed together into the Channel—Stay of Bonaparte at Genoa—His sudden Departure for Fontainebleau—While Napoleon is preparing for the Descent upon England all the Continental Powers are preparing for a formidable War against France—Russia, embarrassed by the refusal of England to evacuate Malta, finds in the annexation of Genoa a Pretext for yielding that point, and Austria for deciding at once—Treaty of Subsidy—Immediate Armaments obstinately denied to Napoleon—He sees the State of the Case and demands Explanations, at the same time making some Preparations towards Italy and the Rhine—He is more than ever persuaded that it is at London that all the Coalitions must be broken up, and sets out for Boulogne—His Resolution to embark, and his Impatience while awaiting the French Fleet—Movement of the Squadrons—Long and fortunate Passage of Villeneuve and Gravina to Martinique—Admiral Villeneuve's first Feelings of Discouragement—He suddenly returns to Europe, and Sails to Ferrol to raise the Blockade of that Port—Naval Battle of Ferrol against Admiral Calder—The French Admiral might have claimed the Victory had he not lost Two Spanish Ships—He has attained his Object in raising the Blockade of Ferrol and rallying two new Divisions, French and Spanish—Instead of gaining Confidence and hastening to raise the Blockade of Ganteaume, in order to proceed with Fifty Sail into the Channel, Villeneuve becomes disconcerted, and determines to Sail towards Cadiz, leaving Napoleon to suppose that he is Sailing for Brest—Tedious Suspense of Napoleon at Boulogne—His hopes on the Receipt of the first Despatches from Ferrol—His Irritation when he begins to believe that Villeneuve has sailed for Cadiz—Violent Excitement and Anger with Admiral Decrès—Positive Intelligence of the Projects of Austria—Sudden Change of Resolution—Plan of the Campaign of 1805—Estimate of the Chances of Success of the Descent, which was prevented by the Mismanagement of Villeneuve—Napoleon finally turns his Forces against the Continent.

BOOK XXI.

THIRD COALITION.

THREE days after the ceremony of the coronation, Napoleon determined to distribute to the army and the national guards, the eagles which were to surmount the colours of the Empire. This ceremony, as nobly regulated as the preceding one, had the Champ de Mars for its scene. The representatives of all the corps came to receive the eagles intended for them, at the foot of a magnificent throne, raised in front of the palace of the military school, and previous to receiving them, they took the oath, which they have since fulfilled, of keeping them even unto death. On the same day there was a banquet at the Tuileries, where the Pope and the Emperor sat side by side at the same table, clad in their pontifical and imperial ornaments, and served by the grand officers of the crown.

The multitude, ever greedy for display, was delighted with these pomps. Many, without acknowledging their import, yet admitted them to be a natural consequence of the re-establishment of monarchy. The wise and prudent put up their prayers that the new monarch might not allow himself to be intoxicated by these fumes of omnipotence. However, no sinister prognostic as yet disturbed the public satisfaction. The new order of things was believed to be permanent. With much magnificence, perhaps with too much, there yet was seen a faithful adherence to the social principles proclaimed by the French Revolution, a constantly increasing prosperity, notwithstanding the war, and a continuation of grandeur which was calculated to flatter the national pride.

The Holy Father had not wished to remain long in France, but he now hoped, that by remaining there, he should find a favourable opportunity to express to Napoleon the secret wishes of the Roman court, and he had resigned himself to a two or three months' stay in Paris. Moreover, the season did not admit of his immediately repassing the Alps. Napoleon, who desired to have the Pontiff by his side to show him France, to enable him to comprehend her spirit, and the conditions upon which the re-establishment of religion was practicable, and, finally, to win his confidence by frank and daily communication, Napoleon em-

ployed consummate courtesy and kindliness in order to detain him, and at length succeeded in completely gaining the affection of that Holy Pontiff. Pius VII. was lodged in the Tuileries, at liberty to follow his simple and religious tastes, but surrounded, when he went abroad, with all the attributes of supreme power, escorted by the Imperial guard, in a word, covered with honours. His interesting countenance, and his virtues, almost visible in his person, had deeply touched the Parisians, who followed him everywhere with a mingled curiosity, sympathy, and respect. He visited in their turns all the parishes of Paris, where he officiated amidst extraordinary crowds. His presence added to the religious impulse that Napoleon desired to give to the public mind. The Holy Pontiff was rejoiced at it. He visited the public monuments, and the museums which Napoleon had enriched, and seemed to interest himself in the grandeurs of the new reign. In a visit that he made to one of our public establishments, he displayed a tact and discretion which obtained him general approbation. Surrounded by a kneeling crowd who solicited his benediction, he perceived a man, whose stern and disapproving countenance still bore the imprint of our extinguished passions, and who had turned away to withdraw himself from the pontifical benediction. The Holy Father approaching this person said to him in the gentlest tone—"Do not go away, sir, an old man's blessing never injured any one." This noble and touching speech was repeated and applauded by all Paris.

The fêtes and the hospitable attentions that he had lavished upon his venerable guest, had not withdrawn the attention of Napoleon from his grand affairs. The fleets that were destined to aid in the descent, continued to occupy his full attention. That of Brest was at length ready to sail; but that of Toulon, retarded in its fitting out by the determination to increase it from eight ships to eleven, had occupied the entire month of December. Since it had been complete, foul winds had detained it in port during January. Admiral Missiessy, with five ships fitted out at Rochefort, waited for a tempest to put to sea unperceived by the enemy. Napoleon devoted this time to the interior administration of his new Empire.

Although determined upon a war of extinction against England, he thought it necessary to commence his reign by a procedure which was quite useless at that time, and which, besides its uselessness, had the inconvenience of being a mere repetition of another admirably well-timed proceeding which he had taken on attaining the Consulate. He wrote a letter to the king of England, proposing peace, and he forwarded that letter by a brig belonging to the English squadron before Boulogne. It was immediately communicated to the British cabinet, who sent word that an answer would be given at a future time. Peace was not only possible but even necessary to the two powers in 1800. The proceeding of the First Consul at that time, therefore, was very proper, and the

rejection of his conditions of peace, followed by the victories of Marengo and Hohenlinden, covered Mr. Pitt with confusion, and was even a principal cause of the fall of that minister. But in 1805, the two nations were at the commencement of a new war, their pretensions had risen to such a height, that they could only be settled by force, and a proposal for peace seemed too obviously resorted to for the purpose of affecting moderation, or of creating an opportunity to address the king of England as monarch addressing monarch.

What was of more importance than these vain proceedings, was the definitive organisation of the Italian Republic. That Republic, daughter of the French Republic, was in every thing to share the lot of her mother. In 1802, at the epoch of the *Consultum* of Lyons, she had framed for herself a constitution in imitation of France, and adopted a government republican in form, but absolute in fact. Now, it was natural that she should take the last step in the track of France, and that from a republic she should become a monarchy.

In the preceding book, we have recounted the overtures that M. Cambacérès and the minister of the Italian Republic at Paris, M. de Marescalchi, had been charged to make to the vice-president Melzi, and to the members of the Consultum of the State. Those overtures had been pretty well received, although the vice-president Melzi, rendered ill-tempered by the state of his health, and by a task too onerous for his powers, had mingled some tolerably bitter reflections with his reply. The Italians had without hesitation accepted the transformation of their Republic into a monarchy, because they hoped to profit by this opportunity to obtain, in part at the least, the fulfilment of their wishes. They were quite willing to accept a king, and to have a brother of Napoleon for that king, but on condition that the choice should fall upon Joseph or Louis Bonaparte, and not upon Lucien, whom they formally excepted; that their king should belong to them alone; that he should constantly reside at Milan; that the two crowns of France and Italy should be immediately separated; that they should pay no further subsidy for the support of the French army; and finally, that Napoleon should undertake to procure Austria's approval of this new change.

"On these conditions," said the vice-president Melzi, "the Italians would be satisfied, for as yet they had felt their enfranchisement only by the imposition of new burdens."

The idea of their money being carried beyond the Alps is in general an engrained one with the Italians, subjected, as they so long have been, to powers placed on the other side of the Alps. At the same time they had a more cogent and a nobler motive for wishing for their enfranchisement—the desire of living under a national government. The paltrier reasons disgusted Napoleon, but did not surprise him; for if he had but a sorry opinion of mankind, he never laboured to debase them. In fact no one seeks to debase

them who requires great things at their hands. He consequently was indignant at the reasoning of the vice-president Melzi.

"What!" exclaimed he, "the Italians can only consider the money which their independence costs them! That supposes them very base and very dastardly: for, my part, I am far from thinking so poorly of them. Can they free themselves and protect themselves without French troops? If they cannot do so, is it not just that they should contribute to the support of the soldiers who shed their blood for them? Who, then, has consolidated into one state, to make it the body of a nation, five or six provinces, formerly governed by five or six different princes? Who, I ask, but the French army, and I who command it? Had I so chosen, Upper Italy would now be cut up, distributed in separate bits, one part given to the Pope, another to the Austrians, a third to the Spaniards. At this price I should have disarmed the powers, and obtained continental peace for France. Do not the Italians perceive that the foundation of their nationality is laid in a State that already includes one-third of all Italy? Is not their government composed of Italians, and founded upon the principles of justice, equality, and a prudential liberty—in a word, upon the principles of the French Revolution? What better can they desire? Can I accomplish every thing in a day?"

Napoleon, on this occasion was perfectly in the right as to Italy. But for it, the fragments of Lombardy would have gratified the Pope, the emperor of Germany, Spain, and the house of Sardinia, and have served as an equivalent for the annexation of Piedmont to France. It was true that it was in the interests of French policy that Napoleon had laboured to constitute the Italian nationality. But was it not a great benefit to the Italians thus to be bound up with the French policy? Was it not incumbent on them to lend that policy their strenuous support? And, in truth, 22 million francs per annum for the support of above 30,000 men—a fictitious number, too, for there were generally 60,000 at least required there—was that such a very heavy burden for a country which included the richest provinces in Europe? However, Napoleon gave himself but very little uneasiness about these doleful complaints of the vice-president Melzi. He knew that all this was not to be taken to the letter. The Italian moderate party, with whose support he governed, abandoned by the nobility and by the priests, who in general inclined towards the Austrians, and by the liberals, who were imbued with exaggerated ideas—the liberal party, in its isolation, felt a certain depression, and willingly painted its situation in the darkest colours. Napoleon attached no weight to this, and, constantly anxious to withdraw Italy from the influence of Austria, he sought the means of accommodating its institutions to the new institutions of France.

The coronation had afforded an opportunity of assembling at Paris the vice-president Melzi and some delegates of the various Italian authorities. Messrs. Cambacérès, de Marescalchi, and

de Talleyrand entered into conferences with them, and came to an understanding upon all points excepting one — that of the subsidy to be paid to France; for although the Italians invoked the French occupation as their salvation, they were nevertheless unwilling to bear the expense of it.

The arch-chancellor Cambacérès was then charged to treat with Joseph Bonaparte on the question of his elevation to the Italian throne. To the great astonishment of Napoleon, Joseph refused that throne upon two pleas, one of them very natural, the other singularly presumptuous. Joseph declared that, on account of the principle of the separation of the two crowns, the condition of the throne of Italy being the renunciation of the throne of France, he preferred to remain a French prince, with all his rights of succession to the Empire. Napoleon having no children, Joseph preferred the distant possibility of some day reigning in France, to the certainty of immediately reigning in Italy. Such a pretension was only natural and patriotic. The second reason given by Joseph for his refusal was, that the kingdom offered to him was too near a neighbour to France, and consequently too dependent; that he could only reign under the authority of the head of the French Empire; and that it did not suit him to reign on those terms. Thus already broke forth those sentiments which animated the brothers of the Emperor, upon all the thrones which he bestowed upon them. It was a proof of a silly vanity, to be unwilling to have for counsellor such a man as Napoleon. It was a very impolitic ingratitude to wish to be freed from his power; for, placed at the head of a newly-created Italian state, to tend towards isolation was to tend alike towards the ruin of Italy and the weakening of France.

All persuasions employed with Joseph were in vain, and although his future royalty had been announced to all the courts with which France had amicable relations, to Austria, to Prussia, and to the Holy See, it was necessary to revert to other ideas, and to determine upon a new arrangement. Napoleon, warned by this new experience that he must not create, in Lombardy, a jealous royalty disposed to obstruct his grand designs, resolved to take himself the iron crown, and assume the title of EMPEROR OF FRANCE AND KING OF ITALY. There was but one objection to this project; it was to recall too forcibly to attention the annexation of Piedmont to France. It was to run the risk of deeply offending Austria, and to recall her from her pacific ideas to the warlike ideas of Mr. Pitt, who, since his return to office, had endeavoured to avail himself of the breaking off of diplomatic relations between France and Russia to form a new coalition. In order to ward off this inconvenience, Napoleon resolved upon making a formal declaration that he would only wear the crown of Italy until the return of Peace; that at that epoch he would proceed to the separation of the two crowns, by choosing a successor from the French princes. For the moment he adopted

Eugène de Beauharnais, the son of Josephine, whom he loved as his own son, and entrusted to him the vice-royalty of Italy.

This determination once taken, he gave himself but little trouble to make it palatable to M. de Melzi, whose somewhat unreasonable complaints began to weary him, for he perceived in him far more of hankering after popularity than of intention to labour in common for the future establishment of Italy. Messrs. Cambacérès and de Talleyrand were charged to signify these resolutions to the Italians who were present in Paris, and to concert with them the means of execution. These latter appeared apprehensive lest the three grand permanent colleges of *possidenti*, *dotti*, and *commercianti*, to which was entrusted the task of electing the authorities and modifying the constitution when there was need, might resist the project of any other than a Lombard monarchy, completely distinct from the French monarchy, and might cloak their opposition under Italian nonchalance, by voting neither for nor against. Napoleon, then, renounced the employment of constitutional forms; he acted as a creator who had made Italy what she then was, and who had the right still to make her whatever he believed it useful that she should become. M. de Talleyrand addressed a report to him, in which he demonstrated that those provinces, some of which were dependant on the ancient Republic of Venice, some of them on the house of Austria, these on the duke of Modena, those on the Holy See, depended, as conquered provinces, upon the will of the Emperor; that what was due to them was an equitable government, adapted to their interests, and founded upon the principles of the French Revolution; but that, for the rest, he could give to that government whatever form might best accord with his vast designs. A decree followed, constituting the new kingdom, a decree which was to be adopted by the State *Consultum* and the Italian deputies who were then at Paris, and then communicated to the French Senate, as one of the grand constitutional acts of the Empire, and promulgated in an imperial sitting. However, it was necessary that Italy should seem to be more or less a party to these new arrangements. It was determined to prepare for her, also, the pageant of a coronation. It was resolved to take out of the treasury of Monza the famous iron crown of the Lombard kings, that Napoleon might place it upon his head after its being blessed by the archbishop of Milan, according to the ancient custom of the Germanic emperors, who received the crown of the West at Rome, but that of Italy at Milan. The ceremony would impress the Italians, revive their hopes, regain the nobles and priests, who especially missed in the domination of the Austrians the monarchical forms, and gratify the populace, always captivated by the state of their rulers; for that very state while it charms their sight also feeds their industry. As for the enlightened liberals, they could not fail ultimately to perceive that the future security of Italy could only be provided for by the association of her destinies with those of France.

It was agreed that after the adoption of the new decree, the Italian deputies, the minister Marescalchi, and the grand master of the ceremonies, M. de Segur, should precede Napoleon to Milan, there to arrange an Italian court, and prepare the programme of the coronation.

At this moment a thousand rumours were circulated among the European diplomatists. Now it was affirmed that Napoleon was about to give the crown of Holland to his brother Louis, now that he was about to confer that of Naples upon Joseph, and anon that he was about to annex Genoa and Switzerland to the French territory. There were even some who maintained that Napoleon wished to promote cardinal Fesch to the papacy, and who already spoke of the crown of Spain as being reserved for a prince of the house of Bonaparte. The hatred of his enemies anticipated his projects on some points, exaggerated them on others, attributed to him some designs which he had not as yet formed, and undoubtedly facilitated them by preparing the mind of Europe for them. The sitting of the Senate for the promulgation of the decree constituting the kingdom of Italy, was to reply to all these suppositions, whether true or false, and, for the time at least, pushed too far.

The Italian deputies were previously assembled at Paris; the decree was submitted to them, and they unanimously agreed to it; and then the imperial session was ordered for the 17th of March, 1805 (26th Ventôse, year XIII.). The Emperor proceeded to the Senate at two o'clock, surrounded by all the state of the constitutional sovereigns of England and France when they hold a royal sitting. A grand deputation received him at the door of the palace of the Luxembourg, and he proceeded to seat himself upon the throne, around which were ranged the princes, the six grand dignitaries, the marshals, and the grand officers of the crown. M. de Talleyrand read his report and, after the report, the imperial decree. A copy of the same decree, in the Italian language, and bearing the adhesion of the Lombard deputies, was then read by the vice-president Melzi. Then the minister Marescalchi presented those deputies to Napoleon, to whom in his quality of king of Italy, they took the oath of fidelity. That ceremony being terminated, Napoleon, seated, and wearing his hat, delivered a firm and concise speech, such as he well knew how to make, and of which the intention will easily be perceived.

"SENATORS,

"We have willed, on this occasion, to come among you, fully and freely to acquaint you with our views upon one of the most important subjects of State policy.

"We have conquered Holland, three-fourths of Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. Amidst the greatest prosperity we have been moderate. Out of so many provinces we have kept only those which were necessary to maintain France in the rank of consideration and power to which she has been accustomed. The partition of Po-

land, the abstraction of provinces from Turkey, the conquest of India, and of almost all the colonies had, to our injury, disturbed the general balance of power.

"All that we have deemed not absolutely necessary for the re-establishment of this balance we have restored.

"Germany has been evacuated; their possessions have been restored to the descendants of many illustrious houses, who would have been irredeemably ruined had we not granted them a generous protection.

"Austria herself, after two unsuccessful wars, has obtained the state of Venice. At any time she would gladly have exchanged for Venice the provinces which she has lost.

"Scarcely was Holland conquered ere she was declared independent. Her annexation to our Empire would have been the completion of your commercial system, as the greatest rivers of one half of our territory have their mouths in Holland. Nevertheless, Holland is independent, and her customs, her commerce, and her administration, are regulated at the will of her own government.

"Switzerland was occupied by our armies; we defended it against the combined forces of Europe. Its annexation would have completed our military frontier. Nevertheless, Switzerland, by the act of mediation, governs itself according to the pleasure of the nineteen free and independent cantons.

"The annexation of the territory of the Italian Republic to the French empire would have aided the development of our agriculture; nevertheless, after its second conquest, we confirmed, at Lyons, its independence. We this day do still more, we proclaim the separation of the crowns of France and Italy, appointing for that separation the epoch when it shall be practicable and safe to our Italian subjects.

"We have accepted and we will place upon our head, the iron crown of the ancient Lombards, that we may temper anew and strengthen it. But we do not hesitate to declare that we will transmit this crown to one of our lawful children, whether of our own issue, or adoptive, as early as we shall be without fears for the independence which we have guaranteed to the other states of the Mediterranean.

"The Genius of Evil will in vain seek for pretexts for rekindling war upon the Continent; that which has been annexed to our Empire by the constitutional laws will remain annexed to it. No new province will be incorporated with it, but the laws of the Dutch Republic, the act of mediation of the nineteen Swiss cantons, and this first statute of the kingdom of Italy will be constantly under the protection of our crown, and we will never permit them to be attacked."

At the conclusion of this lofty and peremptory address Napoleon received the oath of some senators whom he had named, and then returned, surrounded by the same attendance, to the palace of the Tuileries. Messrs. de Melzi, de Marescalchi, and the other

Italians, were directed to proceed to Milan, to prepare the public mind for the new solemnity which had been determined upon. Cardinal Caprara, the Pope's legate to Napoleon, was archbishop of Milan. He had accepted that dignity only in obedience, being very old and oppressed by infirmities, and after a long life passed in courts, he was far more inclined to leave the world than to prolong his part. At the request of Napoleon, and with the consent of the Pope, he set out for Italy to crown the new king according to the ancient custom of the Lombard Church. M. de Segur instantly set out, with orders to hurry on the preparations. Napoleon fixed his own departure for the month of April, and his coronation for the month of May.

This excursion into Italy agreed perfectly well with his military projects, and, indeed, even considerably forwarded them. Napoleon had been all the winter waiting till his squadrons should be ready to run out of Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon. In January, 1805, it was about twenty months since the naval war with England had been proclaimed, for the rupture with England took place in May, 1803, and yet the fleet of men-of-war had been unable to set sail. The administration had not been without the strong impulse of Napoleon, but in naval matters nothing can be hurried, as all nations well know who endeavour to create a naval power. At the same time we must admit that the Brest and Toulon fleets would have been sooner ready if it had not been determined to increase their original strength. That of Brest had been increased from eighteen sail to twenty-one, and was calculated to embark seventeen thousand men and five hundred horses, with a great *materiel*, without any aid from transports borrowed from the merchant service. In the project of sailing in winter, and during bad weather, it had been necessary to give up the idea of being accompanied by vessels of small tonnage, which were equally incapable of following vessels of the line, and of being towed by them. Old men-of-war were, in consequence, taken up, cleared of their guns, and laden with men and munitions. By this means the squadron could run out altogether, and in all weathers, touch at Ireland, land its seventeen thousand men and its munitions, and then return into the Channel. For the rest, it had been ready, as desired, in November. That of Rochefort, consisting of five ships of the line and four frigates, carrying three thousand men, four thousand muskets, and one hundred cwt. of powder, was ready at the same period. Only that of Toulon, increased from eight to eleven sail, had required the whole month of December. General Lauriston, Napoleon's aide-de-camp, had been appointed to form a corps of six thousand picked men, with fifty cannon and a battering train, and to embark the whole in the Toulon fleet. That fleet, as we have mentioned, was to detach a division to St. Helena, to take possession of that island, then proceed to Surinam, to retake the Dutch colonies, and then join the squadron of Missiessy, which, on its part would have relieved our own West India islands, and ravaged the

colonies of the English. Both then, after having thus decoyed the English towards America, and liberated Ganteaume, were to return to Europe. Ganteaume, whose preparations were completed, had during the whole winter awaited the moment when Missiessy and Villeneuve, running out of Toulon, should draw off the English. Missiessy, who wanted energy, but did not want courage, ran out of Rochefort on the 11th of January, during a frightful storm, and, steering through the narrow passes, gained the open sea without being overtaken or even seen by the English. He made sail for the West Indies with five ships of the line and four frigates.

His vessels received some damage, which was repaired at sea. As for Villeneuve, to whom the minister Decrès had communicated a factitious and merely temporary excitement, he was instantly cooled on obtaining a close sight of the Toulon squadron. To make eleven crews out of eight, it had been necessary to divide, and, of course, to weaken them. They had been completed with conscripts drafted from the land service. The materials used in the port of Toulon were not of good quality, and it was found that the iron-work, cordage, masts, and spars, easily broke. Villeneuve was in great, perhaps too great, anxiety about the risks to be run in facing with such craft and such crews, the ships of the enemy trained by a cruise of twenty months. His soul was shaken, even before he put to sea. However, urged by Napoleon, and by the minister Decrès, he got ready to weigh anchor towards the end of December. A head wind detained him in Toulon roads, from the end of December to the 18th of January. On the 18th, the wind having shifted, he set sail, and by shifting his course, succeeded in evading the enemy. But in the course of the night a heavy tempest arose, and the inexperience of the crews, and the bad quality of the materials, exposed all our vessels to serious accidents. The squadron was dispersed. In the morning, Villeneuve found himself separated, with four ships of the line and one frigate. Some had carried away their top-masts, others had sprung leaks, or had received damage not easily repaired at sea. Besides these misadventures, two English frigates were watching us, and the admiral was afraid of the enemy coming up with him at the moment when he had but five sail to oppose to him. He therefore determined to put back to Toulon, although he was already seventy leagues distant from it; and notwithstanding the entreaties of general Lauriston, who, reckoning four thousand and some hundreds of men on board the vessels which still remained together, demanded to be taken to his destination, Villeneuve returned to Toulon on the 27th, and succeeded in assembling his whole squadron there.

The time was not thrown away. The damages that had been sustained were repaired, the masts and rigging were repaired, and every thing put in order for sailing again. But admiral Villeneuve was much affected; on the very day of his return to

Toulon he wrote the minister: "I declare to you, that vessels thus equipped, short-handed, encumbered with troops, with superannuated or bad materials, vessels which lose their masts or sails at every puff of wind, and which, in fine weather, are constantly engaged in repairing the damages caused by the wind, or the inexperience of their sailors, are not fit to undertake any thing. I had a presentiment of this before I sailed; I have now only too painfully experienced it."*

Napoleon was sensibly displeased on hearing of this useless sortie. "What," said he, "is to be done with admirals who allow their spirits to sink and determine to hasten home at the first damage that they receive? It would be requisite to give up sailing, and to remain wholly inactive even in the finest weather, if an expedition is to be prevented by the separation of a few vessels. The whole of the captains," he added, "ought to have had sealed orders to meet off the Canary Islands. The damages should have been repaired *en route*. If any vessel leaked dangerously she should have been left at Cadiz, her crew and the troops being transferred to the *Eagle*, which was in that port and ready for sailing. A few topmasts carried away, some casualties in a gale of wind, were everyday occurrences. Two days of fine weather ought to have cheered up the crews and put every thing to rights. *But the great evil of our navy is that the men who command it are unused to all the risks of command.*"†

Unfortunately, the right moment for the expedition to Surinam had gone by, and it was necessary that Napoleon, with his usual fertility of invention, should devise a new plan. The first, which had consisted in admiral Latouche proceeding from Toulon into the Channel, had fallen to the ground, owing to the death of that valuable officer. The second, which had consisted in decoying the English into the American seas, by sending Villeneuve's squadron to Surinam, and Missiessy's to the Antilles, and in taking advantage of this diversion to bring Ganteaume's squadron into the Channel had equally failed from delays in organisation, foul winds, and an unsuccessful sortie. It was necessary, therefore, to resort to another plan. A new loss, that of admiral Bruix, different from admiral Latouche, but at least his equal in merit, added to the difficulty of naval operations. The unfortunate Bruix, so remarkable for his firmness, experience, and strength of mind, had died through his zeal and devotion to the organisation of the flotilla. Had he lived, Napoleon would certainly have placed him at the head of the squadron charged with the grand manœuvre that he meditated. One would have said that Fate, conjured up in hostility to the French navy, had purposely deprived it in the course of ten months of its two most eminent

* Despatch of the 1st Pluviôse, year XIII. (21st of January, 1805), dated on board the ship *Bucentaur*, in Toulon road.

† Letter to Lauriston, of the 1st of February, 1805.

admirals, either of them, undoubtedly, capable of opposing the English admirals. It was, in consequence, necessary to be content with admirals Ganteaume, Villeneuve, and Missiessy, until the events of war should develope new officers of merit.

A grave event had recently taken place as to the sea, where it greatly altered the situation of the belligerent powers. England, in an unlooked-for and very unjust manner, had declared war against Spain. For some time she had perceived that the neutrality of Spain without being friendly in intention towards France, was, nevertheless, useful to her in more than one respect. Our squadron, lying at Ferrol, had refitted there while waiting for the blockade to be removed. The *Eagle* did the same at Cadiz. Our privateers entered the ports of the Peninsula for the purpose of selling their prizes. As matter of reciprocity, England had a right to the same advantages; but she preferred to forego them rather than suffer France to enjoy them. Accordingly, she announced to the court of Madrid, that she considered as a breach of neutrality what was taking place in the ports of the Peninsula, and threatened war if our vessels continued to repair or fit out there, and if our privateers continued to find an asylum and a market there. She had still further required Charles IV. to guarantee Portugal against all attempts on the part of Napoleon. This last was an exorbitant exaction, going beyond the limit of the neutrality that was required from Spain. At the same time, France had permitted the court of Madrid to show itself accommodating towards England, and even to grant a part of her demands, in order to prolong a state of things which answered our purpose. In fact, the military co-operation of Spain was not worth so much to us as a subsidy of 48 million francs per annum, and that subsidy could only be paid by means of the neutrality, which alone permitted the arrival of specie from the New World. We were, consequently, ready to consent to every thing; but England, becoming more exacting in proportion as her demands were complied with, had required that all repairs and outfitting should cease in the ports of Spain; by which she meant that our ships were immediately to be sent out of Ferrol, in other words, to be given up. Openly violating the law of nations, she, without any previous notice, ordered the capture of all Spanish vessels that might be met with at sea. Considering that such an order had no other object than the capture of vessels coming from America laden with gold, we may justly term it a measure of downright piracy. At this time four Spanish frigates, laden with 12 million dollars (2,400,000*l.*), on their passage from Mexico to Spain, were captured by an English squadron. The Spanish commander, having refused to give up his vessels, was barbarously attacked by an immensely superior force, and made prisoner, after a gallant defence. One of the frigates was blown up, the other three were taken to ports of Great Britain.

This odious measure excited the indignation of Spain and the reprobation of all Europe. Charles IV. unhesitatingly declared war against England. He at the same time ordered the arrest of the English who were found on the territory of the Peninsula, and the sequestration of all their property, to answer for the property and persons of Spanish merchants.

Thus, in spite of her inaction, and in spite of the skilful forbearance of France, Spain was dragged into war by the maritime violences of England. Napoleon, having no longer any ground for requiring the subsidy of 48 million francs, hastened to settle the manner in which Spain should co-operate in the war, and especially endeavoured to inspire her with resolutions worthy of herself and of her ancient greatness.

The Spanish cabinet, with the desire of gratifying Napoleon, and from a sense of justice towards merit, had chosen admiral Gravina as its ambassador to France. He was at the head of the Spanish navy, and beneath a simple exterior concealed a rare intelligence and great courage. Napoleon was much attached to admiral Gravina, who was equally attached to Napoleon. For the same reasons that had caused him to be named ambassador, he had the principal command of the Spanish navy given to him, and previous to quitting Paris, he was instructed to concert with the French government on the plan of naval operations. To this end, the admiral, on the 4th of January, 1805, signed a convention which detailed the part which each of the two powers should take in the war. France engaged constantly to keep at sea forty-seven ships of the line, twenty-nine frigates, fourteen corvettes, and twenty-five brigs; and to hasten as much as possible the finishing of the sixteen ships and fourteen frigates which were on the stocks; to concentrate all the troops which were encamped near the ports of embarkation, in the proportion of five hundred men to each ship, and two hundred to each frigate; to keep the French flotilla constantly ready to transport ninety thousand men, exclusive of the thirty thousand intended to be embarked in the Dutch flotilla. Reckoning the flotilla as equal to so many ships and frigates, and adding our ships of war, we may be said to have had an effective total of sixty ships and forty frigates, at that time at sea.

Spain, on her part, promised instantly to fit out thirty-two ships of the line, furnished with provisions for six months, and with water for four months. The division of them was thus fixed: fifteen to Cadiz, eight to Carthagena, and nine to Ferrol. Spanish troops were to be assembled at the points of embarkation, at the rate of four hundred and fifty men to each ship, and two hundred men to each frigate. Further, she was to be provided with vessels *en flute* (*i. e.* converted into transports by having their guns taken out), in the proportion of four thousand tons at Cadiz, two thousand at Carthagena, and two thousand at Ferrol. It was agreed that admiral Gravina should have the chief com-

mand of the Spanish fleet, and should correspond directly with the French minister Decrès. In other words, he was to receive instructions from Napoleon himself, and Spanish honour needed not to blush for accepting such a direction. Some political conditions accompanied these military stipulations. The subsidy naturally ceased on the day on which England commenced hostilities against Spain. Further, the two nations agreed not to make peace separately. France promised to cause the colony of Trinidad to be restored to Spain, and Gibraltar also, should the war be attended with some signal success.

The engagement entered into by the court of Madrid was far above its means. Instead of thirty-two ships, it was much if she fitted out twenty-four, and but of middling quality, though with gallant crews. If, then, the whole forces of France, Spain, and Holland, be summed up, we may consider the three nations to have possessed ninety-two ships of the line; of which sixty belonged to France, twenty-four to Spain, and eight to Holland. But the flotilla must be reckoned for fifteen, which reduced the actual naval force of the three nations to seventy-seven sail of the line. The English had eighty-nine, perfectly armed, well found, manned with experienced crews, and in every respect superior to those of the two allies, and this number was about to be increased to a hundred. The advantage, therefore, was on their side; they could only be beaten by superior combinations, which are far from being as efficacious by sea as they are by land.

Unfortunately, Spain, formerly so powerful in her navy, and still so much interested in being so, on account of her vast colonies —Spain, as we have already often remarked, was in a state of absolute destitution. Her arsenals were abandoned, and contained no wood, hemp, copper, or iron. The magnificent establishments of Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena, were empty and deserted. They had neither stores nor workmen. The seamen, few in number in Spain, since her commerce was almost reduced to the conveyance of specie, were just now still further diminished in number by the yellow fever, which had ravaged all the seaboard, and had driven them abroad or into the interior. When to this we add a great scarcity of grain, and extreme financial distress, increased by the loss of the galleons that had recently been captured, we shall still have but an inadequate idea of all the miseries which afflicted that power, once so great, but at that period so sadly reduced.

Napoleon, who had so often and so vainly counselled Spain, during the late peace, to devote at least a portion of her resources to the reorganisation of a navy—Napoleon, although with but little hope of being attended to, resolved to make another effort with that court. This time, instead of employing threats, as in 1803, he employed encouragements and caresses. He had recalled marshal Lannes from Portugal, to place him at the head of the grenadiers, who were to be the first of our troops to land in Eng-

land. He had appointed general Junot to replace Lannes in Portugal. He was partial to Junot, who had natural talent, and a boundless devotion, though somewhat too ardent a temperament. He ordered him to stop at Madrid, to see the prince of peace, the queen, and the king. Junot was to pique the honour of the prince of peace, to make him feel that the fate of the Spanish monarchy was in his hands, and that he had to choose between the part of a contemptible and detested favourite, and that of a minister making use of the favour of his sovereigns to restore power to his country. Junot was authorised to promise him the full friendship of Napoleon, and even a principality in Portugal, if he would zealously serve the common cause, and endeavour to infuse an adequate activity into the Spanish administration. Napoleon's envoy was then to see the queen, to declare to her that her influence over the government—that is to say, over the king and the prince of peace—was well known in Europe; that her personal honour, as well as the honour of the kingdom, was interested in great and successful exertions being made; that if the power of Spain was not put forth on this occasion, she, the all-powerful queen, would, in the eyes of the world and of her children, be responsible for the disorders which would have weakened and ruined the monarchy. Junot was to try all possible means to inspire this princess with better principles. As regarded the king, no such efforts were necessary, for his sentiments were excellent; but the weak king had neither attention nor energy. He was brutalised by the chase, and by mechanical labours.

Junot had orders to make some stay at Madrid, previously to proceeding to Portugal, and to play the part of ambassador extraordinary, in order to reanimate in some degree that degenerate court.

The great matter now was to make the best possible use of the naval resources of the three nations, France, Holland, and Spain. The project of suddenly bringing a more or less considerable portion of his navy into the Channel, a project which had twice been modified, had incessantly occupied the attention of Napoleon. But a grand and sudden idea now for a moment turned him aside from it.

Napoleon had frequently received reports from general Decaen, commandant of our factories in India, who had retired to the Isle of France since the renewal of war, and, in conjunction with admiral Linois, had done great damage to the English commerce. General Decaen, an ardent spirit, well qualified to command at a distance, and in an independent and perilous position, had formed connexions with the Mahrattas, who were still insubordinate. He had procured some curious information as to the dispositions of the recently vanquished princes, and had arrived at the conviction that six thousand French, disembarked with a sufficient war *matériel*, and speedily joined by a multitude of insurgents eager to throw off the yoke, could shake the British Empire in India. It will be remembered that it was Napoleon who in 1803

had suggested this to general Decaen, who had ardently seized the idea. But it was no mere mad enterprise that Napoleon contemplated; if any thing was to be attempted, it was a grand expedition, worthy to rival that of Egypt, and adequate to wresting from the English that important conquest which forms at once their glory and their grandeur in the present century. The distance alone would render that expedition far more difficult than that of Egypt. To transport, in a time of war, thirty thousand men from Toulon to Alexandria, was a difficult operation; but to convey them from Toulon to the shores of India, doubling the Cape of Good Hope, was a gigantic enterprise. Napoleon was of opinion, founded on his own experience, that the immensity of the ocean rendering meetings there very unfrequent, only invention was required to venture upon and succeed in the boldest movements without falling in with an enemy, though very superior in number. It was thus that, in 1798, he had passed through the English fleets with some hundreds of vessels and an entire army, taken Malta, and reached Alexandria, without being met by Nelson. It was thus that he hoped to get a fleet into the Channel. The success of such enterprizes required profound secrecy and great art to deceive the British admiralty. He had elaborately prepared every thing for perplexing the English nation. Having troops assembled and ready for embarkation wherever he had squadrons, at Toulon, at Cadiz, at Ferrol, at Rochefort, at Brest, and at the Texel, he at all times had it in his power to send out an army without the English being aware of either its strength or its destination. The project of the descent had this use, that the attention of the enemy being constantly directed towards that object, they would anticipate an expedition against Ireland or the coasts of England. The moment, then, was favourable for attempting one of those extraordinary expeditions, which Napoleon was so prompt in planning and deciding upon. He considered, for instance, that to wrest India from the English was a result sufficiently grand to warrant him in deferring all his other projects, even including that of the descent, and upon that expedition he was inclined to employ all his naval resources. The following were his calculations upon this subject. In the outfitting ports he had, besides the squadrons ready to sail, a reserve of old vessels not very fit for active service. He had also among his crews, besides able and experienced seamen, very young novices, and conscripts newly put on board ship. It was upon this double consideration that he based his plan.

He determined to combine with a certain number of new vessels, all those which were past service, but which were still fit to make a voyage; he resolved to arm them *en flute*, that is, to remove their guns, to put on board, instead of them, a great mass of troops, complete the crews with all sorts of men from our ports, and thus to send out from Toulon, Cadiz, Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest,

fleets which, without being accompanied by a single transport-ship, could land a considerable army in India. He proposed to send thirteen ships from Toulon and twenty-one from Brest, in all thirty-four, one-half of them at least old vessels, and to add to them a score of frigates, one half of them almost past service. These two fleets, running out to sea almost at the same time, and being appointed to join company at the Isle of France, would be capable of carrying soldiers and sailors to the number of 40,000. On reaching India the vessels in bad condition were to be broken up, and only those preserved which were fit for sailing, which would be fifteen ships out of thirty-four, and ten frigates out of twenty. There were also two divisions to be made in the crews. All the good sailors were intended to man the vessels that were to be preserved, while the inferior sailors, capable, however, of being converted into soldiers, were to complete the army of disembarkation. Napoleon judged that it would require about 14,000 or 15,000 seamen efficiently to man the fifteen ships and ten frigates which were to return to Europe. We should then have in India from 25,000 to 26,000 troops, out of the 40,000 seamen and soldiers sent from Europe, and we should have back a fleet of fifteen sail, excellent alike for the quality of the vessels, the choice of the men, and the experience acquired in a long voyage. In reference to the navy the only loss would be worthless hulks and the fag ends of crews, and we should leave in India an army sufficient to conquer the English, especially if it were commanded by so enterprising a man as general Decaen. Napoleon still further prepared to send out 3000 French in the Dutch fleet of the Texel, 2000 in a new fleet organised at Rochefort, and 4000 Spaniards in the Spanish fleet of Cadiz, which would form a new reinforcement of 9000 men, and raise the army of general Decaen to 35,000 or 36,000 men. It is extremely probable that, India being scarcely subjected, such a force would have overthrown the British power there. As regarded the voyage, nothing was less likely than meeting the English. It would have been difficult to escape from them if the war squadron had to be accompanied by some hundreds of transport ships. But the old ships and old frigates, armed *en flute*, rendered that unnecessary. The principle, then, on which the project rested, was to sacrifice the inferior or bad portion of the navy, alike as to men and vessels, and resolve to bring back only the portion which was excellent. At this cost the miracle would be performed of transporting to India an army of 36,000 men. Indeed, the sacrifice was not as great as it appeared to be, for every sailor knows that at sea, as on land, and even more at sea than on land, the quality of forces is every thing, and that more can be done with ten good vessels than with twenty inferior ones.

This project implied the momentary postponing of the descent; but it was possible that it would favour it in an extraordinary manner, for, after some time, when the English should learn the

departure of our fleets they would follow them, and thus leave the seas of Europe open, while the squadron, returning from India with fifteen ships and ten frigates, could pass into the Straits of Dover, where Napoleon, in constant readiness, would be prepared to avail himself of even the shortest gleam of good fortune. It is true that this latter part of the plan supposed a double success; success in going to India and success in returning; and Fortune rarely heaps her favours to this extent upon any man, however great. During four weeks Napoleon remained in suspense between the idea of sending this expedition to India, and the idea of crossing the Straits of Dover. The overthrow of the English power in India appeared to him to be so important a result as to dispense with the necessity for risking himself and his army in so perilous an attempt as the descent. For a whole month, then, he hesitated between these two plans, and his letters bear testimony to the fluctuations of his mind between those two extraordinary enterprises.

However, the Boulogne expedition gained the preference. Napoleon considered that stroke the prompter of the two, the more decisive, and even the more infallible, if a French fleet should suddenly appear in the Channel. He set his mind to work again, and he hit upon a new arrangement, grander, more profound, and more promising than the two former ones, for assembling without the knowledge of the English all his naval forces between Dover and Boulogne.

His plan was resolved upon early in March, and the orders accordingly given. In this plan, as in that of Surinam, the English were to be decoyed towards India and the West Indies, whither the squadron of admiral Missiessy, which had sailed on the 11th of January, already called their attention, and the French were then suddenly to return to the seas of Europe, with an assemblage of force superior to any squadron the English could muster. It was in some degree the same project as that of the previous December, but increased and completed by the junction of the forces of Spain. Admiral Villeneuve was to sail with the first favourable wind, pass the Strait, call at Cadiz for admiral Gravina, with six or seven Spanish ships, besides the *Eagle*, then proceed to Martinique, and, if Missiessy were still there, join him, and wait for a further junction more considerable than all the others. This junction was that of Ganteaume. He, profiting by the first equinoctial gale which should disperse the English, was to sail from Brest with twenty-one ships, the best of this arsenal, steer for Ferrol, be joined by the French division in port there, and the Spanish division which would be ready to sail, and then steer for Martinique, where Villeneuve would be awaiting him. After this general assemblage, which presented but few real difficulties, there would be at Martinique twelve sail under Villeneuve, six or seven under Gravina, five under Missiessy, and twenty-one under Ganteaume, besides the Franco-Spanish

squadron of Ferrol, that is to say, about fifty to sixty vessels—an enormous force, the concentration of which had never been witnessed at any time or on any sea. The plan was now so complete, so well-calculated, that it necessarily produced in the mind of Napoleon a rapture of hope. Even the minister Decrès confessed that it presented the greatest chances of success. It was always possible to run out of Toulon with the (*Mistral*) north-west wind, as the late sortie of Villeneuve showed. The junction with Gravina at Cadiz, should Nelson be outwitted, was easy, for the English had not yet thought it necessary to blockade that port. The Toulon squadron, thus increased to seventeen or eighteen sail, was almost certain to reach Martinique. Missiessy had touched there without meeting any thing during his voyage, except some merchantmen, which he captured. The most difficult point was to get out of Brest road. But in March there was every reason to expect some equinoctial gale. Ganteaume, on arriving before Ferrol, which was only blockaded by five or six English vessels, would, on presenting himself with twenty-one, put all idea of fighting out of their minds, and, without striking a blow, succeed in adding to his force the French division commanded by admiral Gourdon, and those Spanish vessels which were ready, and then proceed to Martinique. It could not be suspected by the English that there was any design of assembling, at a single point like Martinique, from fifty to sixty vessels at once. It was probable that their ideas would turn towards India. At all events, Ganteaume, Gourdon, Villeneuve, Gravina, and Missiessy, having once effected a junction, no English squadron that they might meet, and numbering at most only from twelve to fifteen sail, would venture to oppose fifty, and the return into the Channel was consequently secured. All our forces, then, were to be assembled together between the shores of England and France, at the moment when the fleets of England would be sailing towards the East or the West Indies. Events speedily proved that this grand plan was practicable even with an inferior execution.

Every precaution was taken to preserve the most profound secrecy. The plan was not confided to the Spaniards, who had engaged to follow with docility the directions of Napoleon. Villeneuve and Ganteaume alone of the admirals were to be entrusted with the secret, and they were not to have it on sailing, but when fairly at sea, and without opportunity of communicating with land. Then their sealed orders, which they were only to open on reaching a certain latitude, would instruct them what course to steer. None of the captains of these vessels were let into the secret of the expedition, but they had certain fixed points at which to rejoin each other in case of separation. None of the ministers were acquainted with the plan excepting admiral Decrès. He was expressly instructed to correspond directly with Napoleon, and to write his despatches with his own hand.

The report of an expedition to India was circulated in all the ports. It was pretended that great numbers of troops were embarked; in reality, the Toulon squadron was charged to take scarcely three thousand men, and the Brest squadron six or seven thousand. The admirals were instructed to land half that force in the West Indies, to reinforce the garrisons there, and to bring back four or five thousand of the best soldiers, to add to the force of Boulogne.

By arranging matters thus, the fleets would not be greatly encumbered, but free and comfortable. They were all victualled for six months, so that they might remain at sea a long time without putting into port. Couriers were despatched to Ferrol and Cadiz, bearing orders to have every thing prepared for weighing, because, at any moment, the blockade might be raised by an allied fleet, without saying which or how.

To all these precautions for outwitting the English, one more was added, which was not less calculated to deceive them—the journey of Napoleon into Italy. He computed that his fleets, sailing towards the end of March, and employing the month of April to go to Martinique, the month of May to assemble together, and the month of June to return, would get into the Channel in the beginning of July. He was to remain all that time in Italy reviewing troops, and giving fêtes, hiding his profound designs beneath the appearances of a vain and sumptuous life; then, at the appointed moment, to set off secretly by post, travel in five days from Milan to Boulogne, and while he was supposed to be still in Italy, strike his long-meditated blow upon England; that blow which she had so much expected for two years, that she now began to disbelieve it. Europe now considered it a mere feint, intended to convulse the British nation, and oblige it to exhaust itself in useless efforts. While this idea was adopted, Napoleon, on the contrary, had incessantly been increasing his army of invasion by drafting from the depôts the number of men necessary to increase the effective force of the war battalions, and by filling up, from the conscription of the year, the void thus caused in the depôts. The army of Boulogne was thus augmented by nearly thirty thousand men, without any one knowing it. He had always kept this army in such a state of activity and readiness, that it was scarcely possible to judge of its greater or less effective force. The opinion of a mere demonstration intended to harass England, daily became the prevalent opinion.

Every thing being thus arranged, with the firmest resolution to attempt the enterprise, and with a deep conviction of success, Napoleon prepared to set out for Italy. The pope had remained during the whole winter at Paris. He at first intended to set out in the middle of February on his return to his own states. Heavy snow-storms in the Alps delayed his departure. Napoleon so winningly urged his further stay, that the holy father yielded, and consented to defer his departure to the middle of March. Napo-

leon was not ill pleased that Europe should note this long visit, that his intimacy with the pope should become greater every day, and that his holiness should remain on this side of the Alps while preparations were making at Milan for a second coronation. The courts of Naples, Rome, and even Etruria, did not without regret perceive the creation of a vast French kingdom in Italy, and if the pope had been at the Vatican, besieged by all sorts of suggestions, perhaps he would have been induced to show himself unfavourable to it.

Pius VII., after having learned to put full confidence in Napoleon, had ended by entrusting him with his secret desires. He was delighted with the honours paid to his person—honours which benefited religion—with the good which his presence appeared to do, and also with what the new Emperor had done in France to aid the restoration of public worship. But though a saintlike man, Pius VII. still was a man, and a prince, and the triumph of spiritual interests, while it filled him with satisfaction, did not cause him to forget the temporal interests of the Holy See, damaged since the loss of the Legations. Six cardinals had accompanied him, one of whom, cardinal Borgia, had died at Lyons. The others, especially Antonelli and di Pietro, were of the ultramontane party, and strongly opposed to cardinal Caprara, who was too prudent and enlightened to suit them. They, consequently, had induced the Pope to conceal his proceedings from that cardinal, who, in his quality of legate, ought to have been informed of all negotiations attempted in Paris. He certainly would not have taught them the way to succeed in their projects, for what could be done for the Church Napoleon did spontaneously, and without being urged. But that personage, full of prudence and experience, would have dissuaded them from useless efforts, which are always to be regretted, as they most frequently became the cause of quarrel.

They began to dogmatise with Napoleon upon the four propositions of Bousset, which Louis XIV., towards the close of his reign, was said to have promised to annul. Napoleon, gentle in manner, but inflexible as to the essential, made it manifest that nothing was to be expected from him as to the revocation of the famous Organic Articles. There remained the manner of executing them. He appeared inclined to attend to the observations which they might offer to him upon this subject. At first they spoke to him of the jurisdiction of bishops over the ecclesiastics, of which much had been said to him, and which Pius VII. did not deem to be sufficiently complete. To this Napoleon, concerting his replies with M. Portalis, replied that every spiritual offence was, and would continue to be, left to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but that every civil offence against the civil law would continue to be referred to the ordinary tribunals, for the priests were citizens, and therefore must be held accountable to the common laws. It was pretended that 38 million francs per annum

(1,520,000*l.*) were required for the support of religion, while there were but 13 million francs (520,000*l.*) devoted to it in the budget of the State, which left a deficiency of 25 million francs (1,000,000*l.* sterling.) Napoleon replied by enumerating what he had done in that respect, and that which he still intended to do, in proportion to the gradual increase of the revenues of the State. Mention was made to him of various other objects, foreign to the Organic Articles, and their execution, especially of divorce, which was permitted by our new laws. Napoleon, still consulting M. Portalis, replied, that divorce had appeared to the legislator to be indispensable as a remedy to certain disorders of morals, but that the priests remained free to refuse the religious benediction to divorced persons who wished to contract a new marriage; that the conscience of the priests, therefore, was not outraged; and that, moreover, that was not a matter opposed to the dogma, inasmuch as divorce had existed in the ancient Church. From this subject they turned to that of Sundays and holidays, which, notwithstanding the re-establishment of the Gregorian calendar, were not generally enough observed by the people. Napoleon replied that already, towards the close of the last century, manners, more potent than laws, had brought about a relaxation; and that, before the Revolution, workmen in the towns used to work on Sundays; that penalties applied in this case would be less serviceable than example; that the government would always set good ones; and that workmen paid by the State should never work on holidays; that the Sunday was faithfully observed by the country people, and only neglected by the population of the towns; and that in the towns, to compel the people in the towns to be idle, would, besides the inconvenience of having recourse to the penal law, be giving to drunkenness and vice the time taken away from labour; and, finally, that every thing had been tried that was permitted by a religious, but also a prudent policy.

Another subject was touched upon—that of education; and they demanded for the clergy the power of superintending the schools. Napoleon replied, that in the Lyceums there would be almoners chosen from among priests conforming in doctrine with the Church; that they would virtually be ecclesiastical inspectors of houses of education, and could point out to their bishops those in which the religious teaching was defective, but that there would be over the educational establishments no other authority than that of the State. Some mention was also made of the bishops dissentient with the Holy See, and it was agreed to reduce them to that peace, voluntary or forced, in which Napoleon was resolved that the whole clergy should live. This series of questions of spiritual interests was terminated by the discussion of a plan which had unceasingly occupied the court of Rome—that of obtaining that the Catholic religion should be the established religion of the State. On this subject Napoleon was inflexible. He maintained that that religion was dominant, in fact, since it was the religion

of the majority of the French people, and since the important actions of the government, such, for instance, as the taking of the crown, had been surrounded by Catholic ceremonies. But a declaration of that kind was calculated to alarm all the dissenting faiths; now his intention was to ensure perfect repose to them all, and he would not allow that the re-establishment of the Catholic faith, a re-establishment which he had willed, and frankly willed, should be any diminution of the security of any other religion.

On all these points Napoleon was extremely mild in form, unalterably firm as to substance. At length they passed to the essential point, that which touched Rome more nearly than all the points of ecclesiastical discipline—the business of the Legations. A memorial was drawn up, which Pius VII. himself delivered to Napoleon, and which related to the losses which the Holy See had sustained during a century past, alike in revenues and in territories. In this memorial various revenues were enumerated, which the Holy See formerly collected in all Catholic States, and which, under the influence of the public spirit in France, had been diminished or wholly suppressed in France, in Austria, and even in Spain.

The memorial recalled the manner in which the Holy See had been kept out of its reversion of the duchy of Parma, on the extinction of the Farnese house, the still older privation of the county Venaissin, which had been ceded to France; and the gravest of all the losses, that of the Legations, incorporated in the Italian Republic. Thus reduced, the Holy See could no longer, it was urged, make head against the inevitable expenses of the Catholic worship in all parts of the world. It could neither put the cardinals in a position to support their dignity, nor support foreign missions, nor provide for the defence of its weak states. They reckoned upon the modern Charlemagne vieing in munificence with the ancient one. Here Napoleon did not fail to feel some embarrassment at so direct a demand. He had made no promise to attract the Pope to Paris; but all along he had, in a general way, left room to hope that he would ameliorate the worldly circumstances of the Holy See. To restore the Legations to the pontifical court was a thing impossible, without odiously betraying that Italian Republic of which he was the founder, and was about to become the monarch. That would have been to destroy all the hopes of the Italian patriots, who looked upon that new State as the commencement of the independent existence of their country. But he had at his disposal the duchy of Parma, which he would not grant either to the house of Sardinia as an indemnity for Piedmont, nor to Spain as an aggrandisement of the kingdom of Etruria, and which at this time he reserved as a family endowment. It would no doubt have been prudent to employ it as an indemnity to the house of Sardinia, or even to add it to Etruria, while obliging the latter to indemnify the house of Sardinia with the Siennese. At the same stroke peace would have been

purchased with Russia, and great pleasure given to Spain. But if it were not thought worth while to keep on good terms with Russia, who had withdrawn her *chargé d'affaires*, or to gratify Spain, whose inertness was scarcely to be roused into energy by friendly actions, it would have been a destination worthy of the lofty designs of Napoleon, to give the duchy of Parma to the Pope. In ceding it to the Holy See, Napoleon would have put an end to many rumours as to his designs in Italy; he would have destroyed the chief argument used to induce Austria to join in a new coalition, and what was no less important, he would for ever have bound the Pope to him, and prevented that painful rupture with the Holy See, which, at a later period, did him so much moral injury, and which in reality had no other origin than the ill-disguised discontent of the court of Rome on this occasion. All this would have been better than reserving Parma, as Napoleon then resolved to reserve it, as a family endowment. His having, in 1804, allowed the alliance of Prussia to escape him, and sent home the Pope in 1805, covered with honours, but wounded in his interests, formed, in our opinion, the first essential errors of that powerful policy, whose mistake it was to account only with itself, and never with others.

Napoleon took advantage of these applications being confined solely to the Legations, to make the simple and easy reply which sprang out of the very state of the case. He could not betray a State which had chosen him for its head, a legitimate and decisive reason as to the Legations; and he announced his intention of, at a future time, ameliorating the situation of the Holy See. He charged cardinal Fesch to enter into an explanation with the Pope. He would at that time render him pecuniary aid, and he held out the prospect of new distributions of territory at no distant day, by means of which the Pope could be indemnified. For the rest he was sincere, for he descried these distributions in a not distant future. He saw, in fact, an early rekindling of war upon the Continent, Italy wholly conquered, Venice wrested from Austria, and Naples, from the Bourbons, and he deemed that in all this he could easily find wherewithal to satisfy the Pope.

But the deferring of these good intentions allowed a present displeasure to arise, which speedily became the source of mischievous consequences.

Napoleon and the Pope separated without being so much displeased with each other as the demands made and refused might have given reason to fear. The Pope, in lieu of the dangers which blunderers had predicted on his leaving Rome, had experienced a magnificent reception at Paris, had augmented the religious impulse by his presence; in short, had occupied in France a position worthy of the palmiest days of the Church. On the whole, if his interested councillors were discontented, he departed satisfied. He left Paris on the 4th of April, 1805, in the midst

of a greater crowd of people than had welcomed his arrival. He was to stay some days at Lyons to celebrate Easter.

Napoleon had prepared every thing for his journey at the same period. After having given his final orders to the fleet and the army, and reiterated his urgent directions to the court of Spain, to have every thing ready at Ferrol and at Cadiz, and after giving the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, not the ostensible, but the actual direction of the Empire, he, on the 1st of April, proceeded to Fontainebleau, where he was to remain for two or three days. He departed, delighted with his projects, and full of confidence in their success. He had a first pledge of that success in the fortunate departure of admiral Villeneuve. He had at length set sail on the 30th of March, with a favourable wind, and he had been lost sight of from the heights of Toulon, without any fear existing of his having met the English. One thwarting circumstance alone prevented the satisfaction from being complete. On the 1st of April the equinox was not yet felt at Brest, and the existing calm and clear weather was not that which was needed for dispersing the English, or concealing from them the movements of a squadron, so that the departure of Ganteaume had been rendered impossible. Had he once been clear of Brest, the success of the assemblages would have been almost made certain; and it was to suppose a phenomenon in the seasons, to entertain a doubt that the equinox would not bring on a gale in the course of April. Napoleon departed from Fontainebleau on the 3rd of April, proceeding by Troyes, Châlons, and Lyons, and preceding the Pope by the rapidity with which he travelled, so that the two trains should not interfere. While he journeyed towards Italy, busied with his grand ideas, and occasionally allowing his attention to be diverted by the homages of the people, Europe, variously excited, was in travail with a third coalition. England, alarmed for her existence, Russia wounded in her pride, Austria deeply annoyed at what was in progress in Italy, and Prussia, constantly hesitating between opposing fears, formed, or suffered to be formed, a new European league, which, far from being more successful than the former ones, was to procure Napoleon a colossal empire, which, unhappily, was too disproportioned to be permanent.

The Russian cabinet, regretting the errors which the ardour of the young sovereign had caused him to commit, would have been glad to have discovered in the replies of France a pretext for retracing its inconsiderate course. The pride of Napoleon, which withheld even a specious explanation of the occupation of Naples, of the refusal to indemnify the house of Savoy, or of the invasion of Hanover, considering them as matters which might be explained to a friendly court, but not to a hostile court—this pride had disconcerted the cabinet of St. Petersburg, and compelled it, in spite of itself, to recall M. D'Oubril. The emperor Alexander, who had not firmness enough to bear the consequences of a first movement, was disconcerted, and almost intimidated. Messrs.

de Strogonoff, de Nowositzoff, and Czartoryski, more firm, but perhaps less penetrating, had surrounded him, and made him feel the necessity of upholding the dignity of his crown in the eyes of Europe. The Russian cabinet had reverted to the not very practicable, but seductive ideas of a supreme arbitration, exercised in the name of justice and right. Two powers, France and England, disturbed Europe, and oppressed it, for the interests of their rivalry. It was necessary to head the ill-treated nations, and propose to them a common plan of pacification, in which their rights should be guaranteed, and the points of dispute between France and England set at rest. It was necessary to rally Europe to this plan, propose it in the name of Europe to England and France, then side with that one of the two powers which adopted it, against the one which refused it, and to overwhelm this latter with the force and just right of the whole world. Men not quite so young, nor so crammed with theory, would have seen in all this just simply a coalition with England and part of Europe against France. This plan, in fact, which was conceived in a spirit entirely favourable to England, which managed Russia, and unfavourable to France, which did not, was sure to be tolerably acceptable to Mr. Pitt, and unacceptable to Napoleon, and productive, sooner or later, of a war against the latter. It brought about a third coalition. The proposals presented to the emperor Alexander were mingled with so many specious and brilliant ideas, and with some so generous and so just, that the young czar, alarmed at first at what was proposed to him, was at length struck and seduced to the extent of immediately putting his hand to the work.

Previous to giving an account of the negotiations which followed, we must describe this plan of European arbitration, and point out its author. It will be seen, from the gravity of the consequences, that they merit to be known.

One of those adventurers, sometimes endowed with rare and eminent abilities, who carry into the north the intellect and learning of the south, had proceeded to Poland to find a field for his talents. He was an abbé, named Piatoli, and had in the first instance been attached to the court of the last king of Poland. After the various partitions he had passed into Courland, and from Courland into Russia. He was one of those active spirits, who, unable to rise to the government of states, placed too far above them, conceive plans, which, though commonly chimerical, are not always contemptible. The man of whom we speak had meditated much upon the affairs of Europe, and chance having brought him into connexion with the young friends of Alexander, he seized the opportunity of exercising a great though secret influence, and of causing a part of his conceptions to prevail in the resolutions of the powers. Those subaltern thinkers rarely have such an honour. The abbé Piatoli had the melancholy advantage of furnishing, in 1805, some of the principal ideas, which ended by being admitted into the treaties of 1815. On this account he is

worthy of notice, and the ideas which we attribute to him are not mere suppositions, for they are contained in secret memorials sent at that time to the emperor Alexander.* This foreigner discovering in prince Czartoryski a more earnest and thoughtful spirit than animated the other young men who governed Russia, associated himself more closely with him, and their ideas became identical to such an extent, that the plan proposed to the emperor belonged almost as much to one as to the other. The following was this plan.

The ambition of the northern powers, and the conquests of the French Revolution, had for thirty years disturbed the balance of Europe, and oppressed all the second-rate nations. It was necessary to remedy this by a new organisation, and by the establishment of a new law of nations, placed under the protection of a grand European confederation. To this end, it was necessary that there should be one perfectly disinterested power, which would cause that disinterestedness to be shared by all the others—and which would labour for the accomplishment of the proposed object.

One power alone bore all the marks of that noble mission, and that power was Russia. Her true ambition, if she rightly understood her part, would be to acquire, not territory, as England, Austria, or Prussia would, but moral influence. For a great state influence is every thing. After a long influence come territorial acquisitions. This Italian was right. By appearing to protect, against what is called the Revolution, the European princes, great or small, to whom it was a bugbear, Russia has gained Poland. It is not impossible that she may yet gain Constantinople. The first thing needful is influence—conquest follows.

Russia, then, was to propose to the other courts, not a war against France, which would not have been either politic or just, but a *mediatory alliance for the pacification of Europe*. There would certainly be no difficulty in procuring the adhesion of Austria and England to this alliance, but every thing was in peril without the concurrence of Prussia. It was necessary, therefore, to drag that astute court from its interested hesitations, or even to trample her down with European armies, should she refuse to concur in the common project. No consideration was to be shown to Prussia, or to any other power that should resist the proposed plan, *because* (by such resistance) *they would have deserted* the cause of humanity.

The co-operation of all the European states, with the exception of France, being once secured, three grand masses of troops were to be formed; one to the south, consisting of Russians and English transported into Italy by sea, and intended to ascend, with the Neapolitans, the Italian peninsula, to join a column of [illegible] hundred thousand Austrians operating in Lombardy; a mass to the east,

* There is a copy of these memorials extant in France.

consisting of two grand Austrian and Russian armies, marching by the valley of the Danube towards Suabia and Switzerland; finally, a mass to the north, consisting of Russians, Prussians, Swedes, and Danes, proceeding straight from north to south upon the Rhine. These three grand masses of troops were to act independently of each other, in order to avoid the inconveniences of coalitions, which strive in vain to produce an impracticable concert. Each of the three was to act as an army having to think only of its own safety and its own action. It was by endeavouring to combine their movements that the archduke Charles and Suwarrow produced the disaster of Zurich.

The three masses of troops being thus composed, proceedings would be taken in the name of a general congress, representing the *Mediatory Alliance*. To France conditions would be offered compatible with her existing grandeur; conditions to which the consent of England would be preliminarily obtained, and war would not be resorted to, except in the case of a refusal. The bases treated upon would be these: the treaties of Lunéville and Amiens, but, those treaties as expounded by Europe. Assuredly a high idea may be formed of our power at that period, merely by looking at the plans elaborated by our jealous enemies.

France would be allowed to keep the Alps and the Rhine; that is to say, Savoy, Geneva, the Rhenish provinces, Mayence, Cologne, Luxembourg, and Belgium. Piedmont would be restored. The new state created in Italy would not be destroyed in order to give the fragments to Austria, but would be employed to construct an independent Italy. With that view, Austria would be required even to give up Venice. Switzerland, preserving the organisation bestowed upon it by Napoleon, would be closed against the French troops, and declared perpetually neutral. It would be the same with Holland. In a word, France, maintained in her grand limits of the Alps and the Rhine, would be obliged to evacuate all Italy, Switzerland, and Holland, not to mention Hanover, which, the war over, could not longer be occupied.

In return for these concessions demanded from France, England would be compelled to give up Malta, to restore the colonies which she had seized upon, and even to aid the French in another enterprise against St. Domingo, for Europe was interested in seeing that magnificent country wrested from the barbarism of the revolted negroes. England would also be obliged to agree with all the nations upon an equitable maritime code. As the last condition, all the courts were to acknowledge Napoleon Emperor of the French.

Undoubtedly, if Russia had been strong enough to make Austria consent to the independence of Italy, and England to the freedom of the seas, Napoleon would have been very blameable for refusing the proposed conditions! But, far from abandoning Venice to those benevolent organisers of a new Europe,

Austria was eager to regain possession of Milan, and to extend her frontier into Suabia; and England was determined to keep possession of Malta, and not to recognise the rights of the neutrals. If, then, Napoleon was bent, as doubtless he was, upon keeping Piedmont, Switzerland, and Holland, in order to turn to his own advantage those countries which his enemies desired to combine against him, we certainly may excuse his ambition in the face of that of all the other governments of Europe.

This plan, conceived, in the first instance, sincerely and with generous intentions, had been wholly equitable if wholly accepted by all parties. But it was to be a pretext in the hands of a hypocritical coalition for urging France to a refusal which would rouse the whole power of Europe once more against her. The facts will speedily prove this.

Supposing France to refuse, which was probable, military measures were to be employed against her. In that case it would be requisite rather to conceal than to publish the intention of changing her government, to spare her pride, re-assure the holders of national property, promise to the military the preservation of their ranks (all of which was done in 1814) and, if the weariness of a warlike and agitated government should turn the public mind of France towards the old dynasty, then, but then only to think of restoring it, because that dynasty, owing its restoration to Europe, would be more easily reconciled than the Bonaparte family with the remnant of a kingdom left to it.

The war might have various results. If it were only half successful, Italy and Belgium would be taken from France, if it were completely successful, France would also be deprived of the Rhenish provinces, that is to say, of the territory lying between the Meuse and the Rhine. Still, it was necessary to bear in mind the error committed against Louis XIV., and beware of imitating the lofty proceedings of the Pensionnary Heinsius, for if France were too sternly treated she would never remain at rest. It was necessary, then, to leave her some of her existing conquests, by drawing a line from Luxembourg to Mayence, and conceding to her, besides the fortress of Mayence, what is called Rhenish Bavaria. It is evident that the plans of this policy not having yet been modified by Mr. Pitt, did not bear the imprint of passionate hate which marked those which prevailed ten years later.

On the double hypothesis of a war more or less fortunate, Europe was to be distributed in the following manner:

It was before all things necessary to guard against that French nation that was endowed with *such dangerous talents*, and was of so enterprising a turn. For this purpose it was necessary to surround her with powerful states capable of protecting themselves. It was, in the first place, requisite to strengthen Holland, and for this purpose to give her Belgium, to make of the two countries what was called *the kingdom of the two Belgiums*, which should be given to the house of Orange, which had suffered so severely

from the consequences of the French Revolution. Prussia would be maintained as she was on the Rhine; perhaps she would have restored to her the small provinces that she had ceded to the French Republic, such as the duchies of Cleves and Gueldres, and, as far as possible, she would be established in Westphalia, around Holland, to separate her from all contact with France. Nevertheless, in accordance with the principle of disinterestedness that was imposed upon the great courts, a principle without which Europe could not be established upon a durable footing, but little would be given to Prussia, in order that there might be means of giving a fitting organisation to Germany and Italy. After creating the kingdom of the two Belgiums on the north of France, they would create to the south and east the kingdom of Piedmont, under the name of the *Subalpine Kingdom*. This crown would be adjudged to the then dethroned house of Savoy, which had suffered even more than the house of Orange for the common cause of kings. Savoy would not be restored to it, but it would be put in possession of all Piedmont, all Lombardy, and even the Venetian state, taken with this object from Austria, which was to receive compensation as specified hereafter. Finally, to this vast territory Genoa was to be added. This *Subalpine Kingdom*, thus forming the most considerable state in Italy, would be capable of holding the balance between France and Austria, and of serving at a future time as the foundation of Italian independence.

Italy, that splendid and interesting country, was to be separately constituted, and to enjoy that independent existence so much and so vainly desired by her. To consolidate her into one single nation was for the time impracticable. She was to be composed of several states united by a federal bond, a sufficiently strong bond to render common action at once prompt and easy. Besides the *Subalpine Kingdom*, comprising all upper Italy, from the Maritime Alps to the Julian Alps, and having two ports, such as Venice and Genoa, there would be the kingdom of the two Sicilies preserved within its existing limits, which would be placed at the other extremity of the Peninsula; at the centre would be the Pope, with the Legations restored to him, enjoying a perpetual neutrality, and, like the elector of Mayence in the Germanic body, performing the duties of chancellor of the Confederation; also at the centre would be the kingdom of Etruria, left to Spain; and then either between these or at the extremities, the Republic of Lucca, the Order of Malta, the Republic of Ragusa, and the Ionian Islands. This Italian body, in its federative organisation, would have a head like the Germanic body, but not like him elective. The king of Piedmont and the king of the two Sicilies were alternately to enjoy that dignity.

Here, undoubtedly, was a grand and a skilful combination, for which France ought to have imposed some sacrifices upon her-

self, if the young heads that governed Russia had been capable of seriously and resolutely carrying out any scheme truly great.

Savoy, taken from the crown of Sardinia, was not to be given up to France, but, together with the Valteline and the Grisons, converted into a Swiss canton. Switzerland, divided into cantons, was to be joined to Germany, as one of the confederated states.

The Germanic empire was to be absolutely modelled anew. It had been alternately oppressed by Austria and Prussia, who had striven with each other for preponderance. Those two powers would be excluded from the confederation, in which they played only the part of ambitious party leaders. The Germanic body thus left to itself, diminished by these two great members, but increased by the kingdom of the two Belgiums and by Switzerland, freed from all mischievous influence, and having only the interests of Germany in view, would no longer be dragged in its own despite into wars, unjust in themselves, or hostile to its real interests. The crown was to cease to be elective in Germany. The principal States of the Confederation would in succession have the supreme power, as it was proposed for Italy. By means of new territorial delimitations, Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, were to be strengthened. The mischievous quarrel between Bavaria and Austria would be terminated, by giving the frontier of the Inn to the latter.

The three great states of the Continent, France, Prussia, and Austria, would thus be separated from each other by three great independent confederations:—the Germanic confederation, the Swiss confederation, and the Italian confederation, extending themselves from the Zuyder Zee to the Adriatic.

Even supposing these combinations correct and practicable, we cannot refrain from pointing out, that to cut off Prussia and Austria from the Germanic body, was not to enfranchise Germany, for those two powers, remaining excluded, would have acted towards Germany as absolute states adjoining a free state; as Frederick and Catherine had acted towards Poland; they would have convulsed and divided it; instead of seeking to influence it, they would have tried to conquer it. The true independence of Germany consisted, then, in a strong organisation of the Diet, and in an equitable division of votes between Austria and Prussia, in such wise, that the confederation could hold the balance between them. Add to this, such European arrangements, as should not render Prussia the natural enemy of France (as was done in 1815, by giving the former the Provinces of the Rhine) and the two German powers remaining rivals, but kept in equilibrium by the Diet, Germany would have been free; that is to say, capable of making her interests and resolutions coincide.

The suppression of the election to the imperial crown, would not, as it seems to us, have been a whit more useful. Although

for two centuries that crown had not gone out of the house of Austria, the election, nevertheless, was a dependent tie, which put that house under obligations to the states of Germany. Now it is sometimes useful to render the great dependent upon the little, when anarchy is not the consequence. Germany, constituted as she had been in 1803, by Napoleon, with some votes given to the Catholics, to re-establish the balance that had been too much disturbed at the expense of Austria, would, in our opinion, have presented a better and more natural arrangement than that which was conceived by the authors of the new European organisation.

Although disinterestedness was the fundamental principle of the proposed plan, that disinterestedness could readily go so far as not to acquire aught, and to content itself with a better arrangement of Europe, as the sole indemnity for the costs of war, but it could not go so far as actual loss. It was necessary, therefore, to indemnify Austria for the required cession of the state of Venice. In consequence, it was proposed to give her Moldavia and Wallachia, to extend her thus to the Black Sea, and secure her against the danger of seeing herself, at a future time hemmed in by Russia.

The Ottoman Empire was to be maintained, such as it was, with the exception of some restrictions, which will be hereafter mentioned.

There still remained the north to be arranged. In that quarter a great deal was to be done, according to the singular organizer of Europe, who carved out so freely the map of the world. Prussia and Russia were separated by an ill-chosen frontier. Poland was divided between these two powers. In the judgment of the abbé Piatoli, in that of the young men whom he inspired with his policy, and especially in that of prince Czartoryski, and, finally, in the judgment even of Alexander, the partition of Poland was a great crime. Alexander, in fact, in unoccupied and oppressed youth, during the life of Paul, had often, in the outpourings of his confidence, declared that the partition of Poland was a crime of his predecessors which he should be happy to repair. But how reconstruct that Poland? How replace her, erect and isolated, between the rival states which had destroyed her? There existed one means, it was to reconstruct her entirely, to restore her all the parts of which she was formerly composed, and then to give her to the emperor of Russia, who would bestow independent institutions upon her, in such wise that Poland, intended in the ancient ideas of Europe to serve as a barrier to Germany against Russia, would now serve as a barrier, or rather an advanced post, of Russia against Germany.

Such was the dream of these young politicians, such was the ambition with which they imbued Alexander! That grand indignation against the crime of the preceding century, that

noble disinterestedness imposed upon all the courts, for the purpose of restraining the ambition of France, was to end in reconstructing Poland for the purpose of giving her to Russia! It is not the first time that beneath displays of virtue, ostentatiously claiming the esteem of the world, towering ambition and consummate vanity have been concealed. This court of Russia which at that time pushed to the utmost extent its affectation of justice and disinterestedness, and which pretended to lecture England and France, was in secret dreaming of the possession of Poland! However, amidst these projects, there was a sentiment to which we must pay due honour. It was that of the prince Czartoryski, who, seeing no immediate possibility of re-establishing Poland, solely by Polish hands, was willing, for want of others, to use Russian hands. He, at least, had a legitimate object. He was open to reproach only upon one point, which was often perceived by the Russians, and more than once denounced to the emperor Alexander, namely, that the prince Czartoryski was less zealous for the interests of Russia than for those of his native country, and was thus led to urge his master into an imprudent war. The abbé Piatoli, long attached to Poland, partook of all those ideas. It was difficult, however, to propose to this *Mediatory Alliance*, founded upon the principle of disinterestedness—it was difficult to propose to it the abandonment of Poland to Russia; still there were means of attaining the end. Prussia, strongly attached to the peace, and the profits of neutrality, would probably not give her adhesion. Then, to punish her for her refusal, she would be attacked, deprived of Warsaw, and the Vistula, and with those vast portions of ancient Poland, added to those which Russia already possessed, that new Poland would be founded, of which Alexander would be the king and the legislator.

To these ideas were added some others, accessory to the plan, some of them whimsical, and others just and generous.

England was to be compelled to restore Malta to the order. Russia would give up Corfu, which would thenceforth be reckoned among the Ionian islands. England had conquered India, which there was no choice but to leave to her; but Egypt could be made immensely serviceable to the civilisation of the world, to general commerce, and to the balance of naval power. It would be taken from the Porte, and given to France, that the latter might undertake the task of civilising it. It would be formed into an eastern kingdom, subject to France. The Bourbons would reign there, if, on the return of peace, Napoleon were to be kept on the throne of France; and Napoleon, if the Bourbons were restored. The Barbary States were to be restored to the Porte, and that power would even be assisted in reconquering them, that their piracy, which was a barbarism disgraceful to Europe, might be suppressed. Finally, there were certain possessions contrary to the nature of things, although

consecrated by time and conquest, which it would be both wise and humane to put an end to. For instance, Gibraltar enabled the English to keep up a system of smuggling in Spain, at once shameful and demoralising to that country; the islands of Jersey and Guernsey assisted the English in stirring up civil war in France; Memel, in the possession of Prussia, was to the Russian territory a sort of Gibraltar for the purposes of smuggling. If possible, it was requisite to induce, by means of compensations, the possessors to renounce posts of which so reprehensible a use was made.

Spain and Portugal were to be reconciled and united by a federal tie, which should protect them from the French influence on the one hand, and from the English influence on the other. It was requisite that England should be obliged to redress the wrongs she had inflicted on Spain, and constrained to restore the captured galleons; by this course Spain, which demanded nothing better, would be wrested from the tyranny of France.

To complete this grand work of European reorganisation, the emperor of Russia was to address himself to all the learned men of Europe, to demand from them a code of the laws of nations, including a new maritime law. It was urged that it was inhuman and barbarous, that a nation should declare war without having previously submitted the cause of dispute to a neighbouring and disinterested State; and it was especially so, that one nation should commence hostilities against another, without a previous declaration of war, as England had lately done towards Spain, and that innocent merchants should thus find themselves ruined, or deprived of their property, by a sort of ambush. It was also intolerable that neutral nations should be made victims of the fury of powerful rivals, and could not cross the seas without being exposed to the consequences of a quarrel in which they had no part. The honour of the grand reforming court demanded that all these evils should be provided against by international laws.

It was by this mixture of heterogeneous ideas, some lofty, others merely ambitious, these wise, those chimerical, that ardour was communicated to the heart and the head of this young, mercurial, and sprightly emperor, who was as vain of his honest, but fugitive intentions, as one should be of long-practised virtues. He believed himself really called upon to regenerate Europe; and if he sometimes awakened from his splendid dreams, it was when he thought of the great man who ruled the West, and who was not of a temper to tolerate any regeneration without his aid or against his policy. Those who had the opportunity of closely observing Alexander, plainly perceived that his heart failed him, when he perceived war with Napoleon to be the probable final consequence of all his plans.

This strange conception would not have merited the honour of being introduced at such length, any more than the thousand

and one projects with which schemers often pester those courts which have the weakness to listen to them, if it had not captivated the good-will of Alexander and his friends, and if, which is still more important, it had not become the text of all the succeeding negotiations, and served, at last, as the basis of the treaties of 1815.

One thing is worthy of remark. This epoch of the French Revolution is reproached with having promised, and not given, liberty, independence, and happiness, to the nations, and having thus been guilty of breach of promise to humanity. Now, observe absolute power at work. Young men of ability, some of them honest and sincere, others merely ambitious, all reared in the school of the philosophers, united by their birth and the uniformity of their tastes, and surrounding the inheritor of the mightiest despotic empire upon the face of the earth, were possessed with the idea of rivalling the French Revolution, as respected generous and popular intentions. That Revolution which, according to them, had not even procured liberty for France, as it had given her a master, and which had given nothing to other nations but a humiliating dependence upon the French Empire, that Revolution they resolved to confound, by opposing to it a European regeneration, founded upon an equitable distribution of territories, and upon a new law of nations. There was to be an independent Italy, a free Germany, and a reconstructed Poland. Each great power was to be restrained by efficient counterpoises. France herself was to be not humiliated, but merely brought back to respect the rights of others. The abuses of war would disappear alike from sea and land; piracy would be abolished; the ancient road of commerce would be re-established by Egypt; and finally, science would be called upon to remodel the public law of nations. All this was not merely laid down by some vulgar scribbler of memorials, but seriously proposed to all the courts of Europe, and discussed with the least chimerical of men, with Mr. Pitt! We know now, we who are forty years older, what has been the upshot of all those philanthropic views of absolute power. The inventors of these plans, beaten and baffled, during ten years, by him whom they wished to destroy, but at length conquerors in 1815, have made neither a code of the laws of nations, nor a code of maritime laws; they have freed neither Italy, nor Germany, nor Poland. The English have not been deprived of Malta nor of Gibraltar; and the territorial boundaries of Europe, traced according to temporary interests, and without any view to the future, are the least prudent that can be imagined.

However, let us not anticipate the sequel of this history. To describe how all those ideas became common to Alexander and his young friends, would be useless. What is certain, is, that both he and they were fully possessed with those ideas, and with the desire to make them the basis of the Russian policy.

Prince Czartorvski, seeing in this system a chance of reconstruction for Poland, was most ardently desirous of having it carried into execution. The prince, since the retirement of M. de Woronzoff, had become, from a mere assistant in the Foreign Office, the directing minister of that department. Messrs. de Nowosiltzoff and de Strogonoff, subalterns, one in the Department of Justice, and the other in the Home Department, devoted their energies to far other matters than those of their ostensible employments; they, with their young colleague and the emperor, employed themselves in poising the world upon new bases. It was agreed that the most dexterous among them, M. de Nowosiltzoff, should be sent to London to confer with Mr. Pitt, and procure his assent to the projects of the court of Russia. It was necessary to bring round the ambitious British cabinet, and render acceptable the disinterested views of the project, in order to found the *Mediatory Alliance*, and, in the name of that alliance, to speak to France in such a manner as to secure attention. A cousin of M. de Strogonoff set out for Madrid, with the double view of reconciling England and Spain, and of binding Spain and Portugal, together by indissoluble bonds. It was decided that M. de Strogonoff should proceed to London, before going to Madrid, in order to commence in that capital his conciliatory mission. In the judgment of all Europe, the procedure of the British government against the Spanish shipping had been unjust and odious. That government was to be told that if it did not exhibit more moderation it would be left alone to contend with France, and that Russia, with all the continental powers, would observe a neutrality which would be fatal to Great Britain.

The two young Russians who were charged to present the policy of their cabinet for acceptance abroad, set out for London at the close of 1804. M. de Nowosiltzoff was presented at the court of St. James's by the ambassador Woronzoff, brother of the retired chancellor, and was received with distinction and attention well calculated to affect a young statesman admitted, for the first time, to the honour of treating upon the affairs of Europe. Roughness and haughtiness, rather than astuteness, usually characterise English diplomatists. Nevertheless, lord Harrowby, and especially Mr. Pitt, with whom the Russian envoy entered into direct conference, could soon discover with what sort of minds they had to do, and conducted themselves accordingly. The veteran Pitt, a veteran still more by the part he played than by age, rendered flexible by danger, lofty as he was, was too happy to regain the alliance of the Continent, to show himself unaccommodating. He was complaisant, as it was necessary to be towards inexperienced young men nurtured in chimeras. He listened to the singular proposals of the Russian cabinet, and appeared to receive them with great consideration, but modified them to suit his own policy, abstaining from refusal, and confining him-

self to postponing till the general peace, those points which were incompatible with the interests of English policy. He had the proposals of the Russian envoy delivered to him, and added his own observations.* At first, Mr. Pitt tolerated even the reproofs of the young Russian envoy; he allowed himself to be reproached with the ambition of England, with the harshness of her proceedings, and with her encroaching system, which served as a pretext for the encroaching system of France. He allowed himself to be told, that in order to form a new alliance it was necessary to found it upon a grand disinterestedness on the part of all the contracting powers. The head of the British cabinet became animated on this subject, much approved of the ideas of Alexander's ambassador, and declared that, in fact, it was necessary to display the most perfect freedom from all personal views, if the mask was to be torn away that covered the ambition of France; that it was indispensably necessary that the allies should not appear to think of themselves, but only of the enfranchisement of Europe, oppressed by a barbarous and tyrannical power. The gravity of men, and the gravity of the interests which they treat, does not prevent them from frequently presenting a very puerile spectacle! Was there not something, in fact, truly puerile in the sight of these diplomatists, representatives of ambitious nations which for centuries have agitated the world, reproaching France with her insatiable greediness? As if the English minister wanted in this instance aught less than Malta, the Indies, and the empire of the seas! As if the Russian minister really aimed at aught less than Poland, and a dominant influence on the Continent! How pitiable to hear the heads of States addressing such reproaches to each other! No doubt, Napoleon was far too ambitious for his own interest, and still more so for ours; but Napoleon considered, if we may so speak, in his moral position—Napoleon, was he aught else than the re-action of the French power against the encroachments of the European courts in the last century, against the partition of Poland, and the conquest of India? Ambition is the vice or the virtue of all nations—vice, when it agitates the world without benefitting it; virtue, when it civilises while agitating it. Thus considered, the ambition of which the nations have still the least reason to complain is that of France, for there is not a country which has been traversed by her armies, which France has not left ameliorated and enlightened.

It was agreed, then, between Mr. Pitt and M. de Nowosiltzoff, that the new alliance should lay great and public stress upon its disinterestedness, in order to make more than ever evident the insatiable cupidity of the Emperor of the French. While admitting that it would be very important to disembarrass

* I have myself perused the minutes of these conferences, of which a copy is extant in France.

Europe of that redoubtable personage, it was, nevertheless, agreed that it would be imprudent to announce the intention of imposing a new government upon France. It was necessary to wait till the nation should declare itself, to second it to the utmost should it show a disposition to shake off the yoke of the imperial government, and especially to take great pains to assure the heads of the army of the preservation of their rank, and the holders of national property, of that property being preserved to them. All the proclamations addressed to the French nation were to abound in the most tranquillising assurances on these points. So important did Mr. Pitt consider this precaution, that he even stated himself to be ready to make, from the funds of England, *a provision* (his own words) to indemnify the emigrants who surrounded the Bourbons, and thus deprive them of any motive for alarming the holders of the national property. Mr. Pitt, then, thought of the famous indemnity to the emigrants, twenty years before it was voted by the Parliament of France. In wishing to render such pretensions disinterested, he assuredly knew not what he undertook; but in showing himself disposed to try it, at the expense of the British treasury, he proved the immense importance which England attached to the downfall of Napoleon, who had become so menacing towards her.

The idea of assembling an imposing mass of forces, in whose name the Mediatory Alliance could treat, previous to fighting, was naturally admitted by Mr. Pitt with extreme readiness. He consented to the mockery of a preliminary negotiation, well knowing that it would lead to no result, and that the pride of Napoleon would never be reconciled to the conditions proposed. The latter could, on no account, suffer that, without him, or against him, Italy, Switzerland, and Holland should be organized, under the specious pretext of their independence. Mr. Pitt, therefore, allowed the young rulers of Russia to fancy that they were labouring for a grand mediation, because he was well convinced that they were simply and merely progressing towards a third coalition. As regarded the distribution of the forces, he opposed certain parts of the project. He agreed readily enough to three grand masses; one to the south, composed of Russians, Neapolitans, and English; another to the east, composed of Russians and Austrians; and one to the north, composed of Prussians, Russians, Swedes, Hanoverians, and English. But he declared that he could not, on the instant, supply a single Englishman. He maintained, that in keeping them upon the coasts of England, constantly ready to embark, a very important result would be produced, that of threatening the sea-board of France on all points at once; which signified that, living in constant terror of the expedition prepared at Boulogne, the British government was unwilling to send troops from its own territory; which, after all, was natural enough. Mr. Pitt pro-

mised subsidies, but not nearly to the amount asked; he offered six millions sterling. He insisted upon one point, to which it seemed to him that the authors of the Russian project had by no means attached sufficient importance; the concurrence of Prussia. Without her, all seemed to him to be difficult, even impossible. To him it seemed requisite to have the concurrence of all Europe, in order to destroy Napoleon. He approved of attacking Prussia, if she could not be persuaded to give her adhesion, for Russia would thus permanently ally herself to English policy; he offered even, in that case, to send to St. Petersburgh the portion of the subsidy intended for Prussia; but he considered this a matter of grave importance, and that the most advantageous proposals should be made to the cabinet of Berlin, in order to seduce it. "Do not imagine," said he to M. de Nowosiltzoff, "that I am at all favourable to that hypocritical, astute, and greedy cabinet, which now asks from Napoleon, and even from Europe, the price of its perfidies. No. But upon that cabinet depends the fate of the present, and even of the future. Prussia, jealous of Austria, and fearing Russia, will always have a leaning to France. We must detach her from that country, or she will never cease to be the accomplice of our irreconcileable enemy. With reference to her alone, you must depart from your ideas of disinterestedness; we must give her more than Napoleon can offer; something, especially, which will irrevocably embroil her with France." Mr. Pitt, then, aided by hate, which sometimes enlightens, if it sometimes blindfolds—Mr. Pitt proposed a modification of the Russian plan, as fatal for Germany as for France. He confessed that it was a luminous and profound idea, that of surrounding our soil with kingdoms able to resist us, a kingdom of the two Belgiums, and a Subalpine kingdom; the one for the house of Orange, protected by England; the other for the house of Savoy, protected by Russia. But he thought that the precaution was insufficient. He desired that, instead of separating Prussia and France by the Rhine, they, on the contrary, should be placed in immediate contact; and he proposed that if Prussia pronounced for the Coalition, she should receive all the country enclosed between the Meuse, the Moselle, and the Rhine, which we now call the Rhenish provinces. This appeared to him to be indispensable, if it were desired, for the future, to withdraw Prussia from her interested neutrality, and her leaning to Napoleon, in whom she had incessantly sought and found a support against Russia. This project was extended in 1815, when, besides Prussia, Bavaria was placed upon the Rhine, in order to deprive us of all our ancient allies in Germany. When Germany shall some day need support against the dangers which will threaten her from the north, she will appreciate the services rendered to her by those who have studied to create causes of dispute between her and France.

From these conferences there sprang a new idea, destined to complete the creation of a kingdom of the two Belgiums: it was to construct a chain of fortresses, like those which Vauban formerly planned to cover France, in that country without frontiers, and to construct those fortresses at the expense of the alliance.

As regarded Germany and Italy, the English minister showed how impossible it was to execute these vast projects immediately; how they would offend the two powers who were most needed, Prussia and Austria. Neither one nor the other would consent to quit the German confederation: Prussia, in particular, would not agree to the crown of Germany being made hereditary; Austria would oppose a constitution for Italy that would exclude her from that country. Of the project as to Italy, Mr. Pitt only admitted the constitution of the kingdom of Piedmont. He wished Savoy to be added to all which the Russian project already bestowed upon Piedmont.

Finally, scarcely any mention was made of Poland: all that portion of the project rested on the supposition of war with Prussia, and that Mr. Pitt was especially anxious to avoid. The Russian diplomatist who was imbued with such generous ideas when he quitted St. Petersburg, dared not even make mention of Egypt, Gibraltar, Memel—in a word, of that which was loftiest in the original project. Upon two very important subjects Mr. Pitt was by no means favourable, that is to say, he was almost negative—we mean Malta and the maritime law. As regarded Malta, Mr. Pitt peremptorily declined the discussion, and postponed all explanations on that point till it should be known what sacrifices France was inclined to make. As regarded the new law of nations, he said that it would be necessary to refer that work, a moral but somewhat impracticable one, to a congress which would assemble after the war to conclude a peace, in which all the interests of the nations would be equitably weighed. The idea of a new law of nations seemed to him to be a very admirable one, but difficult of realisation, for various populations do not easily adopt uniform dispositions, and observe them still less readily when they have adopted them. However, he had no objection to allowing these matters to be treated in the congress, which at a future time would settle the conditions of a general peace.

These conferences ended with a singular explanation. The object of it was the East and Constantinople. Very recently, by her policy in Georgia, and by her connexions with the insurgents of the Danube, Russia had given some umbrage to England, and provoked a note from her, in which the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire were already professed as principles of the European policy. "That is not the way to proceed in order to produce confidence between allies," said M. de Nowosiltzoff to Mr. Pitt. "My master is the noblest and

most generous of men; it is sufficient to trust to his honour. But to endeavour to stop him by menaces, or only by insinuations, is uselessly to affront him. He will be rather excited than restrained by such means." In reply, Mr. Pitt made many apologies for having shown suspicions so ill-founded, which, however, were natural previous to the establishment of that full mutual confidence, though, of course, in the intimate connexion which was about to be established they, for the future, would be quite impossible. "Moreover," added M. de Nowosiltzoff, "what inconvenience would there be in Constantinople belonging to a civilising people like the Russians, instead of belonging to a barbarous people like the Turks? Would not your commerce in the Black Sea be greatly improved by it? No doubt, were the East subjected to this ever-encroaching France, there would be a real danger, but to Russia there would be no danger." Mr. Pitt* replied, "That assuredly these considerations had great importance in his view; that, as far as he was concerned, he had no prejudice upon this subject, and could not see the great danger if Constantinople should fall to Russia; but that it was a prejudice of his nation, which he must avoid offending, and that it was essentially necessary to avoid touching upon such a subject at that period."

Relatively to Spain, M. de Strogonoff obtained nothing, or next to nothing. She gave up all her resources to France, argued the British cabinet, and to serve or gratify her would be merely to be her dupe. However, if she would declare against France, her galleons would be restored to her.

M. de Strogonoff set out for Madrid, and M. de Nowosiltzoff for St. Petersburg. It was agreed that Lord Gower, since Lord Granville, ambassador from England to St. Petersburg, should be furnished with detailed powers to conclude a treaty upon the bases agreed upon by the two courts.

The Russian plan had only undergone a few days' elaboration at London, and it returned divested of every thing generous, and also of whatever was impracticable, that it had contained. It was reduced to a destructive project against France. No more mention of independent Italy, independent Germany, or independent Poland! The kingdom of Piedmont, the kingdom of the two Belgiums, with a profoundly inimical idea, Prussia upon the Rhine; the restitution of Malta evaded, the new law of nations postponed for a future congress; finally, previous to the commencement of hostilities, a pretence of negotiation, a very vain pretence, for general and immediate war was at the very heart of the proceedings—such was all that remained of the boastful project of European reconstitution, the production of a sort of fermentation of mind in the young heads which governed Russia. The negotiation was, however, opened at St. Petersburg by

* These details are contained in a very curious letter of M. de Nowosiltzoff to his cabinet.

Lord Gower upon the points agreed upon at London between Mr. Pitt and M. de Nowosiltzoff.

While this sort of league was being formed with England, it was necessary to undertake a similar labour with Austria and Prussia, to draw them into the new coalition. Prussia, who had engaged with Russia to declare war if the French should go beyond Hanover, but who, at the same time, had promised France to remain unalterably neutral if the number of French in Germany were not augmented—Prussia would not quit that perilous equilibrium. She affected not to understand Russia, and entrenched herself in her old system, become proverbial, *of the neutrality of the north of Germany.* This manner of evading the question was the more facile to her, because, from fear of seeing the secrets of the new coalition divulged to Napoleon, the Russian diplomatists dared not openly explain. The cabinet of Berlin, from its hesitations, had got such a reputation for duplicity, that it was thought impossible to entrust it with a secret which it would not immediately communicate to France. Nothing, therefore, was said to that cabinet about the project sent to London, and the subsequent and consequent negotiation, but Prussia was daily reminded of new encroachments by Napoleon, especially the conversion of the Italian Republic into a kingdom, which, it was argued, amounted to an annexation of Lombardy to France, equal to the annexation of Piedmont. The most gigantic plans were announced. It was reported that Napoleon was about to convert Parma, Piacenza, Naples, and, finally, Spain herself, into kingdoms for his family; that Holland would very soon share the same fate; that Switzerland would be incorporated, under the pretext of rectifying the French frontiers; that cardinal Fesch would soon be raised to the papacy; that it was necessary to save Europe, which was threatened with a universal domination; that the courts which should persist in want of forethought would be the cause of the general ruin, and would at length be themselves involved in it. Well knowing that the rivalry of Austria and Prussia was the principal cause of the latter inclining to France, an endeavour was made to reconcile the rivals. Prussia was asked to fix her pretensions, and to make them known; she was told that an endeavour would be made to draw from Austria an avowal of her pretensions, and to reconcile the pretensions of both parties by a definitive arbitration. It was announced that, in consideration of some addition to the Catholic votes in the College of Princes, an unimportant concession, Austria would be permanently contented with the recess of 1803, and would consecrate, by her irrevocable adhesion, the new arrangements by which Prussia had so largely profited. It was even insinuated that if, unfortunately, a struggle should become inevitable, Prussia would be largely indemnified for the risks of the war. However, it was not avowed that a coalition was on the point of being formed, still less that its basis was agreed upon;

only the wish seemed to be expressed, that Prussia would unite herself to the rest of Europe to guarantee the equilibrium of the nations, which was seriously threatened.

In order to get into closer communication with the court of Prussia, a Russian general was sent to it, an officer of the staff, well acquainted with what was in agitation, M. de Vinzingerode, who was to explain matters by degrees to the king, but to the king alone, and who, being acquainted with the military plan, could, if he succeeded in obtaining his majesty's attention, propose the means of execution, and regulate the whole future warfare and its details. M. de Vinzingerode arrived at the close of the winter of 1804, at the time when Napoleon was preparing to set out for Italy; the general observed a great reserve towards the Prussian cabinet, but was somewhat more communicative with the king, and, invoking the friendship which had commenced between the two sovereigns at Memel, endeavoured to win this prince in the name of that friendship, and of the common cause of kings. The young Frederick William, finding himself closely pressed, and comprehending at length what was in question, dwelt upon his personal affection for Alexander, and his warm sympathies in the cause of Europe, but objected that he was the first who would be exposed to the attacks of Napoleon; that he did not believe himself able to resist so powerful an adversary; that the aid for which he was led to hope had so far to come that it must needs be tardy, and that he should probably be vanquished before aid arrived. He also pointed out the danger of acting on the suggestions of England, and even proposed, in order to prevent a general war, of which he was greatly in dread, to mediate between Russia and France.

In this delicate state of things, the king had called for the advice of M. de Haugwitz, who had for some time retired to his estates in Silesia, and found in his opinions a new encouragement to his ambiguous and pacific policy. If it had been necessary, however, to take a positive resolution, M. d'Haugwitz would rather have inclined to France. M. de Hardenberg, who had succeeded him, would rather have inclined to Russia, but this latter was ready, he said, to determine in favour of France, as soon as to determine in favour of Russia, provided only that some positive course were determined upon. With less talent, tact, and prudence than M. d'Haugwitz, he was fond of censuring that statesman's tergiversations, and, in order to distinguish himself from his predecessor, professed a liking for decided measures. It was requisite, in his view of affairs, to side with France, if it were thought useful to do so, and to embrace her cause, but in that case to secure the advantages and reap the reward of a decided support. In this he was less agreeable to the king than M. d'Haugwitz, who allowed that prince to enjoy the pleasure of indecision; and already there arose

between M. d'Haugwitz and M. de Hardenberg that discrepancy of language by which quarrels between rival ministers are preceded, whether in despotic courts or in free states.

The king, in acknowledgment of the mission of M. de Vinzingerode, determined to send a confidential agent to St. Petersburg, and despatched M. de Zastrow, with the mission of explaining to the emperor Alexander the position of the king, to reconcile him to his reserved conduct, and, if possible, to become better acquainted with the still hidden secret of the new coalition. While he despatched M. de Zastrow to hold this language at St. Petersburgh, Frederick William claimed credit of Napoleon for the resistance he had made to the suggestions of Russia; he spoke of the neutrality of the north of Germany, not as of a real neutrality, as it really was, but as of a positive alliance, which to the north covered France against all the enemies whom she could have to combat; further, this prince offered Napoleon, as he had already offered Russia, to play the part of a conciliator.

M. de Vinzingerode, after having prolonged his stay at Berlin until he had rendered himself unwelcome to the court, which feared to be compromised by the prolonged presence of a Russian agent, repaired to Vienna, where the same efforts were made as at Berlin. With Austria there was not so much dissimulation required as with Prussia. None at all, indeed, was needed with the former. Austria was full of hatred towards Napoleon, and ardently desired the expulsion of the French from Italy. With her it was not necessary, as with the king of Prussia, to conceal the truth under specious professions of disinterestedness. Here the plain truth and the real object might be avowed, for Austria desired what was desired at St. Petersburg; true, she indulged in none of the illusions of youth, and disdained false sentimentality, which fell short of her veteran experience. Moreover, Austria could keep a secret. If, in appearance, she was infinitely anxious to show her complaisance towards France, and if towards Napoleon personally her language was constantly flattering, she, in her heart, nourished all the resentment of a balked ambition, constantly ill-treated for ten years. From the first, then, she had entered secretly into the passions of the Russian government, but, remembering her defeats, she had only with extreme prudence consented to enter the alliance, and had taken only conditional engagements of pure precaution. She had signed with Russia a secret convention, which was, as to the south of Europe, what the convention signed by Prussia was as to the north. She promised, in this convention, to abandon her inactive policy, if France, committing new usurpations in Italy, should extend further the occupation of the kingdom of Naples, then extending to the gulf of Taranto, make new incorporations, like that of Piedmont, or threaten Egypt or any part of the Turkish Empire. Three hundred and fifty

thousand Austrians were, in that case, to be her war contingent. She had the assurance, should fortune favour the arms of the coalitionists, of obtaining Italy to the Adda and the Po, the Milanese being thus reserved. She was also promised the restoration of the two archdukes to their ancient states of Tuscany and Modena; while she should have the then vacant territories of Salzburg and the Brisgau. The house of Savoy was to receive large possessions in Italy, consisting of the Milanese, Piedmont, and Genoa. Here, then, was the upshot of the Russian scheme: at Vienna, as at London, there remained no portion of it but what was hostile to France and advantageous to the coalitionists. Austria desired and obtained, that this convention*, should be buried in the most profound secrecy, that she;

* This convention is dated 6th of November, 1804. We give the hitherto unpublished text of it, as we have given that of the convention with Prussia.

Declaration signed the 25*th of October, N. S.*, 1804:
6*th of November, O. S.*,

The preponderating influence exercised by the French government upon the circumjacent states, and the number of countries occupied by its troops, having inspired just anxieties for the maintenance of the general tranquillity and safety of Europe, his majesty the emperor of all the Russias shares with his majesty the Emperor-King the conviction that this state of things calls for their mutual and most serious solicitude, and renders it necessary that they should unite to that end by a close concert, adapted to the state of crisis and of danger to which Europe is exposed.

The undersigned having been furnished in consequence with instructions and powers for negociating and treating with the plenipotentiary of his majesty the Emperor-King, for the attainment of this salutary object, and having mutually communicated their full powers, found in due form, have agreed with the said plenipotentiary upon the stipulations contained in the following articles:—

Article I.—His majesty the emperor of all the Russias promises and engages himself to establish, in consideration of the crisis and danger above-mentioned, the closest concert with his majesty the Emperor-King, and the two monarchs, will be careful to give mutual notice and explanations of all negociations and agreements into which they shall think fit to enter with other powers, for the same object as that upon which they have agreed, and their measures in that respect will be so taken as in nowise to compromise the present engagement determined upon between them, until they shall mutually have agreed to its being made public.

Art. II.—His majesty the emperor of all the Russias, and his majesty the Emperor-King, will not neglect any opportunity or precaution to be in a condition efficiently to co-operate in the active measures judged necessary for preventing the dangers which may suddenly threaten the general safety.

Art. III.—If, in revenge for the opposition which the two imperial courts, in virtue of their mutual agreement, will offer to the ambitious views of France, one of them should be immediately attacked (the Russian troops presently stationed in the Seven Ionian Isles are included in the present stipulation), each of the two high contracting parties obliges himself, in the most formal manner, to put in motion, for the common defence, as speedily as possible, the forces enumerated hereafter in Article VIII.

Art. IV.—If it should happen that the French government, abusing the advantages procured to it by the position of its troops, which now occupy the territory of the empire of Germany, should invade the adjacent countries, of which the integrity and independence are essentially connected with the interests of

Austria, might not be prematurely compromised with Napoleon. Thus much justice must be done to Austria that at least she did not, like Prussia, make a display of pretended virtues. She pursued her interests steadily, sternly, and without pretence.

Russia, and that, consequently, being unable to look upon such an encroachment with an indifferent eye, his majesty the emperor of all the Russias should find himself obliged to march his troops thither, his majesty the Emperor-King will consider such proceedings on the part of France as an aggression which will impose upon him the obligation of placing himself, as speedily as possible, in a condition to furnish prompt succour, according to the stipulations of the present agreement.

Art. V.—His imperial majesty of all the Russias fully participates in the lively interest that his imperial and royal Apostolic Majesty takes in the maintenance of the Ottoman Porte, the vicinity of which is agreeable to both; and as an attack upon European Turkey, by any other power, cannot but compromise the safety of Russia and Austria, and as the Porte, in its present disturbed state, would not be able to repel with its own force an enterprise directed against it, on that supposition, and if war on that account should ensue directly between one of the two imperial courts and the French government, the other will immediately prepare to assist, as speedily as possible, the power at war, and to aid in concert towards the preservation of the Ottoman Porte, in its present integrity.

Art. VI.—As the fate of the kingdom of Naples must necessarily influence that of Italy, in the independence of which their imperial majesties take an especial interest, it is agreed that the stipulations of the present convention will have effect in the event of the French determining to carry their occupation of the kingdom of Naples, beyond their present lines; to seize upon the capital, or the fortresses of that country, or to penetrate into Calabria; in a word, if they shall force his majesty the king of Naples to peril his whole state, in resisting such encroachments upon it, and forcibly to oppose this new violation of his neutrality; and that if his imperial majesty the emperor of all the Russias, through the succour which, in such case, he will be bound to furnish to the king of the Two Sicilies, shall be engaged in a war against France, his imperial and royal majesty obliges himself to commence on his part the operations against the common enemy, in accordance with the stipulations herein contained, and with especial reference to Articles IV., V., VIII. and IX., of the present agreement.

Art. VII.—In consideration of the uncertainty in which the two high contracting powers up to the present moment remain, as to the future designs of the French government, they reserve it to themselves, beyond what is stipulated above, to agree, according to the urgency of the circumstances, upon the different cases which may also require the employment of their combined forces.

Art. VIII.—In all cases in which the two imperial courts resort to active measures, in virtue of the present agreement, or of those which hereafter may be made between them, they promise and engage to co-operate simultaneously and according to a plan which will immediately be agreed upon between them, with sufficient forces to combat the enemy with the probability of success, and of driving him back into his own territories, which forces will not be fewer than 350,000 men under arms for the two imperial courts; his imperial and royal majesty on his part will furnish 235,000 men, and the rest will be supplied by his imperial majesty the emperor of Russia. These troops will be embodied and constantly provided on both sides with every requisite, and there will further be a corps of observation left to secure the non-activity of the court of Berlin. The respective armies will be so distributed as shall prevent the forces of the two imperial courts, acting in concert, from being inferior in number to those of the enemy they will have to combat.

Art. IX.—In conformity with the desire manifested by the imperial royal court, his imperial majesty of all the Russias undertakes to use his good offices to obtain from the court of London for his imperial and royal Apostolic

She can be censured for nothing on the present occasion, but the falseness of her language at Paris.

At the same time, in signing this convention, she flattered herself that it would be but an act of simple precaution, for she

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Majesty, in the cases of war with France, set forth in the present declaration, or which may result from the future agreements, which by Article VII., the two imperial courts reserve the power of making, subsidies alike for the opening of the campaign, and annually for the whole duration of the war, which shall as far as possible, meet the expectations and wants of the court of Vienna.

Art. X.—In the execution of the plans determined upon, a just consideration will be paid to the obstacles arising, as well from the present state of the frontiers and forces of the Austrian monarchy, as from the imminent dangers to which she would, in that state, be exposed, by demonstrations and armaments, which would provoke immediately a premature invasion on the part of France. Consequently, in determining the active measures to be mutually agreed upon, and so far as the safety of the two empires and the essential interests of the common cause will permit, the greatest care will be taken to combine with the employment of them, the time and means of putting the forces and frontiers of his majesty the Emperor-King into a condition for opening the campaign with the energy necessary to attaining the object of the war. When once, however, the encroachments of the French shall have established the cases in which his said imperial and royal Apostolic Majesty will be engaged to take part in the war, by virtue of the present agreement, and of those which may hereafter be mutually formed, he engages not to lose an instant in making his preparations in the shortest possible space of time, and which shall not exceed three months after demand made for efficient co-operation on the part of his imperial majesty of all the Russias, and for vigorously proceeding to the execution of the plan which will be settled.

Art. XI.—As the principles of the two sovereigns forbid their seeking, under any circumstances, to constrain the free will of the French nation, the object of the war will be not to operate any counter-revolution, but solely to provide against the common dangers of Europe.

Art. XII.—His majesty the emperor of all the Russias admitting that it is just that, in the event of a new breaking out of war, the house of Austria should be indemnified for the immense losses that it has suffered in its recent wars with France, engages to co-operate in procuring it such indemnification in such event, as far as may consist with the success of their arms. Nevertheless, in the case of even brilliant success, his majesty the Emperor-King will not extend his frontiers beyond the Adda on the west, and the Po on the south; it being distinctly understood that of the different mouths of the latter river, it is the most southerly which is in this case referred to. The two imperial courts are desirous that, in the supposed case of success, his royal highness the elector of Salzburg may be replaced in Italy, and that to this end he either be put into possession of the grand duchy of Tuscany, or that he obtain some other suitable possessions in the north of Italy, supposing events to render such arrangements practicable.

Art. XIII.—Their imperial majesties, on the same supposition, will strive to procure the re-establishment of the king of Sardinia in Piedmont, even with a great ulterior accession of territory. Should the issue be less favourable, every endeavour will still be used to secure him suitable possessions in Italy.

Art. XIV.—In the same case of great successes, the two imperial courts will agree upon the destination of the Legations, and will concur in causing the duchies of Modena, of Massa, and of Carrara to be restored to the legitimate heirs of the last duke; but, in the case of events compelling a limitation of these projects, the said Legations or the Modenese shall form the dominion of the king of Sardinia; the archduke Ferdinand will remain in Germany; and his majesty will content himself, if need be, with a frontier nearer than that of the Adda to that now existing.

had not ceased to dread war. Accordingly, after having signed it, she resisted all the solicitations of the Emperor of Russia to proceed immediately to military preparations; she even angered him by her inertness. But, on receiving tidings of the arrangements made by Napoleon in Italy, she was suddenly drawn from her inaction. The title of King, taken by Napoleon, and, above all, so general a title as that of "King of Italy," which seemed necessarily to apply to the whole Peninsula, had alarmed Austria to the highest degree. On the instant she commenced those armaments, which, at first, she had desired to defer, and called to the war department the celebrated Mack, who, although destitute of the qualities of a general-in-chief, was not without talent in the organisation of armies. Henceforward she paid quite a new attention to the urgent proposals of Russia, and, without engaging herself, as yet, in writing, to an immediate war; she left to Russia the task of pushing forward the common negotiations with England, and of treating with that power upon the difficult question of subsidies. In the meanwhile, she discussed with M. de Vinzingerode a plan of campaign adapted to all imaginable hypotheses.

It was at St. Petersburg, then, that was finally to be formed the new coalition; that is to say, the third reckoning from the commencement of the French Revolution. That of 1792 ended in 1797, at Campo Formio, under the blows of general Bonaparte; that of 1768 ended in 1801, under the blows of the First Con-

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Art. XV.—If the circumstances shall permit the replacement of the elector of Salzburg in Italy, the territories of Salzburg, Berchtolsgaden, and Passau, will be annexed to the Austrian monarchy. This is the only contingency in which his majesty is to obtain also an extension of his frontier in Germany. As to the part of the territory of Aichstadt, at present possessed by the elector of Salzburg, it is then to be disposed of in such manner as the two courts shall mutually agree upon, and especially in favour of the elector of Bavaria, if, by his part taken in the common cause he has acquired a claim to be benefited. In like manner, in the case supposed in the preceding Article, of the re-establishment of the heirs of the late duke of Modena in his ancient possessions, the possessions of Brisgau and Ortenau would become a means of encouragement in the good cause to one of the principal princes of Germany, particularly to the elector of Baden, in whose favour it then would be renounced by the house of Austria.

Art. XVI.—The two high contracting powers engage not to lay down their arms, and not to treat of an accommodation with the common enemy, except by mutual consent, and after preliminary agreement between them.

Art. XVII.—In limiting for the present to the above objects and points, this present preliminary agreement, upon which the two monarchs mutually promise the most inviolable secrecy, they reserve to themselves, without delay and directly, to fix by ulterior arrangements, as well upon a plan of operations, in the event of war becoming inevitable, as upon all which relates to the support of the respective troops, as well in the Austrian states as upon foreign territory.

Art. XVIII.—The present declaration, mutually recognised as being equally obligatory with the most solemn treaty, will be ratified within the period of six weeks, or earlier if practicable, and the acts of ratification likewise exchanged at the same time.

In witness whereof, &c. &c.

sul; the third, that of 1804, was destined to have a no more prosperous issue under the blows of the Emperor Napoleon.

Lord Gower, as we have said, had powers from his court to treat with the Russian cabinet. After long discussions, the following conditions were agreed upon. A coalition was to be formed among the powers of Europe, comprising England and Russia, at the outset, and, subsequently, those which they could influence. The object was to procure the evacuation of Hanover, and of the north of Germany, the effective independence of Holland and Switzerland, the evacuation of the whole of Italy, including the Isle of Elba, the reconstitution and enlargement of the kingdom of Piedmont, the consolidation of the kingdom of Naples, and, finally, the establishment in Europe of an order of things which would guarantee the safety of all the States against the usurpations of France. The object was not more precisely defined, in order that a certain latitude might remain for treating with France; at the least, deceptively. All the powers were to be invited to give their adhesion.

The coalition had determined to assemble, at fewest, 500,000 men, and to take the field as soon as it had 400,000 men. England furnished an annual subsidy of 1,250,000*l.* sterling, per 100,000 men. She further advanced a sum down, amounting to three months subsidy, to defray the expences of opening the campaign. Austria engaged to supply 250,000 men, out of 500,000; the remainder was to be furnished by Russia, Sweden, Hanover, England, and Naples. The very grave question of the adhesion of Prussia was settled in a very summary and hardy manner. England and Russia promised to make common cause against any power, which, by hostile measures, or by its too close connexions with France, should oppose the designs of the coalition. It was determined, in fact, that Russia, dividing her forces into two masses, should march one by Gallicia, to the aid of Austria; the other, by Poland, to the frontiers of the Prussian territory; and if definitively Prussia should refuse to enter into the coalition, overrun her territory before she could put herself in a state of defence; and as it was desirable not to forewarn her by the assemblage of such an army upon her frontiers, it was agreed that the pretext should be taken of a desire to hasten to her aid, in the event of Napoleon suspecting her, and throwing himself upon her states. The name, then, of auxiliaries and friends were to be given to the eighty thousand Russians, destined to trample Prussia under foot.

This projected violence against Prussia, although it appeared to England to be somewhat rash, was very acceptable to her, as she could do nothing better towards saving herself from invasion, than to kindle a vast flame upon the Continent, and excite a frightful war there, no matter who the combatants, or who the vanquished or the victors. On the part of Russia, on the contrary, this resolution was a great imprudence; for to

risk throwing Prussia into the arms of Napoleon, was to insure herself a certain defeat, even were the invasion of the Prussian territory as prompt as it was proposed to be. But prince Czartoryski, the most obstinate of those young men in pursuing an object, saw in all this only a means of wresting Warsaw from Prussia, in order to reconstitute Poland, by giving it to Alexander.

The military plan that was indicated by the situation, was still to attack in three masses; in the south, with the Russians of Corfu, the Neapolitans, and the English, ascending the Italian peninsula, and joining a hundred thousand Austrians in Lombardy: in the east, with the grand Austrian and Russian army acting upon the Danube; lastly, in the north, with the Swedes, the Hanoverians, and the Russians, descending upon the Rhine.

As to the diplomatic plan, it consisted in an intervention in the name of a *Mediatory Alliance*, and an offer of a preliminary negotiation previous to fighting. Russia was much attached to this portion of her original project, which preserved to her that altitude of arbiter which flattered her pride, and which, it must be added, was also agreeable to the weakness of her sovereign. He still entertained a vague hope that Prussia would be prevailed upon, provided that she were not too much alarmed by being made aware of the fixed design of a coalition, and that Napoleon would thus have only to choose between an alarming league of all Europe, and reasonable concessions.

From England, consequently, was obtained the most singular dissimulation, the least dignified, but also the best adapted to her views. England consented to be left out, to be unmentioned in the negotiations, especially with Prussia. In the efforts upon the last-mentioned power, Russia was to represent herself as being unconnected with Great Britain by any project of common war, but as wishing to impose a mediation, in order to put an end to a state of things that was burdensome to all Europe. In a solemn proceeding with respect to France, Russia, without ostensibly acting in the name of a coalition, was to offer her mediation, affirming that she would cause every one to accept equitable conditions, provided that Napoleon would accept similar ones. Here was a double means intended to avoid, alike, alarming Prussia and irritating the pride of Napoleon. England lent herself to every thing, provided only that Russia, compromised by this mediation, were definitively drawn into the war. As to Austria, the greatest pains were taken to leave her in the shade, and not even to name her; for, should she appear to be in the plot, Napoleon would throw himself upon her before preparations were completed for aiding her. She actively prepared herself without taking any part in the negotiations. It was necessary to pursue the same course as to the court of Naples, which was the first exposed to the

blows of Napoleon, as general St. Cyr was at Taranto with a division of from fifteen to eighteen thousand French. Queen Caroline had been advised to take all the engagements of neutrality, and even of alliance which Napoleon might impose upon her. In the meantime, Russian troops were by degrees transported in vessels through the Dardanelles, and disembarked at Corfu. Here a strong division was preparing, which at the last moment was to be joined at Naples by a reinforcement of English, Albanians, and others. It would then be time to throw aside the mask, and to attack the French by the extremity of the Peninsula.

In order to attempt a preliminary negotiation with Napoleon, it was necessary to be able to offer him some at least specious conditions. There were none such apart from offering to cause Malta to be evacuated by the English. The Russian cabinet had thrown aside all the brilliant portion of its plan, such as the reorganisation of Italy and of Germany, the reconstitution of Poland, and the framing of a new maritime code. If, in addition, it conceded Malta to the English, instead of playing the part of arbiter between France and England, it only became the agent of the latter, or, at the very most, her docile and dependent ally. The Russian cabinet consequently held to the evacuation of Malta with an obstinacy not common to it, and, when the moment arrived for signing the treaty, was inflexible. Hitherto, Lord Gower had given way on every point, in order to compromise Russia, by means of a treaty of some kind, with England; but now he was asked to abandon a maritime position of the greatest importance, a position which, if not the only, was, at least, the principal cause of the war, and he would not yield. Lord Gower deemed it incompatible with his instructions to go any further, and he refused to sign the abandonment of Malta. The project was in danger of falling to the ground. However, on the 11th of April, the emperor Alexander consented to sign the convention, at the same time declaring that he would not ratify it, unless the English cabinet would give up the island of Malta. A courier, therefore, was despatched to London, bearer both of the convention and of the condition which was annexed to it, and upon which depended the ratification by Russia.

It was settled that, without loss of time, lest the season for military operations should be lost, the step agreed upon should be taken as to the Emperor of the French. For this mission the personage was selected who, at London, had fastened the first link of the coalition, M. de Nowosiltzoff. As assistant to him the abbé Piatoli was selected, the actual author of that plan of a new Europe, which had since been so disfigured.

M. de Nowosiltzoff was extremely proud of being about to proceed to Paris to present himself to that great man, who for years past had attracted the gaze of the whole world. If, as

the decisive moment drew nearer and nearer, the emperor Alexander more and more warmly desired to see this preliminary mediation successful, M. de Nowosiltzoff desired it no less. He was young and ambitious; he considered it a great distinction in the first place to treat with Napoleon, and in the second place, to be the negotiator who, at the moment when Europe seemed about to return to war, would suddenly pacify it by his able intervention. It could thence be relied upon that he would not himself add to the difficulties of the negotiation. After long deliberations, the conditions were agreed upon which he was to offer to Napoleon, and it was also agreed that they should be kept a profound secret. He was charged to offer a first, a second, and a third project, each more advantageous to France than the preceding one, but was recommended not to pass from one to the other until after a great struggle.

The basis of all these projects was the evacuation of Hanover and of Naples, the practical independence of Switzerland and Holland, and, in return, the evacuation of Malta by the English, and the promise of subsequently compiling a new code of maritime law. Thus far Napoleon would oppose no serious difficulties. In fact, in the event of a solid peace, he had no objection to evacuate Hanover, Naples, Holland, and even Switzerland, on condition of the act of mediation being maintained in the last named country. The real difficulty was Italy. Russia, already obliged to forego her plans of European reconstitution, had promised, in the event of war becoming inevitable, one part of Italy to Austria, and another part to the future kingdom of Piedmont. Now, on the supposition of a mediation, it would be indispensable, on pain of seeing the negotiator sent away from Paris on the day after his arrival there, to concede to France a part of this same Italy. It was necessary in order that the mediation should appear serious, above all, that it should appear serious to Prussia, that she might be persuaded and compromised by the appearance of a negotiation attempted in good faith. It was resolved, in the first place, to demand the separation of Piedmont, but saving its reconstitution as a separate state for a branch of the Bonaparte family, and further, the abandonment of the existing kingdom of Italy intended, together with Genoa, for the house of Savoy. Parma and Piacenza remained to furnish another endowment for a prince of the Bonaparte family. This was only the first proposition, the second was then to be brought forward. Piedmont would remain incorporated with France; the kingdom of Italy, with the addition of Genoa, would, as in the first proposition, be given to the house of Savoy. Parma and Piacenza would remain the only endowment of the collateral branches of the house of Bonaparte. From this second proposition the envoy was finally to pass to the third, which would be as follows: Piedmont continuing to be a French province, and the existing kingdom of

Italy being given to the Bonaparte family, the indemnity of the house of Savoy would be reduced to Parma, Piacenza, and Genoa. The kingdom of Etruria, assigned for four years past to a Spanish branch, would remain as it was.

It must be allowed that if to these last conditions the evacuation of Malta by the English had been added, Napoleon would have had no legitimate reason for refusing peace, for they were the conditions of Lunéville and Amiens, with the addition of Piedmont for France. The sacrifice demanded of Napoleon being in reality confined to that of Parma and Piacenza, which had become French possessions by the death of the last duke, and of Genoa, hitherto independent, Napoleon might consent to such an arrangement provided always care was taken to give no offence to his dignity in the form of the propositions.

All the five projects, then, of the friends of Alexander, led to a very slender result. After having dreamed of a reconstitution of Europe, by the means of a powerful mediation, after having seen that reconstitution of Europe converted at London into a destructive project against France, Russia, alarmed at having advanced so far, reduced her grand mediation to the obtaining Parma and Piacenza as an indemnity for the house of Savoy; for the evacuation of Hanover and Naples, and the independence of Holland and Switzerland, which she further demanded, had never been contested by Napoleon, peace being once re-established. And should so small a matter not be obtained, she would have a terrible war upon her hands. The rash and inconsiderate conduct of Russia had hemmed her up in a very narrow pass.

It was further agreed upon, that passports should be solicited for M. de Nowosiltzoff, through the medium of a friendly court. There was only the choice between Prussia and Austria. To apply to Austria would be to draw upon her the penetrating glance of Napoleon, and, as we have already said, it was desired to have her as much as possible kept in the back ground, in order that she might have time to make her preparations. Prussia, on the contrary, had offered herself as mediatrix, which furnished a natural reason to make use of her mediation to procure passports for M. de Nowosiltzoff. He at the same time was to proceed to Berlin, see the king of Prussia, make another effort with that prince, communicate to him alone, and not to his cabinet, the moderate conditions proposed to France, and make him perceive that if she refused to accede to such arrangements, it must be from her having views alarming for Europe, views irreconcileable with the independence of all states, in which case it was the duty of all to unite and march against the common enemy.

M. de Nowosiltzoff, then, set out for Berlin, where he speedily arrived, eager as he felt to commence the negotiation. He was accompanied by the abbé Piatoli. His demeanour was mild,

conciliating, but extremely reserved. Unfortunately, the king of Prussia was absent, engaged in visiting his provinces of Franconia. This was a vexatious circumstance. There was a double danger: of a refusal on the part of England relative to Malta, which would render all negotiation impossible, or of some new enterprise of Napoleon upon Italy, where he then was, an enterprise which would ruin beforehand the various projects of reconciliation on their way to Paris. The prompt arrival of M. de Nowosiltzoff in Paris was, consequently, of immense importance for the peace. Moreover, the young Russians who governed the Empire were so impressionable, that their first contact with Napoleon might attract them to him, and seduce them, as the contact with Mr. Pitt had drawn them far indeed away from their first plan of European regeneration. There was, consequently, reason greatly to regret the time which was about to be lost.

The king of Prussia having learnt that he was solicited to demand passports for the Russian envoy, greatly congratulated himself upon that circumstance, and upon the probabilities of peace, which he deemed he could discern in it. He did not suspect that, masked behind this endeavour at reconciliation, there was a project of war more mature than had been entrusted to him, more mature than it was deemed to be by those who had so inconsiderately engaged in it. The pacific Frederick William gave the order to his cabinet immediately to apply to Napoleon for passports for M. de Nowosiltzoff. The latter was not to assume at Paris any official character, in order to avoid the difficulty of recognising the imperial title borne by Napoleon; but in addressing him, he was to employ only the title of Sire and of Majesty, and he was, moreover, provided with full and positive powers, which he was to show as soon as they should be agreed, which authorised him on the instant to concede the recognition of the imperial title.

While the powers of Europe were thus exerting themselves against Napoleon, he, surrounded by all the pomps of Italian royalty, was brimful of ideas the very opposite to those of his adversaries, even to the most moderate of them. The sight of that Italy, the scene of his first victories, the object of all his predilections, filled him with new designs for the grandeur of his Empire and for the establishment of his family. Far from purposing to share Italy with any one, he proposed, on the contrary, wholly to occupy it, and to create there some of those vassal kingdoms which were to strengthen the new Empire of the West. The members of the Italian *Consultum*, who were present at the formality of the institution of the kingdom of Italy, accompanied by the vice-president Melzi, and the minister Marescalchi had preceded him to prepare his reception at Milan. Although the Italians were proud to have him for their king, though his government reassured them more than any other,

yet the hope lost, or at the very least deferred, of a purely Italian royalty, the fear of war with Austria in consequence of this change, and even the generality of that title of King of Italy, calculated to please them, but also to alarm Europe, all this had much perplexed them. Messrs. Melzi and Marescalchi found them more disturbed and also less zealous than previous to their departure. The ultra-liberal party receded more every day, and the aristocracy did not draw closer. Napoleon alone could mend this state of things. Cardinal Caprara had arrived, and endeavoured to inspire the clergy with his own devotion to Napoleon. M. de Ségur, accompanying M. Marescalchi, had selected the ladies and officers of the palace from the first Italian families. Some at first declined. The exertion of M. de Marescalchi, of some members of the *Consultum*, and the general attraction of the fêtes which were in preparation, had brought over the froward, and finally the arrival of Napoleon had determined every one. His presence as general had always deeply moved the Italians; his presence as emperor and king could not but strike them still more forcibly; for that prodigy of fortune whom they had delighted to gaze on, had become a prodigy still more vast and marvellous. Magnificent troops assembled upon the battle fields of Marengo, and Castiglione prepared to execute grand manœuvres, and to represent immortal combats. All the foreign ministers were convoked to Milan. The crowds of gazers who had flocked to Paris to see the coronation there, now repaired to Milan. The impulse was given, and the Italian imaginations were again seized with love and admiration of the man who for nine years had so much excited them. The youth of the great families formed, in imitation of the towns of France, guards of honour to receive him.

On his arrival at Turin he had there met Pius VII. and exchanged tender and filial adieux with him. Then he had with an infinite gracefulness and affability received his new subjects, and had busied himself about their interests, which were still distinct from those of the rest of the French Empire, with that intelligent solicitude which marked all his journeys. He had repaired the blunders or the acts of injustice of the administrations, decided upon a whole host of demands, and displayed, to seduce the people, all the attractions of the supreme power. He had then employed several days in visiting the stronghold, which was his grand creation, and the foundation of the defensive system of Italy, that of Alexandria. Thousands of workmen were employed on it at this instant. Finally, on the 5th of May, in the middle of the plain of Marengo, from the summit of a throne raised in that plain where, five years previously, he had gained the sovereign authority, he had witnessed some splendid manœuvres representing the battle. Lannes, Murat, and Bessières, executed those manœuvres. There wanted only Desaix! Napoleon had laid the first stone of an

intended monument to the memory of the brave who fell upon that field of battle. From Alexandria he had proceeded to Pavia, whither the magistrates had repaired to offer him the homages of his new capital, and he had entered Milan itself on the 8th of May, amidst the pealing of bells, the thunder of cannon, and the acclamations of a population excited to enthusiasm by his presence. Surrounded by the Italian authorities and the clergy, he had bent the knee in that old Lombard cathedral, which was admired by all Europe, and which was destined to receive from him its final completion. The Italians, sensitive to the highest degree, sometimes agitate themselves for sovereigns whom they do not love, seduced thereto, like all other people, by the power of grand spectacles; what, then, must they not have felt at sight of that man whose grandeur commenced under their eyes, that star that they could boast of having been the first to perceive upon the European horizon?

It was amidst these intoxicating displays of grandeur that the proposal to receive M. de Nowosiltzoff at Paris reached Napoleon. He felt every inclination to welcome the Russian minister, to hear him, to treat with him, no matter under what form, official or not, provided the negotiation was serious; and that in endeavouring to influence him no partiality or condescension was shown to England. As for the conditions he was far enough from reckoning as the Russians did. But he was unaware of their offers; he saw only the advance, which was made in becoming terms, and he cautiously avoided the error of repulsing it. He replied that he would receive M. de Nowosiltzoff at Paris towards the month of July; his maritime projects, to which he never ceased to be attentive, notwithstanding his apparent abstraction from them, would not recall him to France until that period. He proposed then to receive M. de Nowosiltzoff, to judge if it was worth while to attend to him; and he would at the same time hold himself in constant readiness to interrupt this diplomatic communication, and set out for London, there to cut the Gordian knot of all the coalitions.

Although he was not precisely aware of the one which had been organised, and was far from believing it to be so far perfected as it really was, he well understood the character of the emperor Alexander, and the unreflecting impulses which had rapidly drawn him towards the English policy, and on sending to Prussia the passports for M. de Nowosiltzoff, he caused the following observations to be communicated to that court:

"The Emperor," wrote the minister for foreign affairs to M. de Laforest—"the Emperor having read your despatch, finds that it fully justifies the fears that he had manifested in his letter to the king of Prussia, and all that his majesty hears of the language that has been held by the British ministers, tends to keep him in that of state of suspicion. The emperor Alexander is

led away in spite of himself; he has not perceived that the design of the English cabinet in offering him the part of a mediator, was closely to connect the interests of England, and those of Russia, and eventually to lead the latter to take up arms to sustain a cause which would have become her own.

"From the instant that, by experience in public affairs, the Emperor Napoleon had acquired precise ideas of the character of the emperor Alexander, he felt that, at one time or another, that prince would be seduced into the interest of England, who had so many means of gaining over so corrupt a court as that of St. Petersburg.

"Probable as that future appeared to the Emperor Napoleon, he contemplated it coolly, and he had taken steps to meet it, as far as that rested with him. Independently of the conscription of the year, he had made a call upon the reserve of the year XI. and of the year XII., and had augmented by fifteen thousand men, the call made upon the conscription of the year XIII.

"At the slightest word of menace that may be uttered by M. de Nowosiltzoff, of threatening, of affront, or of hypothetical treaties with England, he will no longer be listened to. If Russia, or any other continental power, wishes to interfere in the affairs of the day, and to press equally upon France and upon England, the Emperor will have no objection to that, and will readily make some sacrifices. England, on her part, should make equivalent concessions; but, if, on the contrary, sacrifices are required from France alone, then, whatever be the union of the powers, the Emperor will avail himself, to their utmost extent, of his good right, of his genius, and of his armies." (Milan, 15 Prairial, year XIII., 4th of June, 1805.)

On the 26th of May, Napoleon was crowned in the cathedral of Milan, with as much pomp as that with which he had six months previously been crowned at Paris, in presence of the ministers of Europe, and of the deputies of all Italy. The crown of iron, reputed to be the ancient crown of the Lombard kings, had been conveyed from Monza, where it is carefully kept. After cardinal Caprara, archbishop of Milan, had blessed it with the forms anciently used in the case of the German emperors, when crowned kings of Italy, Napoleon placed it upon his own head, as he had placed that of Emperor of the French, pronouncing, in Italian, these decisive words, "*God has given it to me, let him beware who shall touch it!*" (*Dio me l'ha data, guai a chi la tocchera!*) He sent a thrill through all present by the significant accents in which he spoke those words. This pageant, prepared by Italian artists, and especially by the painter Appiani, surpassed in splendour and magnificence all that had ever been witnessed in Italy.

After this ceremony, Napoleon promulgated the Organic Statute, by which he created in Italy a monarchy in imitation of that of France, and named Eugene de Beauharnais viceroy.

He then presented that young prince to the Italian nation in a royal sitting of the Legislative Body. He employed the whole of the month of June in presiding over the Council of State, and in giving to the administration of Italy the impulse that he had given to the administration of France, by daily occupying himself with its affairs.

The Italians, for whose satisfaction there needed only a government present in the midst of them, had one now beneath their eyes, which to its real value added a prodigious magic of externals, and thus, withdrawn from their discontents, and from their repugnance to foreigners, they had already rallied, great and small, around the new king. The presence of Napoleon, supported by those formidable armies which he had formed and organised for every event, had dissipated the fear of war. The Italians began to believe that they should see it no more upon their soil, even should it again break out, and that its shoutings and its thunders would come to them from the banks of the Danube, and from the very gates of Vienna. Every Sunday Napoleon held grand reviews of troops at Milan; after which he returned to his palace, and gave public audience to the ambassadors of all the courts of Europe, to foreigners of distinction, and, above all, to the representatives of the great Italian families and the clergy. It was at one of these audiences that he exchanged the insignia of the Legion of Honour with the insignia of the most ancient and illustrious orders of Europe. The Prussian minister first presented himself, to deliver to him the Black Eagle and the Red Eagle. Then came the ambassador of Spain, who delivered to him the Golden Fleece; and then the ministers of Bavaria and Portugal, who delivered to him the orders of St. Hubert and of Christ. Napoleon gave them in exchange the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour, and bestowed a number of decorations equal to that which he received. He then distributed those foreign decorations among the principal personages of the Empire. In a few months his court was on the same footing as all the other courts of Europe; the same insignia were worn in it, with rich costumes, chiefly of a military character. In the midst of all this splendour, remaining simple in his personal appearance, having for his sole decoration a star of the Legion of Honour upon his breast, wearing a coat of the chasseurs of the guard, without gold embroidery, a black hat, with no ornament but a tricoloured cockade, Napoleon proved to all that the luxury by which he was surrounded was not for himself. His noble and handsome countenance, around which the imagination of men ranged so many glorious trophies, was all that he chose to display to the eager gaze of the people. Yet his person was the only one that they sought, that they desired to behold amidst that train glittering with gold and bedizened with the ribands of all Europe.

The various towns of Italy sent deputations to him to obtain the favour of seeing him within their walls. It was not only an honour but an advantage that they solicited, for everywhere his penetrating eye discerned some good to be done, and his powerful hand found the means of accomplishing it. Having resolved to devote the spring and half the summer to Italy, the better to divert the attention of the English from Boulogne, he promised to visit Mantua, Bergamo, Verona, Ferrara, Bologna, Modena, and Piacenza. These tidings completed the joy of the Italians, and gave them all hopes of participating in the benefits of the new reign.

His abode in this splendid country soon engendered within him those formidable impulses which were so much to be dreaded for the maintenance of general peace. He began to feel an extreme irritation against the court of Naples, which, wholly devoted to the English and to the Russians, and publicly protected by the latter in all negotiations, incessantly displayed the most hostile feelings towards France. The imprudent queen, who had allowed the government of her husband to be compromised by odious cruelties, had now taken a most unfortunately imagined step. She had sent to Milan the most clumsy of negotiators, a certain prince de Cardito, to protest against the title of king of Italy, taken by Napoleon, a title which many people translated by those words that were inscribed upon the Iron Crown: "*Rex totius Italiæ—King* OF ALL *Italy.* The marquis de Gallo, ambassador from Naples, a man of sense, and much esteemed at the imperial court, had vainly endeavoured to prevent this perilous proceeding. Napoleon had consented to receive the prince de Cardito, but upon a day of diplomatic audience. On that day he first gave the most gracious reception to the marquis de Gallo, and then, in Italian, addressed the most crushing harangue to the prince de Cardito, declaring to him in terms equally harsh and contemptuous to the queen, that he would drive her out of Italy, and scarcely leave her Sicily for shelter. The prince de Cardito was led away nearly fainting. This outbreak produced a great sensation, and speedily filled the despatches of all the European ministers. Napoleon from this moment conceived the idea of making the kingdom of Naples a family kingdom, and one of the fiefs of his grand Empire. By degrees the idea had entered his mind of expelling the Bourbons from all the thrones of Europe. However, the accidental zeal that those of Spain had displayed in the war against the English, banished this formidable idea as concerned them. But Napoleon, under the strong presentiment that he should speedily have to reconstruct Europe, whether he should become all-powerful by crossing the straits of Dover, or whether, withdrawn from the maritime war by continental war, he should succeed in expelling the Austrians from Italy, Napoleon promised himself that he would

unite the Venetian states to his kingdom of Lombardy, and that he would then effect the conquest of Naples for one of his brothers. But all this portion of his designs was for the moment postponed. Exclusively occupied with the descent, he would not actually provoke a continental war. Nevertheless, there was one measure which seemed to him to be opportune and without danger: it was to put a period to the sad situation of the Republic of Genoa. That Republic, placed between the Mediterranean, which was commanded by England, and Piedmont, which France had annexed to her territory, was, as it were, imprisoned between two great powers, and was thus deprived of her ancient prosperity, for she had all the inconveniences of being annexed to France, without any of its advantages. In fact, the English had refused to recognise her, considering her as an annexation of the French Empire, and had attacked her flag; Even the Barbary states pillaged and insulted her vessels without mercy. France, treating her as a foreign country, had separated her from Piedmont and from the territory of Nice, by lines of custom-houses and by exclusive tariffs. The trade of Genoa was consequently stifled between the sea and the land, which were alike closed against her. France received no more benefit from Genoa than she bestowed upon her. The Apennine, separating Genoa from Piedmont, formed a frontier that was infested by brigands: it required the bravest gendarmerie in great numbers to render the roads safe there. With reference to the navy the treaty that had recently been made, only very partially, secured the services which Genoa was capable of rendering us. That borrowing of a foreign port for the purpose of founding a naval establishment there, was an essay leading to other things. By uniting the port of Genoa, and the population of both shores of the gulf of Genoa to the French Empire, Napoleon would acquire from the Texel to the extremity of the principal gulf of the Mediterranean, an extent of coasts, and a number of seamen which, with time and persevering attention, might render him if not England's equal upon the seas, at least her respectable rival.

Napoleon could not resist all these temptations. He considered that England alone could take any real interest in this question. He would not have ventured to deal with the duchy of Parma and Piacenza; whether on account of the Pope, for whom that duchy was a motive to hope; on account of Spain, who coveted it to extend the kingdom of Etruria; or, finally, on account of Russia herself, who did not despair of an indemnity for the late sovereign of Piedmont, so long as it remained an unappropriated territory in Italy. But Genoa, appearing to him to possess but little interest for Austria, who was too far removed from it, and of no consideration to the Pope and Russia, was of importance, in his opinion, only to England; and having no

occasion to avoid offending her, and not supposing her to be as strongly bound up as she was with Russia, he resolved to annex the Ligurian Republic to the French Empire.

This was an error, for in the then temper of Austria, to pronounce a new annexation was to throw her into the arms of the Coalition; it was to furnish to all our enemies who filled Europe with perfidious rumours, new and not unfounded pretext for declaiming against the ambition of France, and, especially against her violation of promises, since Napoleon himself, on instituting the kingdom of Italy, had promised to the Senate that he would not add a single province more to his Empire. But Napoleon, sufficiently apprised of the inimical designs of the Continent, to deem himself warranted in dispensing with considerations towards it, yet not sufficiently apprised to perceive all the danger of a new provocation; flattering himself, moreover, that he should speedily solve all European difficulties at London; did not hesitate, but determined to add Genoa to the naval establishments of France.

His minister to that Republic was his fellow-Corsican Salicetti, whom he instructed to sound and prepare the public mind. The task was not a difficult one, for the public mind of Liguria was well disposed. The aristocratic and Anglo-Austrian party could not become more hostile than it was. The existing protectorate under which Genoa was placed seemed to that party to be as hateful as annexation to France. As for the popular party, it saw in that annexation the freedom of its commerce with the interior of the Empire, the certainty of a great future prosperity, a guarantee against ever again falling beneath the yoke of oligarchy, and, finally, the advantage of belonging to the greatest power in Europe. The minority of the nobility, favourable to the Revolution, alone contemplated with some pain the destruction of the Genoese nationality, but the grand employments of the imperial court were a sufficient attraction to console the principal personages of that class.

The proposition, prepared in concert with some senators, and presented by them to the Genoese senate, was there adopted by twenty members out of twenty-two, who deliberated upon it. It was then confirmed by a species of *Plebiscitum*, given in the form employed in France during the Consulate. Registers were opened, upon which every one could inscribe his vote. The people of Genoa hastened, as those of France had formerly done, to record their suffrages, almost all of which were favourable. The Senate and the Doge proceeded to Milan, to present their request to Napoleon. They were introduced to him amidst a pomp and ceremony which recalled the times when vanquished nations were wont to repair to Rome, to solicit the honour of forming part of the Roman Empire. Napoleon, on the 4th of June, received them on his throne, told them that he acceded to their wish, and that he would visit Genoa ere he

quitted Italy. To this incorporation was added another, which was of small importance in itself, but which was like the drop of water which overflows the vessel. The Republic of Lucca was without a government, and incessantly tossed about between Etruria become Spanish, and Piedmont become French, like a rudderless vessel—a very small vessel indeed, upon a very small sea. The same prompting that had been resorted to at Genoa caused Lucca to offer herself to France, and her magistrates, like those of Genoa, repaired to Milan to solicit a government and a constitution. Napoleon acceded to their request also, but considering them too distant to be annexed to the Empire, he made their territory the dowry of his elder sister, the princess Eliza, a woman of capacity and judgment, indulging in some pretensions as a wit, but endowed with the qualities of a queen regnant, and possessed of the talent to make her authority popular in that little state which she governed; which procured her the title, smartly enough coined by M. de Talleyrand, of the *Semiramis of Lucca*. Napoleon had already conferred the duchy of Piombino upon her; he now gave to her and her husband, the prince Bacciochi, the territory of Lucca, in the form of an hereditary principality, dependent on the French Empire, and reverting to the crown in the case of failure of the male line; consequently, with all the conditions of the ancient fiefs of the German Empire. This princess was for the future to bear the title of princess of Piombino and Lucca.

M. de Talleyrand was directed to write to Russia and to Austria, to explain these proceedings, which Napoleon considered of no consequence to those powers, or, at least, insufficient to rouse the court of Vienna from its inertness. Nevertheless, secret as were the military preparations of Austria, they had partially been perceived, and had not failed to strike the experienced glance of Napoleon. Troops were in motion towards the Tyrol and towards the ancient Venetian provinces. The march of those troops could not be denied, and Austria did not attempt to deny it, but hastened to declare that the grand assemblages of troops at Marengo and at Castiglione, appearing to her to be too vast for mere reviews, she had made some musters as a mere measure of precaution, musters which, moreover, were sufficiently justified by the yellow fever, which was raging in Spain and Tuscany, especially at Leghorn. To a certain extent this excuse was plausible; but the point to be ascertained was, whether this was a mere shifting of the quarters of some troops, or whether the army was in reality being put upon a war footing by the filling up of regiments and the remounting of cavalry; and more than one secret intimation, sent by Poles attached to France, began to render these things probable. Napoleon instantly sent some disguised officers into the Tyrol, the Friuli, and Carinthia, to ascertain upon

the spot the nature of the preparations which were being made there, and he at the same time demanded decisive explanations from Austria.

He determined upon another method of fathoming the intentions of that court. He had exchanged the Legion of Honour against the orders of friendly courts; he had not as yet effected that change against the orders of Austria, and he desired to place himself on the same footing with this court as with others. He conceived the idea, then, of making an immediate communication to Austria upon this subject, and thus to ascertain her real sentiments. He thought, that if she had really determined upon an early war, she would not venture, in the face of Europe and of her allies, to give a testimony of cordiality, which, in the usages of courts, was the most significant that could be given, especially to a power so recent as that of the French Empire. M. de la Rochefoucauld was minister at Vienna, in the room of M. de Champagny, who had become minister of the interior. The former was directed to demand explanations from Austria of her military preparations, and to propose to her an exchange of her orders against the order of the Legion of Honour.

Napoleon, continuing from the heart of Italy to keep the English under the delusion that the descent so often announced and so often put off, was but a mere feint, busied himself incessantly in providing for its execution in the summer. Never did an operation cause the sending of so many couriers and despatches as that which he at this period meditated. Consular agents and naval officers, stationed in the Spanish and French ports, at Carthagena, at Cadiz, at Ferrol, at Bayonne, at the mouth of the Gironde, at Rochefort, at the mouth of the Loire, at Lorient, at Brest, and at Cherbourg, having couriers at their orders, transmitted to Italy all naval intelligence, even the slightest. Numerous secret agents, kept in pay in the ports of England, forwarded their reports, which were immediately sent to Napoleon. Finally, M. de Marbois, who was well acquainted with English affairs, had the especial duty of reading all the journals published in England, and of translating the slightest news relating to naval movements; and it is a circumstance worthy of remark, that it was especially from these journals that Napoleon, who could with perfect correctness anticipate all the plans of the English admiralty, received the best information. Although their statements were for the most part false, they yet furnished to his prodigious sagacity the means of guessing at the real facts. There was something more singular still. By dint of attributing to Napoleon the most extraordinary, and, frequently, the most absurd plans, several of them, without knowing that they did so, hit upon his real project, and said that he had sent his fleets on distant voyages, only to re-assemble them on a sudden in the Channel.

The admiralty did not fasten upon this supposition, which, however, was the true one. Their measures, at all events, would lead us to suppose that they did not take it to be the true one.

With the exception of one circumstance which annoyed him greatly, and which had led to a last modification of his vast plan, Napoleon had every reason to be satisfied with the progress of his operations. Admiral Missiessy, as we have seen, had sailed in January for the West Indies. The details of his expedition were not yet known, but it was certain that the English were greatly alarmed for their colonies; that one of them, the island of Dominica, had been taken, and that they had sent strong reinforcements into the seas of America, a diversion all in our favour in the seas of Europe. Admiral Villeneuve, who sailed from Toulon on the 30th of March, had touched at Cadiz after a voyage of which the particulars were not known, rallied admiral Gravina with a Spanish division of six ships of the line and several frigates, besides the French frigate *l'Aigle*, and had steered for Martinique. No subsequent tidings of him had arrived, but it was known that Nelson, who guarded the Mediterranean, had not been able to intercept him either on his running out of Toulon, or on his getting clear of the strait. The Spanish seamen did their best in the state of destitution in which they were left by an ignorant, corrupt, and indolent government. Admiral Salcedo had assembled a fleet of seven sail at Carthagena; admiral Gravina, as we have just seen, one of six at Cadiz; admiral Grandellana a third of eight at Ferrol, which was to operate with the French fleet in harbour there. But sailors were scarce, owing to the epidemic, and to the depressed condition of Spanish commerce, and fishermen and the working men of the towns were taken to form crews. Finally, a scarcity of grain, added to scarcity of money, and the epidemic, had so exhausted the resources of Spain, that the six months' biscuit which was necessary for each squadron could not be procured. Admiral Gravina had scarcely enough for three months when he had joined the squadron of Villeneuve, and at Ferrol admiral Grandellana had scarcely enough for a fortnight. Fortunately, M. Ouvrard, whom we have seen undertaking to transact business for and with France and Spain, had arrived at Madrid, had delighted that debt-laden court with the most charming projects, obtained its confidence, concluded a treaty with it, a treaty which we shall describe by and by, and by various combinations put an end to the horrors of the dearth. He at the same time provided the Spanish navy with a considerable quantity of biscuit. Matters, therefore, in the ports of Spain, went on as well as the impoverished and wretched state of the Spanish administration would allow.

But while admiral Missiessy spread dismay in the English colonies, and admirals Villeneuve and Gravina, with their combined squadrons, sailed without accident towards Martinique,

Ganteaume, who was to have joined company with them, owing to a sort of phenomenon in the season, had not had a single day such as would admit of his running out of the port of Brest. Within the memory of man the equinox had never before been unattended by a gale. The months of March, April, and May (1805), however, had gone by without the English fleet having once been compelled to abandon the Brest station. Admiral Ganteaume, well knowing how immense an operation he was called upon to take part in, was so impatient for the moment of departure as actually to be rendered ill by his vexation.*

* I cite the two following letters, which will prove both the state of mind of the admiral, and the serious intention of the naval expedition, which some persons, bent upon seeing feints where no feints, in fact, exist, have supposed, to be a mere demonstration. These are not the only letters of the same sort, but I select these for quotation.

Ganteaume to the Emperor.

On board *l'Imperial*, 11th Floréal, year XIII. (1st of May, 1805).

SIRE,—The extraordinary weather which we have had since we were ready for sea is quite distracting; I cannot possibly describe to you, the painful feelings which I have endured on finding myself kept in port, while the other squadrons are in full sail for their destinations, and may be cruelly compromised by our difficulties; this last and most afflicting idea allows me no rest, and if I have thus long resisted the impatience and the sufferings by which I am racked, I have done so because I have seen not one chance in our favour, should I run out, and all chances in favour of the enemy; a disadvantageous battle was and is inevitable as long as the enemy shall keep his present position, and then our expedition would be irreparably ruined, and our forces for a long time paralysed.

Nevertheless, at the moment when I received your Majesty's despatch of the 3rd Floréal, I had determined to run out at all hazards; all the vessels had weighed anchor; a westerly wind which had become fresher and fresher during twelve hours, had led me to hope that the enemy might be driven out to sea, when his look-out vessels were perceived from our moorings, and his squadron signalled off Ushant, and the shifting and lightness of the wind prevented me from carrying out my intention. Feeling sure that I should be obliged to bring up in Bertheaume road, and there attract the notice of the enemy, I abandoned all thought of stirring, and I wish to make it appear that we never had any real intention of running out.

Here I would fain repeat to your Majesty the assurance I have already given you, as to the order and preparation in which I keep all the vessels; the crews are all mustered on board, no communications take place with the shore except for indispensable objects of duty, and at all hours every vessel is ready to obey the signals which may be made to it; these arrangements, which alone can enable us to profit by the first favourable opportunity, will be kept up with the utmost exactitude.

Ganteaume to Decrès.

7th Floréal, year XIII. (27th of April, 1805).

I doubt not, my friend, that you share all that I am suffering. Every day that passes is a day of torment to me, and I tremble lest I should after all be forced upon some precious blunder! The wind, which for two days was in the west, but light, although with rain and a dirty sky, has shifted into the north-north-east, and freshened, and I have been tempted to run all risks,

The weather was almost always calm and clear. Occasionally a gust from the west, accompanied by stormy clouds, gave hopes of a tempest, but suddenly all became clear again. There was no resource but to fight a disadvantageous battle with a squadron which was now very nearly equal in number to the French squadron, and very superior to it in quality. The English, without precisely suspecting what threatened them, yet struck by the presence of a fleet at Brest and another at Ferrol, and put still more on the alert by the sorties from Toulon and Cadiz, had augmented the force of their blockade. They had twenty sail before Brest, commanded by admiral Cornwallis, and seven or eight before Ferrol, commanded by admiral Calder. Admiral Ganteaume, in this position, passed out of the road and returned into it, anchored at Bertheaume, or returned to the inner moorings, having for two months all his hands kept strictly on board, land forces as well as seamen. In his vexation he asked if he should give battle in order to get out to open sea, but this he was expressly forbidden to do.

Napoleon, calculating that after the middle of May it would be dangerous to leave Villeneuve, Gravina, and Missiessy waiting any longer at Martinique, and that the English squadrons sent in their pursuit would end by overtaking them, once more altered this part of his plan. He determined that if by the 20th of May Ganteaume had not been able to sail, he should not do so at all, but remain at Brest until relieved from blockade. Villeneuve, therefore, had orders to return with Gravina to Europe to do what was in the first instance entrusted to Ganteaume; that is to say, to raise the blockade of Ferrol, where he would find five sail of French and seven of Spanish, then, if he could, to touch at Rochefort, and be reinforced by Missiessy, who would probably have returned from the West Indies, and, finally, to present himself before Brest to open the

although the enemy was still signalled as being in the Yroise, and though his advanced ships were in the road, and the weather was very clear. The certainty, however, which his position and his force gave me of having to fight to disadvantage, and the variableness of the wind, restrained me, and I am now glad of it; but I am none the less in a state of horrible anxiety.

The length of the days, and the fineness of the weather, make me now almost despair of getting out, and, then, how shall I support the idea of keeping our friends waiting in vain at the place of rendezvous and of compromising them by exposing them to delays and to an extremely dangerous return? These ideas leave me not an instant of peace, and I dare say that they harass you also. However, my friend, you may rest perfectly assured that I have done the best I could, unless I had run the risks of an encounter which, independent of the chances that the enemy would have derived from his superior force, would equally have spoiled the expedition. As I have already reported, the weather has constantly been such as to render it impossible for us to elude the observation of the enemy.

Although in your last you recommended me to write frequently to the Emperor, I dare not write to him, having nothing favourable to say; I remain silent, awaiting events, being unwilling to trouble him about mere trifles, and I confine myself to saying that I trust that he will do us justice.

sea to Ganteaume, which would increase his whole force to fifty-six sail. He was to steer for the Channel with this squadron, the largest ever assembled upon the ocean.

This plan was perfectly practicable, and even had great chances of success, as the result will presently prove. Nevertheless, it was less secure than the preceding one. In fact, if Ganteaume could have got out to sea in April, raised the blockade of Ferrol, which was possible without fighting, for only five or six English vessels then blockaded that port, and afterwards proceeded to Martinique, his junction with Villeneuve and Gravina would have taken place without any probability of battle: they would have returned to Europe to the number of fifty sail, and needed to touch nowhere previous to entering the Channel. There were no other risks to run than those of rencontres at sea, risks so rare that they might be wholly left out of question. The new plan, on the contrary, had the inconvenience of exposing Villeneuve to a battle before Ferrol, and to another before Brest; and though he would have a great superiority of force, there was no certainty that the two squadrons whom he had freed from blockade would have time to come to his aid and take part in the battle. In fact, the egress both from Ferrol and Brest is by narrow channels; there, as elsewhere, the wind that suits vessels going in is not that which suits them on coming out, and it was very possible for a battle to take place at the entrance of those ports, and be brought to a termination, before the fleets within could arrive to take a share in it. Even a battle of doubtful result would suffice to discourage the officers, whose confidence at sea was not very firm, however great their personal courage. Admiral Villeneuve, especially, though a gallant sailor, had not a firmness equal to these risks, and it was to be regretted that the serenity of the weather had prevented the execution of the first plan.

There was another which Napoleon had in contemplation for a moment, which would have consolidated fewer forces, indeed, but which would have taken Villeneuve with certainty into the Channel: it was, not to send Villeneuve before either Ferrol or Brest, but to cause him to double Scotland, and then steer down the North Sea, and so reach Boulogne. It is true that he would have arrived with only twenty sail, instead of fifty; but this would have sufficed for three days; and the flotilla, sufficiently protected, would certainly have crossed. This idea presented itself for an instant to the mind of Napoleon; he put it on paper and then, wishing for still greater security, he preferred a greater consolidation of forces to a greater certainty of making the Channel, and he reverted to the plan of raising the blockade of Ferrol and Brest by Villeneuve.

This was the last change of his plan that was produced by circumstances. It was in the midst of a fête, as he himself relates in a postscript to one of his letters, that he had ruminated on all these combinations, and decided upon his course.

He immediately gave the necessary instructions. Two ships of the line had been prepared at Rochefort; rear-admiral Magon commanded them. He immediately sailed for Martinique, to announce the change that had taken place in Napoleon's determination. Frigates fitted out at Lorient, at Nantes, and at Rochefort, were ready to leave these ports as soon as it was decided that Ganteaume was to make no further attempt at getting out, and they were commissioned to take orders to Villeneuve, to return immediately to Europe, there to execute the new plan. Each frigate was to be accompanied by a brig, furnished with a duplicate of these orders. The despatches were enclosed in leaden boxes, and entrusted to confidential officers, who were to throw them into the sea in case of danger. These precautions, and those which follow, are worthy of being mentioned for the instruction of governments.

In order that the fleets of Brest and Ferrol might be able to second those which were to raise the blockades for them, great precautions had been taken. Ganteaume was to anchor outside the road of Brest, in the creek of Bertheaume, an open place of doubtful safety. To correct this defect, a general of artillery was sent from Paris, and a hundred and fifty guns were placed in battery, in order to cover the squadron. Gourdon, commanding at Ferrol, in the room of admiral Boudet, who was ill, had orders to pass from Ferrol to Corunna, where the anchorage is open, and to conduct the French division thither. Admiral Grandellana was directed to do the same with the Spanish vessels. The court of Spain was solicited to take precautions similar to those taken at Bertheaume, to secure the anchorage by means of batteries. Finally, anticipating the case of the vessels that were to raise the blockade having consumed their provisions, there were prepared at Ferrol, at Rochefort, at Brest, at Cherbourg, and at Boulogne, barrels of biscuit containing many millions of rations, which could be embarked without loss of time. An order was awaiting admiral Missiessy at Rochefort, should he return thither. That order enjoined him to set sail again on the instant, to go and alarm Ireland by his presence for a few days, and then, to cruise at a distance from Ferrol in a given latitude, where admiral Villeneuve, instructed by a frigate, was to join company with him.

While these measures of foresight were taken for the marine force, continual and secret pains were bestowed upon the land force, to increase the effective strength of the war battalions on the coasts of the ocean. The troops of the expedition now amounted to one hundred and sixty thousand men, exclusive of the Brest corps, which had been broken up since the new destination was assigned to the fleet of Ganteaume. Admiral Verhuell had orders to repair to Ambleteuse with the Dutch fleet, in order that the whole expedition might be able to set out together from the four ports adjoining Boulogne. Those ports, ar-

tificially created, had become choked up with sand in the four years that had elapsed since their construction. New labours had cleared them. Further, repairs had been done to the vessels of the flotilla, which had suffered a little from their continual sorties and an exposed anchorage ground.

At the same time that he sent forth this multitude of orders, Napoleon had continued his journey in Italy. He had visited Bergamo, Verona, and Mantua, and had been present at a representation of the battle of Castiglione, given by a corps of twenty-five thousand men, upon the actual field of that battle; he had stayed several days at Bologna, and enchanted the learned men of its celebrated university; then he had traversed Modena, Parma, Piacenza, and, finally, "Genoa the superb," acquired by a dash of the pen. Here he remained from the 30th of June to the 7th of July, amidst fêtes worthy of the city of marble palaces, and even surpassing the most splendid of those with which he had been welcomed by the Italians. At Genoa he met with an illustrious personage, weary of an exile which had lasted for twelve years, and with an opposition which his religious principles no longer justified: that personage was the cardinal Maury. The Pope had given him an example which he had at length determined upon following, and he had come to the resolution of espousing the cause of the restorer of religion. It was at Genoa that an opportunity had been provided for him to return to favour. Like those partisans of Pompey, who, one after the other, endeavoured to meet with Cæsar in some one of the cities of the Roman Empire, voluntarily to deliver themselves to his allurements, cardinal Maury, in the city of Genoa, bent before the new Cæsar. He was received by him with the courtesy of a man of genius, who desires to ingratiate himself with a man of talent, and could see that his return into France would be recompensed with the highest dignities of the Church.

After having received the oath of the Genoese, planned, with the engineer Forfait, the future naval establishment that he wished to create on that coast, and entrusted to the arch-chancellor Lebrun the task of organising this new portion of the Empire, Napoleon set out for Turin, where he pretended to occupy himself with reviews; then, on the evening of the 8th of July, leaving the Empress in Italy, he started with two very humble post-carriages, caused himself to be represented on the road as the minister of the interior, and, in eighty hours, reached Fontainebleau. He arrived there on the morning of the 11th. The arch-chancellor Cambacérès, and the ministers, were already in waiting there to receive his final orders. He was about to depart on an expedition which was to rend him absolute master of the world, or plunge him, like another Pharaoh, into the abyss of the deep. Never had he been more calm, cheerful, or confident. But no matter what even

the mightiest geniuses may will, their will, however powerful it may be, is still but the will of man, it is a mere caprice without strength, when the will of Providence is opposed to it. Here is a memorable example of it. While Napoleon had every thing prepared for the meeting with armed Europe between Boulogne and Dover, Providence had prepared that meeting for him in very different places!

The emperor Alexander had adjourned the ratification of the treaty which constituted the new coalition to the moment when England should consent to evacuate Malta. Not doubting of a favourable reply, he had demanded passports for M. de Nowosiltzoff, in order to put himself as early as possible in communication with Napoleon. The emperor Alexander, less martially disposed as he approached the denouement, hoped, by this promptitude, to increase the chances of peace. But he had misjudged the cabinet of London. That cabinet, resolved to preserve a capital position, which the course of events, and an act of bad faith had thrown into its hands, had positively refused to abandon the island of Malta. That intelligence, which arrived at St. Petersburg while M. de Nowosiltzoff was at Berlin, had thrown the Russian cabinet into indescribable embarrassment. What was to be done? To give way to whatever England chose, to submit to all the exactions of her intractable ambition, would be to accept, in the eyes of Europe, a very inferior part, and to relinquish the negotiation of M. de Nowosiltzoff, for he would be dismissed from Paris on the very day of his arrival there, and probably in a humiliating manner, should he not take with him England's consent to the evacuation of Malta. It was, therefore, immediate war for the profit of England, at her beck, at her wages, and Europe would know that it was so. On the other hand, to break with her on account of this refusal, was publicly to confess having engaged in a course of policy without understanding it, to decide, before the whole world, in favour of Napoleon, and to place Russia in a ridiculous isolation, involved in a quarrel with England through the exactions of that power, and with France through her own levities. To avoid being at the mercy of England was to become at the mercy of Napoleon, who would be master of the conditions of reconciliation with France.* If Napoleon had not come to the aid of the Russian cabinet, by his error in annexing Genoa to France, he would now have seen his enemies plunged into the greatest confusion. In fact, the Russian cabinet was busily deliberating upon this grave situation, when it was informed of the annexation of Genoa. It was a real subject of rejoicing, for that unforeseen event released from their embarrassment statesmen who had most imprudently committed themselves. It was resolved to

* It is from authentic documents that I describe this embarrassment of the Russian cabinet.

noise the tidings abroad to the utmost, and to declare very plainly that it was impossible to treat with a government which daily committed new usurpations. A very natural pretext was hereby furnished for recalling M. de Nowosiltzoff from Berlin, and an order was instantly despatched to him to return to St. Petersburg, leaving behind him a note to the king of Prussia, explanatory of this change of determination. The Russian cabinet now held itself released from the necessity of urging England to the evacuation of Malta, and ratified the treaty which constituted the third coalition, alleging as its reason for so doing the recent usurpations of the Emperor of the French.

M. de Nowosiltzoff was at Berlin, whither the king of Prussia had at length arrived. The order for his return surprised and deeply annoyed him, for it was an opportunity lost of undertaking the finest of negotiations. He did not disguise his disappointment from the king himself, made him aware of his own personal inclination to do every thing to win over the Emperor of the French, had he gone on to Paris, and disclosed to him even the concessions to which he would have subscribed in the name of his court. It was an additional reason for the king of Prussia to deplore the new impulse to which Napoleon had yielded, and to indulge in his usual complaints, complaints very mild, as was his custom, but also extremely doleful, for every additional risk added to the already very numerous risks of war, affected him deeply.

At Vienna the effect was still more decisive. It was not from an embarrassment arising out of inconsiderate conduct that the cabinet of Vienna was drawn, but from long prudential hesitations. That cabinet had long perceived that Napoleon desired to possess himself of the whole of Italy, and could not resign itself to abandon it to him without making one last resistance with all the courage of despair. But the Austrian finances were in a deplorable condition, and a frightful dearth of grain afflicted upper and lower Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, and Hungary. Bread was so dear at Vienna, that the usually mild and submissive population of that capital grew so enraged, as even to plunder the shops of some bakers. Thus situated, Austria would still have hesitated for a long time, ere she would have plunged herself into the expense of opposing so formidable an enemy as Napoleon; but on learning the annexation of Genoa, and the creation of the duchy of Lucca, all doubts ceased on the instant. The resolution to fight was immediately taken. Despatches were sent to St. Petersburg announcing the resolution, and were received with joy by the Russian cabinet, which, seeing itself drawn into a war, looked upon the concurrence of Austria as the most fortunate of events.

The adhesion of that court to the coalition was signed forthwith. Russia undertook to negotiate with England, to provide Austria with the largest possible amount of subsidy. They asked

and obtained, for the first expenses of opening the campaign, one million sterling, besides the immediate advance of the moiety of the annual subsidy, that is to say, two millions sterling more. The plan of the campaign, discussed between M. de Vinzingerode and the prince of Schwartzenberg, was settled on the 16th of July. It was agreed that ten thousand Russians and some thousands of Albanians should be opportunely thrown into Naples, to prepare a movement upon Lower Italy, while one hundred thousand Austrians should march upon Lombardy; that the grand Austrian army, supported by a Russian army of sixty thousand men at least, entering by Gallicia, should operate in Bavaria; that an army of eighty thousand Russians should advance towards Prussia; that another army of Russians, English, Hanoverians, and Swedes, assembled in Swedish Pomerania, should march upon Hanover; and that, finally, the Russians should have considerable reserves to bring up wherever needed. The English were to effect disembarkations upon the points of the French Empire which were deemed the most accessible, as soon as the diversion with which Napoleon was threatened should have led to the dissolution of the army of the coasts of the ocean. It was settled that the troops destined to aid Austria should be ready to march before the autumn of the current year, to prevent Napoleon from taking advantage of the winter to destroy the Austrian army.

It was further agreed that the court of Vienna, continuing its system of deep dissimulation, should persist in denying its military preparations, while making them more actively than ever; and, when dissimulation was no longer possible, should speak of negotiating and of resuming on her own part, and that of Russia, the negotiations abandoned by M. de Nowosiltzoff. This time, also, all connexion with England was to be disavowed, and the Continent alone to seem to be treated for. The usual duplicity of weakness characterised all this conduct. Prussia was in a state of cruel anxiety. Without completely penetrating it, she had had a presentiment of this determination to go to war, and she had kept herself aloof from all engagement by alleging to Russia that she was too much exposed to the attacks of Napoleon, and to Napoleon, who had renewed his offers of alliance to her, that she was too much exposed to the attack of Russia.

M. de Zastrow had returned from St. Petersburg after a disagreeable and bootless mission. An unforeseen circumstance nearly led to the sudden discovery of the coalition and the obligation of Prussia to pronounce. Since a treaty of subsidies concluded between England and Sweden had secured that, at least thus far, in one royalty to the coalition, Stralsund swarmed with troops. It is known that that important place was the last foothold that Sweden possessed in the north of Germany. Napoleon had perceived from certain reports of his diplomatic agents that something was brewing in that quarter, and had

given notice of it to the king of Prussia, telling him to take care of that neutrality of the north of Germany, that great object of his anxiety, and that he, for his part, would send thirty thousand more men into Hanover at the first danger. These few words had sufficed to alarm the king of Prussia, who immediately desired the king of Sweden to discontinue his military preparations in Swedish Pomerania. The king of Sweden feeling secure of support, replied to the king of Prussia that he was master in his own territory; that he was making preparations which he deemed to be necessary to his own safety; and that if the king of Prussia wished to restrict his liberty, he reckoned upon the king of England and the emperor of Russia, his allies, to aid him in compelling respect to the independence of his states. His gasconading did not end there; he returned to king Frederick William the orders of Prussia, saying that he would not wear them from the moment that they had been conferred on the most cruel enemy of Europe.

This affront deeply irritated Frederick William. Extremely prudent as he was, he would have taken vengeance for it, had not Russia, immediately interfering, declared to Prussia that Swedish Pomerania was under the protection of Russia, and should remain inviolable. This sort of prohibition of action signified to Prussia, gave her much cause for reflection, and humiliated her no less. She determined to make no reply, confining herself to dismissing the Swedish minister, and declaring to Napoleon that she could not answer for what would take place in Hanover; but, nevertheless, she would guarantee that the Prussian territory should not serve as the road of an invading army.

The horizon then grew dark on all sides, and in a manner very visible to the dullest sight. From all parts assemblages of troops were announced, in the Friuli, in the Tyrol and in upper Austria. It was not simple concentrations of men that were spoken of, but the organisation of special services, which was more significant. Cavalry were remounted, artillery provided with horses, and conducted in numerous trains to the banks of the Adige; considerable magazines were everywhere formed, bridges thrown over the Piave and the Tagliamento, and field works thrown up in the lagunes of Venice; all this could scarcely leave any doubt. Austria denied her preparations with a hardihood of which there are but few examples in history, and confessed only some precautions in the Venetian states, caused by the French assemblages formed in Italy. As for the exchange of grand decorations which had been demanded of her, she had declined it under various pretexts.

It was upon this concatenation of circumstances that Napoleon had to come to a resolution during the few days that he was to pass at Fontainebleau and St. Cloud, previous to his departure for Boulogne. It was necessary to decide for the descent or for

an overwhelming march upon the continental powers. On the 11th of July, the very day of his arrival at Fontainebleau, the arch-chancellor Cambacérès had repaired thither, and commenced consulting with him on the grand affairs of the moment. That grave personage was alarmed at the state of the Continent, and at the threatening symptoms of an approaching war, and rightly looked upon the annexations in Italy as being the inevitable cause of a rupture. In such a state of things he could not well comprehend that Napoleon should leave Italy and France exposed to the attacks of the coalition, to throw himself upon England. Napoleon, full of confidence and enthusiasm for the vast maritime plan, of which he had not entrusted the whole secret even to the arch-chancellor, was not embarrassed by any of these objections. In his opinion the acquisition of Genoa and Lucca did not concern Russia, for Italy was not calculated to be subject to her influence. That court ought to think it fortunate that he asked no account of the Russian proceedings in Georgia, in Persia, and even in Turkey. Russia had allowed herself to be engaged in the English policy; she was visibly in a state of coalition with her; M. de Nowosiltzoff was a mere English commissioner, whom they had wished to send, but whom he would have received accordingly. It was very evident that Russia and England were closely engaged together, but those two powers could do nothing without Austria, without the armies and the territories of that power, and Austria, still impressed with a great dread of France, would still hesitate for some time ere she would be entirely gained over. At all events, she would not be ready soon enough to prevent the English expedition. A few days would suffice for the execution of that expedition, and the Channel being once crossed, all the coalitions would be destroyed at a single blow, and the arm of Austria, now raised against France would be stricken down on the instant. "Leave it to me," said Napoleon to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès—"rely on my activity; I will surprise the world by the grandeur and the rapidity of my strokes!"

He then gave some orders concerning Italy and the Rhine. He enjoined Eugène, who remained at Milan, and marshal Jourdan, the young prince's military Mentor, to set about provisioning fortresses, getting together field-artillery, purchasing draught horses, and forming parks of artillery, and stores of ammunition and provisions. He ordered the troops who had been reviewed at Marengo and Castiglione to be moved towards the Adige. He had some time previously posted a reserve division in the neighbourhood of Pescara, to support general St. Cyr, should he need it. He directed that general to obtain all possible information, and, should he discover the slightest attempt of the Russians or the English upon any part whatever of the Calabrias, to pass from Taranto to Naples itself, drive the court from the kingdom, and retain possession of it.

He sent forward upon the Rhine the heavy cavalry which was not intended to embark for England, and directed upon the same point the regiments which were not to be included in the expedition. He gave especial orders to commence the formation of field batteries at Metz, Strasburg, and Mayence.

He then gave his last instructions to M. de Talleyrand, with reference to diplomatic business. As often as any new information was received of the preparations of Austria, that court was immediately to be made aware of it, convicted of its bad faith, and made to tremble for the consequences of its conduct. This time it would perish, and have no mercy shown to it should it interrupt the expedition to England. As to Prussia, communications had long since been opened with her upon the subject of Hanover. It was necessary to seize upon the present opportunity to sound her about this valuable acquisition, to stimulate her known ambition, and, should she nibble at that bait, to offer it to her immediately on condition of an alliance with France, concluded on the instant, and publicly proclaimed. With such an alliance, Napoleon was certain to freeze Austria with terror, and render her motionless for many a year. In any case, he was convinced that between Boulogne and Dover he was about to arrange matters better than they could be arranged by the most skilful and successful negotiations.

Time pressed, every thing was prepared on the coasts of the ocean, and at any moment admiral Villeneuve might arrive before Ferrol, before Brest, and in the Channel. Admiral Missiessy had returned to Rochefort, after having traversed the West Indies, taken Dominica from the English, thrown troops, arms, and munitions into Guadaloupe and Martinique, taken numerous prizes, and displayed the French colours upon the ocean, without suffering a repulse. Nevertheless, he had returned too soon; and as he displayed some unwillingness to put to sea again, Napoleon had replaced him by captain Lallemand, an excellent officer, whom he sent off before the ships were repaired, to join company with Villeneuve in the latitudes of Ferrol. All this being finished, Napoleon repaired to Boulogne, leaving Messrs. Cambacérès and de Talleyrand at Paris, taking marshal Berthier with him, and giving orders to admiral Decrès to join him without delay. He arrived at Boulogne on the 3rd of August, amidst the enthusiastic joy of the army, which began to be weary of daily repeating the same exercises, during two years and a half, and which firmly believed that, this time, Napoleon arrived to place himself at its head, and finally cross into England.

On the very morrow of his arrival, he had all the infantry mustered on the shore at low-water mark. It occupied above three leagues, and presented the enormous mass of 100 thousand infantry, drawn up in a single line. In his whole warrior-life he had seen nothing finer. Accordingly, on returning to

his head-quarters in the evening, he wrote these significant words to admiral Decrès: "*The English know not what awaits them. If we have the power of crossing for but twelve hours, England is no more!*"*

He had now assembled, in the four ports of Ambleteuse, Vimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples, that is to say, to the west of cape Grisnez, and to the northward of Boulogne, all the corps which were to embark on the flotilla. The wish formed two years before was now realised, thanks to the pains taken in consolidating, and thanks to a splendid battle fought by the Dutch flotilla, under admiral Verhuell, in doubling cape Grisnez in presence of the English. That battle, fought on the 18th of July (29th Messidor), a few days previous to the arrival of Napoleon, was the most important check that the flotilla had offered to the English. Several divisions of Dutch gun-boats had fallen in at cape Grisnez with forty-five sail of the English, consisting of ships of the line as well as frigates and corvettes, and had fought them with a rare coolness and complete success. The meeting at the cape was dangerous, because, the water being deep there, the English vessels could press our slightly constructed vessels close, without fear of grounding. Notwithstanding this advantage of the enemy, the Dutch gun-boats held their own in presence of their powerful adversaries. The artillery that guarded the shore hastened to sustain them, the Boulogne flotilla ran out to their support, and, amidst a shower of projectiles, admiral Verhuell, with marshal Davoust by his side, passed at half cannon-shot from the English squadron without losing a single vessel. This battle established the reputation of admiral Verhuell, who already enjoyed great esteem in the expedition, and infused confidence into the hundred and sixty thousand men, soldiers and sailors, ready to cross the Channel upon the French and Dutch flotillas.

Napoleon had now his whole army under his hand. In two hours both men and horses could be embarked, and in two tides, that is to say, in twenty-four hours, they could be conveyed to Dover. As for the *materiel*, it was embarked.

The army assembled on this point, successively increased, now amounted to nearly one hundred and thirty-two thousand fighting men, and fifteen thousand horses, independently of the corps of general Marmont stationed at the Texel, amounting to twenty-four thousand men, and of the four thousand men at Brest destined to sail with the squadron of Ganteaume.

The one hundred and thirty-two thousand who were to go on board the flotilla and sail from the four ports of Ambleteuse, Vimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples, were divided into six corps.

* Letter to M. Decrès of the 16th Thermidor, year XIII. (4th of August, 1805).—*Archives of the State Paper Office.*

The advanced-guard, commanded by Lannes, fourteen thousand strong, consisting of the Gazan division and of the famous united grenadiers, encamped at Arras, was to embark at Vimereux. Those ten battalions of grenadiers, forming by themselves a corps of eight thousand men, of the finest infantry in the world, embarked on a light division of pinnaces, were called to the honour of being the first to throw themselves upon the shore of England, under the inspiring impulse of Lannes and Oudinot. Then came the main body, divided into right wing, centre, and left wing. The right wing, under the command of Davoust, numbering twenty-six thousand men, consisting of the valiant divisions of Morand,* Friant, and Gudin, which have since distinguished themselves at Awerstaedt and in a hundred fights, was destined to embark at Ambleteuse upon the Dutch flotilla. The centre, under Marshal Soult, numbering forty-six thousand men, distributed into four divisions, at the head of which were generals Vandamme, Suchet, Le Grand, and St. Hilaire, were to embark upon the four divisions of the flotilla that were assembled at Boulogne. Finally, the left, or camp of Montreuil, was under the command of the intrepid Ney. It consisted of twenty-two thousand men; it comprised three divisions, and especially the Dupont division, which soon after covered itself with glory at Albek, at the bridge of Halle, and at Friedland. This corps was to depart from Etaples upon two divisions of the flotilla. A division of the *élite* of the guard, three thousand strong, and already on its march, was about to arrive at Boulogne, there to strengthen the centre.

Finally, the sixth subdivision of that grand army was what was called the reserve. It was under the command of prince Louis; it comprised the dragoons and the foot chasseurs, commanded by generals Klein and Margaron, the heavy cavalry commanded by Nansouty, and an Italian division, perfectly disciplined, and not yielding in steadiness of bearing to the finest French divisions. Napoleon had said, that he would show the English what they had never seen since Cæsar,—Italians in their island, and that he would teach those Italians to know their own prowess and to fight as well as the French. This reserve, amounting to twenty-seven thousand men, and posted in the rear of all the other camps, was to march to the shore when the five first corps of the army had sailed; and as it was presumed that a squadron would cover the passage, and that we should for some days be masters of the Strait, the transport flotilla, parting company for a few hours with the war flotilla, was to return and embark this reserve, as well as the second half of the horses. In fact, out of fifteen thousand horses, the flotilla could only embark eight thousand at a time. The other seven thousand were to be taken at a second trip.

* At that time the Bisson division.

Thus, besides the twenty-four thousand men under Marmont, embarked in the fleet of the Texel, and the four thousand men embarked at Brest, Napoleon could at once put in motion a total mass of one hundred-and-thirty-two thousand men, being one hundred thousand infantry, seven thousand mounted, and twelve thousand dismounted cavalry, and thirteen thousand artillery.*

It was in this formidable array that Napoleon awaited the squadron of Villeneuve.

That admiral, as we have seen, had sailed on the 30th of March from Toulon, with eleven vessels, of which two were eighty-gun ships and six frigates. Nelson was cruising near Barcelona. Endeavouring to make it believed that his intention was to remain in that neighbourhood, he had suddenly steered to the south of Sardinia, in the hope that the French, misled by the reports that he had circulated, would endeavour to avoid the coast of Spain, and so meet him by their own act. The French fleet having run out with a fair wind, and being informed of the truth by a Ragusan vessel, steered between Majorca and Minorca on the one hand, and Carthagena on the other, touched at the last-named place on the 7th of April, and lay there one day owing to a dead calm. Villeneuve offered the Spanish admiral, Salcedo, permission to join his squadron, an offer which, for want of orders, the latter could not accept; and Villeneuve, resuming his course with a favourable wind, arrived on the 9th of April at the entrance of the Straits of Gibraltar. On the same day, at noon, he entered the Straits in two columns, his frigates in advance, all his vessels cleared for action, and every thing prepared for fighting. The French fleet was perceived by the look-out at Gibraltar, the alarm-bells were rung, and the alarm-guns fired, for there was only a very weak division in the port. On the same evening, Villeneuve hove in sight of Cadiz.

Advertised by his signals, the captain of *l'Aigle* hastened to run out of port, and the brave Gravina, who had neglected nothing to be in readiness, hastened to weigh anchor to join the French admiral. But many things were still left undone at Cadiz. The two thousand five hundred Spaniards, who were to be conveyed to the colonies, were not even embarked. All the provisions were not yet on board. It would have required at least eight-and-forty hours more for admiral Gravina to have been fully ready; but Villeneuve was in a hurry to be gone, and said that he would not wait if they could not join him at

* I have taken all these numbers from the memorandum-book of the Emperor, the very book which he carried with him. This memorandum-book is deposited at the Louvre, and it alone gives the true statistics of the army of the Ocean, which are not to be found in the archives of either the war or the navy department. Consequently all military works have given incorrect numbers relatively to the composition of the army.

once. Although somewhat recovered from the anxiety of his first sortie, he was still haunted by the image of Nelson, whom he constantly fancied he saw in pursuit of him.

Gravina, deeply devoted to the projects of Napoleon, embarked *pêle-mêle*, determining to complete stowage and other arrangements at sea, and sailed out of Cadiz during the night. Such, indeed, were the hurry and confusion of this *sortie*, that one vessel actually took the ground.

About two o'clock in the morning, Villeneuve, who had been riding at a single anchor, took advantage of the wind, and resumed his course to the west. On the 11th, he was well out at sea, having escaped the dreaded observation of the English. During the 11th and 12th he awaited the Spanish ships, but only two of them hove in sight, and, being unwilling to lose any more time, he made sail, reckoning that they would rejoin him either *en route*, or at Martinique, for every commander had received information of that general rendezvous. Moreover, no one but Villeneuve knew the main destination of the squadron.

Villeneuve should now have felt reassured, and have taken some confidence in himself, for he had overcome the most serious difficulties of his undertaking, in quitting Toulon, passing the Straits, and rallying the Spaniards, without accident. But the sight of his crews filled him with vexation. He saw that they were far inferior to those of the English, and to those of France in the time of the American war. It was very natural that they should be so, seeing that they had just left port for the first time. He complained not merely of the quality of his seamen, but also of the vessels themselves, and of their equipment. Three of his ships were inferior or bad sailers: these were *le Formidable*, *l'Intrepide*, and especially *l'Atlas*. A new vessel, *le Pluton*, had bad iron work, which frequently gave way. Admiral Villeneuve was annoyed by all this, to an extent which affected his self-confidence. The Emperor's aide-de-camp, Lauriston, had made every effort to cheer him, but to little purpose. For the rest, he had excellent captains, who, as far as possible, made amends for the inexperience of the crews and the defects of the fleet. Villeneuve was not consoled until he saw the condition of the Spanish ships, which were inferior to his own. However, the voyage though retarded by their slow sailers, which is not uncommon when sailing in a squadron, appeared a fortunate one, and continued without accident.

Nelson, outwitted, had in the first instance gone in pursuit of the French squadron to the south, and to the east of the Mediterranean. He had learned, on the 16th of April, that the French squadron had steered for the Straits, had been detained by westerly winds till the 30th, had anchored, on the 10th of May, in the bay of Lagos, and, after detaching one of his ships to escort a convoy, he had not made the ocean till the

11th of May, to sail for the West Indies, whither he supposed our squadron to have steered.

At this period, Villeneuve had very nearly reached his destination, for, on the 14th of May, he made Martinique, having been six weeks on the passage. On touching there, he had the gratification of being rejoined by the four Spanish sail which had parted company with the squadron, and which arrived nearly at the same time that he did. It was a great advantage, and he ought now to have felt a little more confidence in his fortune, which hitherto had been uniformly favourable.

This voyage had been of great service. It had given experience to the crews. As the weather had been moderate, the rigging too had been put into ship-shape. "*We are,*" wrote general Lauriston to the Emperor, "*stronger by one-third than we were when we sailed.*"*

A fleet already disciplined and practised, gains nothing by a voyage of twelve or fifteen hundred leagues the more, but a fleet which has never before been out of sight of port, will, in such a voyage, acquire the main of the instruction it required, and such was the case with ours.

Admiral Villeneuve, alarmed at his responsibility, and not setting due value upon any of the advantages which he at the same time enjoyed, considered that we were destitute of so many requisites that some improvements, made on the passage, would not suffice to supply our deficiencies. He had the folly, like a man whose moral courage is shaken, to exaggerate the merit of the enemy, and to under-rate that of his own men. He said that with twenty French or Spanish ships he would not venture to offer battle to fourteen sail of English, and this language he held in the presence of his own officers. Fortunately, the soldiers and sailors, full of zeal, were not so much impressed as their commander with the insufficiency of our means, but full of confidence in their own courage, ardently desired to engage the enemy. General Lauriston, whom the Emperor had attached to Villeneuve, that he might sustain and excite him, fulfilled his duty with untiring zeal, but rather contributed to vex and irritate him by contradiction. Gravina, simple, sensible, and full of energy, agreed with Villeneuve as to the quality of his squadron,

* All our vessels are in good order, and in better order, in my opinion, than when we first sailed from Toulon. The moderate weather has afforded the opportunity of setting up the rigging by degrees; notwithstanding this, the chains, and generally speaking, all the iron work of the *Pluton* and of the *Hermione* are of such bad quality, as well as the masts and spars, that many of them have been sprung.

At present, every thing is refitted; the sailors have learned a great deal; there is a sensible difference in the working of the ships; *we are stronger by one-third than at the moment of our first sailing.*—*Letter of General Lauriston to the Emperor.*

but with Lauriston, as to the necessity of unwavering devotion, and was resolved, if necessary, to sacrifice his own existence in carrying out the designs of Napoleon.

Now that they had escaped all the perils of the voyage, it was necessary to wait forty days at Martinique, for the arrival of Ganteaume, unaware of his detention at Brest by that rare occurrence, an equinox without a single gale. Villeneuve, then, having arrived at Martinique on the 11th of May, had to remain in those latitudes until the 23rd of June, and he reflected, with vexation, that that was a space of time even more than sufficient to allow of his being overtaken by Nelson, and blockaded in Martinique, or beaten if he ventured out.

His orders were, to wait for Ganteaume, which implied a sort of inaction; and, like all men who are ill at ease, he wished to be in motion. He complained of being unable to go and ravage the islands of the English, which, but for his orders, he easily could have done with twenty sail. To pass away the time they took the Diamond fort, which is in front of Martinique, and which admiral Missiessy, to the great regret of Napoleon, had neglected to capture. It was cannonaded by several ships, and then some hundreds of men landed from the boats, and carried it by assault. They now would fain have completed the occupation of Dominica, by the capture of the Bluff of Cabry, of which, also, admiral Missiessy had neglected to make himself master; but this position, strongly defended by nature and art, required a regular siege, and that they could not venture to undertake. Villeneuve sent his frigates, which were excellent, and fast sailers, to cruise in the Archipelago, to make prizes, and procure him tidings of the enemy.

They had brought troops; Missiessy had also brought some; there were about 12,000 men in the French Islands. Such a force would have sufficed for the execution of important operations, but they could not be ventured upon, from the fear of missing Ganteaume. For the rest, the French islands were in the best condition, garrisoned, provided with munitions, and, thanks to the privateers, with abundance of provisions, and moreover, animated by the best spirit. However, to prevent the crews from further contracting the sickness which had begun to prevail among them from their stay in this climate, and also with the view of preventing desertion, to which the Spaniards showed a strong inclination, it was determined to attempt a *coup de main* upon Barbadoes, where the English had important military establishments. It was in that island, in fact, that they kept all the *depôts* of their colonial troops. General Lauriston had brought with him an excellent division of five thousand men, organised and equipped with the greatest care. It was intended for this service. General Lauriston determined to go by Guadaloupe to embark another battalion there, for it was expected he would find some ten thousand men at Barbadoes, half

militia, and half troops of the line. It was determined, then, to set out on the 4th of June; but on the very day appointed, rear-admiral Magon arrived with the two vessels, from Rochefort, which Napoleon had despatched to convey the first tidings of the change which had taken place in his projects. Magon brought word, that as Ganteaume had not been able to get out of Brest, it was necessary to go and release from blockade not only him, but also the Ferrol squadron, and, after rallying the fleets which were in those parts, to steer in a body for the Channel. However, he, at the same time, brought orders for remaining at Martinique till the 21st of June, as, up to the 21st of May, it was possible that Ganteaume might get out of Brest, in which case, allowing a month for the passage to Martinique, it could not be definitively known until the 21st of June, whether that admiral had sailed or not. There was sufficient time, therefore, for executing the project against Barbadoes. Magon had brought troops and munitions in his ships. He joined the squadron, now twenty-seven sail strong, fourteen being French sail of the line, six Spanish sail of the line, and seven frigates. On the 6th of June they reached Guadaloupe, here they embarked a battalion; on the 7th they had got as far as Antigua, on the 8th they had got clear of that island, which had incessantly fired upon them, when they came in sight of a convoy of fifteen sail which had left Antigua. They were merchantmen, laden with colonial produce, and convoyed only by a corvette.

The admiral instantly gave the signal to give chase, *according to sailing*, as the sailors have it; that is to say, that each vessel should do its best, and take the rank that it could get by its speed. Before evening the convoy was taken. It was of the value of from nine to ten millions of francs. Some American and Italian passengers gave intelligence of Nelson. They stated that he had arrived at Barbadoes, as they left that island. They varied as to the strength of his squadron. But he had been joined by admiral Cochrane, who guarded those seas. This intelligence produced an extraordinary effect upon the mind of admiral Villeneuve. He fancied he saw Nelson, with fourteen, sixteen, perhaps even eighteen sail; that is to say, with a force nearly equal to his own, ready to come up with him, and give him battle. On the instant he formed the determination of returning to Europe. Lauriston, on the contrary, resting upon the assertion of the prisoners, which gave only two sail to Cochrane, leading to the supposition that Nelson had at most only fourteen, maintained that with twenty we were able to fight him to advantage, and that, after having rid ourselves of his pursuit, by a battle, our expedition would be far more secure of success. Villeneuve was not of this opinion, but would absolutely make sail for Europe. So much in haste was he, that he would not even return to the French islands, to reland the troops he had embarked thence. To do this, it would

have been necessary to beat up against the wind that blows from east to west, along the Antilles, and they were now at Antigua, far to the west of Martinique. Ten days, perhaps, would have been lost, and they would have run the risk of meeting with the English. He, therefore, determined to select his four best frigates, to put as many troops on board them as he could, and to despatch them for Martinique. He gave them orders to rejoin the squadron at the Western Islands. But there still remained some four or five thousand troops on board, and these were a very embarrassing freight. By keeping them, he would deprive the colonies of a very valuable force, which it was very difficult to send to them from the mother country, besides having so many more mouths to feed, which was very vexatious, seeing that he was somewhat short of provisions, and had barely water enough for the passage. Further, there was the risk of missing Ganteaume, as it was, as yet, uncertain whether he had left Brest for Martinique. In point of fact, they were right in supposing that Ganteaume had not set out, but they did not certainly know it, and the course proposed was, therefore, a serious blunder. To these objections Villeneuve replied, that if Ganteaume had set out, it was so much the better; that in that case they would not have to raise the blockade of Brest, but could pass that port without difficulty, and enter the Channel at once.

Villeneuve at once formed his determination, put all the troops that he could on board the frigates, and sent them to Martinique. Unwilling either to hamper himself with the convoy, or to lose it, he gave it in charge to another frigate, to escort it to one of the French islands. On the 10th of June he was on his passage to Europe. His resolution, though censurable in principle, was not bad in effect, provided he returned to Martinique to land his troops, to revictual and to take in water, and to receive tidings from Europe.

Nelson, whom he so much dreaded, had arrived at Barbadoes early in June, after a prodigiously rapid voyage, sailing fearlessly with only nine ships. Imagining that the French intended to retake Trinidad from the Spaniards, he had embarked two thousand men at Barbadoes, rallied the two vessels of admiral Cochrane, and, without staying to revictual or refit, on the 7th he was in the Gulf of Paria, before Trinidad. There he discovered his error, set sail again, and on the 10th made Grenada. He prepared to return to Barbadoes; to land there the troops he had needlessly brought thence, and to return to Europe with eleven sail. What activity! what energy! It is a new proof, that in war—and in war by sea still more than in war by land—the quality of the forces is always of more consequence than their number. Nelson, with but eleven sail, was full of confidence, on those seas on which Villeneuve trembled with twenty sail, and those manned by heroic sailors!

Villeneuve steered for Europe, bearing to the north-west with pretty favourable weather. On making the Western islands, on the 30th of June, he there found his frigates, which had occupied but four days in landing their troops, and which had not fallen in with the English, showing that Villeneuve might safely have done the same. The four detached frigates had fallen in with the fifth, which was escorting the captured convoy, and could not conduct it. They had therefore determined to burn it, which involved a loss of ten millions of francs. All had then assembled at the Western isles, and Villeneuve now resumed his voyage with the twenty ships and seven frigates, shaping his course towards the coast of Spain. They were repaid for the loss of the burned convoy by the capture of a rich galleon from Lima, laden with dollars to the amount of from seven to eight millions (280,000*l.* to 320,000*l.* sterling). It was a resource which soon became very valuable. Suddenly, at the commencement of July, when they were sixty leagues from cape Finisterre, the wind shifted to the north-east, and became entirely against them. They began to tack, in order to gain time without being driven back. But the wind continued in the same quarter, and became so violent that several vessels were damaged; some even losing their top-masts. The two ships that had come from Rochefort under Magon, had brought the fever with them from Charente. They were crowded with sick. The troops who had been carried from Europe to America, and from America to Europe, almost without touching land, were attacked by sickness of all sorts. Misery reigned throughout the squadron. Eighteen hours of a contrary wind completed that misery, and helped still further to depress the courage of admiral Villeneuve. He wanted to go to Cadiz, that is to say, directly away from the point at which Napoleon expected him, and to which his instructions directed him. Lauriston resisted as strongly as possible, and at length prevailed over him. The wind, too, having shifted about the 20th of July, they again made for Ferrol.

The bad weather had caused two misfortunes: the first, the depression of the moral courage of both the squadron and its commander; and the second, giving intelligence of its course to the British admiralty. Nelson had despatched in advance of him the brig *Le Curieux*, to convey to England the bulletin of his passage. This brig had seen the French squadron, and, making all sail, had arrived at Portsmouth on the 7th of July. On the 8th, the despatch had been delivered at the Admiralty. Though still unaware of the precise object of the French squadron, yet thinking it likely that it was to raise the blockade of Ferrol, the admiralty had ordered admiral Sterling, who was detached from the blockade of Brest to watch Rochefort, to take five sail, and join Calder, who was cruising off cape Finisterre. The length of time which had elapsed since Napoleon thought of his

grand naval plan, the various sorties that had been recently attempted, the departure of Villeneuve, his passage to Cadiz, his junction with Gravina, his return to Europe, where two fleets, for a long time ready to sail, seemed to be waiting for him to raise their blockade; all these circumstances had at length by degrees led the English, at the least, vaguely, to surmise a part of the projects of Napoleon. They did not exactly contemplate a junction of the French squadrons in the Channel, but they resolved to prevent the raising of the blockade of Ferrol or of Brest, which appeared to them to be the probable design. Accordingly, they had increased the blockading squadron of Cornwallis before Brest to twenty-four sail, of which five were detached to watch Rochefort, and that of Ferrol to ten. The latter was about to have fourteen or fifteen sail by the junction of the division of Rochefort. Every delay is a misfortune for a project which requires secresy. It gives the enemy time to reflect, sometimes to guess by dint of reflecting, and frequently thus to receive such indications as end by putting him on the right scent.

On the 22nd of July, Villeneuve, sailing in three columns, was making for Ferrol, that is to say, to the north-east, with a tolerable north-west wind on his quarter. Towards the middle of the day he saw twenty-four sail, of which fifteen were ships of the line; it was admiral Calder's English squadron coming up in the opposite direction to meet him, and cut him off from Ferrol. They were forty leagues from that port.

There was not much room to doubt that a battle must take place. Villeneuve no longer thought of avoiding it; for it was responsibility, and by no means danger, of which he was afraid; but, still worn out with anxieties, he lost some precious time in ranging himself for battle. General Lauriston, urging him incessantly, pressed him to give at eleven o'clock in the morning the orders which he did not give until one. The best part of the day was thus wasted, which there was soon good reason to regret. The vessels of the two combined squadrons consumed two hours in forming in order of battle, and it was not until three o'clock in the afternoon that the twenty French and Spanish ships were brought into a regular line, the Spaniards forming the head of the column, and Magon, with the Rochefort division and several frigates, its rear. The English admiral, Calder, with fifteen ships of the line, several of them carrying a hundred guns, while the strongest of ours were only of eighty, in his turn ranged up for battle, and formed a long line parallel to ours, but advancing in the opposite direction. The English bearing to the south-west, and we to the north-west, and the wind blowing from the north-west, both squadrons had it on their quarter. Each bearing down, and in opposite directions, they would speedily have ended by avoiding each other, when Calder directed the head of his column

against the rear of our line in order to break it. Villeneuve, to whom danger restored the resolution of a man of courage, perceiving that the English admiral, according to a manœuvre often repeated in our days, wished to break our line, so as to place it between two fires, imitated the manœuvre of his enemy, and coming, as seamen say, *luff by luff by the stern way*, brought off the rear of this column, and presented its head to the head of that of the enemy. In this double movement, the two squadrons meeting, the first Spanish vessel, the *Argonaut*, with admiral Gravina on board, found itself engaged with the first English vessel, the Hero. English and French, following up this movement, were speedily engaged from one end of the line to the other. But the English squadron being less numerous than ours, the fire did not reach on one side further than to the thirteenth or fourteenth vessel. Our rear-guard, without an enemy before it, and merely receiving some stray shots, now was the time for some decisive manœuvre. Unfortunately, a heavy fog, which at this moment prevailed over several hundred leagues, for it was visible at Brest, obscured the two fleets to such a degree that the English admiral was for some time unaware whether he had an enemy on the starboard or on the larboard side. Each ship could perceive only the one that was opposite to it, and fought only that. A smart and well-sustained, but not quick cannonading ensued. The French and Spaniards, notwithstanding their inexperience, fought coolly, and in good order. Our crews had not attained to that precision of fire which now distinguishes them; nevertheless, in this kind of duel, of ship to ship, the English suffered as much as we did; and if our rear, which had no enemy to engage it, could have discovered what was passing, and had doubled upon the English line, so as to place part of it between two fires, the victory would have been secured to us. Villeneuve, making nothing out through the fog, had difficulty in giving his orders. Magon, it is true, had made his inaction known to Villeneuve; but this information, owing to the state of the atmosphere, having been transmitted, not by signals, but by frigates, arrived too late, and induced no determination on the part of the French admiral, who, after a momentary decision at the commencement of the battle, had relapsed into his customary indecision, fearing to act in the dark lest he should make false movements. All that he ventured upon was to fight his flagship gallantly.

After a long cannonade the English ship, the Windsor, had suffered so severely, that a frigate was obliged to tow her out of the line of battle to prevent her from falling into our hands. Other English vessels had also been much damaged. The French vessels, on the contrary, though they stood up gallantly, had been fortunate enough to escape serious damage. Our Spanish allies, who formed the first third of the line of battle,

had suffered much more, without being at all in fault. Their three ships nearest to us, *l'España*, the *San Firmo*, and the *San Rafaël* were in a sad condition. The *San Firmo*, especially, had lost two masts. As the wind blew from us to the English these vessels, being unable to manœuvre, were drifting towards the enemy. Seeing this, the brave captain of the *Pluton*, M. de Cosmao, lying nearest to the Spaniards, quitted the line, and advanced to cover with his ship the disabled Spanish vessels. The *San Rafaël*, a slow sailer, and the first of the three Spaniards thus drifting, endeavoured to let herself run between the two lines towards the rear-guard, in the hope of escaping by this movement. The *San Firmo*, which had suffered more, was in vain protected by M. de Cosmao, who could not prevent her from going to leeward, and thus falling into the hands of the English. M. de Cosmao succeeded in saving *l'España*, which, thanks to him, was kept in our line. About six o'clock a gleam of clear weather disclosed this spectacle to admiral Villeneuve. The *San Rafaël* was seen escaping to the rear-guard, and the *San Firmo*, already surrounded by enemies, driving gradually towards the English squadron. As they fought at long shot, there was sufficient space between the two to allow of a forward movement, by which movement our disabled vessels would again have made part of our line. General Lauriston kept by the side of Villeneuve, and he heard the officers of the squadron proposing that movement. He therefore advised him to make the signal for bearing up all together, that is to say, for sailing before the wind, which, blowing towards the English, would have enabled us to come up with our endangered vessels. We should have been nearer to the enemy, and he, damaged and inferior in number, would probably have given way before this offensive movement. Villeneuve, in consequence of the fog, seeing but imperfectly what was passing, and fearing to derange his line of battle, and to run new risks, preferred the loss of two ships to the chance of recommencing the action. He consequently refused to give the order, which was solicited on all hands. By this time night was coming on, and the firing had almost ceased. The English drew off, towing with them two of their ships which were much shattered by the fire, and the two Spaniards that were abandoned to them by our blunder.

As for us, we had suffered but little; there was not one of our crews that was not ready to recommence the fight, and who did not believe himself a conqueror on seeing the enemy withdraw. The loss of the two Spanish vessels was unknown in the fleet.

All night the English were visible far away to leeward, with lights astern, busied in repairing damages.

The same was done on our side. At daybreak the situation of the two squadrons was clearly discernible. The English were retreating, but carrying off the two Spanish vessels

with them. Grief and exasperation became general on board our vessels. The crews asked to renew the action, and fight a decisive battle. The wind was in our favour, as on the previous evening, blowing from us towards the English. If at this instant Villeneuve had given the signal to bear down upon the enemy, without any other order of battle than the order of speed in sailing, fourteen of the eighteen vessels we still possessed, being of an equal rate of speed, would have fallen upon the English at once; the other four would have arrived soon afterwards, and the battle would certainly have been in our favour. Roused by the cry which arose among all the officers, Villeneuve at length gave orders for that movement, and went with Lauriston on board the frigate *l'Hortense*, to give his orders verbally to each chief of division. The *Argonaut*, the Spanish admiral's ship, having sprung her mizen-top-yard, required time to fish it. Villeneuve would wait for her, which took till near noon. Then he commenced the chase; but the wind had slackened, and he saw the English steal away from him without his being able to gain much upon them even under a press of canvass. Imagining that he should not overtake them until night, he waited till morning, in order to fight by daylight. But on the morrow the wind had shifted to the north-east, that is to say, in the very contrary direction. The English now had the weather gage; to come up with them was difficult. Villeneuve had now good reason to halt. In pursuing the contrary course he would have been getting further and further from Ferrol, and have run the risk of finding the English reinforced, and thus for two damaged and captured vessels, have sacrificed his main object, the raising the Ferrol blockade and pursuing his mission.

Thus ended the battle, which might have been taken for a victory on our side but for the loss of the two Spanish ships. The crews, notwithstanding their inexperience, had fought bravely and well; but, on the other hand, the fog, which had increased the natural indecision of admiral Villeneuve, his exaggerated want of confidence in himself and in his seamen, had paralysed the resources that he had at his command, and prevented this battle from ending in a brilliant victory. There, as in so many naval battles, one wing of our fleet did not aid the other; but, on this occasion, it was not the fault of the wing that remained inactive, for rear-admiral Magon was not the officer who would willingly keep out of fire. In the first moments after the battle, Villeneuve was almost happy that he had met the English without experiencing a disaster; but having left the scene of action, and having had time for reflection, his discouragement and habitual melancholy deepened into a profound grief. In his imagination, he saw himself exposed to the censure of Napoleon and of public opinion for having lost two ships while fighting with twenty against fifteen. He believed himself disgraced, and was a prey to a kind of depression that

bordered upon despair. The severe judgment of his people, who openly complained of his want of resolution, and were loud in their praise of the bravery and decision of admiral Gravina, cut him to the heart's core. To complete his misfortune, the wind, which for two days had been favourable, had now become contrary again. To the sick, whose numbers had increased, the wounded had now to be added. There were not the necessary refreshments for them, and there was only water for five or six days. Thus situated, he again wanted to proceed to Cadiz. Lauriston again opposed this course: they split the difference, and ran into Vigo.

This port was far from being secure, and, moreover, had no great resources to offer. However, succour was found there for the sick and wounded. Three vessels, one French, *l'Atlas*, and two Spanish, *l'America* and *l'España*, were such heavy sailers that they could not keep up with the squadron. The *Atlas* was turned into an hospital, into which the sick and wounded were conveyed. General Lauriston had brought with him, for the use of his division, the necessaries for a field hospital; and he employed it for the succour of the sailors who were left at Vigo. The treasure of the Spanish galleon was now in part, employed in supplying the various wants of the squadron. Fresh provisions and water for a month were laid in, wages were paid to the whole squadron; and having somewhat reanimated the men's spirits, no difficult matter with sailors of a lively temperament, they set sail again after a stay of five days, which had been serviceable. The wind not being foul, the squadron stood up from Vigo to Ferrol, and, on the 2nd of August, entered the open roadstead which separates Ferrol from Corunna.

The moment the French squadron hove in sight, the consular agents, who were stationed on the shore by the orders of Napoleon, communicated to admiral Villeneuve the orders which awaited him. These orders enjoined him not to enter Ferrol, which was difficult of egress; barely to allow himself time to rally the two divisions which awaited the junction, and then to proceed to Brest. Villeneuve transmitted this order to Gravina; but the latter was already in the pass, and could not retrograde, and a part of the squadron entered with him. The rest, obeying Villeneuve, brought up opposite, that is to say, at Corunna.

This separation placed the two squadrons at three or four leagues distance from each other. The greatest evil that could result from it was the loss of three or four days in getting out again. This loss would have been greatly to be regretted with an admiral who was not in the habit of losing days at a stretch; but with Villeneuve it was of minor importance.

That admiral found at Corunna the pressing orders of Napoleon, his encouraging words, and his magnificent promises, as well as the private communications of the minister Decrès, the friend of his boyhood. The Emperor and the minister both urged him

not to remain for an instant, to hasten to Brest, and give battle to Cornwallis, at the risk even of annihilation, provided that Ganteaume succeeded in getting out safe and sound, and to rally what might remain entire of the squadron after he had raised the blockade of Brest. All these things, for a moment, revived the spirits and courage of Villeneuve. The little consequence that Napoleon attached to the sacrifice of ships, provided only that a fleet should arrive in the Channel, greatly tended to reassure him. Had he rightly comprehended the task entrusted to him, he would have been gratified, rather than depressed. After all, if the enemy had captured two vessels from him in the late battle, he had regained Ferrol safe and sound, escaped the enemies' squadrons, and eluded the precautions of the English Admiralty. Of the two admirals, the English and the French, Calder, not Villeneuve, was the most ill-treated by fortune; for Villeneuve had achieved his object, and Calder had failed in his. Deducting the two vessels which had been taken, and the three which had been left at Vigo, he had now twenty-nine French and Spanish vessels assembled at Ferrol, which might at any moment be increased to thirty-four by the division of Lallemand, and would then be strong enough to attempt to raise the blockade of Brest. Moreover, the English Admiralty itself, and Napoleon, were of the same opinion; the Admiralty sent admiral Calder before a court-martial, and Napoleon publicly addressed great praises to Villeneuve, for having fulfilled his mission, said he, although two ships remained in the hands of the enemy.

What fear, then, could an officer conceive for his reputation, to whom an all-powerful master, disposing of the reputation and the fortunes of his lieutenants, constantly said: "Give battle, risk all, lose all, provided only that your efforts open the port of Brest." But it seems that there was a sort of fatality attached to this unfortunate seaman, to disturb his spirit, and to lead him from pang to pang to the result which he fain would have shunned, that is to say, to losing a great battle, and losing it without obtaining the only result that Napoleon demanded of him, that of being four-and-twenty hours in the Channel.

Nevertheless, he felt some consolation on seeing the division of rear-admiral Gourdon, which division had sailed some time previously to being shut up in Ferrol, had been carefully repaired and completed, and merited every confidence. He saw with no less satisfaction, nine Spanish ships equipped by admiral de Grandellana, and far superior to those of admiral Gravina, because that time had been bestowed upon equipping them, which could not be spared for those which had sailed from Cadiz. "Would to Heaven," wrote Villeneuve, when he had compared the division of Ferrol and that of Cadiz, "that the Spanish squadron (*l'Argonaut*, and the line-of-battle ship *l'Atlas*, alone excepted, had never made part of my squadron. Those vessels are abso

lutely fit for nothing but to peril their consorts. They alone have brought us to the lowest depths of misfortune." This language shows how deeply Villeneuve's feelings were shocked, since he characterises as "the lowest depths of misfortune," a cruise which, thus far, had fulfilled the object prescribed by Napoleon, and which had even won him the approbation of a master who was not easily pleased.

Villeneuve was now concerned only about what awaited him on quitting Ferrol. He imagined that Calder would be at him again, reinforced by Nelson or Cornwallis, and that a new battle awaited him, in which he might reasonably look for destruction. Letters from Cadiz informed him, in fact, that Nelson had returned to Europe, that he had been seen at Gibraltar, but that he had steered for the ocean, in order to form a junction with Calder before Ferrol, or with Cornwallis before Brest. The truth is, that Nelson, sailing with prodigious speed, had touched at Gibraltar towards the end of July, at the very epoch when Villeneuve gave battle to Calder; that he had repassed the Straits, and strove against contrary winds to get into the Channel; that he had only eleven sail; that he had rallied neither Calder nor Cornwallis, and that his intention, after two years' constant sailing, was to go into harbour for a short time to revictual his exhausted division. Villeneuve was unaware of these facts; but he knew his orders, which for a man of courage were easy of execution, since he was not ordered to conquer, but to fight as long as he had a ship to swim, in order to raise the blockade of Brest. If, before Brest, he should be seconded by Ganteaume, it was not likely that the battle, fought with fifty-five sail against twenty or twenty-five, would be a lost battle. If, on the contrary, the weather or other circumstances should prevent Ganteaume from taking part in the action, Villeneuve, in fighting desperately, even to the utter destruction of his fleet, would render it impossible for Cornwallis to remain at sea and continue the blockade, and Ganteaume, rallying to his fleet the remains of a fleet gloriously vanquished, could still command the Channel for some days. That was all that Napoleon demanded of his admirals.

Unfortunately, Villeneuve had made port. All the captains of the vessels that had been in the action were anxious to refit. They would have sailed for another month or two had they been kept out at sea; but, being within reach of a grand arsenal, they all found some damage to repair. Masts were replaced, rigging refitted, leaks were to be stopped; the surplus stores of some ships were to be removed to others. The whole squadron was thus detained for forty-five days. Owing to the Spanish dearth, it had not been possible to execute at Ferrol the orders of Napoleon, to have biscuit, to the number of two or three millions of rations, in each port. But they would find biscuit at Brest, at Cherbourg, and at Boulogne. Moreover, forty-five days suf-

ficed. At length, on the 10th of August, they prepared to weigh anchor. Villeneuve stationed himself off Corunna, in the bay of Ares, waiting for Gravina and the second Spanish division to run out of Ferrol, which was no easy matter, on account of the wind. He waited three days, which he employed in worrying himself. He wrote thus to the minister Decrès: "I am made the arbiter of vast interests; my despair redoubles with the confidence shown me, because I see no prospect of success, take what course I may. It is quite evident to me that the navies of France and Spain can do nothing in great squadrons. Divisions of three, four, or five vessels, are, at the utmost, all that we are capable of commanding. Let Ganteaume put to sea, and he will judge for himself. *As regards the public, the question will be decided.*

"I am about to sail; but I know not what I shall do. Eight vessels remain in sight of the coast, at eight leagues off. They will follow us; I cannot wait for them; and they will go and join the squadrons before Brest or Cadiz, according as I steer for the one or for the other of those two ports. No doubt it is thought that, sailing hence with twenty-nine sail, I am considered able to fight vessels of any thing like the same number; I am not afraid to confess to you, that I should be very sorry to meet with twenty. Our naval tactics are out of date; we only know how to range ourselves in line, and that is precisely what the enemy wishes for. I have neither time nor means to agree upon another system with the commanders of the vessels of the two nations. * * * I foresaw all this before I left Toulon; but all my delusions did not vanish until the day on which I saw the Spanish ships which are joined to mine * * then I was obliged to despair of every thing."

At the moment of sailing, the fever broke out again in the vessels from Rochefort, *l'Algesiras* and *l'Achille;* some Spanish vessels ran foul of each other on leaving Ferrol, breaking their bowsprits and tearing their sails. These accidents, of no consequence in themselves, yet, being added to all the mishaps that Villeneuve had already experienced, completed his despair. Ready, at length, to set sail, he gave his orders to captain Lallemand. The latter, with an excellent division of five ships of the line and several frigates, was to touch at Vigo on the 15th or 16th of August. It would have been sufficient for Villeneuve to have taken his whole squadron thither, to rally that division, and thus procure a considerable augmentation of his strength; but not venturing to move, still haunted by the fear of Nelson, he sent an officer to captain Lallemand, and directed him to repair to Brest, without letting such that he would go thither himself; thus exposing this division to destruction should it arrive there alone. He wrote to admiral Decrès a despatch, in which, exposing all the distress of his soul, he manifested an inclination to steer for Cadiz rather than for Brest. To Lauriston,

whose troublesome presence reminded him of the Emperor, he said that they would proceed to Brest. Lauriston, grieved to see him in such a state of mind, delighted with his professed determination, wrote to the Emperor by a courier, whom he despatched from Ferrol, that at length they were going to Brest, and from Brest into the Channel.

In the midst of these deplorable anxieties, Villeneuve departed from Corunna, and lost sight of land during the day of the 14th. To crown his misfortunes, a pretty strong north-easterly wind came on, and prevented his making much progress towards his destination. Melancholy consequence of a want of confidence, which often makes us neglect the most splendid favours of fortune! At that very moment, Calder and Nelson were not united near Ferrol as Villeneuve feared. Nelson, after having vainly sought after the French at Cadiz, had returned northward, had long to beat up against the same north-easterly wind that then prevailed, and had at length rejoined Cornwallis before Brest, on the very day, the 14th of August, when the French squadron put out from Ferrol. He left with Cornwallis the few vessels which could still keep the sea, and went with the others to refit at Portsmouth, where he arrived on the 18th of August. Calder, on his part, after the battle of Ferrol, had rejoined Cornwallis with his damaged fleet. A part of his vessels were despatched to the Channel ports to refit. Cornwallis had immediately composed for him another division of seventeen or eighteen sail, and had sent him back to Ferrol, keeping at the most only eighteen sail to blockade Brest. Calder then, returned, to find Ferrol evacuated. If Villeneuve, regaining a little confidence, had rallied Lallemand at Vigo, and proceeded by open sea to the Channel, he would have crossed, without encountering Calder, who would have gone to blockade the empty Ferrol; he would have surprised Cornwallis, separated from Nelson and Calder, and with, at the most, seventeen or eighteen sail, and have attacked him with thirty-five, without reckoning the twenty-one of Ganteaume. What an opportunity was lost to him by his want of energy! For the rest, general Lauriston overwhelmed him with the most urgent persuasions; a momentary shifting of the wind, a momentary revival of the depressed spirits of Villeneuve, and the grand idea of Napoleon might yet have been realised!

It would not be easy to imagine the impatience with which Napoleon was racked upon that coast of Boulogne, where he every instant expected the appearance of his fleets, and the so much coveted opportunity of invading England. All his forces were embarked, from the Texel to [illegible]s. At the Texel, the horses of the artillery and of the cavalry had been many weeks on board. The troops, without an exception, were on board the boats. The line squadron, charged with convoying the forces, only awaited the signal to weigh anchor. In the four ports of Ambleteuse, Vimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples, the one hundred and thirty

thousand men intended to pass in the flat-bottomed boats had several times been put under arms. They had been marched to the quays, and all made to take their respective places on the boats. The time necessary for this operation was thus ascertained. At Ambleteuse, the men of Davoust's corps had been embarked in a quarter of an hour, and the horses in an hour and a half. It had been the same at Etaples and Boulogne, allowing for the different number of men and horses.

All, then, was ready, when Napoleon at length received tidings of the battle of Ferrol, of the putting in at Vigo, and of the entering of Corunna. Whatever displeasure he felt at the moral condition of Villeneuve, however sternly he judged his conduct, he, nevertheless, was gratified by the whole result, and by his orders all the gazettes contained an account of the sea-fight, with the most flattering praises of Villeneuve, and of the two combined squadrons. The loss of the two vessels appeared to him to be a mere accident, attributable to the fog; to be regretted, doubtless, but of very minor importance compared to the result obtained, that of the entrance of Vigo, and the junction of the two fleets.*

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* The following letters were written upon the subject by Napoleon to admiral Villeneuve, and the Emperor's aide-de-camp, general Lauriston:

To admiral Villeneuve.

Boulogne, 25th Thermidor, year XIII. (13th of August, 1805).

VICE-ADMIRAL VILLENEUVE:

I perceive with pleasure, by the battle of the 3rd Thermidor, that several of my ships have borne themselves with the bravery that I anticipated from them. I am much pleased with the admirable manœuvre which you executed at the beginning of the action, and which baffled the designs of the enemy. I could have desired that you had employed your numerous frigates in aiding the Spanish ships, which, being the first engaged, must necessarily have been most in need of support. I could equally have desired that on the day after the action, you had not given the enemy time to place his ships—the Windsor Castle and Malta, in safety,—as well as the two Spanish ships which, having lost their rigging, must have been heavy and embarrassing sailers. This would have given to my arms the *éclat* of a grand victory. The tardiness of this manœuvre left the English time to send them into their ports. But I am justified in concluding that the victory remained on my side, since you have entered Corunna. I hope that this despatch will not find you there; that you will have repulsed the enemy's squadron, so that you may effect your junction with captain Lallemand, sweep away every thing that you find before you, and come into the Channel, where we await you with great impatience. If you have not done so, do it. Bear down boldly upon the enemy. The preferable order of battle appears to me to intermix the French and Spanish vessels, and to station behind each Spanish vessel frigates to aid them in the battle, and thus turn your numerous frigates to useful purpose. You can still further increase their number by means of *la Guerrière* and *la Revanche*, and that without retarding your operations. You at this time have under your command eighteen of our ships, and twelve, or, at the least, ten of those of the king of Spain. It is my desire, that wherever the enemy presents himself before you with fewer than twenty-four vessels, you give him battle.

By the return of the frigate *le President*, and of several others that I had despatched to you at Martinique, I have learned that, instead of your having

Now, he no longer doubted that Villeneuve would make his appearance at Brest. Ganteaume was at Bertheaume, that is to say, outside the inner roadstead, in face of the open sea, and supported by a hundred-and-fifty cannon, ranged in battery upon the coast. Nothing short of a concatenation of misfortunes could prevent Ganteaume from taking part in the attack of the blockade; and the French, having a force of fifty sail, twenty-nine under Villeneuve and twenty-one under Ganteaume, from scattering the enemy from their path, and entering the Channel with thirty or forty sail, even should they lose ten or twenty.

"You clearly perceive," said Napoleon to Decrès, who was with him at Boulogne, "that notwithstanding a host of blunders and unfavourable accidents, the plan, as a whole, is essentially so good, that all the advantages are still on our side, and that we are on the eve of success." Decrès, who was in the secret of the misgivings of Villeneuve, and who shared his doubts of fortune, was not so tranquil. "All this is possible," he replied, "for all

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landed troops in those islands, they are weaker than they were before. Nevertheless, Nelson had but nine sail. The English are not so numerous as you seem to imagine. They are everywhere in a state of uncertainty and alarm. Should you make your appearance here for three days, nay, even for twenty-four hours, your mission would be fulfilled. Make the moment of your departure known to admiral Ganteaume by an extraordinary courier. Never for a grander object did a squadron run such risks, and never have our soldiers and seamen poured out their blood for a grander and nobler result. For this great object of forwarding the descent upon that power which for six centuries has oppressed France, we may all die without regretting the sacrifice of life. Such are the sentiments which should animate you, and which should animate all my soldiers. England has in the Downs only four ships of the line, which we daily harass with our praams and our flotillas.

And with this, &c.

On the 14th of August he is still bent, and even more than ever bent, upon the expedition, although Decrès thought otherwise.

To general Lauriston.

Boulogne, 25th Thermidor, year XIII. (14th of August, 1805).

I have received, general Lauriston, your two letters of the 9th and 11th Thermidor. I hope that this letter will find you no longer at Ferrol, but that the squadron will have set sail and proceeded to its destination. I do not understand why you have not left the 67th and the 16th regiments at Martinique and at Guadaloupe. It was very distinctly expressed in your instructions. The consequence is, that after so extended an expedition I have not even the pleasure of seeing my islands secure from all attack. There are only 3000 men there now, and after Vendémiaire there will only be 2500. I hope that Villeneuve will not allow himself to be blockaded by a squadron inferior to his own. Aid and urge the admiral as much as you possibly can. Arrange with him about the troops that you have on board, and send me an exact account of their condition; you can leave them on board. If the admiral deem fit you can land them and form them into a division.

Take measures for forming a depôt of the men whom you have landed at Vigo, whither an officer was sent in the supposition that Villeneuve had not made his appearance on the 20th Thermidor. *We are ready everywhere. Your presence in the Channel for twenty-four hours will suffice.*

With this, &c.

this has been perfectly calculated; but if this fall out to our hopes, I shall see the finger of God in our success! However, it has so often been visible in the operations of your majesty, that I should not be surprised to behold it in them once more."*

It was from the 18th to the 20th of August that Napoleon was in the most lively expectation. Signals prepared on the most elevated points of the coast, were to inform him if the French fleet became visible upon the horizon. Attentive to every courier who arrived from Paris or from the ports, he every moment gave new orders for guarding against accidents that might have thwarted his designs. M. de Talleyrand having informed him that the preparations of Austria were daily becoming more significant and more threatening, and that a continental war was to be feared; but that, at the same time, Prussia, seduced by the brilliant temptation held out to her, that of Hanover, was ready to agree to an alliance with France, Napoleon, without taking an hour to deliberate, had summoned Duroc, and delivered him a letter for the king, and all the powers necessary for signing a treaty. "Set out directly," said he to him; "proceed to Berlin without passing by Paris, and determine the king of Prussia to sign a treaty of alliance with me. I give him Hanover, but on condition that it be decided immediately. The present that I make him is an ample equivalent. In a fortnight I will not make him the same offer. At present I require to be covered on the side of Austria while I embark. To obtain this service from the king of Prussia, I grant him a vast territory, which will add forty thousand men to his army. But if by and by I should be obliged to quit the sea-shore to return inland, my camps being broken up, and my projects against England being abandoned, I should have no need of any one to bring Austria to her senses, and I would not pay so dear for a service which would be useless to me."

Accordingly, Napoleon required that Prussia should immediately put troops in motion against Bohemia, and would not allow, moreover, that the treaty should be laden with conditions relating to Holland, Switzerland, and Italy. He ceded Hanover, and expected that Prussia would join him without any other condition.†

One can judge from a step of such gravity, and so promptly resolved upon, what paramount importance Napoleon at this moment attached to the free accomplishment of his projects. On the very day on which he gave instructions to Duroc, that is to say, on the 22nd of August, the courier who had been despatched from Ferrol as Villeneuve sailed thence, arrived at Boulogne. Napoleon

* I have confined myself to a correct analysis of the numerous notes which Napoleon and admiral Decrès daily exchanged, although they were within half a league of each other. One was at Pont de Briques, the other on the coast.

† This is the substance of the instructions given to the grand marshal Duroc.

immediately received at the little château of Pont de Briques, the despatch of Lauriston; while that of Villeneuve, addressed to Decrès, was delivered to Decrès, at the coast, in the hut in which he had taken up his quarters.

Napoleon, delighted with those words of Lauriston, *we are going to Brest*, had immediately dictated two letters for Villeneuve and Ganteaume. They are too worthy to be preserved in history to allow of our omitting their insertion here.

To Ganteaume he said:

"I have already made known to you by telegraph, that it is my desire that you do not allow Villeneuve to lose an hour, in order that, profiting by the superiority given to me by fifty ships of the line, you instantly put to sea and proceed to your destination, by making sail for the Channel with all your forces. I reckon upon your firmness, your talents, and your character, under circumstances so important. Set out and come hither. We will take vengeance for six centuries of insults and disgrace. Never have my soldiers and sailors exposed their lives for a grander object." (From the Imperial Camp of Boulogne, 22nd of August, 1805.)

To Villeneuve he wrote:

"I hope, vice-admiral Villeneuve, that you are arrived at Brest. Set out, lose not a moment, bring my united squadrons into the Channel, and ENGLAND IS OURS! We are all ready, every thing is embarked. Be here but for twenty-four hours, and all is ended." (Imperial Camp of Boulogne, 22nd of August.)

But while Napoleon, misled by the despatch of Lauriston, addressed these burning words to the two admirals; Decrès, by the same courier, had received a widely different despatch, which left but little hope of Villeneuve steering for Brest. He hastened to wait upon the Emperor, and to make known to him the melancholy moral condition in which Villeneuve had quitted Ferrol.

On hearing this contradictory intelligence, Napoleon was thrown into a fury. The first bursts of his anger fell upon admiral Decrès, who had given him such a man to command his fleet. He inveighed all the more violently against that minister, because he attributed to him, besides his choice of Villeneuve, opinions analogous to those which had deprived that unfortunate admiral of all courage. He reproached him alike with the weakness of his friend, and with decrying the French navy, which had carried despair into the hearts of all the fleet. He complained of not being seconded in his grand designs, and of being able to find only men who, in order to spare their persons or their reputations, did not even know how to lose a battle, when nothing more, after all, was required of them but the courage to fight it and lose it. "Your Villeneuve," said he to Decrès, "is not even fit to command a frigate. What can be said of a man who, on account of a few sailors falling sick on board a couple of vessels of his squadron, for a broken bowsprit or a split sail, or for a report of a

junction between Nelson and Calder, loses his self-possession, and renounces his plans? They would have been at the very entry of Ferrol, ready to pounce upon the French, and not upon the open sea! All this is so simple, that it must strike the eyes of every one who is not blinded by fear!"*

Napoleon even went so far as to call Villeneuve a coward and even a traitor, and directed orders to be instantly drawn up for bringing him by force from Cadiz into the Channel, if he were gone to Cadiz; and, in case of his having made sail for Brest, for giving the command of the two united squadrons to Ganteaume. The minister of marine, who had not yet ventured to give his entire opinion upon the assemblage of the fleets in the midst of the Channel, and who, under existing circumstances, considered that assemblage to be horribly dangerous, since the English, on their guard, were concentrated between Ferrol, Brest, and Portsmouth, supplicated the Emperor not to issue so fatal an order; urged that the season was too far advanced; that the English were too much upon their guard; and that, should he persist, some horrible catastrophe would take place before Brest. To all such objections Napoleon had but one reply, that fifty sail would be assembled at Brest, should Villeneuve present himself there, that the English would never have that number, that, at all events, one of the two fleets being lost, would be of no consequence to him, provided that the other, being liberated, could enter the Channel and keep the command of it for twenty-four hours.

Decrès, overwhelmed by the sternness of the Emperor, determined to write to him what he could not venture to say verbally.

"4th Fructidor, Year XIII. (22nd of August).

"On my knees I supplicated your Majesty not to associate the Spanish vessels in the operations of your squadron. Far from conceding this point, your Majesty required that this combined fleet should be increased by the vessels of Cadiz and those of Carthagena.

"With such an addition, you willed that a thing should be undertaken, difficult in itself, and rendered still more so by the elements composing the force, by the inexperience of the leaders, their want of the habit of commanding, and other circumstances with which your Majesty is as well acquainted as I am, and which, therefore, it is superfluous to recapitulate.

"In such a state of things, when your Majesty allows my reasoning and my experience to go for nothing, I know of no

* These scenes, of which there are now no living witnesses, would have been lost to history, but for the private and autograph letters of admiral Decrès and the Emperor. They are evidence of the stormy emotions of those memorable days. There are a great number of them for the same day, though the Emperor and Decrès were within half a league of each other.

situation more painful than mine. I beg that your Majesty will take it into your consideration, that I have no interest but that of your flag and the honour of your arms; and if the squadron is at Cadiz, I supplicate you to consider that as a decree of Providence, which reserves it for other operations. I entreat you not to compel it to come from Cadiz into the Channel, for the attempt at this moment cannot be unproductive of misfortunes. Above all, I entreat that this passage may not be ordered to be attempted with two months' provisions, for M. d'Estaing, I believe, has been seventy or eighty days, or perhaps more, in coming from Cadiz to Brest.

"If these entreaties which I address to your Majesty seem to you to be of no weight, you should judge of what passes in my heart. * * *

"It is especially at this moment, when I can still arrest the issuing of these fatal orders, that, in my opinion, it is my duty to your Majesty, most strongly to urge this. May I be more fortunate on this occasion than I have formerly been!

"But it is unfortunate for me to be acquainted with the naval profession, since that acquaintance obtains me no confidence, and produces no results upon the plans of your Majesty. In truth, sire, my situation becomes too painful. I reproach myself with being unable to prevail with your Majesty. I doubt if any one man can do so. Condescend, as regards naval affairs, to form yourself an admiralty-council, or whatever your Majesty may deem best; but for myself, I feel that instead of growing stronger, I grow weaker every day. And, to speak the whole truth, a minister of marine, subjugated by your Majesty in naval affairs, serves you badly, and becomes useless to your arms, if not actually injurious to them.

"It is in the bitterness of my soul, which in no wise diminishes either my devotion or my fidelity to your person, that I beg your Majesty to accept my profound respects.

(Signed) "DECRES."

The Emperor, angry and yet touched, replied to him on the instant from Pont de Briques.

"I beg you will send me in the course of the day a memorial upon this question:—As matters stand, if Villeneuve remain at Cadiz, what is he to do? Raise yourself to the height of the circumstances, and of the situation in which France and England are placed; do not write me another letter such as that which you have written, all that says nothing. For my part I have but one want—to succeed." (22nd of August, Depôt of the Louvre.)

On the following day, the 23rd, Decrès submitted his plan to the Emperor. It was, in the first place, to adjourn the expedition till the winter, for it was too late to bring the fleet from Cadiz into the channel. They would be obliged to execute the enterprise in the midst of the equinoctial gales. Moreover, the Eng-

lish were warned. Every one had at length perceived the project of a junction between Boulogne and Brest. According to Decrès' opinion, it would be necessary to divide the squadrons, which were too large, into seven or eight squadrons, of five or six sail each. What Lallemand was at this very time doing, was the proof of what might be expected from these detached squadrons. They should be composed of the best officers and of the best ships, and sent out upon the ocean. They would drive the English to despair, by ruining their commerce, and form excellent sailors and naval commanders. Thence could be drawn the elements of a fleet for a grand ulterior project.

"That," said admiral Decrès, "is *the system of war which I would fain pursue.*

"If, finally, in the winter," added he, "you wish for a fleet in the Channel, there are means of bringing one. You will have at Cadiz forty sail. Assemble there an army of embarkation, and give to this project the appearance of an expedition against India or Jamaica. Then divide the squadron into two parts. Select, among the vessels, the swiftest sailers; among the officers, those who, for a year, have proved themselves the boldest and most skilful; go out secretly, with only twenty sail, taking care to leave the others to attract the attention of the English; then let these twenty sail round Ireland and Scotland, and thence into the Channel. Summon Villeneuve and Gravina to Paris, reanimate their courage, and to a certainty they will execute this manœuvre."

On reading this plan, Napoleon entirely gave up the idea of recalling the fleet immediately from Cadiz, if, indeed, it was there. With his own hand he thus endorsed this despatch: "*To form seven squadrons*, with the following destinations: *Africa, Surinam, St. Helena, the Cape, the Windward Islands, the United States, the coasts of Ireland and Scotland, and the mouth of the Thames.*"* Then he read and re-read the despatches of Villeneuve, of Lauriston, and of the consular agent, who for a long time had watched, through a glass, the progress of the French squadron, until all sight of it was lost from the heights of Ferrol. In those despatches he sought, as in the book of destiny, a reply to this question: "Is Villeneuve steering for Cadiz or for Brest?" The uncertainty in which these despatches left him, irritated him still more than would the certainty of the squadron having gone to Cadiz. In that state of agitation, and especially as Europe was situated, it would have been the greatest of all services to inform him how the case really stood, for the news from the frontier of Austria became more alarming every instant. The Austrians now scarcely aimed at concealment; the troops were assembling in considerable force upon the Adige, and threatened the Inn and Bavaria.

* I transcribe these details from the document itself.

Now, if he did not strike a crushing blow upon London, which would make all Europe tremble and draw back, it was necessary that he should make forced marches upon the Rhine, to prevent the outrage preparing for him, that of being on his frontiers before him. In this urgent necessity of knowing the truth, he wrote several letters to admiral Decrès, from Pont-de-Briques to the camp, to learn his personal opinion as to the probable determination of Villeneuve. Decrès, fearing to irritate the Emperor too much, and at the same time conscientiously averse from deceiving him, replied each time in an almost directly contradictory manner, now saying yes, and then no, and partaking of the anxiety of his master, but evidently inclining towards the opinion that Villeneuve had gone to Cadiz. In fact, he had, himself, no doubt of it. It was then that Napoleon, that he might not be taken wholly unprepared, was divided between two plans, and passed several days in one of those ambiguous situations which are so insupportable to characters of his stamp; ready, at once, to cross the sea or to throw himself upon the Continent; to make a descent upon England, or a military march towards Austria. It was an especial trait in his character, when action became necessary, instantly to control himself, suddenly to subdue those gusts of passion to which, for an instant, he had abandoned his better judgment, as if to be the more entirely master of it at the moment when he needed it. After numerous perplexities, on the day of the 23rd, he gave the necessary orders for a double hypothesis. "My resolution is fixed," he wrote to M. de Talleyrand. "My fleets were lost sight of from the heights of cape Ortegal, on the 14th of August. If they come into the Channel, there is time yet; I embark and I attempt the descent; I go to London, and there cut the knot of all coalitions. If, on the contrary, my admirals fail in conduct or in firmness, I raise my ocean camps, I enter Germany with two hundred thousand men, and I do not stop until I have *scored the game at Vienna*, taken Venice, and all that she still possesses of Italy from Austria, and driven the Bourbons from Italy. I will not allow the Austrians and the Russians to assemble; I will strike them down before they can form their junction. The Continent being pacified, I will return to the ocean, and work anew for a maritime peace." Then, with his profound and incomparable experience of war, with that unparalleled discernment of that which was of the most or the least consequence to hasten forward in the arrangements, he gave his first orders for the Continental war, without, as yet, deranging any thing of his maritime expedition, which was still in constant readiness, as all still remained on board or alongside the vessels. He commenced with Naples and Hanover, the two parts furthest removed from his will. He ordered that there should be added to the division which was being organised at

Pescara, under general Reynièr, several regiments of light cavalry, and some batteries of horse-artillery, in order to form moveable columns in that country of guerillas. He sent orders to general St. Cyr, at the first sign of hostility to call in this division of Reynièr, join it to the division he had brought from Taranto, and to throw himself upon Naples with twenty thousand men, so as to prevent the descent into Italy of the Russians from Corfu, and of the English from Malta.

He then commanded prince Eugène, who, though viceroy of Italy, was under the military direction of marshal Jourdan, to assemble on the instant all the French troops distributed between Genoa, Bologna, and Verona, to direct them upon the Adige, to purchase artillery horses all over Italy, and to get a hundred guns horsed immediately. As the French troops were formed in divisions, and kept upon a war footing, these arrangements were easy to make, and prompt of execution. He ordered the recruits from the depôts to be sent to them. He at the same time gave orders for baking large quantities of biscuit, for victualling the fortresses of Italy. Alexandria not being yet completed, he ordered that the citadel of Turin should serve as the magazine for Piedmont.

He made similar arrangements for Germany. On the same day, the 23rd, he despatched a courier for Bernadotte, who had succeeded general Mortier in the command of Hanover. He ordered him, under the pledge of the utmost secrecy, and without giving any outward sign of his new destination, to assemble at Göttingen, that is to say, at the extremity of that electorate, the greater part of his *corps d'armée;* to commence by despatching to that quarter the artillery and heavy baggage; to execute those movements so that they could not be clearly discerned for ten or twelve days, and, in order to procrastinate the doubt, to show himself in person at the opposite point, and, finally, to await further orders for putting himself in actual march. His idea was, if he should agree with Prussia, as he doubted not that he should, relatively to Hanover, to evacuate that kingdom, and to traverse, without permission, all the small states of central Germany, to carry into Bavaria the *corps d'armée* withdrawn from Hanover.

By the same courier he ordered general Marmont at the Texel, immediately to prepare his trains and *matériel*, so as to be able in three days to march with his *corps d'armée*, recommending him carefully to keep the secret, and to make no change in the embarkation of his troops until further orders. Finally, he made at Boulogne a first and only displacement of the troops under his own hand, that of the heavy cavalry and the dragoons. He had assembled far more cavalry than he really wanted, and, especially, far more than he could embark. He sent the cuirassiers of Nansouty a march to the rear, and assembled at St. Omer the foot and horse dragoons, under the command of Baraguay d'Hilliers.

To these he added a certain number of pieces of horse artillery, and instantly sent them on to Strasburg. He at the same time, ordered the assemblage at Alsace of all the heavy cavalry remaining in France, despatched the general-in-chief of artillery, Songis, to prepare a park of field-guns between Metz and Strasburg, and provided with funds for purchasing in Lorraine, in Switzerland, and in Alsace all the draught horses that could be procured. The same order was given for the infantry stationed near the eastern frontier. Five hundred thousand rations of biscuit were ordered at Strasburg. His numerous cavalry, accompanied by horse artillery, and supported by a species of infantry, that of the dragoons, might furnish a first support to the threatened Bavarians, who loudly demanded aid. Some regiments of infantry would speedily be ready to assist them. In fact, Bernadotte could reach Wurtzburg in ten or twelve marches. Thus, in a few days, without withdrawing any thing from his embarked forces, merely some divisions of heavy cavalry and dragoons, he was ready to support the Bavarians, upon whom Austria wished her first attack to fall.

These arrangements being made with the promptitude of a great character, he resumed a little tranquillity of mind, and resolved to await what the winds might bring him.

He was gloomy, absent, and harsh towards admiral Decrès, upon whose countenance he seemed to see imprinted all the opinions which had shaken Villeneuve, and he was incessantly upon the sea shore looking for some sudden arrival upon the horizon. Naval officers, stationed with their glasses upon the various points of the coast, were employed to observe all that was visible upon the sea, and to report to him. Thus he passed three days in that uncertainty which is the most intolerable to strong and ardent minds, which love decision and action. At length admiral Decrès, whom he continually questioned, declared to him that, in his opinion, seeing how long a time had passed, and the winds that had prevailed upon the coast, from the gulf of Gascony to the straits of Dover, and looking also at the moral condition of Villeneuve, he was persuaded that the fleets had sailed for Cadiz.

It was with deep grief, mingled with violent bursts of anger, that Napoleon at length gave up all hope of seeing his fleet arrive in the Straits. Such was his irritation, that a man for whom he entertained no ordinary friendship, the learned Monge, who almost every morning made a very military breakfast with him in the imperial hut on the sea shore, Monge, on seeing him in that disposition, discreetly retired, judging that his presence would be troublesome. He went to M. Daru, then principal secretary at war, and told him what he had seen. At the same instant M. Daru himself was called, and had to repair to the Emperor. He found him agitated, talking to himself, and not seeming to perceive the persons around him. Scarcely had M. Daru arrived,

and still stood silent and waiting for orders, when Napoleon went up to him, and addressing him as if he had been acquainted with every thing, said, "Do you know where Villeneuve is? He is at Cadiz!" Then he launched out into long and fierce invectives against the weakness and incapacity of all who surrounded him, said that he was betrayed by the cowardice of mankind, deplored the ruin of the most splendid, the most secure of all the plans he had ever conceived in his life, and displayed in all its bitterness the grief of genius abandoned by fortune. Suddenly mastering his agitation, he all at once calmed himself, and with a surprising facility recalling his mind from those closed ways of the ocean to the open roads of the Continent, he dictated, for several hours in succession, with an extraordinary precision and presence of mind, the plan which will be given in the following book. It was the plan of the immortal campaign of 1805. There was no longer the slightest trace of irritation either in his voice or in his countenance.*

The grand conceptions of genius had dissipated the griefs of his soul. Instead of attacking England directly, he was about to combat her by the long and sinuous route of the Continent, and he was about to find upon that route an incomparable grandeur previous to finding his ruin there.

Would he more surely have attained his end by the direct road, in other words, by the descent? That is a question which will often be asked both in our days and by future generations, and which it is not easy to solve. However, supposing Napoleon to have once effected a landing at Dover, we do not affront the English nation in believing that it would have been vanquished by the army and by the captain who, in eighteen months, conquered and subjected Austria, Germany, Prussia, and Russia. Not a man was added to that ocean army which at Austerlitz, at Jena, and at Friedland, beat the eight hundred thousand soldiers of the Continent. It must be added, too, that the territorial inviolability so long enjoyed by England, has not familiarised her with the danger of invasion, nor tested her means and courage to repel it; a circumstance which by no means diminishes the glory of her fleets and regular armies. It is therefore very improbable that she would have successfully withstood the soldiers of Napoleon, not yet exhausted by fatigue, and not yet decimated by war. An heroic resolution of her government, taking refuge, for instance, in Scotland, and leaving England to be ravaged until Nelson, with the English squadrons, could come and cut off all retreat from Napoleon, such a resolution, exposing Napoleon, the conqueror, to be made a prisoner in his own proper conquest, would, doubtless have brought about some singular conjunctures; but it

* I extract this account from a fragment of memoirs written by M. Daru: a copy of which is now in my possession, thanks to the kindness of his son.

it is beyond all probability to suppose, that it would have been adopted. We are firmly persuaded that had Napoleon reached London, England would have treated.

All the difficulty lay in the crossing of the Straits. Although the flotilla could pass in a summer calm, or in the fogs of winter, the passage was full of danger. Accordingly, Napoleon had planned the co-operation of a fleet to cover the expedition. But then it may be urged, the difficulty was, after all, coincident with the original one, that of being superior to the English on the sea. By no means. The point in question was, not to be superior, or even equal to them. All that he proposed was, by an able plan to bring a fleet into the Channel, by taking advantage of the chances of the sea, its immensity rendering encounters on it so uncertain. The plan of Napoleon, so often modified, and reproduced with so much fecundity, had every chance of success, in the hands of a firmer man than Villeneuve. Doubtless, Napoleon experienced here, under another form, the disadvantages of his naval inferiority. Villeneuve, keenly alive to that inferiority, became discouraged; but he was too much discouraged, and in a manner to affect his honour in the eyes of posterity. After all, his fleet fought well at Ferrol; and if we suppose that he had fought before Brest the disastrous battle which he shortly afterwards lost at Trafalgar, Ganteaume would have run out; and as for losing that battle, would it not have been well lost, in order to secure the passage of the Channel? Nay, under such circumstances, could it be said to be lost? Villeneuve, then, acted wrongly, although he has been too much decried, as is usually the case with those who are unfortunate. A practical seaman, and unmindful, that by dint of energy and resolute courage, one can often supply what is deficient in *matériel*, he knew not how to elevate himself to the height of his mission, and attempt that which, in his situation, Latouche Tréville would assuredly have accomplished.

The enterprise of Napoleon, then, was no chimera; it was perfectly possible, as he had prepared it; and, perhaps, in the eyes of discerning judges, this unfinished enterprise will do him more honour than those which have been crowned with the most brilliant success. Neither was it a mere feint, as it has been supposed to be by some people, who discover depths where there are none: some thousands of letters of the ministers and the Emperor, put an end to all doubt on that point. It was a serious enterprise, followed up and matured for several years, with aereal passion. It has also often been asserted, that if Napoleon had not rejected Fulton's offer of steam navigation, he would have crossed the Straits. It is not possible, even now, to predict what part steam navigation will play in future warfare. That it will add to the strength of France against England is very probable. Whether it will, or not, render the Straits more easy to be crossed, will solely depend upon the efforts which France shall see fit to make

for securing a superiority in the employment of this wholly new power; that will depend upon her patriotism and her foresight. But with respect to the refusal of Napoleon, it may be affirmed that Fulton proposed to him an art in its infancy, and which at that moment would have rendered him no aid. Napoleon, then, did all that he could do. On this occasion there was not the shadow of a fault to reproach him with. It was, doubtless, the will of Providence that he should not succeed. Yet why? He who was not always in the right against his enemies, had, in this instance, the right upon his side.

END OF VOLUME THE FIFTH.

C. WHITING, BEAUFORT HOUSE, STRAND.

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